draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-10.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-11.txt 
SIDR G. Huston SIDR G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans
Expires: December 19, 2008 APNIC Expires: February 2, 2009 APNIC
June 17, 2008 August 1, 2008
A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-10.txt draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-11.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 19, 2008. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 2, 2009.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use" the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use"
of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System
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4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 14 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template
Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 18 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 18
5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 19 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 19
5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate
Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 21 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 22
6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 28 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 28
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 31 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 31
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers. use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers.
Such certificates are termed here "Resource Certificates." Resource Such certificates are termed here "Resource Certificates." Resource
Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile
[RFC3280], and also conform to the constraints specified in this [RFC5280], and also conform to the constraints specified in this
profile. Resource Certificates attest that the issuer has granted profile. Resource Certificates attest that the issuer has granted
the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of IP addresses and the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of IP addresses and
Autonomous System numbers. Autonomous System numbers.
A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer
that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject
of the issued certificate. The binding is identified by the of the issued certificate. The binding is identified by the
association of the subject's private key with the subject's public association of the subject's private key with the subject's public
key contained in the Resource Certificate, as signed by the private key contained in the Resource Certificate, as signed by the private
key of the certificate's issuer. key of the certificate's issuer.
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This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource
Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid.
Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to
this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet
Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing
Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines" Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines"
[RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management
policy documents. policy documents.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
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certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certificate certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certificate
authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource
extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's
issued certificate to the certificate being validated form a sequence issued certificate to the certificate being validated form a sequence
of encompassing relationships in terms of the resources described in of encompassing relationships in terms of the resources described in
the resource extension. the resource extension.
3. Resource Certificate Fields 3. Resource Certificate Fields
A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate, A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate,
consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields
listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL,
all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST
NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value
is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource
Certificates. Certificates.
3.1. Version 3.1. Version
Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field
MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this
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3.3. Signature Algorithm 3.3. Signature Algorithm
This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on
this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with
RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055]. OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055].
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the Certiciate Authority and relying parties, indicating that both the Certificate Authority and relying parties, indicating that
care should be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key care should be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key
size. size.
3.4. Issuer 3.4. Issuer
This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.
If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of
the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the
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In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and
each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using
a subject name that is unique per issuer. a subject name that is unique per issuer.
This field MUST be non-empty. This field MUST be non-empty.
3.6. Valid From 3.6. Valid From
The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this
profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of
certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280],
Certification Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST Certification Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST
always encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year always encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year
2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as
GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC3280]. GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC5280].
In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior
certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information
that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time
other than the current time. other than the current time.
3.7. Valid To 3.7. Valid To
The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the
certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime
of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the
issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], CAs issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280], CAs
conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's
"Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050
or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats
are defined in [RFC3280]. are defined in [RFC5280].
In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior
certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information
that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time
other than the current time. other than the current time.
CAs are typically advised against issuing a certificate with a CAs are typically advised against issuing a certificate with a
validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's
certificate that will be used to validate the issued certificate. certificate that will be used to validate the issued certificate.
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issued certificates, and that their immediate subordinate certificate issued certificates, and that their immediate subordinate certificate
authorities also use a key size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate authorities also use a key size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate
certificates MAY use a key size of 1024 bits. certificates MAY use a key size of 1024 bits.
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken
when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields
As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC5280], each extension in a certificate
is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate- is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate-
using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical
extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension
MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC3280]. MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC5280].
The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming
Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise. Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise.
3.9.1. Basic Constraints 3.9.1. Basic Constraints
The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the
certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification
paths that include this certificate. paths that include this certificate.
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certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all
Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical. Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical.
The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in
the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of
immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the
subject of this certificate). subject of this certificate).
The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as
described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC3280]. described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280].
3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier
The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by identifying certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key,
providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate by providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate
path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource
Certificates. The keyIdentifier sub field MUST be present in all Certificates. The keyIdentifier sub field MUST be present in all
Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self- Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self-
signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and
authorityCertSerialNumber sub fields MUST NOT be present. This authorityCertSerialNumber sub fields MUST NOT be present. This
extension is non-critical. extension is non-critical.
The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as
described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280].
3.9.4. Key Usage 3.9.4. Key Usage
This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical
extension, and it MUST be present. extension, and it MUST be present.
In certificates issued to Certicate Authorities only the keyCertSign In certificates issued to Certificate Authorities only the
and CRLSign bits are set to TRUE and MUST be the only bits set to keyCertSign and CRLSign bits are set to TRUE and MUST be the only
TRUE. bits set to TRUE.
In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and In end-entity certificates the digitalSignature bit MUST be set and
MUST be the only bit set to TRUE. MUST be the only bit set to TRUE.
3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points
This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s)
associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile
uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access
mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references
a single inclusive CRL for each issuer. a single inclusive CRL for each issuer.
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"self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted. "self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted.
3.9.6. Authority Information Access 3.9.6. Authority Information Access
This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the
certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA, certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA,
where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a
single reference object to publication location of the immediate single reference object to publication location of the immediate
superior certificate MUST be used, except in the case where a CA superior certificate MUST be used, except in the case where a CA
distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed" distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed"
certificate, the authority key identifier SHOULD be omitted. certificate, the AIA field SHOULD be omitted.
This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred
URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified
with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST
reference the point of publication of the certificate where this reference the point of publication of the certificate where this
issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate). issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate).
Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be
included in the value sequence of this extension. included in the value sequence of this extension.
When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate
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id-ad-signedObjectRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 } id-ad-signedObjectRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 }
When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes a single object When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes a single object
signed with the matching private key, the location where this signed signed with the matching private key, the location where this signed
object is published is referenced the id-ad-signedObject OID. object is published is referenced the id-ad-signedObject OID.
id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 } id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 }
This profile requires the use of repository publication manifests This profile requires the use of repository publication manifests
[ID.SIDR-MANIFESTS] to list all signed objects that are deposited in [ID.SIDR-MANIFESTS] to list all signed objects that are deposited in
the repository publication point assocaited with a CA or an EE. The the repository publication point associated with a CA or an EE. The
publication point of the manifest for a CA or EE is placed in the SIA publication point of the manifest for a CA or EE is placed in the SIA
extension of the CA or EE certificate. This profile uses a URI form extension of the CA or EE certificate. This profile uses a URI form
of manifest identification for the accessLocation. The preferred URI of manifest identification for the accessLocation. The preferred URI
access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified. access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified.
Other accessDescription fields may exist with this id-ad-Manifest Other accessDescription fields may exist with this id-ad-Manifest
accessMethod, where the accessLocation value indicates alternate URI accessMethod, where the accessLocation value indicates alternate URI
access mechanisms for the same manifest object. access mechanisms for the same manifest object.
id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 } id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 }
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When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying multiple When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying multiple
objects, EE certificate MUST include in the SIA an access method OID objects, EE certificate MUST include in the SIA an access method OID
of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the associated access location refers to of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the associated access location refers to
the publication point of the objects that are verified using this EE the publication point of the objects that are verified using this EE
certificate. certificate.
When an EE certificate is used to sign a single object, the EE When an EE certificate is used to sign a single object, the EE
certificate MUST include in the SIA an access method OID of id-ad- certificate MUST include in the SIA an access method OID of id-ad-
signedObject, where the associated access location refers to the signedObject, where the associated access location refers to the
publication point of the single object that is verified using this EE publication point of the single object that is verified using this EE
certificate. certificate. In this case, the SIA MUST NOT include the access
method OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest.
3.9.8. Certificate Policies 3.9.8. Certificate Policies
This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using
the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field
MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource
Certificates. Certificates.
PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile. PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile.
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or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported
in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST
include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both
extensions. extensions.
This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.
4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile
Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL),
consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect consistent with [RFC5280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect
CRLs are supported in this profile. CRLs are supported in this profile.
An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one
regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's
validity period. validity period.
This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs.
The scope of the CRL MUST be "all certificates issued by this CA The scope of the CRL MUST be "all certificates issued by this CA
using a given key pair". The contents of the CRL are a list of all using a given key pair". The contents of the CRL are a list of all
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The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The
following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be
present in a CRL. present in a CRL.
4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier
The authority key identifier extension provides a means of The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier
method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section
4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280].
This extension is non-critical. This extension is non-critical.
4.7.2. CRL Number 4.7.2. CRL Number
The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence
number of positive integers for a given CA and scope. This extension number of positive integers for a given CA and scope. This extension
allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes
another CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs another CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs
issued by the CA with the same scope. issued by the CA with the same scope.
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profile. profile.
With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the
SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any
requested field. requested field.
6. Resource Certificate Validation 6. Resource Certificate Validation
This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure.
This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of
[RFC3280]: [RFC5280]:
To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n
certificates) satisfies the following conditions: certificates) satisfies the following conditions:
1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the
issuer of certificate x+1; issuer of certificate x+1;
2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor;
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means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator.
Some further heuristics may be required to halt the certificate path Some further heuristics may be required to halt the certificate path
validation process in order to avoid some of the issues associated validation process in order to avoid some of the issues associated
with attempts to validate such structures. It is suggested that with attempts to validate such structures. It is suggested that
implementations of Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a implementations of Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a
validation failure if the certificate path length exceeds a pre- validation failure if the certificate path length exceeds a pre-
determined configuration parameter. determined configuration parameter.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC3280] and [RFC3779]apply to The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] and [RFC3779]apply to
Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use. Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use.
A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms
of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in
the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same
resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the
status of resource allocations and assignments then the information status of resource allocations and assignments then the information
conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the
allocation and assignment databases. allocation and assignment databases.
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The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from
Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo
Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of
this document. The document also reflects review comments received this document. The document also reflects review comments received
from Sean Turner. from Sean Turner.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[ID.SIDR-MANIFESTS]
Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
Work in progress: Internet
Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests-00.txt,
January 2008.
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981. September 1981.
[RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and [RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and
J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES", J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES",
BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996. BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
June 2005. June 2005.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
September 2005. September 2005.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006. Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[ID.SIDR-MANIFESTS]
Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
Work in progress: Internet
Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests-00.txt,
January 2008.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
November 2000. November 2000.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
November 2000. November 2000.
[RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. [RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R.
Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
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