draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-21.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-22.txt 
SIDR G. Huston SIDR G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans
Expires: June 6, 2011 APNIC Expires: November 7, 2011 APNIC
December 3, 2010 May 6, 2011
A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-21 draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-22
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use" the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use"
of Resources (INRs). The certificates issued under this profile are of Internet Number Resources (INRs). The certificates issued under
used to convey the Issuer's authorisation of the Subject to be this profile are used to convey the Issuer's authorisation of the
regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-use" of the INRs that Subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-use" of
are described in the certificate. This document contains the the INRs that are described in the certificate. This document
normative specification of Certificate and Certificate Revocation contains the normative specification of Certificate and Certificate
List (CRL) syntax in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). Revocation List (CRL) syntax in the Resource Public Key
The document also specifies profiles for the format of certificate Infrastructure (RPKI). The document also specifies profiles for the
requests. The document also specifies the Relying Party RPKI format of certificate requests. The document also specifies the
certificate path validation procedure. Relying Party RPKI certificate path validation procedure.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 6, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 7, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
skipping to change at page 2, line 25 skipping to change at page 2, line 25
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. End-Entity (EE) Certificates and Signing Functions in the 3. End-Entity (EE) Certificates and Signing Functions in the
RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.6. Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.6.1. notBefore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.6.2. notAfter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.9. Resource Certificate Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.7. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.8. Resource Certificate Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.8.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.8.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.8.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.9.5. Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.8.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.9.6. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.8.5. Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.9.7. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.8.6. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.9.8. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.8.7. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.9.9. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.8.8. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.8.9. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.8.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.8.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Resource Certificate Revocation Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. Resource Certificate Revocation Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Resource Certificate Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Resource Certificate Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template 6.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template
Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 15 6.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 15
6.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 16 6.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 16
6.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate 6.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate
Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.1. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2. Resource Certification Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.2. Resource Certification Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8. Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9. Operational Considerations for Profile Agility . . . . . . . . 22
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates
[X.509] for use in the context of certification of Internet Number [X.509] for use in the context of certification of Internet Number
Resources (INRs), i.e., IP Addresses and Autonomous System (AS) Resources (INRs), i.e., IP Addresses and Autonomous System (AS)
Numbers. Such certificates are termed "Resource Certificates". A Numbers. Such certificates are termed "Resource Certificates". A
Resource Certificate is a certificate that conforms to the PKIX Resource Certificate is a certificate that conforms to the PKIX
profile [RFC5280], and that conforms to the constraints specified in profile [RFC5280], and that conforms to the constraints specified in
this profile. A Resource Certificate attests that the Issuer has this profile. A Resource Certificate attests that the Issuer has
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certificate subject's key to the INRs enumerated in the certificate. certificate subject's key to the INRs enumerated in the certificate.
One or two critical extensions, the IP Address Delegation or AS One or two critical extensions, the IP Address Delegation or AS
Identifier Delegation Extensions [RFC3779], enumerate the INRs that Identifier Delegation Extensions [RFC3779], enumerate the INRs that
were allocated or assigned by the Issuer to the Subject. were allocated or assigned by the Issuer to the Subject.
RP validation of a Resource Certificate is performed in the manner RP validation of a Resource Certificate is performed in the manner
specified in Section 7.1. This validation procedure differs from specified in Section 7.1. This validation procedure differs from
that described in section 6 of [RFC5280], such that: that described in section 6 of [RFC5280], such that:
o additional validation processing imposed by the INR extensions is o additional validation processing imposed by the INR extensions is
required, required,
o a conformation of a public key match between the CRL issuer and o a confirmation of a public key match between the CRL issuer and
the Resource Certificate issuer is required, and the Resource Certificate issuer is required, and
o the Resource Certificate is required to conform to this profile. o the Resource Certificate is required to conform to this profile.
This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource
Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid.
Any extensions not explicitly mentioned MUST be absent. The same Any extensions not explicitly mentioned MUST be absent. The same
applies to the CRLs used in the RPKI, that are also profiled in this applies to the CRLs used in the RPKI, that are also profiled in this
document. A CA conforming to the RPKI CP MUST issue certificates and document. A CA conforming to the RPKI CP MUST issue certificates and
CRLs consistent with this profile. CRLs consistent with this profile.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], and "X.509 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], and "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779]. Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Describing Resources in Certificates 2. Describing Resources in Certificates
The framework for describing an association between the Subject of a The framework for describing an association between the Subject of a
certificate and the INRs currently under the Subject's control is certificate and the INRs currently under the Subject's control is
described in [RFC3779]. This profile further requires that: described in [RFC3779]. This profile further requires that:
o Every Resource Certificate MUST contain either the IP Address o Every Resource Certificate MUST contain either the IP Address
Delegation or the Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Delegation or the Autonomous System Identifier Delegation
extension, or both. extension, or both.
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The algorithm used in this profile is specified in The algorithm used in this profile is specified in
[ID.sidr-rpki-algs]. [ID.sidr-rpki-algs].
4.4. Issuer 4.4. Issuer
The value of this field is a valid X.501 distinguished name. The value of this field is a valid X.501 distinguished name.
An Issuer name MUST contain one instance of the Common Name attribute An Issuer name MUST contain one instance of the Common Name attribute
and MAY contain one instance of the Serial Number attribute. If both and MAY contain one instance of the Serial Number attribute. If both
attributes are present, it is RECOMMENDED that they appear as a set. attributes are present, it is RECOMMENDED that they appear as a set.
The Common Name attribute MUST be encoded as a printable string. The Common Name attribute MUST be encoded using the ASN.1 type
Issuer names are not intended to be descriptive of the identity of PrintableString [X.680]. Issuer names are not intended to be
Issuer. descriptive of the identity of Issuer.
The RPKI does not rely on Issuer names being globally unique, for The RPKI does not rely on Issuer names being globally unique, for
reasons of security. However, it is RECOMMENDED that Issuer names be reasons of security. However, it is RECOMMENDED that Issuer names be
generated in a fashion that minimizes the likelihood of collisions. generated in a fashion that minimizes the likelihood of collisions.
See Section 8 for (non-normative) suggested name generation See Section 8 for (non-normative) suggested name generation
mechanisms that fulfill this recommendation. mechanisms that fulfill this recommendation.
4.5. Subject 4.5. Subject
The value of this field is a valid X.501 distinguished name, and is The value of this field is a valid X.501 distinguished name
subject to the same constraints as the Issuer name. [RFC4514], and is subject to the same constraints as the Issuer name.
In the RPKI the Subject name is determined by the Issuer, not In the RPKI the Subject name is determined by the Issuer, not
proposed by the subject [ID.sidr-repos-struct]. Each distinct proposed by the subject [ID.sidr-repos-struct]. Each distinct
subordinate CA and EE certified by the Issuer MUST be identified subordinate CA and EE certified by the Issuer MUST be identified
using a Subject name that is unique per Issuer. In this context using a Subject name that is unique per Issuer. In this context
"distinct" is defined as an entity and a given public key. An Issuer "distinct" is defined as an entity and a given public key. An Issuer
SHOULD use a different Subject name if the Subject's key pair has SHOULD use a different Subject name if the Subject's key pair has
changed (i.e., when the CA issues a certificate as part of re-keying changed (i.e., when the CA issues a certificate as part of re-keying
the Subject.) Subject names are not intended to be descriptive of the Subject.) Subject names are not intended to be descriptive of
the identity of Subject. the identity of Subject.
4.6. Valid From 4.6. Validity
The "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of The certificate validity period is represented as a SEQUENCE of two
dates: the date on which the certificate validity period begins
(notBefore) and the date on which the certificate validity period
ends (notAfter).
While a CA is typically advised against issuing a certificate with a
validity period that spans a greater period of time than the validity
period of the CA's certificate that will be used to validate the
issued certificate, in the context of this profile, a CA MAY have
valid grounds to issue a subordinate certificate with a validity
period that exceeds the validity period of the CA's certificate.
4.6.1. notBefore
The "notBefore" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of
certificate generation. certificate generation.
In the RPKI it is valid for a certificate to have a value for this In the RPKI it is valid for a certificate to have a value for this
field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior
certificate. Relying Parties SHOULD NOT attempt to infer from this certificate. Relying Parties SHOULD NOT attempt to infer from this
time information that a certificate was valid at a time in the past, time information that a certificate was valid at a time in the past,
or will be valid at a time in the future, as the scope of an RP's or will be valid at a time in the future, as the scope of an RP's
test of validity of a certificate refers specifically to validity at test of validity of a certificate refers specifically to validity at
the current time. the current time.
4.7. Valid To 4.6.2. notAfter
The Valid To time represents the anticipated lifetime of the current The "notAfter" time represents the anticipated lifetime of the
resource allocation or assignment arrangement between the Issuer and current resource allocation or assignment arrangement between the
the Subject. Issuer and the Subject.
It is valid for a certificate to have a value for this field that It is valid for a certificate to have a value for this field that
post-dates the same field value in any superior certificate. The post-dates the same field value in any superior certificate. The
same caveats apply to RP's assumptions relating to the certificate's same caveats apply to RP's assumptions relating to the certificate's
validity at any time other than the current time. validity at any time other than the current time.
While a CA is typically advised against issuing a certificate with a 4.7. Subject Public Key Info
validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's
certificate that will be used to validate the issued certificate, in
the context of this profile, a CA MAY have valid grounds to issue a
certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity
interval of its certificate.
4.8. Subject Public Key Info
The algorithm used in this profile is specified in The algorithm used in this profile is specified in
[ID.sidr-rpki-algs]. [ID.sidr-rpki-algs].
4.9. Resource Certificate Extensions 4.8. Resource Certificate Extensions
The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming
Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise. Each Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise. Each
extension in a resource certificate is designated as either critical extension in a resource certificate is designated as either critical
or non-critical. A certificate-using system MUST reject the or non-critical. A certificate-using system MUST reject the
certificate if it encounters a critical extension it does not certificate if it encounters a critical extension it does not
recognise; however, a non-critical extension MAY be ignored if it is recognise; however, a non-critical extension MAY be ignored if it is
not recognised [RFC5280]. not recognised [RFC5280].
4.9.1. Basic Constraints 4.8.1. Basic Constraints
The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the
Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present when the Subject is Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present when the Subject is
a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise. a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise.
The Issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. The Issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set.
The Path Length Constraint is not specified for RPKI certificates, The Path Length Constraint is not specified for RPKI certificates,
and MUST NOT be present. and MUST NOT be present.
4.9.2. Subject Key Identifier 4.8.2. Subject Key Identifier
This extension MUST appear in all Resource Certificates. This This extension MUST appear in all Resource Certificates. This
extension is non-critical. extension is non-critical.
The Key Identifier used for resource certificates is the 160-bit The Key Identifier used for resource certificates is the 160-bit
SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the
Subject Public Key, as described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280]. Subject Public Key, as described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280].
4.9.3. Authority Key Identifier 4.8.3. Authority Key Identifier
This extension MUST appear in all Resource Certificates, with the This extension MUST appear in all Resource Certificates, with the
exception of a CA who issues a "self-signed" certificate. In a self- exception of a CA who issues a "self-signed" certificate. In a self-
signed certificate, a CA MAY include this extension, and set it equal signed certificate, a CA MAY include this extension, and set it equal
to the Subject Key Identifier. The authorityCertIssuer and to the Subject Key Identifier. The authorityCertIssuer and
authorityCertSerialNumber fields MUST NOT be present. This extension authorityCertSerialNumber fields MUST NOT be present. This extension
is non-critical. is non-critical.
The Key Identifier used for resource certificates is the 160-bit The Key Identifier used for resource certificates is the 160-bit
SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the
Issuer's public key, as described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280]. Issuer's public key, as described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280].
4.9.4. Key Usage 4.8.4. Key Usage
This extension is a critical extension and MUST be present. This extension is a critical extension and MUST be present.
In certificates issued to Certification Authorities only the In certificates issued to Certification Authorities only the
keyCertSign and CRLSign bits are set to TRUE, and these MUST be the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits are set to TRUE, and these MUST be the
only bits set to TRUE. only bits set to TRUE.
In EE certificates the digitalSignature bit MUST be set to TRUE and In EE certificates the digitalSignature bit MUST be set to TRUE and
MUST be the only bit set to TRUE. MUST be the only bit set to TRUE.
4.9.5. Extended Key Usage 4.8.5. Extended Key Usage
The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension MUST NOT appear in any CA The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension MUST NOT appear in any CA
certificate in the RPKI. This extension also MUST NOT appear in EE certificate in the RPKI. This extension also MUST NOT appear in EE
certificates used to verify RPKI objects (e.g., ROAs or manifests. certificates used to verify RPKI objects (e.g., ROAs or manifests.
The extension MUST NOT be marked critical. The extension MUST NOT be marked critical.
The EKU extension MAY appear in EE certificates issued to routers or The EKU extension MAY appear in EE certificates issued to routers or
other devices. Permitted values for the EKU OIDs will be specified other devices. Permitted values for the EKU OIDs will be specified
in Standards Track RFCs issued by other IETF working groups that in Standards Track RFCs issued by other IETF working groups that
adopt the RPKI profile and that identify application-specific adopt the RPKI profile and that identify application-specific
requirements that motivate the use of such EKUs. requirements that motivate the use of such EKUs.
4.9.6. CRL Distribution Points 4.8.6. CRL Distribution Points
This extension MUST be present, except in "self-signed" certificates, This extension MUST be present, except in "self-signed" certificates,
and it is non-critical. In a self-signed certificate this extension and it is non-critical. In a self-signed certificate this extension
MUST be omitted. MUST be omitted.
In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all
certificates issued by this CA Issuer. certificates issued by this CA Issuer.
The CRL Distribution Points (CRLDP) extension identifies the The CRL Distribution Points (CRLDP) extension identifies the
location(s) of the CRL(s) associated with certificates issued by this location(s) of the CRL(s) associated with certificates issued by this
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contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The form of the generalName MUST contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The form of the generalName MUST
be of type URI. be of type URI.
The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single
DistributionPoint. The DistributionPoint MAY contain more than one DistributionPoint. The DistributionPoint MAY contain more than one
URI value. An RSYNC URI [RFC5781] MUST be present in the URI value. An RSYNC URI [RFC5781] MUST be present in the
DistributionPoint, and reference the most recent instance of this DistributionPoint, and reference the most recent instance of this
Issuer's CRL. Other access form URIs MAY be used in addition to the Issuer's CRL. Other access form URIs MAY be used in addition to the
RSYNC URI, representing alternate access mechanisms for this CRL. RSYNC URI, representing alternate access mechanisms for this CRL.
4.9.7. Authority Information Access 4.8.7. Authority Information Access
In the context of the RPKI, this extension identifies the publication In the context of the RPKI, this extension identifies the publication
point of the certificate of the issuer of the certificate in which point of the certificate of the issuer of the certificate in which
the extension appears. In this profile a single reference to the the extension appears. In this profile a single reference to the
publication point of the immediate superior certificate MUST be publication point of the immediate superior certificate MUST be
present, except for a "self-signed" certificate, in which case the present, except for a "self-signed" certificate, in which case the
extension MUST be omitted. This extension is non-critical. extension MUST be omitted. This extension is non-critical.
This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred
URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI [RFC5781] MUST be URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI [RFC5781] MUST be
skipping to change at page 11, line 5 skipping to change at page 11, line 13
included in the value sequence of this extension. included in the value sequence of this extension.
A CA MUST use a persistent URL name scheme for CA certificates that A CA MUST use a persistent URL name scheme for CA certificates that
it issues [ID.sidr-repos-struct]. This implies that a re-issued it issues [ID.sidr-repos-struct]. This implies that a re-issued
certificate overwrites a previously issued certificate (to the same certificate overwrites a previously issued certificate (to the same
Subject) in the publication repository. In this way certificates Subject) in the publication repository. In this way certificates
subordinate to the re-issued (CA) certificate can maintain a constant subordinate to the re-issued (CA) certificate can maintain a constant
Authority Information Access (AIA) extension pointer and thus need Authority Information Access (AIA) extension pointer and thus need
not be re-issued when the parent certificate is re-issued. not be re-issued when the parent certificate is re-issued.
4.9.8. Subject Information Access 4.8.8. Subject Information Access
In the context of the RPKI, this extension (SIA) identifies the In the context of the RPKI, this extension (SIA) identifies the
publication point of products signed by the Subject of the publication point of products signed by the Subject of the
certificate. certificate.
4.9.8.1. SIA for CA Certificates 4.8.8.1. SIA for CA Certificates
This extension MUST be present, and is non-critical. This extension MUST be present, and is non-critical.
This extension MUST have an instance of an accessMethod of id-ad- This extension MUST have an instance of an accessMethod of id-ad-
caRepository, with an accessLocation form of a URI that MUST specify caRepository, with an accessLocation form of a URI that MUST specify
an RSYNC URI [RFC5781]. This URI points to the directory containing an RSYNC URI [RFC5781]. This URI points to the directory containing
all published material issued by this CA. i.e., all valid CA all published material issued by this CA. i.e., all valid CA
certificates, published EE certificates, the current CRL, manifest certificates, published EE certificates, the current CRL, manifest
and signed objects validated via EE certificates that have been and signed objects validated via EE certificates that have been
issued by this CA [ID.sidr-repos-struct]. Other accessDescription issued by this CA [ID.sidr-repos-struct]. Other accessDescription
elements with an accessMethod of id-ad-caRepository MAY be present. elements with an accessMethod of id-ad-caRepository MAY be present.
In such cases, the accessLocation values describe alternate supported In such cases, the accessLocation values describe alternate supported
URI access mechanisms for the same directory. The ordering of URIs URI access mechanisms for the same directory. The ordering of URIs
in this accessDescription sequence reflect the CA's relative in this accessDescription sequence reflect the CA's relative
preferences for access methods to be used by RPs, with he first preferences for access methods to be used by RPs, with the first
element of the sequence being the most preferred by the CA. element of the sequence being the most preferred by the CA.
This extension MUST have an instance of an AccessDescription with an This extension MUST have an instance of an AccessDescription with an
accessMethod of id-ad-rpkiManifest, accessMethod of id-ad-rpkiManifest,
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 } id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 }
with an RSYNC URI [RFC5781] form of accessLocation. The URI points with an RSYNC URI [RFC5781] form of accessLocation. The URI points
to the CA's manifest of published objects [ID.sidr-rpki-manifests] as to the CA's manifest of published objects [ID.sidr-rpki-manifests] as
an object URL. Other accessDescription elements MAY exist for the an object URL. Other accessDescription elements MAY exist for the
id-ad-rpkiManifest accessMethod, where the accessLocation value id-ad-rpkiManifest accessMethod, where the accessLocation value
indicates alternate access mechanisms for the same manifest object. indicates alternate access mechanisms for the same manifest object.
4.9.8.2. SIA for EE Certificates 4.8.8.2. SIA for EE Certificates
This extension MUST be present, and is non-critical. This extension MUST be present, and is non-critical.
This extension MUST have an instance of an accessMethod of id-ad- This extension MUST have an instance of an accessMethod of id-ad-
signedObject, signedObject,
id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 } id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 }
with an accessLocation form of a URI that MUST include an RSYNC URI with an accessLocation form of a URI that MUST include an RSYNC URI
[RFC5781]. This URI points to the signed object that is verified [RFC5781]. This URI points to the signed object that is verified
using this EE certificate [ID.sidr-repos-struct]. Other using this EE certificate [ID.sidr-repos-struct]. Other
accessDescription elements may exist for the id-ad-signedObject accessDescription elements may exist for the id-ad-signedObject
accessMethod, where the accessLocation value indicates alternate URI accessMethod, where the accessLocation value indicates alternate URI
access mechanisms for the same object, ordered in terms of the EE's access mechanisms for the same object, ordered in terms of the EE's
relative preference for supported access mechanisms. relative preference for supported access mechanisms.
Other AccessMethods MUST NOT be used for an EE certificates's SIA. Other AccessMethods MUST NOT be used for an EE certificates's SIA.
4.9.9. Certificate Policies 4.8.9. Certificate Policies
This extension MUST be present, and MUST be marked critical. It MUST This extension MUST be present, and MUST be marked critical. It MUST
include exactly one policy, as specified in the RPKI CP [ID.sidr-cp] include exactly one policy, as specified in the RPKI CP [ID.sidr-cp]
4.9.10. IP Resources 4.8.10. IP Resources
Either the IP Resources extension, or the AS Resources extension, or Either the IP Resources extension, or the AS Resources extension, or
both, MUST be present in all RPKI certificates, and if present, MUST both, MUST be present in all RPKI certificates, and if present, MUST
be marked critical. be marked critical.
This extension contains the list of IP address resources as per This extension contains the list of IP address resources as per
[RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a [RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a
particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates
describing public number resources for use in the public Internet, describing public number resources for use in the public Internet,
the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. the SAFI value MUST NOT be used.
This extension MUST either specify a non-empty set IP address This extension MUST either specify a non-empty set IP address
records, or use the "inherit" setting to indicate that the IP address records, or use the "inherit" setting to indicate that the IP address
resource set of this certificate is inherited from that of the resource set of this certificate is inherited from that of the
certificate's issuer. certificate's issuer.
4.9.11. AS Resources 4.8.11. AS Resources
Either the AS Resources extension, or the IP Resources extension, or Either the AS Resources extension, or the IP Resources extension, or
both, MUST be present in all RPKI certificates, and if present, MUST both, MUST be present in all RPKI certificates, and if present, MUST
be marked critical. be marked critical.
This extension contains the list of AS number resources as per This extension contains the list of AS number resources as per
[RFC3779], or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT [RFC3779], or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT
supported in this profile and MUST NOT be used. supported in this profile and MUST NOT be used.
This extension MUST either specify a non-empty set AS number records, This extension MUST either specify a non-empty set AS number records,
or use the "inherit" setting to indicate that the AS number resource or use the "inherit" setting to indicate that the AS number resource
set of this certificate is inherited from that of the certificate's set of this certificate is inherited from that of the certificate's
issuer. issuer.
5. Resource Certificate Revocation Lists 5. Resource Certificate Revocation Lists
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request, the CA is permitted to alter any requested field when request, the CA is permitted to alter any requested field when
issuing the certificate. issuing the certificate.
6.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 6.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
This profile applies the following additional requirements to fields This profile applies the following additional requirements to fields
that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: that may appear in a Certificate Request Template:
version version
This field SHOULD be omitted. If present, it MUST specify a This field SHOULD be omitted. If present, it MUST specify a
request for a Version 3 Certificate. It request for a Version 3 Certificate.
serialNumber serialNumber
This field MUST be omitted. This field MUST be omitted.
signingAlgorithm signingAlgorithm
This field MUST be omitted. This field MUST be omitted.
issuer issuer
This MUST be omitted in this profile. This MUST be omitted in this profile.
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BasicConstraints SubjectType sub field, when specified. BasicConstraints SubjectType sub field, when specified.
ExtendedKeyUsage ExtendedKeyUsage
The CA MAY honour ExtendedKeyUsage extensions of keyCertSign The CA MAY honour ExtendedKeyUsage extensions of keyCertSign
and cRLSign if present, as long as this is consistent with the and cRLSign if present, as long as this is consistent with the
BasicConstraints SubjectType sub field, when specified. BasicConstraints SubjectType sub field, when specified.
SubjectInformationAccess SubjectInformationAccess
This field MUST be present, and the field value SHOULD be This field MUST be present, and the field value SHOULD be
honoured by the CA if it conforms to the requirements set forth honoured by the CA if it conforms to the requirements set forth
in Section 4.9.8. If the CA is unable to honour the requested in Section 4.8.8. If the CA is unable to honour the requested
value for this field, then the CA MUST reject the Certificate value for this field, then the CA MUST reject the Certificate
Request. Request.
7. Resource Certificate Validation 7. Resource Certificate Validation
This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure.
This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of
[RFC5280]. [RFC5280].
7.1. Resource Extension Validation 7.1. Resource Extension Validation
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(The issuing CA may wish to be able to extract the (The issuing CA may wish to be able to extract the
database key or subscriber ID from the commonName. Since database key or subscriber ID from the commonName. Since
only the issuing CA would need to be able to parse the only the issuing CA would need to be able to parse the
commonName, the database key and the source of entropy commonName, the database key and the source of entropy
(e.g., a UUID) could be separated in any way that the CA (e.g., a UUID) could be separated in any way that the CA
wanted, as long as it conformed to the rules for wanted, as long as it conformed to the rules for
PrintableString. The separator could be a space PrintableString. The separator could be a space
character, parenthesis, hyphen, slash, question mark, character, parenthesis, hyphen, slash, question mark,
etc. etc.
9. Security Considerations 9. Operational Considerations for Profile Agility
This profile requires that relying parties reject certificates or
CRLs that do not conform to the profile. (Through the remainder of
this section the term "certificate" is used to refer to both
certificates and CRLs.) This includes certificates that contain
extensions that are prohibited, but which are otherwise valid as per
[RFC5280]. This means that any change in the profile (e.g.,
extensions, permitted attributes or optional fields, or field
encodings) for certificates used in the RPKI will not be backward
compatible. In a general PKI context this constraint probably would
cause serious problems. In the RPKI, several factors minimize the
difficulty of effecting changes of this sort.
Note that the RPKI is unique in that every relying party (RP)
requires access to every certificate and every CRL issued by the CAs
in this system. An important update of the certificates and CRLs
used in the RPKI must be supported by all CAs and RPs in the system,
lest views of the RPKI data differ across RPs. Thus incremental
changes require very careful coordination. It would not be
appropriate to introduce a new extension, or authorize use of an
extant, standard extension, for a security-relevant purpose on a
piecemeal basis.
One might imagine that the "critical" flag in X.509 certificate and
CRL extensions could be used to ameliorate this problem. However,
this solution is not comprehensive, and does not address the problem
of adding a new, security-critical extension. (This is because such
an extension needs to be supported universally, by all CAs and RPs.)
Also, while some standard extensions can be marked either critical or
non-critical, at the discretion of the issuer, not all have this
property, i.e., some standard extensions are always non-critical.
Moreover, there is no notion of criticality for attributes within a
name or optional fields within a field or an extension. Thus the
critical flag is not a solution to this problem.
In typical PKI deployments there are few CAs and many RPs. However,
in the RPKI, essentially every CA in the RPKI is also an RP. Thus
the set of entities that will need to change in order to issue
certificates under a new format is the same set of entities that will
need to change to accept these new certificates. To the extent that
this is literally true it says that CA/RP coordination for a change
is tightly linked anyway. In reality there is an important exception
to this general observation. Small ISPs and holders of provider-
independent allocations are expected to use managed CA services,
offered by Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) and potentially by
wholesale Internet Service Providers (ISPs). This reduces the number
of distinct CA implementations that are needed, and makes it easier
to effect changes for certificate issuance. It seems very likely
that these entities also will make use of RP software provided by
their managed CA service provider, which reduces the number of
distinct RP software implementations. Also note that many small ISPs
(and holders of provider-independent allocations) employ default
routes, and thus need not perform RP validation of RPKI data,
eliminating these entities as RPs.
Widely available PKI RP software does not cache large numbers of
certificates and CRLs, an essential strategy for the RPKI. It does
not process manifest or ROA data structures, essential elements of
the RPKI repository system. Experience shows that such software
deals poorly with revocation status data. Thus extant RP software is
not adequate for the RPKI, although some open source tools (e.g.,
OpenSSL and cryptlib) can be used as building blocks for an RPKI RP
implementation. Thus it is anticipated that RPs will make use of
software designed specifically for the RPKI environment, and
available from a limited number of open sources. Several RIRs and
two companies are providing such software today. Thus it is feasible
to coordinate change to this software among the small number of
developers/maintainers.
If the resource certificate profile is changed in the future, e.g.,
by adding a new extension or changing the allowed set of name
attributes or encoding of these attributes, the following procedure
will be employed to effect deployment in the RPKI. The model is
analogous to that described in [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility], but is
simpler.
A new document will be issued as an update to this RFC. The CP for
the RPKI [ID.sidr-cp] will be updated to reference the new
certificate profile. The new CP will define a new policy OID for
certificates issued under the new certificate profile. The updated
CP also will define a timeline for transition to the new certificate
(CRL) format. This timeline will define 3 phases and associated
dates:
1. At the end of phase 1, all RPKI CAs MUST be capable of issuing
certificates under the new profile, if requested by a subject.
Any certificate issued under the new format will contain the
new policy OID.
2. During phase 2 CAs MUST issue certificates under the new
profile, and these certificates MUST co-exist with
certificates issued under the old format. (CAs will continue
to issue certificates under the old OID/format as well.) The
old and new certificates MUST be identical, except for the
policy OID and any new extensions, encodings, etc. The new
certificates, and associated signed objects, will coexist in
the RPKI repository system during this phase, analogous to
what is required by an algorithm transition for the RPKI
[ID.sidr-algorithm-agility]. Relying parties MAY make use of
the old or the new certificate formats when processing signed
objects retrieved from the RPKI repository system. During
this phase, a relying party that elects to process both
formats will acquire the same values for all certificate
fields that overlap between the old and new formats. Thus if
either certificate format is verifiable, the relying party
accepts the data from that certificate. This allows CAs to
issue certificates under the new format before all relying
parties are prepared to process that format.
3. At the beginning of phase 3, all relying parties MUST be
capable of processing certificates under the new format.
During this phase CAs will issue new certificates ONLY under
the new format. During this phase, certificates issued under
the old OID will be replaced with certificates containing the
new policy OID. The repository system will no longer require
matching old and new certificates under the different formats.
At the end of phase 3, all certificates under the old OID will have
been replaced. The resource certificate profile RFC will be replaced
to remove support for the old certificate format, and the CP will be
replaced to remove reference to the old policy OID and to the old
resource certificate profile RFC. The system will have returned to a
new, steady state.
10. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] and [RFC3779] apply to The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] and [RFC3779] apply to
Resource Certificates. The Security Considerations of [RFC2986] and Resource Certificates. The Security Considerations of [RFC2986] and
[RFC4211] apply to Resource Certificate certification requests. [RFC4211] apply to Resource Certificate certification requests.
A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms
of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in
the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same
resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the
status of resource allocations and assignments then the information status of resource allocations and assignments then the information
skipping to change at page 22, line 42 skipping to change at page 25, line 32
using separate validation paths for a certificate and the using separate validation paths for a certificate and the
corresponding CRL. If there are subject name collisions in the RPKI corresponding CRL. If there are subject name collisions in the RPKI
as a result of CAs not following the guidelines provided here as a result of CAs not following the guidelines provided here
relating to ensuring sufficient entropy in constructing subject relating to ensuring sufficient entropy in constructing subject
names, and this is combined with the situation that an RP uses an names, and this is combined with the situation that an RP uses an
implementation of validation path construction that is not in implementation of validation path construction that is not in
conformance with this RPKI profile, then it is possible that the conformance with this RPKI profile, then it is possible that the
subject name collisions can cause an RP to conclude that an otherwise subject name collisions can cause an RP to conclude that an otherwise
valid certificate has been revoked. valid certificate has been revoked.
10. IANA Considerations 11. IANA Considerations
[Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
considerations stated in this document.] considerations stated in this document.]
11. Acknowledgements 12. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to particularly acknowledge the valued The authors would like to particularly acknowledge the valued
contribution from Stephen Kent in reviewing this document and contribution from Stephen Kent in reviewing this document and
proposing numerous sections of text that have been incorporated into proposing numerous sections of text that have been incorporated into
the text. The authors also acknowledge the contributions of Sandy the text. The authors also acknowledge the contributions of Sandy
Murphy, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo Patara Murphy, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo Patara
and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of this and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of this
document. The document also reflects review comments received from document. The document also reflects review comments received from
Roque Gagliano, Sean Turner and David Cooper. Roque Gagliano, Sean Turner and David Cooper.
12. References 13. References
13.1. Normative References
12.1. Normative References
[ID.sidr-cp] [ID.sidr-cp]
Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", Work in Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", Work in
progress: Internet Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-c-13.txt, progress: Internet Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-c-13.txt,
September 2010. September 2010.
[ID.sidr-rpki-algs] [ID.sidr-rpki-algs]
Huston, G., "A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Huston, G., "A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", Work in use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", Work in
progress: Internet progress: Internet
Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs-00.txt, August 2009. Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs-00.txt, August 2009.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
November 2000. November 2000.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
September 2005. September 2005.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[X.509] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.509: The Directory - [X.509] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.509: The Directory -
Authentication Framework", 2000. Authentication Framework", 2000.
12.2. Informative References [X.680] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002,
Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", 2002.
13.2. Informative References
[ID.sidr-algorithm-agility]
Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
Procedure for RPKI", Work in progress: Internet
Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility-00.txt,
February 2011.
[ID.sidr-arch] [ID.sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", Work in progress: Internet Secure Internet Routing", Work in progress: Internet
Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-arch-04.txt, November 2008. Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-arch-04.txt, November 2008.
[ID.sidr-keyroll] [ID.sidr-keyroll]
Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "CA Key Rollover Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "CA Key Rollover
in the RPKI", draft-ietf-sidr-keyroll-02.txt (work in in the RPKI", draft-ietf-sidr-keyroll-02.txt (work in
progress), October 2010. progress), October 2010.
skipping to change at page 24, line 44 skipping to change at page 27, line 42
October 2010. October 2010.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
November 2000. November 2000.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally [RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
July 2005. July 2005.
[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
RFC 4514, June 2006.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010. Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate
The following is an example Resource Certificate. The following is an example Resource Certificate.
Certificate Name: 9JfgAEcq7Q-47IwMC5CJIJr6EJs.cer Certificate Name: 9JfgAEcq7Q-47IwMC5CJIJr6EJs.cer
Data: Data:
Version: 3 (0x2) Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial: 1500 (0x5dc) Serial: 1500 (0x5dc)
Signature Algorithm: SHA256WithRSAEncryption Signature Algorithm: SHA256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN=APNIC Production-CVPQSgUkLy7pOXdNeVWGvnFX_0s Issuer: CN=APNIC Production-CVPQSgUkLy7pOXdNeVWGvnFX_0s
Validity Validity
Not Before: Oct 25 12:50:00 2008 GMT Not Before: Oct 25 12:50:00 2008 GMT
Not After : Jan 31 00:00:00 2010 GMT Not After : Jan 31 00:00:00 2010 GMT
Subject: CN=A91872ED Subject: CN=A91872ED
Subject Public Key Info: Subject Public Key Info:
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