draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis-02.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis-03.txt 
SIDR G. Huston SIDR G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson, Ed. Internet-Draft G. Michaelson, Ed.
Obsoletes: 6485 (if approved) APNIC Obsoletes: 6485 (if approved) APNIC
Intended status: Standards Track May 15, 2015 Intended status: Standards Track July 24, 2015
Expires: November 16, 2015 Expires: January 25, 2016
The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure Key Infrastructure
draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis-02.txt draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis-03.txt
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies the algorithms, algorithms' parameters, This document specifies the algorithms, algorithms' parameters,
asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key size and signature format for asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key size, and signature format for
the Resource Public Key Infrastructure subscribers that generate the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) subscribers that
digital signatures on certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and generate digital signatures on certificates, Certificate Revocation
signed objects as well as for the Relying Parties that verify these Lists (CRLs), Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) signed objects and
digital signatures. certification requests as well as for the relying parties (RPs) that
verify these digital signatures.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 16, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 25, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Public Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Private Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Signature Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Additional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Changes Aplied to RFC6485 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document specifies: This document specifies:
* the digital signature algorithm and parameters; * the digital signature algorithm and parameters;
* the hash algorithm and parameters; * the hash algorithm and parameters;
* the public and private key formats; and, * the public and private key formats; and,
* the signature format * the signature format
used by Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) subscribers when used by Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]
they apply digital signatures to certificates, Certificate Revocation subscribers when they apply digital signatures to certificates and
Lists (CRLs), and signed objects (e.g., Route Origin Authorizations Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) [RFC5280], Cryptographic Message
(ROAs) and manifests). Relying Parties (RPs) also use this document Syntax (CMS) signed objects [RFC5652] (e.g., Route Origin
when verify RPKI subscribers' digital signatures [RFC6480]. Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482] and manifests [RFC6486]), and
certification requests [RFC2986][RFC4211]. Relying parties (RPs)
also use the algorithms defined in this document to verify RPKI
subscribers' digital signatures [RFC6480].
This document is referenced by other RPKI profiles and This document is referenced by other RPKI profiles and
specifications, including the RPKI Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484], specifications, including the RPKI Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484],
the RPKI Certificate Profile [RFC6487], the SIDR Architecture the RPKI Certificate Profile [RFC6487], the RPKI Architecture
[RFC6480], and the Signed Object Template for the RPKI [RFC2119]. [RFC6480], and the Signed Object Template for the RPKI [RFC6488].
Familiarity with these documents is assumed. Familiarity with these documents is assumed.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Algorithms 2. Algorithms
Two cryptographic algorithms are used in the RPKI: Two cryptographic algorithms are used in the RPKI:
* The signature algorithm used in certificates, CRLs, and signed * The signature algorithm used in certificates, CRLs, CMS signed
objects is RSA Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 objects, and certification requests is RSA Public-Key
Version 1.5 (sometimes referred to as "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5") from Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 Version 1.5 (sometimes
Section 5 of [RFC4055]. referred to as "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5") from Section 8.2 of
[RFC3447].
* The hashing algorithm used in certificates, CRLs, and signed
objects is SHA-256 [SHS] (see note below). Hashing algorithms
are not identified individually in certificates and CRLs, as
the identity of the hashing algorithm is combined with the
identity of the digital signature algorithm.
When used in the context of the Cryptographic Message Syntax * The hashing algorithm used in certificates, CRLs, CMS signed
(CMS) SignedData, the hashing algorithm is identified objects and certification requests is SHA-256 [SHS] (see note
individually (in this case the hashing algorithm is sometimes below).
called a message digest algorithm).
NOTE: The exception to the above hashing algorithm use is the NOTE: The exception is the use of SHA-1 [SHS] when CAs generate
use of SHA-1 [SHS] when CAs generate authority and subject key authority and subject key identifiers [RFC6487].
identifiers [RFC6487].
For generating and verifying certificates and CRLs the hashing and In certificates, CRLs, and certification requests the hashing and
digital signature algorithms are referred to together, i.e., "RSA digital signature algorithms are identified together, i.e., "RSA
PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256" or more simply "RSA with SHA-256". The PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256" or more simply "RSA with SHA-256". The
Object Identifier (OID) sha256WithRSAEncryption from [RFC4055] MUST Object Identifier (OID) sha256WithRSAEncryption from [RFC4055] MUST
be used in this case. be used in these products.
For CMS SignedData, the object identifier and parameters for SHA-256 For CMS SignedData, the object identifier and parameters for SHA-256
in [RFC5754] MUST be used for the SignedData digestAlgorithms field in [RFC5754] MUST be used for the SignedData digestAlgorithms field
and the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field when generating and and the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field when generating and
verifying CMS SignedData objects. The object identifier and verifying CMS SignedData objects. The object identifier and
parameters for rsaEncryption MUST be used for the SignerInfo parameters for rsaEncryption MUST be used for the SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field when generating CMS SignedData objects. signatureAlgorithm field when generating CMS SignedData objects.
RPKI implementations MUST accept CMS SignedData objects that use the RPKI implementations MUST accept CMS SignedData objects that use the
object identifier and parameters for either rsaEncryption or object identifier and parameters for either rsaEncryption or
sha256WithRSAEncryption for the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field sha256WithRSAEncryption for the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field
when verifying CMS SignedData objects. when verifying CMS SignedData objects.
Locations for this OID are as follows: The OID is in the following locations:
In the certificate, the OID appears in the signature and In the certificate, the OID appears in the signature and
signatureAlgorithm fields [RFC4055]; signatureAlgorithm fields [RFC4055];
In the CRL, the OID appears in the signatureAlgorithm field In the CRL, the OID appears in the signatureAlgorithm field
[RFC4055]; [RFC4055]; and
In CMS SignedData, the OID appears in each SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field, the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field,
and in the SignedData digestAlgorithms [RFC5652]; and,
In a certification request, the OID appears in the PKCS #10 In a certification request, the OID appears in the PKCS #10
signatureAlgorithm field [RFC2986], or in the Certificate Request signatureAlgorithm field [RFC2986], or in the Certificate Request
Message Format (CRMF) POPOSigningKey signature field [RFC4211]. Message Format (CRMF) POPOSigningKey algorithmIdentifier field
[RFC4211].
In CMS SignedData, the hashing (message digest) and digital signature
algorithms are identified separately. The object identifier and
parameters for SHA-256 (as defined in [RFC5754]) MUST be used for the
SignedData digestAlgorithms field and the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm
field. The object identifier and parameters for rsaEncryption
[RFC3370] MUST be used for the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field
when generating CMS SignedData objects. RPKI implementations MUST
accept either rsaEncryption or sha256WithRSAEncryption for the
SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field when verifying CMS SignedData
objects (for compatibility with objects produced by implementations
conforming to [RFC6485].
3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats 3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats
The RSA key pairs used to compute the signatures MUST have a 2048-bit The RSA key pairs used to compute the signatures MUST have a 2048-bit
modulus and a public exponent (e) of 65,537. modulus and a public exponent (e) of 65,537.
3.1. Public Key Format 3.1. Public Key Format
The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo The subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo
[RFC5280]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey. [RFC5280]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey.
The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow: The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow:
algorithm (which is an AlgorithmIdentifier type): algorithm (which is an AlgorithmIdentifier type):
The object identifier for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 MUST be The object identifier for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 MUST be
used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section 5 of used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section 5 of
[RFC4055]. The value for the associated parameters from that [RFC4055]. The value for the associated parameters from that
clause MUST also be used for the parameters field. clause MUST also be used for the parameters field.
subjectPublicKey: subjectPublicKey:
RSAPublicKey MUST be used to encode the certificate's RSAPublicKey MUST be used to encode the certificate's
subjectPublicKey field, as specified in [RFC4055]. subjectPublicKey field, as specified in [RFC4055].
3.2. Private Key Format 3.2. Private Key Format
Local Policy determines private key format. Local policy determines the private key format.
4. Signature Format 4. Signature Format
The structure for the certificate's signature field is as specified The structure for the certificate's signature field is as specified
in Section 1.2 of [RFC4055]. The structure for the Cryptographic in Section 1.2 of [RFC4055]. The structure for the CMS SignedData's
Message Syntax (CMS) SignedData's signature field is as specified in signature field is as specified in [RFC5652].
[RFC5652].
5. Additional Requirements 5. Additional Requirements
It is anticipated that the RPKI will require the adoption of updated It is anticipated that the RPKI will require the adoption of updated
key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over
time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic
security to protect the integrity of signed products in the RPKI. security to protect the integrity of signed products in the RPKI.
This profile should be relaced to specify such future requirements, This profile should be replaced to specify such future requirements,
as and when appropriate. as and when appropriate.
Certification Authorities (CAs) and RPs SHOULD be capable of Certification Authorities (CAs) and RPs SHOULD be capable of
supporting a transition to allow for the phased introduction of supporting a transition to allow for the phased introduction of
additional encryption algorithms and key specifications, and also additional encryption algorithms and key specifications, and also
accommodate the orderly deprecation of previously specified accommodate the orderly deprecation of previously specified
algorithms and keys. Accordingly, CAs and RPs SHOULD be capable of algorithms and keys. Accordingly, CAs and RPs SHOULD be capable of
supporting multiple RPKI algorithm and key profiles simultaneously supporting multiple RPKI algorithm and key profiles simultaneously
within the scope of such anticipated transitions. The recommended within the scope of such anticipated transitions. The recommended
procedures to implement such a transition of key sizes and algorithms procedures to implement such a transition of key sizes and algorithms
is not specified in this document. is not specified in [RFC6916]
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC4055], [RFC5280], and [RFC6487] The Security Considerations of [RFC4055], [RFC5280], and [RFC6487]
apply to certificate and CRLs. The Security Considerations of apply to certificate and CRLs. The Security Considerations of
[RFC5754] apply to signed objects. No new security are introduced as [RFC2986], [RFC4211], and [RFC6487] apply to certification />
a result of this specification. requests. The Security Considerations of [RFC5754] apply to CMS
signed objects. No new security threats are introduced as a result
of this specification.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
[Remove before publication. There are no IANA considerations in this [Remove before publication. There are no IANA considerations in this
document.] document.]
8. Changes Aplied to RFC6485 8. Changes Aplied to RFC6485
This document represents a slight technical change to [RFC6485] that This update includes a slight technical change to [RFC6485] that is
is considered to be outside the limited scope of an erratum. considered to be outside the limited scope of an erratum. The
document update process has included other errata and also corrected
a number of nits.
Section 2 of [RFC6485] specified a single signature algorithm (SHA- Section 2 of [RFC6485] specified sha256WithRSAEncryption as the OID
256) and a single CMS OID, sha256withRSAEncryption, to be used for to use for the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field in CMS
the SignerInfo field of the CMS object. A closer reading of SignedObjects. However, existing implementations use the
[RFC4055] and [RFC5754] has identified that the CMS SignerInfo field rsaEncryption OID for this field. (Support for rsaEncryption in 3rd
must support use of the rsaEncryption OID for full conformance with party cryptographic libraries is better than sha256WithRSAEncryption,
the CMS specifications, and the normative references in [RFC6485] perhaps because [RFC3370] says that support for rsaEncryption is
inherited this requirement. required while support for OIDs that specify both RSA and a digest
algorithm is optional.)
This document changes Section 2 of [RFC6485]. By conforming to the Rather than force existing implementations to switch to
CMS specifications as per [RFC4055] and [RFC5754], RPKI CMS objects sha256WithRSAEncryption, this document was changed to follow existing
are less likely to be rejected as non-conformant with the CMS practice. This does not represent a cryptographic algorithm change,
standards. No change is made to the cryptographic status of the CMS just an identifier change. (Unlike certificates, CRLs, and
objects produced. This change reflects the behaviour of deployed certification requests, CMS signed objects have a separate algorithm
interoperating code. No other changes have been made to the identifier field for the hash (digest) algorithm, and that field is
specification as described in [RFC6485]. already required to contain the id-sha256 OID per Section 2.)
To avoid compatibility problems, RPs are still required to accept
sha256WithRSAEncryption if encountered.
Other changes include:
* Minor wording and typo fixes.
* Some incorrect references were fixed ([RFC5652] instead of
[RFC3370], [RFC3447] instead of [RFC4055]).
* Additional citations were added to the Introduction.
* Section 2 now references the correct CRMF POPOSigningKey field
(algorithmIdentifier instead of signature).
* Certification requests are now mentioned along with
certificates, CRLs, and CMS signed objects.
* Section 5 now cites [RFC6916] (algorithm agility).
* "Signed object" is now "CMS signed object" everywhere.
9. Acknowledgments 9. Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the re-use in this draft of material The authors acknowledge the reuse in this document of material
originally contained in working drafts the RPKI Certificate Policy originally contained in working drafts the RPKI Certificate Policy
and Resource Certificate profile documents. The co-authors of these [RFC6484] and resource certificate profile [RFC6487] documents. The
two documents, namely Stephen Kent, Derrick Kong, Karen Seo, Ronald co-authors of these two documents, namely Stephen Kent, Derrick Kong,
Watro, George Michaelson and Robert Loomans, are acknowledged, with Karen Seo, Ronald Watro, George Michaelson and Robert Loomans, are
thanks. The constraint on key size noted in this profile is the acknowledged, with thanks. The constraint on key size noted in this
outcome of comments from Stephen Kent and review comments from David profile is the outcome of comments from Stephen Kent and review
Cooper. Sean Turner has provided additional review input to this comments from David Cooper. Sean Turner has provided additional
document. review input to this document.
Andrew Chi and David Mandelberg discovered the issue addressed in Andrew Chi and David Mandelberg discovered the issue addressed in
this update to [RFC6485], and the changes in this updated this update to [RFC6485], and the changes in this updated
specification reflect the outcome of a discussion between Rob Austein specification reflect the outcome of a discussion between Rob Austein
and Matt Lepinski on the SIDR Working group mailing list. George and Matt Lepinski on the SIDR Working group mailing list. Richard
Michaelson edited the update to this document. Hansen edited this update to the document.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
November 2000. DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC3370] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, DOI 10.17487/RFC3370, August 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3370>.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447,
February 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
June 2005. DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
September 2005. DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, September 2009. RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5754] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic [RFC5754] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", RFC 5754, January 2010. Message Syntax", RFC 5754, DOI 10.17487/RFC5754,
January 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5754>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate [RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012. (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, DOI 10.17487/RFC6484,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI 10.17487/
February 2012. RFC6487, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), [SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard", FIPS "FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard", FIPS
Publication 180-3, October 2008. Publication 180-3, October 2008.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, DOI 10.17487/
RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for [RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
RFC 6485, February 2012. RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6485>.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916,
April 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston Geoff Huston
APNIC APNIC
Email: gih@apnic.net Email: gih@apnic.net
George Michaelson (editor) George Michaelson (editor)
APNIC APNIC
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