draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6490-bis-05.txt   rfc7730.txt 
SIDR G. Huston Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Huston
Internet-Draft APNIC Request for Comments: 7730 APNIC
Obsoletes: 6490 (if approved) S. Weiler Obsoletes: 6490 S. Weiler
Intended status: Standards Track Parsons Category: Standards Track Parsons
Expires: April 10, 2016 G. Michaelson ISSN: 2070-1721 G. Michaelson
APNIC APNIC
S. Kent S. Kent
BBN BBN
October 8, 2015 January 2016
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator
draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6490-bis-05
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document obsoletes RFC6490 by Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document obsoletes RFC 6490
adding support for multiple URIs in a TAL. by adding support for multiple URIs in a TAL.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the Status of This Memo
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering This is an Internet Standards Track document.
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 10, 2016. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7730.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Trust Anchor Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Trust Anchor Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations . . . . . . 4 2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations . . . . . 3
2.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Relying Party Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Relying Party Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. This format may be used Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. This format may be used
to distribute trust anchor material using a mix of out-of-band and to distribute trust anchor material using a mix of out-of-band and
online means. Procedures used by Relying Parties (RPs) to verify online means. Procedures used by Relying Parties (RPs) to verify
RPKI signed objects SHOULD support this format to facilitate RPKI signed objects SHOULD support this format to facilitate
interoperability between creators of trust anchor material and RPs. interoperability between creators of trust anchor material and RPs.
This document obsoletes RFC 6490 by adding support for multiple URIs This document obsoletes RFC 6490 by adding support for multiple URIs
skipping to change at page 3, line 40 skipping to change at page 3, line 7
specifies a format for data used to retrieve and verify the specifies a format for data used to retrieve and verify the
authenticity of a trust anchor in a very simple fashion. That data authenticity of a trust anchor in a very simple fashion. That data
is referred to as the TAL. is referred to as the TAL.
The motivation for defining the TAL is to enable selected data in the The motivation for defining the TAL is to enable selected data in the
trust anchor to change, without needing to effect redistribution of trust anchor to change, without needing to effect redistribution of
the trust anchor per se. In the RPKI, certificates contain the trust anchor per se. In the RPKI, certificates contain
extensions that represent Internet Number Resources (INRs) [RFC3779]. extensions that represent Internet Number Resources (INRs) [RFC3779].
The set of INRs associated with an entity acting as a trust anchor is The set of INRs associated with an entity acting as a trust anchor is
likely to change over time. Thus, if one were to use the common PKI likely to change over time. Thus, if one were to use the common PKI
convention of distributing a trust anchor to RPs in a secure fashion convention of distributing a trust anchor to RPs in a secure fashion,
then this procedure would need to be repeated whenever the INR set then this procedure would need to be repeated whenever the INR set
for the entity acting as a trust anchor changed. By distributing the for the entity acting as a trust anchor changed. By distributing the
TAL (in a secure fashion), instead of distributing the trust anchor, TAL (in a secure fashion), instead of distributing the trust anchor,
this problem is avoided, i.e., the TAL is constant so long as the this problem is avoided, i.e., the TAL is constant so long as the
trust anchor's public key and its location do not change. trust anchor's public key and its location do not change.
The TAL is analogous to the TrustAnchorInfo data structure [RFC5914] The TAL is analogous to the TrustAnchorInfo data structure specified
adopted as a PKIX standard. That standard could be used to represent in [RFC5914], which is on the Standards Track. That specification
the TAL, if one defined an rsync URI extension for that data could be used to represent the TAL, if one defined an rsync URI
structure. However, the TAL format was adopted by RPKI implementors extension for that data structure. However, the TAL format was
prior to the PKIX trust anchor work, and the RPKI implementer adopted by RPKI implementors prior to the PKIX trust anchor work, and
community has elected to utilize the TAL format, rather than define the RPKI implementer community has elected to utilize the TAL format,
the requisite extension. The community also prefers the simplicity rather than define the requisite extension. The community also
of the ASCII encoding of the TAL, versus the binary (ASN.1) encoding prefers the simplicity of the ASCII encoding of the TAL, versus the
for TrustAnchorInfo. binary (ASN.1) encoding for TrustAnchorInfo.
The TAL is an ordered sequence of: The TAL is an ordered sequence of:
1) a URI section, 1) a URI section,
2) a <CRLF> or <LF> line break, 2) a <CRLF> or <LF> line break,
3) a subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280] in DER format [X.509], 3) a subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280] in DER format [X.509],
encoded in Base64 (see Section 4 of [RFC4648]. To avoid long encoded in Base64 (see Section 4 of [RFC4648]). To avoid long
lines <CRLF> or <LF> line breaks MAY be inserted into the lines, <CRLF> or <LF> line breaks MAY be inserted into the
Base64 encoded string. Base64-encoded string.
where the URI section is comprised of one of more of the ordered where the URI section is comprised of one of more of the ordered
sequence of: sequence of:
1.1) an rsync URI [RFC5781], 1.1) an rsync URI [RFC5781],
1.2) a <CRLF> or <LF> line break. 1.2) a <CRLF> or <LF> line break.
2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations 2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations
Each rsync URI in the TAL MUST reference a single object. It MUST Each rsync URI in the TAL MUST reference a single object. It MUST
NOT reference a directory or any other form of collection of objects. NOT reference a directory or any other form of collection of objects.
The referenced object MUST be a self-signed CA certificate that The referenced object MUST be a self-signed CA certificate that
conforms to the RPKI certificate profile [RFC6487]. This certificate conforms to the RPKI certificate profile [RFC6487]. This certificate
is the trust anchor in certification path discovery [RFC4158] and is the trust anchor in certification path discovery [RFC4158] and
validation [RFC5280][RFC3779]. validation [RFC5280] [RFC3779].
The validity interval of this trust anchor SHOULD reflect the The validity interval of this trust anchor SHOULD reflect the
anticipated period of stability of the particular set of INRs that anticipated period of stability of the particular set of INRs that
are associated with the putative trust anchor. are associated with the putative trust anchor.
The INR extension(s) of this trust anchor MUST contain a non-empty The INR extension(s) of this trust anchor MUST contain a non-empty
set of number resources. It MUST NOT use the "inherit" form of the set of number resources. It MUST NOT use the "inherit" form of the
INR extension(s). The INR set described in this certificate is the INR extension(s). The INR set described in this certificate is the
set of number resources for which the issuing entity is offering set of number resources for which the issuing entity is offering
itself as a putative trust anchor in the RPKI [RFC6480]. itself as a putative trust anchor in the RPKI [RFC6480].
The public key used to verify the trust anchor MUST be the same as The public key used to verify the trust anchor MUST be the same as
the subjectPublicKeyInfo in the CA certificate and in the TAL. the subjectPublicKeyInfo in the CA certificate and in the TAL.
The trust anchor MUST contain a stable key. This key MUST NOT change The trust anchor MUST contain a stable key. This key MUST NOT change
when the certificate is reissued due to changes in the INR when the certificate is reissued due to changes in the INR
extension(s), when the certificate is renewed prior to expiration or extension(s), when the certificate is renewed prior to expiration, or
for any reason other than a key change. for any reason other than a key change.
Because the public key in the TAL and the trust anchor MUST be Because the public key in the TAL and the trust anchor MUST be
stable, this motivates operation of that CA in an off-line mode. stable, this motivates operation of that CA in an offline mode.
Thus the entity that issues the trust anchor SHOULD issue a Thus, the entity that issues the trust anchor SHOULD issue a
subordinate CA certificate that contains the same INRs (via the use subordinate CA certificate that contains the same INRs (via the use
of the "inherit" option in the INR extensions of the subordinate of the "inherit" option in the INR extensions of the subordinate
certificate). This allows the entity that issues the trust anchor to certificate). This allows the entity that issues the trust anchor to
keep the corresponding private key of this certificate off-line, keep the corresponding private key of this certificate offline, while
while issuing all relevant child certificates under the immediate issuing all relevant child certificates under the immediate
subordinate CA. This measure also allows the Certificate Revocation subordinate CA. This measure also allows the Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) issued by that entity to be used to revoke the subordinate List (CRL) issued by that entity to be used to revoke the subordinate
CA certificate in the event of suspected key compromise of this CA certificate in the event of suspected key compromise of this
potentially more vulnerable online operational key pair. online operational key pair that is potentially more vulnerable.
The trust anchor MUST be published at a stable URI. When the trust The trust anchor MUST be published at a stable URI. When the trust
anchor is reissued for any reason, the replacement CA certificate anchor is reissued for any reason, the replacement CA certificate
MUST be accessible using the same URI. MUST be accessible using the same URI.
Because the trust anchor is a self-signed certificate, there is no Because the trust anchor is a self-signed certificate, there is no
corresponding CRL that can be used to revoke it, nor is there a corresponding CRL that can be used to revoke it, nor is there a
manifest [RFC6486] that lists this certificate. manifest [RFC6486] that lists this certificate.
If an entity wishes to withdraw a self-signed CA certificate as a If an entity wishes to withdraw a self-signed CA certificate as a
putative trust anchor, for any reason, including key rollover, the putative trust anchor, for any reason, including key rollover, the
entity MUST remove the object from the location referenced in the entity MUST remove the object from the location referenced in the
TAL. TAL.
Where the TAL contains two or more rsync URIs, then the same self- Where the TAL contains two or more rsync URIs, then the same self-
signed CA certificate MUST be found at each referenced location. In signed CA certificate MUST be found at each referenced location. In
order to operational increase resilience, it is RECOMMENDED that the order to increase operational resilience, it is RECOMMENDED that the
domain name parts of each of these URIs resolve to distinct IP domain name parts of each of these URIs resolve to distinct IP
addresses that are used by a diverse set of repository publication addresses that are used by a diverse set of repository publication
points, and these IP addresses be included in distinct Route points, and these IP addresses be included in distinct Route Origin
Origination Authorizations (ROAs) objects signed by different CAs. Authorizations (ROAs) objects signed by different CAs.
2.3. Example 2.3. Example
rsync://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer rsync://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAovWQL2lh6knDx MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAovWQL2lh6knDx
GUG5hbtCXvvh4AOzjhDkSHlj22gn/1oiM9IeDATIwP44vhQ6L/xvuk7W6 GUG5hbtCXvvh4AOzjhDkSHlj22gn/1oiM9IeDATIwP44vhQ6L/xvuk7W6
Kfa5ygmqQ+xOZOwTWPcrUbqaQyPNxokuivzyvqVZVDecOEqs78q58mSp9 Kfa5ygmqQ+xOZOwTWPcrUbqaQyPNxokuivzyvqVZVDecOEqs78q58mSp9
nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAjkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB5OVPIa nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAjkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB5OVPIa
BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG
skipping to change at page 6, line 34 skipping to change at page 5, line 37
2. Confirm that the retrieved object is a current, self-signed RPKI 2. Confirm that the retrieved object is a current, self-signed RPKI
CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified in CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified in
[RFC6487]. [RFC6487].
3. Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key in 3. Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key in
the retrieved object. the retrieved object.
4. Perform other checks, as deemed appropriate (locally), to ensure 4. Perform other checks, as deemed appropriate (locally), to ensure
that the RP is willing to accept the entity publishing this self- that the RP is willing to accept the entity publishing this self-
signed CA certificate to be a trust anchor. These test apply to signed CA certificate to be a trust anchor. These tests apply to
the validity of attestations made in the context of the RPKI the validity of attestations made in the context of the RPKI
relating to all resources described in the INR extension of this relating to all resources described in the INR extension of this
certificate. certificate.
An RP SHOULD perform these functions for each instance of TAL that it An RP SHOULD perform these functions for each instance of TAL that it
is holding for this purpose every time the RP performs a re- is holding for this purpose every time the RP performs a
synchronization across the local repository cache. In any case, an resynchronization across the local repository cache. In any case, an
RP also SHOULD perform these functions prior to the expiration of the RP also SHOULD perform these functions prior to the expiration of the
locally cached copy of the retrieved trust anchor referenced by the locally cached copy of the retrieved trust anchor referenced by the
TAL. TAL.
In the case where a TAL contains multiple URIs, an RP MAY use a In the case where a TAL contains multiple URIs, an RP MAY use a
locally defined preference rule to select the URI to retrieve the locally defined preference rule to select the URI to retrieve the
self-signed RPKI CA certificate that is to be used as a trust anchor. self-signed RPKI CA certificate that is to be used as a trust anchor.
Some examples are: Some examples are:
o Using the order provided in the TAL o Using the order provided in the TAL
skipping to change at page 7, line 33 skipping to change at page 6, line 38
referenced self-signed CA certificate. Instead, the RP is referred referenced self-signed CA certificate. Instead, the RP is referred
to the trust anchor itself and the INR extension(s) within this to the trust anchor itself and the INR extension(s) within this
certificate. This provides necessary operational flexibility, but it certificate. This provides necessary operational flexibility, but it
also allows the certificate issuer to claim to be authoritative for also allows the certificate issuer to claim to be authoritative for
any resource. Relying parties should either have great confidence in any resource. Relying parties should either have great confidence in
the issuers of such certificates that they are configuring as trust the issuers of such certificates that they are configuring as trust
anchors, or they should issue their own self-signed certificate as a anchors, or they should issue their own self-signed certificate as a
trust anchor and, in doing so, impose constraints on the subordinate trust anchor and, in doing so, impose constraints on the subordinate
certificates. certificates.
5. IANA Considerations 5. References
[This document specifies no IANA actions.]
6. Acknowledgments
This approach to trust anchor material was originally described by
Robert Kisteleki.
The authors acknowledge the contributions of Rob Austein and Randy
Bush, who assisted with drafting this document and with helpful
review comments.
The authors acknowledge with work of Roque Gagliano, Terry Manderson
and Carlos Martinez Cagnazzo in developing the ideas behind the
inclusion of multiple URIs in the TAL.
7. References
7.1. Normative References 5.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, DOI 10.17487/ Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
RFC3779, June 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Scheme", RFC 5781, DOI 10.17487/RFC5781, February 2010, Scheme", RFC 5781, DOI 10.17487/RFC5781, February 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5781>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5781>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI 10.17487/ X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
RFC6487, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[X.509] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.509: The Directory - [X.509] ITU-T, "The Directory: Public-key and attribute
Authentication Framework", 2000. certificate frameworks", ITU-T Recommendation X.509,
ISO/IEC 9594-8, October 2012.
7.2. Informative References 5.2. Informative References
[RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. [RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R.
Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, DOI 10.17487/ Certification Path Building", RFC 4158,
RFC4158, September 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4158, September 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4158>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4158>.
[RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor [RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010, Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>. February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012, (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
Acknowledgments
This approach to trust anchor material was originally described by
Robert Kisteleki.
The authors acknowledge the contributions of Rob Austein and Randy
Bush, who assisted with drafting this document and with helpful
review comments.
The authors acknowledge with work of Roque Gagliano, Terry Manderson,
and Carlos Martinez Cagnazzo in developing the ideas behind the
inclusion of multiple URIs in the TAL.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston Geoff Huston
APNIC APNIC
Email: gih@apnic.net Email: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net URI: http://www.apnic.net
Samuel Weiler Samuel Weiler
Parsons Parsons
7110 Samuel Morse Drive 7110 Samuel Morse Drive
Columbia, Maryland 21046 Columbia, MD 21046
USA United States
Email: weiler@tislabs.com Email: weiler@tislabs.com
George Michaelson George Michaelson
APNIC APNIC
Email: ggm@apnic.net Email: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net URI: http://www.apnic.net
Stephen Kent Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies BBN Technologies
10 Moulton St. 10 Moulton St.
Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138
USA United States
Email: kent@bbn.com Email: kent@bbn.com
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