draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-00.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-01.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Standards Track R. Austein Intended status: Standards Track R. Austein
Expires: September 12, 2014 Dragon Research Labs Expires: October 6, 2014 Dragon Research Labs
March 11, 2014 April 4, 2014
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-00 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-01
Abstract Abstract
In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems of BGP In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems of BGP
announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to
receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 6480) prefix origin receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 6480) prefix origin
data from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to data from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to
deliver validated prefix origin data to routers. deliver validated prefix origin data to routers.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
skipping to change at page 1, line 35 skipping to change at page 1, line 35
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 6, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 7, line 24 skipping to change at page 7, line 24
header which end with the length field. header which end with the length field.
Flags: The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an Flags: The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an
announcement and 0 for a withdrawal. For a Prefix PDU (IPv4 or announcement and 0 for a withdrawal. For a Prefix PDU (IPv4 or
IPv6), the flag indicates whether this PDU announces a new right IPv6), the flag indicates whether this PDU announces a new right
to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously announced right; to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously announced right;
a withdraw effectively deletes one previously announced Prefix PDU a withdraw effectively deletes one previously announced Prefix PDU
with the exact same Prefix, Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System with the exact same Prefix, Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System
Number (ASN). Similarly, for a Router Key PDU, the flag indicates Number (ASN). Similarly, for a Router Key PDU, the flag indicates
whether this PDU announces a new Router Key or deletes one whether this PDU announces a new Router Key or deletes one
previously announced Router Key PDU with the exact same AS previously announced Router Key PDU with the exact same AS Number,
Numbers, subjectKeyIdentifier, and subjectPublicKeyInfo. subjectKeyIdentifier, and subjectPublicKeyInfo.
Prefix Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest Prefix Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest
prefix allowed for the prefix. prefix allowed for the prefix.
Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix
allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the Prefix allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the Prefix
Length element. Length element.
Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA. Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA.
skipping to change at page 13, line 21 skipping to change at page 13, line 21
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.10. Router Key 5.10. Router Key
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | | Protocol | PDU | | |
| Version | Type | Flags | AS Count | | Version | Type | Flags | zero |
| 1 | 9 | | | | 1 | 9 | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length | | Length |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Subject Key Identifier | | Subject Key Identifier |
| 20 octets | | 20 octets |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| AS Numbers | | AS Number |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Subject Public Key Info | | Subject Public Key Info |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
In addition to the normal boilerplate fields of an RPKI-Router PDU, In addition to the normal boilerplate fields of an RPKI-Router PDU,
the Router Key PDU has the following fields. the Router Key PDU has the following fields.
Subject Key Identifier is the 20-octet subjectKeyIdentifier (SKI) Subject Key Identifier is the 20-octet subjectKeyIdentifier (SKI)
value for the Router Key, as described in [RFC6487]. value for the Router Key, as described in [RFC6487].
AS Numbers contains one or more Autonomous System Numbers. The AS Number one Autonomous System Number.
number of ASNs is specified in the AS Count field. To simplify
comparision, the ASNs within this field MUST be sorted into
increasing numerical order considered as unsigned big-endian
32-bit integers.
Subject Public Key Info is the Router Key's subjectPublicKeyInfo as Subject Public Key Info is the Router Key's subjectPublicKeyInfo as
described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1
DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag
and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE. and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to
have one and only one Router Key PDU for a unique {SKI, ASN, Subject
Public Key} at any one point in time. Should the router client
receive a Router Key PDU with a {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key}
identical to one it already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate
Announcement Received error.
Note that a particular ASN may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs
with different Subject Public Key values, while a particular Subject
Public Key value may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs with
different ASNs. In the interest of keeping the announcement and
withdrawal semantics as simple as possible for the router, this
protocol makes no attempt to compress either of these cases.
Also note that it is possible, albeit very unlikely, for multiple
distinct Subject Public Key values to hash to the same SKI. For this
reason, implementations MUST compare Subject Public Key values as
well as SKIs when detecting duplicate PDUs.
5.11. Error Report 5.11. Error Report
This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other. This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other.
Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs. Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs.
The Error Code is described in Section 12. The Error Code is described in Section 12.
If the error is generic (e.g., "Internal Error") and not associated If the error is generic (e.g., "Internal Error") and not associated
with the PDU to which it is responding, the Erroneous PDU field MUST with the PDU to which it is responding, the Erroneous PDU field MUST
skipping to change at page 25, line 49 skipping to change at page 25, line 49
3: Invalid Request (fatal): The cache server believes the client's 3: Invalid Request (fatal): The cache server believes the client's
request to be invalid. request to be invalid.
4: Unsupported Protocol Version (fatal): The Protocol Version is not 4: Unsupported Protocol Version (fatal): The Protocol Version is not
known by the receiver of the PDU. known by the receiver of the PDU.
5: Unsupported PDU Type (fatal): The PDU Type is not known by the 5: Unsupported PDU Type (fatal): The PDU Type is not known by the
receiver of the PDU. receiver of the PDU.
6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has Flag=0 6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has Flag=0
but a record for the {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple does not but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple for an
exist in the receiver's database. IPvX PDU, {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a Router Key
PDU) does not exist in the receiver's database.
7: Duplicate Announcement Received (fatal): The received PDU has an 7: Duplicate Announcement Received (fatal): The received PDU has
identical {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple as a PDU which is Flag=1 but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple
still active in the router. for an IPvX PDU, {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a Router
Key PDU) is already active in the router.
13. Security Considerations 13. Security Considerations
As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of
security interest are described in the relevant sections. This security interest are described in the relevant sections. This
section points out issues which may not be obvious in other sections. section points out issues which may not be obvious in other sections.
Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described
in Section 11 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be in Section 11 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be
given consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation given consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation
skipping to change at page 28, line 23 skipping to change at page 28, line 25
5 Unsupported PDU Type 5 Unsupported PDU Type
6 Withdrawal of Unknown Record 6 Withdrawal of Unknown Record
7 Duplicate Announcement Received 7 Duplicate Announcement Received
255 Reserved 255 Reserved
IANA has added an SSH Connection Protocol Subsystem Name, as defined IANA has added an SSH Connection Protocol Subsystem Name, as defined
in [RFC4250], of "rpki-rtr". in [RFC4250], of "rpki-rtr".
15. Acknowledgments 15. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Steve Bellovin, Rex Fernando, Paul Hoffman, The authors wish to thank Steve Bellovin, Tim Bruijnzeels, Rex
Russ Housley, Pradosh Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, Sandy Murphy, Robert Fernando, Paul Hoffman, Russ Housley, Pradosh Mohapatra, Keyur Patel,
Raszuk, John Scudder, Ruediger Volk, and David Ward. Particular David Mandelberg, Sandy Murphy, Robert Raszuk, John Scudder, Ruediger
thanks go to Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of unnecessary Volk, Matthias Waehlisch, and David Ward. Particular thanks go to
fields. Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of unnecessary fields.
16. References 16. References
16.1. Normative References 16.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature
Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-05 (work in Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-06 (work in
progress), September 2013. progress), March 2014.
[RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982, [RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982,
August 1996. August 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
[RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 [RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5
Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998. Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998.
 End of changes. 12 change blocks. 
25 lines changed or deleted 42 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.41. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/