draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-25.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Standards Track R. Austein Intended status: Standards Track R. Austein
Expires: July 31, 2012 Dragon Research Labs Expires: August 6, 2012 Dragon Research Labs
January 28, 2012 February 3, 2012
The RPKI/Router Protocol The RPKI/Router Protocol
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-25 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26
Abstract Abstract
In order to formally validate the origin ASs of BGP announcements, In order to verifiably validate the origin ASs of BGP announcements,
routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to receive RPKI routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to receive RPKI
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] prefix origin data from a trusted cache. This [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] prefix origin data from a trusted cache. This
document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin data document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin data
to routers. to routers.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
skipping to change at page 1, line 41 skipping to change at page 1, line 41
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 31, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 6, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 19 skipping to change at page 2, line 19
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.5. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.6. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.7. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.8. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.9. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.10. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.10. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.4. Cache has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.4. Cache has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. Router-Cache Set-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8. Router-Cache Set-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In order to formally validate the origin ASs of BGP announcements, In order to verifiably validate the origin ASs of BGP announcements,
routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to receive RPKI routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to receive RPKI
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] formally validated prefix origin data from a (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to deliver cryptographically validated prefix origin data from a trusted cache.
validated prefix origin data to routers. The design is intentionally This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin
constrained to be usable on much of the current generation of ISP data to routers. The design is intentionally constrained to be
router platforms. usable on much of the current generation of ISP router platforms.
Section 3 describes the deployment structure and Section 4 then Section 3 describes the deployment structure and Section 4 then
presents an operational overview. The binary payloads of the presents an operational overview. The binary payloads of the
protocol are formally described in Section 5, and the expected PDU protocol are formally described in Section 5, and the expected PDU
sequences are described in Section 6. The transport protocol options sequences are described in Section 6. The transport protocol options
are described in Section 7. Section 8 details how routers and caches are described in Section 7. Section 8 details how routers and caches
are configured to connect and authenticate. Section 9 describes are configured to connect and authenticate. Section 9 describes
likely deployment scenarios. The traditional security and IANA likely deployment scenarios. The traditional security and IANA
considerations end the document. considerations end the document.
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distributed set of servers at the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs, see distributed set of servers at the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs, see
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct].
Cache: A coalesced copy of the RPKI which is periodically fetched/ Cache: A coalesced copy of the RPKI which is periodically fetched/
refreshed directly or indirectly from the global RPKI using the refreshed directly or indirectly from the global RPKI using the
[RFC5781] protocol/tools. Relying party software is used to [RFC5781] protocol/tools. Relying party software is used to
gather and validate the distributed data of the RPKI into a cache. gather and validate the distributed data of the RPKI into a cache.
Trusting this cache further is a matter between the provider of Trusting this cache further is a matter between the provider of
the cache and a relying party. the cache and a relying party.
Serial Number: A 32-bit monotonically increasing unsigned integer Serial Number: A 32-bit strictly increasing unsigned integer which
which wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the logical version of a wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the logical version of a
cache. A cache increments the value by one when it successfully cache. A cache increments the value when it successfully updates
updates its data from a parent cache or from primary RPKI data. its data from a parent cache or from primary RPKI data. As a
As a cache is receiving, new incoming data and implicit deletes cache is receiving, new incoming data and implicit deletes are
are marked with the new serial but MUST NOT be sent until the associated with the new serial but MUST NOT be sent until the
fetch is complete. A serial number is not commensurate between fetch is complete. A serial number is not commensurate between
caches, nor need it be maintained across resets of the cache caches, nor need it be maintained across resets of the cache
server. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too server. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too
much detail on serial number arithmetic. much detail on serial number arithmetic.
Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a session Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a session
identifier to uniquely identify the instance of the cache and to identifier to uniquely identify the instance of the cache and to
bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will
generate. This allows the router to restart a failed session generate. This allows the router to restart a failed session
knowing that the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with knowing that the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with
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5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs)
The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of
exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in
Section 6. Section 6.
Fields with unspecified content MUST be zero on transmission and MAY Fields with unspecified content MUST be zero on transmission and MAY
be ignored on receipt. be ignored on receipt.
5.1. Serial Notify 5.1. Fields of a PDU
PDUs contain the following data elements:
Protocol Version: An eight-bit unsigned integer, currently 0,
denoting the version of this protocol.
PDU Type: An eight-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the
PDU, e.g. IPv4 Prefix, etc.
Serial Number: The serial number of the RPKI Cache when this set of
PDUs was received from an up-stream cache server or gathered from
the global RPKI. A cache increments its serial number when
completing a rigorously validated update from a parent cache or
the Global RPKI.
Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a Session
ID to identify the instance of the cache and to bind it to the
sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will generate.
This allows the router to restart a failed session knowing that
the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with that of the
cache. If, at any time, either the router or the cache finds the
value of the session identifiers they hold disagree, they MUST
completely drop the session and the router MUST flush all data
learned from that cache.
Should a cache erroneously reuse a Session ID so that a router
does not realize that the session has changed (old session ID and
new session ID have same numeric value), the router may become
confused as to the content of the cache. The time it takes the
router to discover it is confused will depend on whether the
serial numbers are also reused. If the serial numbers in the old
and new sessions are different enough, the cache will respond to
the router's Serial Query with a Cache Reset, which will solve the
problem. If, however, the serial numbers are close, the cache may
respond with a Cache Response, which may not be enough to bring
the router into sync. In such cases, it's likely but not certain
that the router will detect some discrepancy between the state
that the cache expects and its own state. For example, the Cache
Response may tell the router to drop a record which the router
does not hold, or may tell the router to add a record which the
router already has. In such cases, a router will detect the error
and reset the session. The one case in which the router may stay
out of sync is when nothing in the Cache Response contradicts any
data currently held by the router.
Using persistent storage for the session identifier or a clock-
based scheme for generating session identifiers should avoid the
risk of session identifier collisions.
The Session ID might be a pseudo-random, a strictly increasing
value if the cache has reliable storage, etc.
Length: A 32-bit unsigned integer which has as its value the count
of the bytes in the entire PDU, including the eight bytes of
header which end with the length field.
Flags: The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an
announcement and 0 for a withdrawal, whether this PDU announces a
new right to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously
announced right. A withdraw effectively deletes one previously
announced IPvX Prefix PDU with the exact same Prefix, Length, Max-
Len, and ASN.
Prefix Length: An eight-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest
prefix allowed for the prefix.
Max Length: An eight-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest
prefix allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the
Prefix Length element.
Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA.
Autonomous System Number: ASN allowed to announce this prefix, a 32-
bit unsigned integer.
Zero: Fields shown as zero or reserved MUST be zero. The value of
such a field MUST be ignored on receipt.
5.2. Serial Notify
The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data. The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data.
The Session ID reassures the router that the serial numbers are The Session ID reassures the router that the serial numbers are
commensurate, i.e. the cache session has not been changed. commensurate, i.e. the cache session has not been changed.
Serial Notify is only message that the cache can send that is not in Serial Notify is only message that the cache can send that is not in
response to a message from the router. response to a message from the router.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
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+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=12 | | Length=12 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Serial Number | | Serial Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.2. Serial Query 5.3. Serial Query
Serial Query: The router sends Serial Query to ask the cache for all Serial Query: The router sends Serial Query to ask the cache for all
payload PDUs which have serial numbers higher than the serial number payload PDUs which have serial numbers higher than the serial number
in the Serial Query. in the Serial Query.
The cache replies to this query with a Cache Response PDU The cache replies to this query with a Cache Response PDU
(Section 5.4) if the cache has a, possibly null, record of the (Section 5.5) if the cache has a, possibly null, record of the
changes since the serial number specified by the router. If there changes since the serial number specified by the router. If there
have been no changes since the router last queried, the cache then have been no changes since the router last queried, the cache then
sends an End Of Data PDU. sends an End Of Data PDU.
If the cache does not have the data needed to update the router, If the cache does not have the data needed to update the router,
perhaps because its records do not go back to the Serial Number in perhaps because its records do not go back to the Serial Number in
the Serial Query, then it responds with a Cache Reset PDU the Serial Query, then it responds with a Cache Reset PDU
(Section 5.8). (Section 5.9).
The Session ID tells the cache what instance the router expects to The Session ID tells the cache what instance the router expects to
ensure that the serial numbers are commensurate, i.e. the cache ensure that the serial numbers are commensurate, i.e. the cache
session has not been changed. session has not been changed.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=12 | | Length=12 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Serial Number | | Serial Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.3. Reset Query 5.4. Reset Query
Reset Query: The router tells the cache that it wants to receive the Reset Query: The router tells the cache that it wants to receive the
total active, current, non-withdrawn, database. The cache responds total active, current, non-withdrawn, database. The cache responds
with a Cache Response PDU (Section 5.4). with a Cache Response PDU (Section 5.5).
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | reserved = zero |
| 0 | 2 | | | 0 | 2 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.4. Cache Response 5.5. Cache Response
Cache Response: The cache responds with zero or more payload PDUs. Cache Response: The cache responds with zero or more payload PDUs.
When replying to a Serial Query request (Section 5.2), the cache When replying to a Serial Query request (Section 5.3), the cache
sends the set of all data records it has with serial numbers greater sends the set of all data records it has with serial numbers greater
than that sent by the client router. When replying to a Reset Query, than that sent by the client router. When replying to a Reset Query,
the cache sends the set of all data records it has; in this case the the cache sends the set of all data records it has; in this case the
withdraw/announce field in the payload PDUs MUST have the value 1 withdraw/announce field in the payload PDUs MUST have the value 1
(announce). (announce).
In response to a Reset Query, the new value of the Session ID tells In response to a Reset Query, the new value of the Session ID tells
the router the instance of the cache session for future confirmation. the router the instance of the cache session for future confirmation.
In response to a Serial Query, the Session ID being the same In response to a Serial Query, the Session ID being the same
reassures the router that the serial numbers are commensurate, i.e. reassures the router that the serial numbers are commensurate, i.e.
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.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 3 | | | 0 | 3 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.5. IPv4 Prefix 5.6. IPv4 Prefix
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | reserved = zero |
| 0 | 4 | | | 0 | 4 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=20 | | Length=20 |
| | | |
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len, asn}, but a different validation path in the RPKI. This is len, asn}, but a different validation path in the RPKI. This is
important to the RPKI, but not to the router. important to the RPKI, but not to the router.
The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to
have one and only one IPvX PDU for a unique {prefix, len, max-len, have one and only one IPvX PDU for a unique {prefix, len, max-len,
asn} at any one point in time. Should the router client receive an asn} at any one point in time. Should the router client receive an
IPvX PDU with a {prefix, len, max-len, asn} identical to one it IPvX PDU with a {prefix, len, max-len, asn} identical to one it
already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate Announcement Received already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate Announcement Received
error. error.
5.6. IPv6 Prefix 5.7. IPv6 Prefix
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | reserved = zero |
| 0 | 6 | | | 0 | 6 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=32 | | Length=32 |
| | | |
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+--- ---+ +--- ---+
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Autonomous System Number | | Autonomous System Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, 96 more bits no magic. Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, 96 more bits no magic.
5.7. End of Data 5.8. End of Data
End of Data: Cache tells router it has no more data for the request. End of Data: Cache tells router it has no more data for the request.
The Session ID MUST be the same as that of the corresponding Cache The Session ID MUST be the same as that of the corresponding Cache
Response which began the, possibly null, sequence of data PDUs. Response which began the, possibly null, sequence of data PDUs.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
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+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=12 | | Length=12 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Serial Number | | Serial Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.8. Cache Reset 5.9. Cache Reset
The cache may respond to a Serial Query informing the router that the The cache may respond to a Serial Query informing the router that the
cache cannot provide an incremental update starting from the serial cache cannot provide an incremental update starting from the serial
number specified by the router. The router must decide whether to number specified by the router. The router must decide whether to
issue a Reset Query or switch to a different cache. issue a Reset Query or switch to a different cache.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | reserved = zero |
| 0 | 8 | | | 0 | 8 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.9. Error Report 5.10. Error Report
This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other. This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other.
Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs. Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs.
The Error Code is described in Section 10. The Error Code is described in Section 10.
If the error is not associated with any particular PDU, the Erroneous If the error is not associated with any particular PDU, the Erroneous
PDU field MUST be empty and the Length of Encapsulated PDU field MUST PDU field MUST be empty and the Length of Encapsulated PDU field MUST
be zero. be zero.
An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU. If an An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU. If an
erroneous Error Report PDU is received, the session SHOULD be erroneous Error Report PDU is received, the session SHOULD be
dropped. dropped.
If the error is associated with a PDU of excessive (too long to be If the error is associated with a PDU of excessive length, i.e. too
any legal PDU other than another Error Report), or possibly corrupt, long to be any legal PDU other than another Error Report, or possibly
length, the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated. corrupt length, the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated.
The diagnostic text is optional, if not present the Length of Error The diagnostic text is optional, if not present the Length of Error
Text field SHOULD be zero. If error text is present, it SHOULD be a Text field MUST be zero. If error text is present, it MUST be a
string in US-ASCII, for maximum portability; if non-US-ASCII string in UTF-8 encoding (see [RFC3269]).
characters are absolutely required, the error text MUST use UTF-8
encoding.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Error Code | | Version | Type | Error Code |
| 0 | 10 | | | 0 | 10 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length | | Length |
| | | |
skipping to change at page 11, line 44 skipping to change at page 13, line 42
| Length of Error Text | | Length of Error Text |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Arbitrary Text | | Arbitrary Text |
| of | | of |
~ Error Diagnostic Message ~ ~ Error Diagnostic Message ~
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.10. Fields of a PDU
PDUs contain the following data elements:
Protocol Version: An eight-bit unsigned integer, currently 0,
denoting the version of this protocol.
PDU Type: An eight-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the
PDU, e.g. IPv4 Prefix, etc.
Serial Number: The serial number of the RPKI Cache when this ROA was
received from the cache's up-stream cache server or gathered from
the global RPKI. A cache increments its serial number when
completing an rigorously validated update from a parent cache, for
example via rcynic. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic
for too much detail on serial number arithmetic.
Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a Session
ID to identify the instance of the cache and to bind it to the
sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will generate.
This allows the router to restart a failed session knowing that
the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with that of the
cache. If, at any time, either the router or the cache finds the
value of the session identifiers they hold disagree, they MUST
completely drop the session and the router MUST flush all data
learned from that cache.
Should a cache erroneously reuse a Session ID so that a router
does not realize that the session has changed (old session ID and
new session ID have same numeric value), the router may become
confused as to the content of the cache. The time it takes the
router to discover it is confused will depend on whether the
serial numbers are also reused. If the serial numbers in the old
and new sessions are different enough, the cache will respond to
the router's Serial Query with a Cache Reset, which will solve the
problem. If, however, the serial numbers are close, the cache may
respond with a Cache Response, which may not be enough to bring
the router into sync. In such cases, it's likely but not certain
that the router will detect some discrepancy between the state
that the cache expects and its own state. For example, the Cache
Response may tell the router to drop a record which the router
does not hold, or may tell the router to add a record which the
router already has. In such cases, a router will detect the error
and reset the session. The one case in which the router may stay
out of sync is when nothing in the Cache Response contradicts any
data currently held by the router.
Using persistent storage for the session identifier or a clock-
based scheme for generating session identifiers should avoid the
risk of session identifier collisions.
The Session ID might be a pseudo-random, a monotonically
increasing value if the cache has reliable storage, etc.
Length: A 32-bit unsigned integer which has as its value the count
of the bytes in the entire PDU, including the eight bytes of
header which end with the length field.
Flags: The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an
announcement and 0 for a withdrawal, whether this PDU announces a
new right to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously
announced right. A withdraw effectively deletes one previously
announced IPvX Prefix PDU with the exact same Prefix, Length, Max-
Len, and ASN.
Prefix Length: An eight-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest
prefix allowed for the prefix.
Max Length: An eight-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest
prefix allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the
Prefix Length element.
Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA.
Autonomous System Number: ASN allowed to announce this prefix, a 32-
bit unsigned integer.
Zero: Fields shown as zero or reserved MUST be zero. The value of
such a field MUST be ignored on receipt.
6. Protocol Sequences 6. Protocol Sequences
The sequences of PDU transmissions fall into three conversations as The sequences of PDU transmissions fall into three conversations as
follows: follows:
6.1. Start or Restart 6.1. Start or Restart
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| <----- Reset Query -------- | R requests data (or Serial Query) | <----- Reset Query -------- | R requests data (or Serial Query)
skipping to change at page 16, line 40 skipping to change at page 17, line 22
To reduce exposure to dropped but non-terminated sessions, both To reduce exposure to dropped but non-terminated sessions, both
caches and routers SHOULD enable keep alives when available in the caches and routers SHOULD enable keep alives when available in the
chosen transport protocol. chosen transport protocol.
It is expected that, when TCP-AO [RFC5925] is available on all It is expected that, when TCP-AO [RFC5925] is available on all
platforms deployed by operators, it will become the mandatory to platforms deployed by operators, it will become the mandatory to
implement transport. implement transport.
Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport over TCP Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport over TCP
using a port, rpki-rtr, to be assigned, see Section 12. Operators using a port, rpki-rtr, to be assigned, see Section 12. Operators
SHOULD use procedural means, e.g. access control lists (ACLs), ... to SHOULD use procedural means, e.g. access control lists (ACLs), to
reduce the exposure to authentication issues. reduce the exposure to authentication issues.
Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO, SSHv2, TCP MD5, or IPsec Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO, SSHv2, TCP MD5, or IPsec
transport. transport.
If unprotected TCP is the transport, the cache and routers MUST be on If unprotected TCP is the transport, the cache and routers MUST be on
the same trusted and controlled network. the same trusted and controlled network.
If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the
following more protected protocols. following more protected protocols.
skipping to change at page 18, line 7 skipping to change at page 18, line 39
Cache servers supporting SSH transport MUST accept RSA and DSA Cache servers supporting SSH transport MUST accept RSA and DSA
authentication, and SHOULD accept ECDSA authentication. User authentication, and SHOULD accept ECDSA authentication. User
authentication MUST be supported; host authentication MAY be authentication MUST be supported; host authentication MAY be
supported. Implementations MAY support password authentication. supported. Implementations MAY support password authentication.
Client routers SHOULD verify the public key of the cache, to avoid Client routers SHOULD verify the public key of the cache, to avoid
monkey in the middle attacks. monkey in the middle attacks.
7.2. TLS Transport 7.2. TLS Transport
Client routers using TLS transport MUST use client-side certificates Client routers using TLS transport MUST present client-side
for authentication. While in principle any type of certificate and certificates to authenticate themselves to the cache, to allow the
certificate authority may be used, in general cache operators will cache to manage load by rejecting connections from unauthorized
generally wish to create their own small-scale CA and issue routers. While in principle any type of certificate and certificate
certificates to each authorized router. This simplifies credential authority (CA) may be used, in general cache operators will generally
roll-over; any unrevoked, unexpired certificate from the proper CA wish to create their own small-scale CA and issue certificates to
may be used. If such certificates are used, the CN field [RFC5280] each authorized router. This simplifies credential roll-over; any
MUST be used to denote the router's identity. unrevoked, unexpired certificate from the proper CA may be used.
Clients SHOULD verify the cache's certificate as well, to avoid Certificates used to authenticate client routers in this protocol
monkey in the middle attacks. MUST include a subjectAltName extension [RFC5280] containing one or
more iPAddress identities; when authenticating the router's
certificate, the cache MUST check the IP address of the TLS
connection against these iPAddress identities and SHOULD reject the
connection if none of the iPAddress identities match the connection.
Routers MUST also verify the cache's TLS server certificate, using
subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [RFC6125], to avoid
monkey in the middle attacks. The rules and guidelines defined in
[RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations:
Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity
in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED in rpki-rtr server
and client implementations which use TLS. Certification
authorities which issue rpki-rtr server certificates MUST support
the DNS-ID identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST be
present in rpki-rtr server certificates.
DNS names in rpki-rtr server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the
wildcard character "*".
rpki-rtr implementations which use TLS MUST NOT use CN-ID
identifiers; a CN field may be present in the server certificate's
subject name, but MUST NOT be used for authentication within the
rules described in [RFC6125].
The client router MUST set its "reference identifier" to the DNS
name of the rpki-rtr cache.
7.3. TCP MD5 Transport 7.3. TCP MD5 Transport
If TCP-MD5 is used, implementations MUST support key lengths of at If TCP-MD5 is used, implementations MUST support key lengths of at
least 80 printable ASCII bytes, per section 4.5 of [RFC2385]. least 80 printable ASCII bytes, per section 4.5 of [RFC2385].
Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences of at least Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences of at least
32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits.
Key rollover with TCP-MD5 is problematic. Cache servers SHOULD Key rollover with TCP-MD5 is problematic. Cache servers SHOULD
support [RFC4808]. support [RFC4808].
skipping to change at page 20, line 41 skipping to change at page 22, line 9
To keep load on global RPKI services from unnecessary peaks, it is To keep load on global RPKI services from unnecessary peaks, it is
recommended that primary caches which load from the distributed recommended that primary caches which load from the distributed
global RPKI not do so all at the same times, e.g. on the hour. global RPKI not do so all at the same times, e.g. on the hour.
Choose a random time, perhaps the ISP's AS number modulo 60 and Choose a random time, perhaps the ISP's AS number modulo 60 and
jitter the inter-fetch timing. jitter the inter-fetch timing.
10. Error Codes 10. Error Codes
This section contains a preliminary list of error codes. The authors This section contains a preliminary list of error codes. The authors
expect additions to this section during development of the initial expect additions to this section during development of the initial
implementations. Errors which are considered fatal SHOULD cause the implementations. There is an IANA registry where valid error codes
session to be dropped. are listed, see Section 12. Errors which are considered fatal SHOULD
cause the session to be dropped.
0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to 0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to
be corrupt in a manner not specified by other error codes. be corrupt in a manner not specified by other error codes.
1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced 1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced
some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran
out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera). out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera).
2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good 2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good
working order, but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a working order, but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a
skipping to change at page 24, line 24 skipping to change at page 25, line 37
[RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982, [RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982,
August 1996. August 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 [RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5
Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998. Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998.
[RFC3269] Kermode, R. and L. Vicisano, "Author Guidelines for
Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Building Blocks and
Protocol Instantiation documents", RFC 3269, April 2002.
[RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006. Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006.
[RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006. Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. May 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP [RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010. Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.
[RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms [RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms
for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926, for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,
June 2010. June 2010.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
14.2. Informative References 14.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-13 (work in Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-13 (work in
progress), May 2011. progress), May 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]
Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", Resource Certificate Repository Structure",
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