draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26.txt   rfc6810.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Request for Comments: 6810 Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Standards Track R. Austein Category: Standards Track R. Austein
Expires: August 6, 2012 Dragon Research Labs ISSN: 2070-1721 Dragon Research Labs
February 3, 2012 January 2013
The RPKI/Router Protocol The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26
Abstract Abstract
In order to verifiably validate the origin ASs of BGP announcements, In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems of BGP
routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to receive RPKI announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] prefix origin data from a trusted cache. This receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 6480) prefix origin
document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin data data from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to
to routers. deliver validated prefix origin data to routers.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the Status of This Memo
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering This is an Internet Standards Track document.
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 6, 2012. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.10. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.10. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.4. Cache has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.4. Cache Has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. Router-Cache Set-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 8. Router-Cache Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 9. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 10. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In order to verifiably validate the origin ASs of BGP announcements, In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems (ASes)
routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to receive RPKI of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to
(Resource Public Key Infrastructure) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]
cryptographically validated prefix origin data from a trusted cache. cryptographically validated prefix origin data from a trusted cache.
This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin
data to routers. The design is intentionally constrained to be data to routers. The design is intentionally constrained to be
usable on much of the current generation of ISP router platforms. usable on much of the current generation of ISP router platforms.
Section 3 describes the deployment structure and Section 4 then Section 3 describes the deployment structure, and Section 4 then
presents an operational overview. The binary payloads of the presents an operational overview. The binary payloads of the
protocol are formally described in Section 5, and the expected PDU protocol are formally described in Section 5, and the expected PDU
sequences are described in Section 6. The transport protocol options sequences are described in Section 6. The transport protocol options
are described in Section 7. Section 8 details how routers and caches are described in Section 7. Section 8 details how routers and caches
are configured to connect and authenticate. Section 9 describes are configured to connect and authenticate. Section 9 describes
likely deployment scenarios. The traditional security and IANA likely deployment scenarios. The traditional security and IANA
considerations end the document. considerations end the document.
The protocol is extensible to support new PDUs with new semantics The protocol is extensible in order to support new PDUs with new
when and as needed, as indicated by deployment experience. PDUs are semantics, if deployment experience indicates they are needed. PDUs
versioned should deployment experience call for change. are versioned should deployment experience call for change.
For an implementation (not inter-op) report, see For an implementation (not interoperability) report, see [RTR-IMPL]
[I-D.ymbk-rpki-rtr-impl]
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]
only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in
lower or mixed case as English words, without special meaning.
2. Glossary 2. Glossary
The following terms are used with special meaning: The following terms are used with special meaning.
Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a
distributed set of servers at the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs, see distributed set of servers at the IANA, Regional Internet
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. Registries (RIRs), National Internet Registry (NIRs), and ISPs;
see [RFC6481].
Cache: A coalesced copy of the RPKI which is periodically fetched/ Cache: A coalesced copy of the RPKI, which is periodically fetched/
refreshed directly or indirectly from the global RPKI using the refreshed directly or indirectly from the Global RPKI using the
[RFC5781] protocol/tools. Relying party software is used to [RFC5781] protocol/tools. Relying party software is used to
gather and validate the distributed data of the RPKI into a cache. gather and validate the distributed data of the RPKI into a cache.
Trusting this cache further is a matter between the provider of Trusting this cache further is a matter between the provider of
the cache and a relying party. the cache and a relying party.
Serial Number: A 32-bit strictly increasing unsigned integer which Serial Number: A 32-bit strictly increasing unsigned integer that
wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the logical version of a wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the logical version of a
cache. A cache increments the value when it successfully updates cache. A cache increments the value when it successfully updates
its data from a parent cache or from primary RPKI data. As a its data from a parent cache or from primary RPKI data. As a
cache is receiving, new incoming data and implicit deletes are cache is receiving, new incoming data and implicit deletes are
associated with the new serial but MUST NOT be sent until the associated with the new serial but MUST NOT be sent until the
fetch is complete. A serial number is not commensurate between fetch is complete. A Serial Number is not commensurate between
caches, nor need it be maintained across resets of the cache caches, nor need it be maintained across resets of the cache
server. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too server. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too
much detail on serial number arithmetic. much detail on the topic.
Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a session Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a session
identifier to uniquely identify the instance of the cache and to identifier to uniquely identify the instance of the cache and to
bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will
generate. This allows the router to restart a failed session generate. This allows the router to restart a failed session
knowing that the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with knowing that the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with
that of the cache. that of the cache.
3. Deployment Structure 3. Deployment Structure
Deployment of the RPKI to reach routers has a three level structure Deployment of the RPKI to reach routers has a three-level structure
as follows: as follows:
Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a
distributed set of servers, RPKI publication repositories, e.g. distributed set of servers, RPKI publication repositories, e.g.,
the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs, see [RFC6481].
Local Caches: A local set of one or more collected and verified Local Caches: A local set of one or more collected and verified
caches. A relying party, e.g. router or other client, MUST have a caches. A relying party, e.g., router or other client, MUST have
trust relationship with, and a trusted transport channel to, any a trust relationship with, and a trusted transport channel to, any
authoritative cache(s) it uses. authoritative cache(s) it uses.
Routers: A router fetches data from a local cache using the protocol Routers: A router fetches data from a local cache using the protocol
described in this document. It is said to be a client of the described in this document. It is said to be a client of the
cache. There MAY be mechanisms for the router to assure itself of cache. There MAY be mechanisms for the router to assure itself of
the authenticity of the cache and to authenticate itself to the the authenticity of the cache and to authenticate itself to the
cache. cache.
4. Operational Overview 4. Operational Overview
A router establishes and keeps open a connection to one or more A router establishes and keeps open a connection to one or more
caches with which it has client/server relationships. It is caches with which it has client/server relationships. It is
configured with a semi-ordered list of caches, and establishes a configured with a semi-ordered list of caches, and establishes a
connection to the most preferred cache, or set of caches, which connection to the most preferred cache, or set of caches, which
accept the connections. accept the connections.
The router MUST choose the most preferred, by configuration, cache or The router MUST choose the most preferred, by configuration, cache or
set of caches so that the operator may control load on their caches set of caches so that the operator may control load on their caches
and the Global RPKI. and the Global RPKI.
Periodically, the router sends to the cache the serial number of the Periodically, the router sends to the cache the Serial Number of the
highest numbered data it has received from that cache, i.e. the highest numbered data it has received from that cache, i.e., the
router's current serial number. When a router establishes a new router's current Serial Number. When a router establishes a new
connection to a cache, or wishes to reset a current relationship, it connection to a cache, or wishes to reset a current relationship, it
sends a Reset Query. sends a Reset Query.
The Cache responds with all data records which have serial numbers The Cache responds with all data records that have Serial Numbers
greater than that in the router's query. This may be the null set, greater than that in the router's query. This may be the null set,
in which case the End of Data PDU is still sent. Note that 'greater' in which case the End of Data PDU is still sent. Note that 'greater'
must take wrap-around into account, see [RFC1982]. must take wrap-around into account, see [RFC1982].
When the router has received all data records from the cache, it sets When the router has received all data records from the cache, it sets
its current serial number to that of the serial number in the End of its current Serial Number to that of the Serial Number in the End of
Data PDU. Data PDU.
When the cache updates its database, it sends a Notify message to When the cache updates its database, it sends a Notify message to
every currently connected router. This is a hint that now would be a every currently connected router. This is a hint that now would be a
good time for the router to poll for an update, but is only a hint. good time for the router to poll for an update, but is only a hint.
The protocol requires the router to poll for updates periodically in The protocol requires the router to poll for updates periodically in
any case. any case.
Strictly speaking, a router could track a cache simply by asking for Strictly speaking, a router could track a cache simply by asking for
a complete data set every time it updates, but this would be very a complete data set every time it updates, but this would be very
inefficient. The serial number based incremental update mechanism inefficient. The Serial Number based incremental update mechanism
allows an efficient transfer of just the data records which have allows an efficient transfer of just the data records that have
changed since last update. As with any update protocol based on changed since last update. As with any update protocol based on
incremental transfers, the router must be prepared to fall back to a incremental transfers, the router must be prepared to fall back to a
full transfer if for any reason the cache is unable to provide the full transfer if for any reason the cache is unable to provide the
necessary incremental data. Unlike some incremental transfer necessary incremental data. Unlike some incremental transfer
protocols, this protocol requires the router to make an explicit protocols, this protocol requires the router to make an explicit
request to start the fallback process; this is deliberate, as the request to start the fallback process; this is deliberate, as the
cache has no way of knowing whether the router has also established cache has no way of knowing whether the router has also established
sessions with other caches that may be able to provide better sessions with other caches that may be able to provide better
service. service.
As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs (Route Origin As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs (Route Origin
Attestations, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]) which are time dependent, Attestations; see [RFC6480]), which are time dependent, servers'
servers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an hour.
hour.
5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs)
The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of
exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in
Section 6. Section 6.
Fields with unspecified content MUST be zero on transmission and MAY Fields with unspecified content MUST be zero on transmission and MAY
be ignored on receipt. be ignored on receipt.
5.1. Fields of a PDU 5.1. Fields of a PDU
PDUs contain the following data elements: PDUs contain the following data elements:
Protocol Version: An eight-bit unsigned integer, currently 0, Protocol Version: An eight-bit unsigned integer, currently 0,
denoting the version of this protocol. denoting the version of this protocol.
PDU Type: An eight-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the PDU Type: An eight-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the
PDU, e.g. IPv4 Prefix, etc. PDU, e.g., IPv4 Prefix, etc.
Serial Number: The serial number of the RPKI Cache when this set of Serial Number: The Serial Number of the RPKI Cache when this set of
PDUs was received from an up-stream cache server or gathered from PDUs was received from an upstream cache server or gathered from
the global RPKI. A cache increments its serial number when the Global RPKI. A cache increments its Serial Number when
completing a rigorously validated update from a parent cache or completing a rigorously validated update from a parent cache or
the Global RPKI. the Global RPKI.
Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a Session Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a Session
ID to identify the instance of the cache and to bind it to the ID to identify the instance of the cache and to bind it to the
sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will generate. sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will generate.
This allows the router to restart a failed session knowing that This allows the router to restart a failed session knowing that
the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with that of the the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with that of the
cache. If, at any time, either the router or the cache finds the cache. If, at any time, either the router or the cache finds the
value of the session identifiers they hold disagree, they MUST value of the session identifier is not the same as the other's,
completely drop the session and the router MUST flush all data they MUST completely drop the session and the router MUST flush
learned from that cache. all data learned from that cache.
Should a cache erroneously reuse a Session ID so that a router Should a cache erroneously reuse a Session ID so that a router
does not realize that the session has changed (old session ID and does not realize that the session has changed (old session ID and
new session ID have same numeric value), the router may become new session ID have same numeric value), the router may become
confused as to the content of the cache. The time it takes the confused as to the content of the cache. The time it takes the
router to discover it is confused will depend on whether the router to discover it is confused will depend on whether the
serial numbers are also reused. If the serial numbers in the old Serial Numbers are also reused. If the Serial Numbers in the old
and new sessions are different enough, the cache will respond to and new sessions are different enough, the cache will respond to
the router's Serial Query with a Cache Reset, which will solve the the router's Serial Query with a Cache Reset, which will solve the
problem. If, however, the serial numbers are close, the cache may problem. If, however, the Serial Numbers are close, the cache may
respond with a Cache Response, which may not be enough to bring respond with a Cache Response, which may not be enough to bring
the router into sync. In such cases, it's likely but not certain the router into sync. In such cases, it's likely but not certain
that the router will detect some discrepancy between the state that the router will detect some discrepancy between the state
that the cache expects and its own state. For example, the Cache that the cache expects and its own state. For example, the Cache
Response may tell the router to drop a record which the router Response may tell the router to drop a record that the router does
does not hold, or may tell the router to add a record which the not hold, or may tell the router to add a record that the router
router already has. In such cases, a router will detect the error already has. In such cases, a router will detect the error and
and reset the session. The one case in which the router may stay reset the session. The one case in which the router may stay out
out of sync is when nothing in the Cache Response contradicts any of sync is when nothing in the Cache Response contradicts any data
data currently held by the router. currently held by the router.
Using persistent storage for the session identifier or a clock- Using persistent storage for the session identifier or a clock-
based scheme for generating session identifiers should avoid the based scheme for generating session identifiers should avoid the
risk of session identifier collisions. risk of session identifier collisions.
The Session ID might be a pseudo-random, a strictly increasing The Session ID might be a pseudo-random value, a strictly
value if the cache has reliable storage, etc. increasing value if the cache has reliable storage, etc.
Length: A 32-bit unsigned integer which has as its value the count Length: A 32-bit unsigned integer that has as its value the count of
of the bytes in the entire PDU, including the eight bytes of the bytes in the entire PDU, including the eight bytes of header
header which end with the length field. that end with the length field.
Flags: The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an Flags: The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an
announcement and 0 for a withdrawal, whether this PDU announces a announcement and 0 for a withdrawal, whether this PDU announces a
new right to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously new right to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously
announced right. A withdraw effectively deletes one previously announced right. A withdraw effectively deletes one previously
announced IPvX Prefix PDU with the exact same Prefix, Length, Max- announced IPvX (IPv4 or IPv6) Prefix PDU with the exact same
Len, and ASN. Prefix, Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System Number (ASN).
Prefix Length: An eight-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest Prefix Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest
prefix allowed for the prefix. prefix allowed for the prefix.
Max Length: An eight-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix
prefix allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the Prefix
Prefix Length element. Length element.
Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA. Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA.
Autonomous System Number: ASN allowed to announce this prefix, a 32- Autonomous System Number: ASN allowed to announce this prefix, a
bit unsigned integer. 32-bit unsigned integer.
Zero: Fields shown as zero or reserved MUST be zero. The value of Zero: Fields shown as zero or reserved MUST be zero. The value of
such a field MUST be ignored on receipt. such a field MUST be ignored on receipt.
5.2. Serial Notify 5.2. Serial Notify
The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data. The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data.
The Session ID reassures the router that the serial numbers are The Session ID reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are
commensurate, i.e. the cache session has not been changed. commensurate, i.e., the cache session has not been changed.
Serial Notify is only message that the cache can send that is not in Serial Notify is the only message that the cache can send that is not
response to a message from the router. in response to a message from the router.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=12 | | Length=12 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Serial Number | | Serial Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.3. Serial Query 5.3. Serial Query
Serial Query: The router sends Serial Query to ask the cache for all Serial Query: The router sends Serial Query to ask the cache for all
payload PDUs which have serial numbers higher than the serial number payload PDUs that have Serial Numbers higher than the Serial Number
in the Serial Query. in the Serial Query.
The cache replies to this query with a Cache Response PDU The cache replies to this query with a Cache Response PDU
(Section 5.5) if the cache has a, possibly null, record of the (Section 5.5) if the cache has a, possibly null, record of the
changes since the serial number specified by the router. If there changes since the Serial Number specified by the router. If there
have been no changes since the router last queried, the cache then have been no changes since the router last queried, the cache sends
sends an End Of Data PDU. an End Of Data PDU.
If the cache does not have the data needed to update the router, If the cache does not have the data needed to update the router,
perhaps because its records do not go back to the Serial Number in perhaps because its records do not go back to the Serial Number in
the Serial Query, then it responds with a Cache Reset PDU the Serial Query, then it responds with a Cache Reset PDU
(Section 5.9). (Section 5.9).
The Session ID tells the cache what instance the router expects to The Session ID tells the cache what instance the router expects to
ensure that the serial numbers are commensurate, i.e. the cache ensure that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., the cache
session has not been changed. session has not been changed.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=12 | | Length=12 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Serial Number | | Serial Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.4. Reset Query 5.4. Reset Query
Reset Query: The router tells the cache that it wants to receive the Reset Query: The router tells the cache that it wants to receive the
total active, current, non-withdrawn, database. The cache responds total active, current, non-withdrawn database. The cache responds
with a Cache Response PDU (Section 5.5). with a Cache Response PDU (Section 5.5).
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | reserved = zero |
| 0 | 2 | | | 0 | 2 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.5. Cache Response 5.5. Cache Response
Cache Response: The cache responds with zero or more payload PDUs. Cache Response: The cache responds with zero or more payload PDUs.
When replying to a Serial Query request (Section 5.3), the cache When replying to a Serial Query request (Section 5.3), the cache
sends the set of all data records it has with serial numbers greater sends the set of all data records it has with Serial Numbers greater
than that sent by the client router. When replying to a Reset Query, than that sent by the client router. When replying to a Reset Query,
the cache sends the set of all data records it has; in this case the the cache sends the set of all data records it has; in this case, the
withdraw/announce field in the payload PDUs MUST have the value 1 withdraw/announce field in the payload PDUs MUST have the value 1
(announce). (announce).
In response to a Reset Query, the new value of the Session ID tells In response to a Reset Query, the new value of the Session ID tells
the router the instance of the cache session for future confirmation. the router the instance of the cache session for future confirmation.
In response to a Serial Query, the Session ID being the same In response to a Serial Query, the Session ID being the same
reassures the router that the serial numbers are commensurate, i.e. reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e.,
the cache session has not changed. the cache session has not changed.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 3 | | | 0 | 3 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
skipping to change at page 10, line 45 skipping to change at page 10, line 45
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Autonomous System Number | | Autonomous System Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an announcement and The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an announcement and
0 for a withdrawal. 0 for a withdrawal.
In the RPKI, nothing prevents a signing certificate from issuing two In the RPKI, nothing prevents a signing certificate from issuing two
identical ROAs. In this case there would be no semantic difference identical ROAs. In this case, there would be no semantic difference
between the objects, merely a process redundancy. between the objects, merely a process redundancy.
In the RPKI, there is also an actual need for what might appear to a In the RPKI, there is also an actual need for what might appear to a
router as identical IPvX (IPv4 or IPv6) PDUs. This can occur when an router as identical IPvX PDUs. This can occur when an upstream
upstream certificate is being reissued or there is an address certificate is being reissued or there is an address ownership
ownership transfer up the validation chain. The ROA would be transfer up the validation chain. The ROA would be identical in the
identical in the router sense, i.e. have the same {prefix, len, max- router sense, i.e., have the same {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN}, but a
len, asn}, but a different validation path in the RPKI. This is different validation path in the RPKI. This is important to the
important to the RPKI, but not to the router. RPKI, but not to the router.
The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to
have one and only one IPvX PDU for a unique {prefix, len, max-len, have one and only one IPvX PDU for a unique {Prefix, Len, Max-Len,
asn} at any one point in time. Should the router client receive an ASN} at any one point in time. Should the router client receive an
IPvX PDU with a {prefix, len, max-len, asn} identical to one it IPvX PDU with a {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} identical to one it
already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate Announcement Received already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate Announcement Received
error. error.
5.7. IPv6 Prefix 5.7. IPv6 Prefix
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | reserved = zero |
| 0 | 6 | | | 0 | 6 | |
skipping to change at page 11, line 43 skipping to change at page 11, line 44
+--- IPv6 Prefix ---+ +--- IPv6 Prefix ---+
| | | |
+--- ---+ +--- ---+
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Autonomous System Number | | Autonomous System Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, 96 more bits no magic. Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, it has 96 more bits and no magic.
5.8. End of Data 5.8. End of Data
End of Data: Cache tells router it has no more data for the request. End of Data: The cache tells the router it has no more data for the
request.
The Session ID MUST be the same as that of the corresponding Cache The Session ID MUST be the same as that of the corresponding Cache
Response which began the, possibly null, sequence of data PDUs. Response that began the, possibly null, sequence of data PDUs.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 7 | | | 0 | 7 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=12 | | Length=12 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Serial Number | | Serial Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.9. Cache Reset 5.9. Cache Reset
The cache may respond to a Serial Query informing the router that the The cache may respond to a Serial Query informing the router that the
cache cannot provide an incremental update starting from the serial cache cannot provide an incremental update starting from the Serial
number specified by the router. The router must decide whether to Number specified by the router. The router must decide whether to
issue a Reset Query or switch to a different cache. issue a Reset Query or switch to a different cache.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | reserved = zero |
| 0 | 8 | | | 0 | 8 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
skipping to change at page 12, line 46 skipping to change at page 13, line 5
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.10. Error Report 5.10. Error Report
This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other. This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other.
Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs. Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs.
The Error Code is described in Section 10. The Error Code is described in Section 10.
If the error is not associated with any particular PDU, the Erroneous If the error is generic (e.g., "Internal Error") and not associated
PDU field MUST be empty and the Length of Encapsulated PDU field MUST with the PDU to which it is responding, the Erroneous PDU field MUST
be zero. be empty and the Length of Encapsulated PDU field MUST be zero.
An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU. If an An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU. If an
erroneous Error Report PDU is received, the session SHOULD be erroneous Error Report PDU is received, the session SHOULD be
dropped. dropped.
If the error is associated with a PDU of excessive length, i.e. too If the error is associated with a PDU of excessive length, i.e., too
long to be any legal PDU other than another Error Report, or possibly long to be any legal PDU other than another Error Report, or a
corrupt length, the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated. possibly corrupt length, the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated.
The diagnostic text is optional, if not present the Length of Error The diagnostic text is optional; if not present, the Length of Error
Text field MUST be zero. If error text is present, it MUST be a Text field MUST be zero. If error text is present, it MUST be a
string in UTF-8 encoding (see [RFC3269]). string in UTF-8 encoding (see [RFC3269]).
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Error Code | | Version | Type | Error Code |
| 0 | 10 | | | 0 | 10 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
skipping to change at page 14, line 26 skipping to change at page 14, line 31
| | and sends new serial | | and sends new serial
~ ~ ~ ~
When a transport session is first established, the router MAY send a When a transport session is first established, the router MAY send a
Reset Query and the cache responds with a data sequence of all data Reset Query and the cache responds with a data sequence of all data
it contains. it contains.
Alternatively, if the router has significant unexpired data from a Alternatively, if the router has significant unexpired data from a
broken session with the same cache, it MAY start with a Serial Query broken session with the same cache, it MAY start with a Serial Query
containing the Session ID from the previous session to ensure the containing the Session ID from the previous session to ensure the
serial numbers are commensurate. Serial Numbers are commensurate.
This Reset Query sequence is also used when the router receives a This Reset Query sequence is also used when the router receives a
Cache Reset, chooses a new cache, or fears that it has otherwise lost Cache Reset, chooses a new cache, or fears that it has otherwise lost
its way. its way.
To limit the length of time a cache must keep the data necessary to To limit the length of time a cache must keep the data necessary to
generate incremental updates, a router MUST send either a Serial generate incremental updates, a router MUST send either a Serial
Query or a Reset Query no less frequently than once an hour. This Query or a Reset Query no less frequently than once an hour. This
also acts as a keep alive at the application layer. also acts as a keep-alive at the application layer.
As the cache MAY not keep updates for little more than one hour, the As the cache MAY not keep updates for little more than one hour, the
router MUST have a polling interval of no greater than once an hour. router MUST have a polling interval of no greater than once an hour.
6.2. Typical Exchange 6.2. Typical Exchange
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| -------- Notify ----------> | (optional) | -------- Notify ----------> | (optional)
| | | |
| <----- Serial Query ------- | R requests data | <----- Serial Query ------- | R requests data
| | | |
| ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs
| ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data
| | and sends new serial | | and sends new serial
~ ~ ~ ~
The cache server SHOULD send a notify PDU with its current serial The cache server SHOULD send a notify PDU with its current Serial
number when the cache's serial changes, with the expectation that the Number when the cache's serial changes, with the expectation that the
router MAY then issue a serial query earlier than it otherwise might. router MAY then issue a Serial Query earlier than it otherwise might.
This is analogous to DNS NOTIFY in [RFC1996]. The cache MUST rate This is analogous to DNS NOTIFY in [RFC1996]. The cache MUST rate
limit Serial Notifies to no more frequently than one per minute. limit Serial Notifies to no more frequently than one per minute.
When the transport layer is up and either a timer has gone off in the When the transport layer is up and either a timer has gone off in the
router, or the cache has sent a Notify, the router queries for new router, or the cache has sent a Notify, the router queries for new
data by sending a Serial Query, and the cache sends all data newer data by sending a Serial Query, and the cache sends all data newer
than the serial in the Serial Query. than the serial in the Serial Query.
To limit the length of time a cache must keep old withdraws, a router To limit the length of time a cache must keep old withdraws, a router
MUST send either a Serial Query or a Reset Query no less frequently MUST send either a Serial Query or a Reset Query no less frequently
skipping to change at page 16, line 5 skipping to change at page 16, line 7
| ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs
| ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data
| | and sends new serial | | and sends new serial
~ ~ ~ ~
The cache may respond to a Serial Query with a Cache Reset, informing The cache may respond to a Serial Query with a Cache Reset, informing
the router that the cache cannot supply an incremental update from the router that the cache cannot supply an incremental update from
the serial number specified by the router. This might be because the the Serial Number specified by the router. This might be because the
cache has lost state, or because the router has waited too long cache has lost state, or because the router has waited too long
between polls and the cache has cleaned up old data that it no longer between polls and the cache has cleaned up old data that it no longer
believes it needs, or because the cache has run out of storage space believes it needs, or because the cache has run out of storage space
and had to expire some old data early. Regardless of how this state and had to expire some old data early. Regardless of how this state
arose, the cache replies with a Cache Reset to tell the router that arose, the cache replies with a Cache Reset to tell the router that
it cannot honor the request. When a router receives this, the router it cannot honor the request. When a router receives this, the router
SHOULD attempt to connect to any more preferred caches in its cache SHOULD attempt to connect to any more preferred caches in its cache
list. If there are no more preferred caches it MUST issue a Reset list. If there are no more preferred caches, it MUST issue a Reset
Query and get an entire new load from the cache. Query and get an entire new load from the cache.
6.4. Cache has No Data Available 6.4. Cache Has No Data Available
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data | <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data
| ---- Error Report PDU ----> | C No Data Available | ---- Error Report PDU ----> | C No Data Available
~ ~ ~ ~
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| <----- Reset Query ------- | R requests data | <----- Reset Query ------- | R requests data
skipping to change at page 16, line 47 skipping to change at page 17, line 7
rebuilding its database. rebuilding its database.
When a router receives this kind of error, the router SHOULD attempt When a router receives this kind of error, the router SHOULD attempt
to connect to any other caches in its cache list, in preference to connect to any other caches in its cache list, in preference
order. If no other caches are available, the router MUST issue order. If no other caches are available, the router MUST issue
periodic Reset Queries until it gets a new usable load from the periodic Reset Queries until it gets a new usable load from the
cache. cache.
7. Transport 7. Transport
The transport layer session between a router and a cache carries the The transport-layer session between a router and a cache carries the
binary Protocol Data Units (PDUs) in a persistent session. binary PDUs in a persistent session.
To prevent cache spoofing and DoS attacks by illegitimate routers, it To prevent cache spoofing and DoS attacks by illegitimate routers, it
is highly desirable that the router and the cache are authenticated is highly desirable that the router and the cache be authenticated to
to each other. Integrity protection for payloads is also desirable each other. Integrity protection for payloads is also desirable to
to protect against monkey in the middle (MITM) attacks. protect against monkey-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, there is no protocol to do so on all currently used there is no protocol to do so on all currently used platforms.
platforms. Therefore, as of this document, there is no mandatory to Therefore, as of the writing of this document, there is no mandatory-
implement transport which provides authentication and integrity to-implement transport that provides authentication and integrity
protection. protection.
To reduce exposure to dropped but non-terminated sessions, both To reduce exposure to dropped but non-terminated sessions, both
caches and routers SHOULD enable keep alives when available in the caches and routers SHOULD enable keep-alives when available in the
chosen transport protocol. chosen transport protocol.
It is expected that, when TCP-AO [RFC5925] is available on all It is expected that, when the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)
platforms deployed by operators, it will become the mandatory to [RFC5925] is available on all platforms deployed by operators, it
implement transport. will become the mandatory-to-implement transport.
Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport over TCP Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport over TCP
using a port, rpki-rtr, to be assigned, see Section 12. Operators using a port, rpki-rtr (323); see Section 12. Operators SHOULD use
SHOULD use procedural means, e.g. access control lists (ACLs), to procedural means, e.g., access control lists (ACLs), to reduce the
reduce the exposure to authentication issues. exposure to authentication issues.
Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO, SSHv2, TCP MD5, or IPsec Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO, SSHv2, TCP MD5, or IPsec
transport. transport.
If unprotected TCP is the transport, the cache and routers MUST be on If unprotected TCP is the transport, the cache and routers MUST be on
the same trusted and controlled network. the same trusted and controlled network.
If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the
following more protected protocols. following more protected protocols.
skipping to change at page 17, line 47 skipping to change at page 18, line 5
Caches and routers MAY use SSHv2 transport [RFC4252] using a the Caches and routers MAY use SSHv2 transport [RFC4252] using a the
normal SSH port. For an example, see Section 7.1. normal SSH port. For an example, see Section 7.1.
Caches and routers MAY use TCP MD5 transport [RFC2385] using the Caches and routers MAY use TCP MD5 transport [RFC2385] using the
rpki-rtr port. Note that TCP MD5 has been obsoleted by TCP-AO rpki-rtr port. Note that TCP MD5 has been obsoleted by TCP-AO
[RFC5925]. [RFC5925].
Caches and routers MAY use IPsec transport [RFC4301] using the rpki- Caches and routers MAY use IPsec transport [RFC4301] using the rpki-
rtr port. rtr port.
Caches and routers MAY use TLS transport [RFC5246] using using a Caches and routers MAY use TLS transport [RFC5246] using a port,
port, rpki-rtr-tls, to be assigned, see Section 12. rpki-rtr-tls (324); see Section 12.
7.1. SSH Transport 7.1. SSH Transport
To run over SSH, the client router first establishes an SSH transport To run over SSH, the client router first establishes an SSH transport
connection using the SSHv2 transport protocol, and the client and connection using the SSHv2 transport protocol, and the client and
server exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The server exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The
client then invokes the "ssh-userauth" service to authenticate the client then invokes the "ssh-userauth" service to authenticate the
application, as described in the SSH authentication protocol RFC 4252 application, as described in the SSH authentication protocol
[RFC4252]. Once the application has been successfully authenticated, [RFC4252]. Once the application has been successfully authenticated,
the client invokes the "ssh-connection" service, also known as the the client invokes the "ssh-connection" service, also known as the
SSH connection protocol. SSH connection protocol.
After the ssh-connection service is established, the client opens a After the ssh-connection service is established, the client opens a
channel of type "session", which results in an SSH session. channel of type "session", which results in an SSH session.
Once the SSH session has been established, the application invokes Once the SSH session has been established, the application invokes
the application transport as an SSH subsystem called "rpki-rtr". the application transport as an SSH subsystem called "rpki-rtr".
Subsystem support is a feature of SSH version 2 (SSHv2) and is not Subsystem support is a feature of SSH version 2 (SSHv2) and is not
included in SSHv1. Running this protocol as an SSH subsystem avoids included in SSHv1. Running this protocol as an SSH subsystem avoids
the need for the application to recognize shell prompts or skip over the need for the application to recognize shell prompts or skip over
extraneous information, such as a system message that is sent at extraneous information, such as a system message that is sent at
shell start-up. shell start-up.
It is assumed that the router and cache have exchanged keys out of It is assumed that the router and cache have exchanged keys out of
band by some reasonably secured means. band by some reasonably secured means.
Cache servers supporting SSH transport MUST accept RSA and DSA Cache servers supporting SSH transport MUST accept RSA and Digital
authentication, and SHOULD accept ECDSA authentication. User Signature Algorithm (DSA) authentication and SHOULD accept Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) authentication. User
authentication MUST be supported; host authentication MAY be authentication MUST be supported; host authentication MAY be
supported. Implementations MAY support password authentication. supported. Implementations MAY support password authentication.
Client routers SHOULD verify the public key of the cache, to avoid Client routers SHOULD verify the public key of the cache to avoid
monkey in the middle attacks. monkey-in-the-middle attacks.
7.2. TLS Transport 7.2. TLS Transport
Client routers using TLS transport MUST present client-side Client routers using TLS transport MUST present client-side
certificates to authenticate themselves to the cache, to allow the certificates to authenticate themselves to the cache in order to
cache to manage load by rejecting connections from unauthorized allow the cache to manage the load by rejecting connections from
routers. While in principle any type of certificate and certificate unauthorized routers. In principle, any type of certificate and
authority (CA) may be used, in general cache operators will generally certificate authority (CA) may be used; however, in general, cache
wish to create their own small-scale CA and issue certificates to operators will wish to create their own small-scale CA and issue
each authorized router. This simplifies credential roll-over; any certificates to each authorized router. This simplifies credential
unrevoked, unexpired certificate from the proper CA may be used. rollover; any unrevoked, unexpired certificate from the proper CA may
be used.
Certificates used to authenticate client routers in this protocol Certificates used to authenticate client routers in this protocol
MUST include a subjectAltName extension [RFC5280] containing one or MUST include a subjectAltName extension [RFC5280] containing one or
more iPAddress identities; when authenticating the router's more iPAddress identities; when authenticating the router's
certificate, the cache MUST check the IP address of the TLS certificate, the cache MUST check the IP address of the TLS
connection against these iPAddress identities and SHOULD reject the connection against these iPAddress identities and SHOULD reject the
connection if none of the iPAddress identities match the connection. connection if none of the iPAddress identities match the connection.
Routers MUST also verify the cache's TLS server certificate, using Routers MUST also verify the cache's TLS server certificate, using
subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [RFC6125], to avoid subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [RFC6125], to avoid
monkey in the middle attacks. The rules and guidelines defined in monkey-in-the-middle attacks. The rules and guidelines defined in
[RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations: [RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations:
Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity
in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED in rpki-rtr server in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED in rpki-rtr server
and client implementations which use TLS. Certification and client implementations that use TLS. Certification
authorities which issue rpki-rtr server certificates MUST support authorities that issue rpki-rtr server certificates MUST support
the DNS-ID identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST be the DNS-ID identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST be
present in rpki-rtr server certificates. present in rpki-rtr server certificates.
DNS names in rpki-rtr server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the DNS names in rpki-rtr server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the
wildcard character "*". wildcard character "*".
rpki-rtr implementations which use TLS MUST NOT use CN-ID rpki-rtr implementations that use TLS MUST NOT use CN-ID
identifiers; a CN field may be present in the server certificate's identifiers; a CN field may be present in the server certificate's
subject name, but MUST NOT be used for authentication within the subject name, but MUST NOT be used for authentication within the
rules described in [RFC6125]. rules described in [RFC6125].
The client router MUST set its "reference identifier" to the DNS The client router MUST set its "reference identifier" to the DNS
name of the rpki-rtr cache. name of the rpki-rtr cache.
7.3. TCP MD5 Transport 7.3. TCP MD5 Transport
If TCP-MD5 is used, implementations MUST support key lengths of at If TCP MD5 is used, implementations MUST support key lengths of at
least 80 printable ASCII bytes, per section 4.5 of [RFC2385]. least 80 printable ASCII bytes, per Section 4.5 of [RFC2385].
Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences of at least Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences of at least
32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits.
Key rollover with TCP-MD5 is problematic. Cache servers SHOULD Key rollover with TCP MD5 is problematic. Cache servers SHOULD
support [RFC4808]. support [RFC4808].
7.4. TCP-AO Transport 7.4. TCP-AO Transport
Implementations MUST support key lengths of at least 80 printable Implementations MUST support key lengths of at least 80 printable
ASCII bytes. Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences ASCII bytes. Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences
of at least 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. MAC lengths of at least of at least 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. MAC (Message
96 bits MUST be supported, per section 5.3 of [RFC2385]. Authentication Code) lengths of at least 96 bits MUST be supported,
per Section 5.1 of [RFC5925].
The cryptographic algorithms and associcated parameters described in The cryptographic algorithms and associated parameters described in
[RFC5926] MUST be supported. [RFC5926] MUST be supported.
8. Router-Cache Set-Up 8. Router-Cache Setup
A cache has the public authentication data for each router it is A cache has the public authentication data for each router it is
configured to support. configured to support.
A router may be configured to peer with a selection of caches, and a A router may be configured to peer with a selection of caches, and a
cache may be configured to support a selection of routers. Each must cache may be configured to support a selection of routers. Each must
have the name of, and authentication data for, each peer. In have the name of, and authentication data for, each peer. In
addition, in a router, this list has a non-unique preference value addition, in a router, this list has a non-unique preference value
for each server in order of preference. This preference merely for each server. This preference merely denotes proximity, not
denotes proximity, not trust, preferred belief, etc. The client trust, preferred belief, etc. The client router attempts to
router attempts to establish a session with each potential serving establish a session with each potential serving cache in preference
cache in preference order, and then starts to load data from the most order, and then starts to load data from the most preferred cache to
preferred cache to which it can connect and authenticate. The which it can connect and authenticate. The router's list of caches
router's list of caches has the following elements: has the following elements:
Preference: An unsigned integer denoting the router's preference to Preference: An unsigned integer denoting the router's preference to
connect to that cache, the lower the value the more preferred. connect to that cache; the lower the value, the more preferred.
Name: The IP Address or fully qualified domain name of the cache. Name: The IP address or fully qualified domain name of the cache.
Key: Any needed public key of the cache. Key: Any needed public key of the cache.
MyKey: Any needed private key or certificate of this client. MyKey: Any needed private key or certificate of this client.
Due to the distributed nature of the RPKI, caches simply can not be Due to the distributed nature of the RPKI, caches simply cannot be
rigorously synchronous. A client may hold data from multiple caches, rigorously synchronous. A client may hold data from multiple caches
but MUST keep the data marked as to source, as later updates MUST but MUST keep the data marked as to source, as later updates MUST
affect the correct data. affect the correct data.
Just as there may be more than one covering ROA from a single cache, Just as there may be more than one covering ROA from a single cache,
there may be multiple covering ROAs from multiple caches. The there may be multiple covering ROAs from multiple caches. The
results are as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. results are as described in [RFC6811].
If data from multiple caches are held, implementations MUST NOT If data from multiple caches are held, implementations MUST NOT
distinguish between data sources when performing validation. distinguish between data sources when performing validation.
When a more preferred cache becomes available, if resources allow, it When a more preferred cache becomes available, if resources allow, it
would be prudent for the client to start fetching from that cache. would be prudent for the client to start fetching from that cache.
The client SHOULD attempt to maintain at least one set of data, The client SHOULD attempt to maintain at least one set of data,
regardless of whether it has chosen a different cache or established regardless of whether it has chosen a different cache or established
a new connection to the previous cache. a new connection to the previous cache.
A client MAY drop the data from a particular cache when it is fully A client MAY drop the data from a particular cache when it is fully
in synch with one or more other caches. in sync with one or more other caches.
A client SHOULD delete the data from a cache when it has been unable A client SHOULD delete the data from a cache when it has been unable
to refresh from that cache for a configurable timer value. The to refresh from that cache for a configurable timer value. The
default for that value is twice the polling period for that cache. default for that value is twice the polling period for that cache.
If a client loses connectivity to a cache it is using, or otherwise If a client loses connectivity to a cache it is using, or otherwise
decides to switch to a new cache, it SHOULD retain the data from the decides to switch to a new cache, it SHOULD retain the data from the
previous cache until it has a full set of data from one or more other previous cache until it has a full set of data from one or more other
caches. Note that this may already be true at the point of caches. Note that this may already be true at the point of
connection loss if the client has connections to more than one cache. connection loss if the client has connections to more than one cache.
9. Deployment Scenarios 9. Deployment Scenarios
For illustration, we present three likely deployment scenarios. For illustration, we present three likely deployment scenarios.
Small End Site: The small multi-homed end site may wish to outsource Small End Site: The small multihomed end site may wish to outsource
the RPKI cache to one or more of their upstream ISPs. They would the RPKI cache to one or more of their upstream ISPs. They would
exchange authentication material with the ISP using some out of exchange authentication material with the ISP using some out-of-
band mechanism, and their router(s) would connect to one or more band mechanism, and their router(s) would connect to the cache(s)
up-streams' caches. The ISPs would likely deploy caches intended of one or more upstream ISPs. The ISPs would likely deploy caches
for customer use separately from the caches with which their own intended for customer use separately from the caches with which
BGP speakers peer. their own BGP speakers peer.
Large End Site: A larger multi-homed end site might run one or more Large End Site: A larger multihomed end site might run one or more
caches, arranging them in a hierarchy of client caches, each caches, arranging them in a hierarchy of client caches, each
fetching from a serving cache which is closer to the global RPKI. fetching from a serving cache that is closer to the Global RPKI.
They might configure fall-back peerings to up-stream ISP caches. They might configure fall-back peerings to upstream ISP caches.
ISP Backbone: A large ISP would likely have one or more redundant ISP Backbone: A large ISP would likely have one or more redundant
caches in each major PoP, and these caches would fetch from each caches in each major point of presence (PoP), and these caches
other in an ISP-dependent topology so as not to place undue load would fetch from each other in an ISP-dependent topology so as not
on the global RPKI publication infrastructure. to place undue load on the Global RPKI.
Experience with large DNS cache deployments has shown that complex Experience with large DNS cache deployments has shown that complex
topologies are ill-advised as it is easy to make errors in the graph, topologies are ill-advised as it is easy to make errors in the graph,
e.g. not maintaining a loop-free condition. e.g., not maintain a loop-free condition.
Of course, these are illustrations and there are other possible Of course, these are illustrations and there are other possible
deployment strategies. It is expected that minimizing load on the deployment strategies. It is expected that minimizing load on the
global RPKI servers will be a major consideration. Global RPKI servers will be a major consideration.
To keep load on global RPKI services from unnecessary peaks, it is To keep load on Global RPKI services from unnecessary peaks, it is
recommended that primary caches which load from the distributed recommended that primary caches that load from the distributed Global
global RPKI not do so all at the same times, e.g. on the hour. RPKI not do so all at the same times, e.g., on the hour. Choose a
Choose a random time, perhaps the ISP's AS number modulo 60 and random time, perhaps the ISP's AS number modulo 60 and jitter the
jitter the inter-fetch timing. inter-fetch timing.
10. Error Codes 10. Error Codes
This section contains a preliminary list of error codes. The authors This section contains a preliminary list of error codes. The authors
expect additions to this section during development of the initial expect additions to the list this section during development of the
implementations. There is an IANA registry where valid error codes initial implementations. There is an IANA registry where valid error
are listed, see Section 12. Errors which are considered fatal SHOULD codes are listed; see Section 12. Errors that are considered fatal
cause the session to be dropped. SHOULD cause the session to be dropped.
0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to 0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to
be corrupt in a manner not specified by other error codes. be corrupt in a manner not specified by other error codes.
1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced 1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced
some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran
out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera). out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera).
2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good 2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good
working order, but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a working order, but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a
Reset Query because it has no useful data available at this time. Reset Query because it has no useful data available at this time.
This is likely to be a temporary error, and most likely indicates This is likely to be a temporary error, and most likely indicates
that the cache has not yet completed pulling down an initial that the cache has not yet completed pulling down an initial
current data set from the global RPKI system after some kind of current data set from the Global RPKI system after some kind of
event that invalidated whatever data it might have previously held event that invalidated whatever data it might have previously held
(reboot, network partition, et cetera). (reboot, network partition, et cetera).
3: Invalid Request (fatal): The cache server believes the client's 3: Invalid Request (fatal): The cache server believes the client's
request to be invalid. request to be invalid.
4: Unsupported Protocol Version (fatal): The Protocol Version is not 4: Unsupported Protocol Version (fatal): The Protocol Version is not
known by the receiver of the PDU. known by the receiver of the PDU.
5: Unsupported PDU Type (fatal): The PDU Type is not known by the 5: Unsupported PDU Type (fatal): The PDU Type is not known by the
receiver of the PDU. receiver of the PDU.
6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has Flag=0 6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has Flag=0
but a record for the Prefix/PrefixLength/MaxLength triple does not but a record for the {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple does not
exist in the receiver's database. exist in the receiver's database.
7: Duplicate Announcement Received (fatal): The received PDU has an 7: Duplicate Announcement Received (fatal): The received PDU has an
identical {prefix, len, max-len, asn} tuple as a PDU which is identical {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple as a PDU that is still
still active in the router. active in the router.
11. Security Considerations 11. Security Considerations
As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of
security interest are described in the relevant sections. This security interest are described in the relevant sections. This
section points out issues which may not be obvious in other sections. section points out issues that may not be obvious in other sections.
Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described
in Section 9 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be given in Section 9 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be given
consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation
process. Distribution of a consistent trust anchor is assumed to process. Distribution of a consistent trust anchor is assumed to
be out of band. be out of band.
Cache Peer Identification: The router initiates a transport session Cache Peer Identification: The router initiates a transport session
to a cache, which it identifies by either IP address or fully to a cache, which it identifies by either IP address or fully
qualified domain name. Be aware that a DNS or address spoofing qualified domain name. Be aware that a DNS or address spoofing
attack could make the correct cache unreachable. No session would attack could make the correct cache unreachable. No session would
be established, as the authorization keys would not match. be established, as the authorization keys would not match.
Transport Security: The RPKI relies on object, not server or Transport Security: The RPKI relies on object, not server or
transport, trust. I.e. the IANA root trust anchor is distributed transport, trust. That is, the IANA root trust anchor is
to all caches through some out of band means, and can then be used distributed to all caches through some out-of-band means, and can
by each cache to validate certificates and ROAs all the way down then be used by each cache to validate certificates and ROAs all
the tree. The inter-cache relationships are based on this object the way down the tree. The inter-cache relationships are based on
security model, hence the inter-cache transport can be lightly this object security model; hence, the inter-cache transport can
protected. be lightly protected.
But this protocol document assumes that the routers can not do the But, this protocol document assumes that the routers cannot do the
validation cryptography. Hence the last link, from cache to validation cryptography. Hence, the last link, from cache to
router, is secured by server authentication and transport level router, is secured by server authentication and transport-level
security. This is dangerous, as server authentication and security. This is dangerous, as server authentication and
transport have very different threat models than object security. transport have very different threat models than object security.
So the strength of the trust relationship and the transport So, the strength of the trust relationship and the transport
between the router(s) and the cache(s) are critical. You're between the router(s) and the cache(s) are critical. You're
betting your routing on this. betting your routing on this.
While we can not say the cache must be on the same LAN, if only While we cannot say the cache must be on the same LAN, if only due
due to the issue of an enterprise wanting to off-load the cache to the issue of an enterprise wanting to off-load the cache task
task to their upstream ISP(s), locality, trust, and control are to their upstream ISP(s), locality, trust, and control are very
very critical issues here. The cache(s) really SHOULD be as critical issues here. The cache(s) really SHOULD be as close, in
close, in the sense of controlled and protected (against DDoS, the sense of controlled and protected (against DDoS, MITM)
MITM) transport, to the router(s) as possible. It also SHOULD be transport, to the router(s) as possible. It also SHOULD be
topologically close so that a minimum of validated routing data topologically close so that a minimum of validated routing data
are needed to bootstrap a router's access to a cache. are needed to bootstrap a router's access to a cache.
The identity of the cache server SHOULD be verified and The identity of the cache server SHOULD be verified and
authenticated by the router client, and vice versa, before any authenticated by the router client, and vice versa, before any
data are exchanged. data are exchanged.
Transports which can not provide the necessary authentication and Transports that cannot provide the necessary authentication and
integrity (see Section 7) must rely on network design and integrity (see Section 7) must rely on network design and
operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/ operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/
corruption attacks. As pointed out in Section 7, TCP-AO is the corruption attacks. As pointed out in Section 7, TCP-AO is the
long term plan. Protocols which provide integrity and long-term plan. Protocols that provide integrity and authenticity
authenticity SHOULD be used, and if they can not, i.e. TCP is SHOULD be used, and if they cannot, i.e., TCP is used as the
used as the transport, the router and cache MUST be on the same transport, the router and cache MUST be on the same trusted,
trusted, controlled network. controlled network.
12. IANA Considerations 12. IANA Considerations
This document requests the IANA to assign 'well known' TCP Port IANA has assigned 'well-known' TCP Port Numbers to the RPKI-Router
Numbers to the RPKI-Router Protocol for the following, see Section 7: Protocol for the following, see Section 7:
rpki-rtr rpki-rtr
rpki-rtr-tls rpki-rtr-tls
This document requests the IANA to create a registry for tuples of IANA has created a registry for tuples of Protocol Version / PDU
Protocol Version / PDU Type, each of which may range from 0 to 255. Type, each of which may range from 0 to 255. The name of the
The name of the registry should be rpki-rtr-pdu. The policy for registry is "rpki-rtr-pdu". The policy for adding to the registry is
adding to the registry is RFC Required per [RFC5226], either RFC Required per [RFC5226], either Standards Track or Experimental.
standards track or experimental. The initial entries should be as The initial entries are as follows:
follows:
Protocol
Version PDU Type
-------- -------------------
0 0 - Serial Notify
0 1 - Serial Query
0 2 - Reset Query
0 3 - Cache Response
0 4 - IPv4 Prefix
0 6 - IPv6 Prefix
0 7 - End of Data
0 8 - Cache Reset
0 10 - Error Report
0 255 - Reserved
This document requests the IANA to create a registry for Error Codes Protocol PDU
0 to 255. The name of the registry should be rpki-rtr-error. The Version Type Description
policy for adding to the registry is Expert Review per [RFC5226], -------- ---- ---------------
where the responsible IESG area director should appoint the Expert 0 0 Serial Notify
Reviewer. The initial entries should be as follows: 0 1 Serial Query
0 2 Reset Query
0 3 Cache Response
0 4 IPv4 Prefix
0 6 IPv6 Prefix
0 7 End of Data
0 8 Cache Reset
0 10 Error Report
0 255 Reserved
0 - Corrupt Data IANA has created a registry for Error Codes 0 to 255. The name of
1 - Internal Error the registry is "rpki-rtr-error". The policy for adding to the
2 - No Data Available registry is Expert Review per [RFC5226], where the responsible IESG
3 - Invalid Request Area Director should appoint the Expert Reviewer. The initial
4 - Unsupported Protocol Version entries should be as follows:
5 - Unsupported PDU Type
6 - Withdrawal of Unknown Record
7 - Duplicate Announcement Received
255 - Reserved Error
Code Description
----- ----------------
0 Corrupt Data
1 Internal Error
2 No Data Available
3 Invalid Request
4 Unsupported Protocol Version
5 Unsupported PDU Type
6 Withdrawal of Unknown Record
7 Duplicate Announcement Received
255 Reserved
This document requests the IANA to add an SSH Connection Protocol IANA has added an SSH Connection Protocol Subsystem Name, as defined
Subsystem Name, as defined in [RFC4250], of 'rpki-rtr'. in [RFC4250], of 'rpki-rtr'.
13. Acknowledgments 13. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Steve Bellovin, Rex Fernando, Paul Hoffman, The authors wish to thank Steve Bellovin, Rex Fernando, Paul Hoffman,
Russ Housley, Pradosh Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, Sandy Murphy, Robert Russ Housley, Pradosh Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, Sandy Murphy, Robert
Raszuk, John Scudder, Ruediger Volk, and David Ward. Particular Raszuk, John Scudder, Ruediger Volk, and David Ward. Particular
thanks go to Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of unnecessary thanks go to Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of unnecessary
fields. fields.
14. References 14. References
14.1. Normative References 14.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] [RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic",
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. RFC 1982, August 1996.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-03 (work in progress),
October 2011.
[RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982, [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
August 1996. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. MD5 Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998.
[RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 [RFC3269] Kermode, R. and L. Vicisano, "Author Guidelines for
Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998. Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Building Blocks and
Protocol Instantiation documents", RFC 3269, April 2002.
[RFC3269] Kermode, R. and L. Vicisano, "Author Guidelines for [RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Building Blocks and Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006.
Protocol Instantiation documents", RFC 3269, April 2002.
[RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006. Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006.
[RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006. Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
May 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP [RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010. Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.
[RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms [RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms
for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926, for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,
June 2010. June 2010.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
January 2013.
14.2. Informative References 14.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] [RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, August 1996.
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-13 (work in
progress), May 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] [RFC4808] Bellovin, S., "Key Change Strategies for TCP-MD5",
Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for RFC 4808, March 2007.
Resource Certificate Repository Structure",
draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-09 (work in progress),
July 2011.
[I-D.ymbk-rpki-rtr-impl] [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Bush, R., Austein, R., Patel, K., Gredler, H., and M. Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.
Waehlisch, "RPKI Router Implementation Report",
draft-ymbk-rpki-rtr-impl-01 (work in progress),
January 2012.
[RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, August 1996. Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC4808] Bellovin, S., "Key Change Strategies for TCP-MD5", [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile
RFC 4808, March 2007. for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI [RTR-IMPL] Bush, R., Austein, R., Patel, K., Gredler, H., and M.
Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010. Waehlisch, "RPKI Router Implementation Report", Work
in Progress, January 2012.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
US US
Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1 EMail: randy@psg.com
Email: randy@psg.com
Rob Austein Rob Austein
Dragon Research Labs Dragon Research Labs
Email: sra@hactrn.net EMail: sra@hactrn.net
 End of changes. 143 change blocks. 
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