draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-00.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01.txt 
Secure Inter-Domain Routing D. Mandelberg Secure Inter-Domain Routing D. Mandelberg
Internet-Draft BBN Technologies Internet-Draft BBN Technologies
Intended status: Best Current Practice October 7, 2015 Intended status: Standards Track April 13, 2016
Expires: April 9, 2016 Expires: October 15, 2016
Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-00 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01
Abstract Abstract
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to
validate the path of a BGP route. Some ISPs locally use BGP with validate the path of a BGP route. Some ISPs locally use BGP with
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 9, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 15, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Validation Output Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Validation Output Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Locally Adding Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Locally Adding Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Configuring SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Configuring SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Combining Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Combining Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Example SLURM File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Appendix A. Example SLURM File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6) resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)
addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482]
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[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview].) However, some ISPs locally use BGP [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview].) However, some ISPs locally use BGP
with private address space ([RFC1918], [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or with private address space ([RFC1918], [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or
private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). These local BGP routes private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). These local BGP routes
cannot be verified by the global RPKI, and SHOULD be considered cannot be verified by the global RPKI, and SHOULD be considered
invalid when using the RPKI. For example, [RFC6491] recommends the invalid when using the RPKI. For example, [RFC6491] recommends the
creation of ROAs that would invalidate routes for reserved and creation of ROAs that would invalidate routes for reserved and
unallocated address space. unallocated address space.
This document specifies two new mechanisms to enable ISPs to make This document specifies two new mechanisms to enable ISPs to make
local assertions about some INRs while using the RPKI's assertions local assertions about some INRs while using the RPKI's assertions
about all other INRs. These mechanisms support the second and third about all other INRs. These mechanisms primarily support the second
use cases in [I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases]. The second use case use case in [I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases], and may additionally
describes use of [RFC1918] addresses or use of public address space support the third use case. The second use case describes use of
not allocated to the ISP that is using it. The third use case [RFC1918] addresses or use of public address space not allocated to
describes a situation in which an ISP publishes a variant of the RPKI the ISP that is using it. The third use case describes a situation
hierarchy (for its customers). In this variant some prefixes and/or in which an ISP publishes a variant of the RPKI hierarchy (for its
AS numbers are different from what the RPKI repository system customers). In this variant some prefixes and/or AS numbers are
presents to the general ISP population. The result is that routes different from what the RPKI repository system presents to the
for consumers of this variant hierarchy will be re-directed (via general ISP population. The result is that routes for consumers of
routing). this variant hierarchy will be re-directed (via routing). Note that
it also is possible to use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions
about non-private INRs, e.g., allocated address space that is not
globally routed. Network operators who elect to use SLURM in this
fashion should use extreme caution. (The fact that SLURM can be used
in this fashion is not an endorsement of such use by the author.)
Both mechanisms are specified in terms of abstract sets of Both mechanisms are specified in terms of abstract sets of
assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6483], an assertion is a tuple assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6483], an assertion is a tuple
of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS number} as used by of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS number} as used by
rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1 rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]. For BGPsec [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]. For BGPsec
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], an assertion is a tuple of {AS [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], an assertion is a tuple of {AS
number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki- number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki-
rtr version 1. Output Filtering, described in Section 2, filters out rtr version 1. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions
any assertions by the RPKI about locally reserved INRs. Locally are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions,
Adding Assertions, described in Section 3, adds local assertions respectively.) Output Filtering, described in Section 2, filters out
about locally reserved INRs. The combination of both mechanisms is (removes from consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in
described in Section 5. the RPKI about locally reserved INRs. Locally Adding Assertions,
described in Section 3, adds local assertions about locally reserved
INRs. The combination of both mechanisms is described in Section 5.
To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic. To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as
if SLURM were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM if SLURM were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM
configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the
case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS
numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Adding Assertions. numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Adding Assertions.
If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown
state [RFC6483]. If both additions occur then both routes would be state [RFC6483]. If both additions occur then both routes would be
in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other
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In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data
it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr
protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions
it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in
assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document
are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both
the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying
party software MAY modify other forms of output in comparable ways, party software MAY modify other forms of output in comparable ways,
but that is outside the scope of this document. but that is outside the scope of this document.
This document is intended to supersede [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt] while
focusing only on local management of private INRs. Another draft
[I-D.kent-sidr-suspenders] focuses on the other aspects of local
management.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Validation Output Filtering 2. Validation Output Filtering
To prevent the global RPKI from affecting routes with locally To prevent the global RPKI from affecting routes with locally
reserved INRs, a relying party may be locally configured with a list reserved INRs, a relying party is locally configured with a (possibly
of IP prefixes and/or AS numbers that are used locally, and taken empty) list of IP prefixes and/or AS numbers that are used locally.
from reserved INR spaces. Any Origin Validation assertions where the (In general, these IP prefixes and AS numbers will be taken from
IP prefix is equal to or subsumed by a locally reserved IP prefix, reserved INR spaces.) Any Origin Validation assertions where the IP
are removed from the relying party's output. Any Origin Validation prefix is equal to or subsumed by a locally reserved IP prefix, are
assertions where the IP prefix contains a locally reserved IP prefix removed from the relying party's output. (Note that an Origin
are removed; the relying party software SHOULD issue a warning when Validation assertion is not removed due to its AS number matching a
this action is taken. (Note that an Origin Validation assertion is locally reserved AS number.) Any BGPsec assertion where the AS
not removed due to its AS number matching a locally reserved AS number is equal to a locally reserved AS number is removed from the
number.) Any BGPsec assertion where the AS number is equal to a relying party's output.
locally reserved AS number is removed from the relying party's
output.
3. Locally Adding Assertions 3. Locally Adding Assertions
Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) list Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) list
of assertions. This list is added to the relying party's output. of assertions. This list is added to the relying party's output.
4. Configuring SLURM 4. Configuring SLURM
Relying party software SHOULD support the following configuration Relying party software SHOULD support the following configuration
format for Validation Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions. format for Validation Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions.
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; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding ; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding
; of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length ; of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length
; values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE. ; values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
RouterPubKey = Base64 RouterPubKey = Base64
Base64 = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/") 0*2"=" Base64 = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/") 0*2"="
An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM
files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output
Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions are the respective unions of Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions are the respective unions of
the inputs from each file. The typical use case for multiple files the inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for
is when the files have distinct scopes. For example, an organization multiple files is when the files have distinct scopes. For example,
may belong to two separate networks that use different private-use IP an organization may belong to two separate networks that use
prefixes and AS numbers. To detect conflict between multiple SLURM different private-use IP prefixes and AS numbers. To detect conflict
files, a relying party SHOULD issue a warning in the following cases: between multiple SLURM files, a relying party SHOULD issue a warning
in the following cases:
1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation assertions 1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation assertions
if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such
that X is contained by any prefix in any <addItemPrefixAS> or that X is contained by any prefix in any <addItemPrefixAS> or
<delItemPrefix> in file Y and X is contained by any prefix in any <delItemPrefix> in file Y and X is contained by any prefix in any
<addItemPrefixAS> or <delItemPrefix> in file Z. <addItemPrefixAS> or <delItemPrefix> in file Z.
2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there
exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X is exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X is
used in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Y and X is used used in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Y and X is used
in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Z. in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Z.
5. Combining Mechanisms 5. Combining Mechanisms
In the typical use case, a relying party uses both output filtering In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both output
and locally added assertions. In this case, the resulting assertions filtering and locally added assertions. In this case, the resulting
MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed before locally assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed
adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions MUST NOT be before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions
removed by output filtering. MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
If a relying party chooses to use both SLURM and Suspenders
[I-D.kent-sidr-suspenders], the SLURM mechanisms MUST be performed on
the output of Suspenders.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
TBD None.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
with additional ways to control its own network while making use of with additional ways to control its own network while making use of
RPKI data. These mechanisms are applied only locally; they do not RPKI data. These mechanisms are applied only locally; they do not
influence how other network operators interpret RPKI data. influence how other network operators interpret RPKI data.
Nonetheless, care should be taken in how these mechanisms are Nonetheless, care should be taken in how these mechanisms are
employed. employed.
skipping to change at page 8, line 32 skipping to change at page 8, line 32
9. References 9. References
9.1. Informative References 9.1. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M., "An Overview of BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr- Lepinski, M., "An Overview of BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr-
bgpsec-overview-07 (work in progress), June 2015. bgpsec-overview-07 (work in progress), June 2015.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases] [I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases]
Bush, R., "RPKI Local Trust Anchor Use Cases", draft-ietf- Bush, R., "RPKI Local Trust Anchor Use Cases", draft-ietf-
sidr-lta-use-cases-03 (work in progress), June 2015. sidr-lta-use-cases-04 (work in progress), December 2015.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]
Reynolds, M., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Local Trust
Anchor Management for the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-08 (work in
progress), April 2013.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", draft-ietf- Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", draft-ietf-
sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-06 (work in progress), October sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-07 (work in progress), March
2015. 2016.
[I-D.kent-sidr-suspenders]
Kent, S. and D. Mandelberg, "Suspenders: A Fail-safe
Mechanism for the RPKI", draft-kent-sidr-suspenders-03
(work in progress), April 2015.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996, BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation, [RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)", selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996, BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>.
skipping to change at page 10, line 9 skipping to change at page 9, line 44
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6890>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6890>.
[RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for [RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July
2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>. 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>.
9.2. Normative References 9.2. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature
Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-11 (work in Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-14 (work in
progress), August 2015. progress), November 2015.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "A Profile for BGPsec Router Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "A Profile for BGPsec Router
Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and
Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki- Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-11 (work in progress), August 2015. profiles-16 (work in progress), March 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
skipping to change at page 11, line 45 skipping to change at page 11, line 45
# length restrictions in RFCs. # length restrictions in RFCs.
add bgpsec 64512 Zm9v VGhpcyBpcyBub3QgYSByb3V0ZXIgcHVibGljIGtleQ== add bgpsec 64512 Zm9v VGhpcyBpcyBub3QgYSByb3V0ZXIgcHVibGljIGtleQ==
add bgpsec 64512 YmFy b3IgYSBmbG9jayBvZiBkdWNrcw== add bgpsec 64512 YmFy b3IgYSBmbG9jayBvZiBkdWNrcw==
add bgpsec 64513 YWJj bWF5YmUgYSBkaWZmZXJlbnQgYXZpYW4gY2Fycmllcj8= add bgpsec 64513 YWJj bWF5YmUgYSBkaWZmZXJlbnQgYXZpYW4gY2Fycmllcj8=
Author's Address Author's Address
David Mandelberg David Mandelberg
BBN Technologies BBN Technologies
10 Moulton St. 10 Moulton St.
Camridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138
US US
Email: david@mandelberg.org Email: david@mandelberg.org
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