draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-02.txt 
Secure Inter-Domain Routing D. Mandelberg SIDR D. Mandelberg
Internet-Draft BBN Technologies Internet-Draft Unaffiliated
Intended status: Standards Track April 13, 2016 Intended status: Standards Track D. Ma
Expires: October 15, 2016 Expires: February 14, 2017 ZDNS
August 13, 2016
Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-02
Abstract Abstract
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to
validate the path of a BGP route. Some ISPs locally use BGP with validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to
private address space or private AS numbers (see RFC6890). These establish a local view of the RPKI to control its own network while
local BGP routes cannot be verified by the global RPKI, and SHOULD be making use of RPKI data. The mechanisms described in this document
considered invalid based on the global RPKI (see RFC6491). The provide a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a local,
mechanisms described below provide ISPs with a way to make local customized view of the RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data
assertions about private (reserved) INRs while using the RPKI's as needed.
assertions about all other INRs.
Status of This Memo Status of this Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 15, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 14, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Validation Output Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. RPKI RPs with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Locally Adding Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. SLURM Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Configuring SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Validation Output Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Combining Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Locally Adding Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3. Combining Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Format of the SLURM File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Example SLURM File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6) resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)
addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482]
to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
block. block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to
validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to validate described in [RFC6483], and validation of the path of a route is
BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is described in described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview].)
[RFC6483], and validation of the path of a route is described in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview].) However, some ISPs locally use BGP
with private address space ([RFC1918], [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or
private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). These local BGP routes
cannot be verified by the global RPKI, and SHOULD be considered
invalid when using the RPKI. For example, [RFC6491] recommends the
creation of ROAs that would invalidate routes for reserved and
unallocated address space.
This document specifies two new mechanisms to enable ISPs to make However, an RPKI relying party may want to override some of the
local assertions about some INRs while using the RPKI's assertions information expressed via putative TAs and the certificates
about all other INRs. These mechanisms primarily support the second downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For instances, [RFC6491]
use case in [I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases], and may additionally recommends the creation of ROAs that would invalidate public routes
support the third use case. The second use case describes use of for reserved and unallocated address space, yet some ISPs might like
[RFC1918] addresses or use of public address space not allocated to to use BGP and the RPKI with private address space ([RFC1918],
the ISP that is using it. The third use case describes a situation [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]).
in which an ISP publishes a variant of the RPKI hierarchy (for its Local use of private address space and/or AS numbers is consistent
customers). In this variant some prefixes and/or AS numbers are with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot be verified by the
different from what the RPKI repository system presents to the global RPKI. This motivates creation of mechanisms that enable a
general ISP population. The result is that routes for consumers of network operator to publish a variant of RPKI hierarchy (for its own
this variant hierarchy will be re-directed (via routing). Note that use and that of its customers) at its discretion. Additionally, a
it also is possible to use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions network operator might wish to make use of a local override
about non-private INRs, e.g., allocated address space that is not capability to protect routes from adverse actions [I-D.ietf-sidr-
globally routed. Network operators who elect to use SLURM in this adverse-actions], until the results of such actions have been
fashion should use extreme caution. (The fact that SLURM can be used addressed. The mechanisms developed to provide this capability to
in this fashion is not an endorsement of such use by the author.) network operators are hereby called Simplified Local internet nUmber
Resource Management with the RPKI (SLURM).
Both mechanisms are specified in terms of abstract sets of SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by
assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6483], an assertion is a tuple generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6483], an
of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS number} as used by assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS
rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1 number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]. For BGPsec [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]. For BGPsec
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], an assertion is a tuple of {AS [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], an assertion is a tuple of {AS
number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki- number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki-
rtr version 1. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions rtr version. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions
are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions, are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions,
respectively.) Output Filtering, described in Section 2, filters out respectively.)
(removes from consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in
the RPKI about locally reserved INRs. Locally Adding Assertions,
described in Section 3, adds local assertions about locally reserved
INRs. The combination of both mechanisms is described in Section 5.
To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic. 1.1. Terminology
That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as
if SLURM were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Adding Assertions.
If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown 2. RPKI RPs with SLURM
state [RFC6483]. If both additions occur then both routes would be
in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other SLURM provides a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a
does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid. local, customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository
data if needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes
from consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI
that are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec
assertions.
In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data
it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr
protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions
it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in
assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document
are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both
the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying
party software MAY modify other forms of output in comparable ways, party software MAY modify other forms of output in comparable ways,
but that is outside the scope of this document. but that is outside the scope of this document.
1.1. Terminology +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
| | | | | |
| Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation |
| | | | | |
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+
|
+-------------------------------------------------+
|
+------v-------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
| | | | | |
| SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +--->BGP Speakers|
| | | | | |
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the Relying Party Stack
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Validation Output Filtering 3. SLURM Mechanisms
3.1. Validation Output Filtering
To prevent the global RPKI from affecting routes with locally To prevent the global RPKI from affecting routes with locally
reserved INRs, a relying party is locally configured with a (possibly reserved INRs, a relying party is locally configured with a (possibly
empty) list of IP prefixes and/or AS numbers that are used locally. empty) list of IP prefixes and/or AS numbers that are used locally.
(In general, these IP prefixes and AS numbers will be taken from (In general, these IP prefixes and AS numbers will be taken from
reserved INR spaces.) Any Origin Validation assertions where the IP reserved INR spaces.) Any Origin Validation assertions where the IP
prefix is equal to or subsumed by a locally reserved IP prefix, are prefix is equal to or subsumed by a locally reserved IP prefix, are
removed from the relying party's output. (Note that an Origin removed from the relying party's output. (Note that an Origin
Validation assertion is not removed due to its AS number matching a Validation assertion is not removed due to its AS number matching a
locally reserved AS number.) Any BGPsec assertion where the AS locally reserved AS number.) Any BGPsec assertion where the AS
number is equal to a locally reserved AS number is removed from the number is equal to a locally reserved AS number is removed from the
relying party's output. relying party's output.
3. Locally Adding Assertions 3.2. Locally Adding Assertions
Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) list Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) list
of assertions. This list is added to the relying party's output. of assertions. This list is added to the relying party's output.
4. Configuring SLURM 3.3. Combining Mechanisms
In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both output
filtering and locally added assertions. In this case, the resulting
assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed
before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions
MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
4. Format of the SLURM File
Relying party software SHOULD support the following configuration Relying party software SHOULD support the following configuration
format for Validation Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions. format for Validation Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions.
The format is defined using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) The format is defined using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
notation and core rules from [RFC5234] and the rules <IPv4address> notation and core rules from [RFC5234] and the rules <IPv4address>
and <IPv6address> from Appendix A of [RFC3986]. See Appendix A for and <IPv6address> from Appendix A of [RFC3986]. See Appendix A for
an example SLURM file. an example SLURM file.
A SLURM configuration file, <SLURMFile>, consists of a head and a A SLURM file, <SLURMFile>, consists of a head and a body. The head
body. The head identifies the file as a SLURM configuration file, identifies the file as a SLURM file, specifies the version of SLURM
specifies the version of SLURM for which the file was written, and for which the file was written, and optionally contains other
optionally contains other information described below. The body information described below. The body contains the configuration for
contains the configuration for Validation Output Filtering and Validation Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions.
Locally Adding Assertions.
SLURMFile = head body
head = firstLine *(commentLine / headLine) SLURMFile = head body
body = *(commentLine / bodyLine) head = firstLine *(commentLine / headLine)
firstLine = %x53.4c.55.52.4d SP "1.0" EOL ; "SLURM 1.0" body = *(commentLine / bodyLine)
commentLine = *WSP [comment] EOL firstLine = %x53.4c.55.52.4d SP "1.0" EOL ; "SLURM 1.0"
headLine = *WSP headCommand [ 1*WSP [comment] ] EOL commentLine = *WSP [comment] EOL
bodyLine = *WSP bodyCommand [ 1*WSP [comment] ] EOL headLine = *WSP headCommand [ 1*WSP [comment] ] EOL
bodyLine = *WSP bodyCommand [ 1*WSP [comment] ] EOL
comment = "#" *(VCHAR / WSP) comment = "#" *(VCHAR / WSP)
EOL = CRLF / LF EOL = CRLF / LF
The head may specify a target. If present, the target string The head may specify a target. If present, the target string
identifies the environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be identifies the environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be
used. The meaning of the target string, if any, is determined by the used. The meaning of the target string, if present, is determined by
user. If a target is present, a relying party SHOULD verify that the user. If a target is present, a relying party SHOULD verify that
that the target is an acceptable value, and reject the SLURM file if the target is an acceptable value, and reject the SLURM file if the
the target is not acceptable. For example, the relying party could target is not acceptable. For example, the relying party could be
be configured to accept SLURM files only if they do not specify a configured to accept SLURM files only if they do not specify a
target, have a target value of "hostname=rpki.example.com", or have a target, have a target value of "hostname=rpki.example.com", or have a
target value of "as=65536". If more than one target line is present, target value of "as=65536". If more than one target line is present,
all targets must be acceptable to the RP. all targets must be acceptable to the RP.
headCommand = target headCommand = target
target = target =
%x74.61.72.67.65.74 1*WSP ; "target" %x74.61.72.67.65.74 1*WSP ; "target"
1*VCHAR 1*VCHAR
The body contains zero or more configuration lines for Validation The body contains zero or more configuration lines for Validation
Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions. Each <del> command Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions. Each <del> command
specifies an INR to use for Validation Output Filtering. Each <add> specifies an INR to use for Validation Output Filtering. Each <add>
command specifies an assertion to use for Locally Adding Assertions. command specifies an assertion to use for Locally Adding Assertions.
bodyCommand = add / del bodyCommand = add / del
add = add =
%x61.64.64 1*WSP ; "add" %x61.64.64 1*WSP ; "add"
addItem addItem
del = del =
%x64.65.6c 1*WSP ; "del" %x64.65.6c 1*WSP ; "del"
delItem delItem
addItem = addItemPrefixAS / addItemASKey addItem = addItemPrefixAS / addItemASKey
; Add a mapping from a prefix and max length to an AS number. ; Add a mapping from a prefix and max length to an AS number.
addItemPrefixAS = addItemPrefixAS =
%x6f.72.69.67.69.6e.61.74.69.6f.6e 1*WSP ; "origination" %x6f.72.69.67.69.6e.61.74.69.6f.6e 1*WSP ; "origination"
IPprefixMaxLen 1*WSP IPprefixMaxLen 1*WSP
ASnum ASnum
; Add a mapping from an AS number to a router public key. ; Add a mapping from an AS number to a router public key.
addItemASKey = addItemASKey =
%x62.67.70.73.65.63 1*WSP ; "bgpsec" %x62.67.70.73.65.63 1*WSP ; "bgpsec"
ASnum 1*WSP ASnum 1*WSP
RouterSKI 1*WSP RouterSKI 1*WSP
RouterPubKey RouterPubKey
delItem = delItemPrefix / delItemAS delItem = delItemPrefix / delItemAS
; Filter prefix-AS mappings, using the given prefix ; Filter prefix-AS mappings, using the given prefix
delItemPrefix = delItemPrefix =
%x6f.72.69.67.69.6e.61.74.69.6f.6e 1*WSP ; "origination" %x6f.72.69.67.69.6e.61.74.69.6f.6e 1*WSP ; "origination"
IPprefix IPprefix
; Filter AS-key mappings for the given AS ; Filter AS-key mappings for the given AS
delItemAS = delItemAS =
%x62.67.70.73.65.63 1*WSP ; "bgpsec" %x62.67.70.73.65.63 1*WSP ; "bgpsec"
ASnum ASnum
IPprefix = IPv4prefix / IPv6prefix IPprefix = IPv4prefix / IPv6prefix
IPprefixMaxLen = IPv4prefixMaxLen / IPv6prefixMaxLen IPprefixMaxLen = IPv4prefixMaxLen / IPv6prefixMaxLen
IPv4prefix = IPv4address "/" 1*2DIGIT IPv4prefix = IPv4address "/" 1*2DIGIT
IPv6prefix = IPv6address "/" 1*3DIGIT IPv6prefix = IPv6address "/" 1*3DIGIT
; In the following two rules, if the maximum length component is ; In the following two rules, if the maximum length component
; missing, it is treated as equal to the prefix length. is
IPv4prefixMaxLen = IPv4prefix ["-" 1*2DIGIT] ; missing, it is treated as equal to the prefix length.
IPv6prefixMaxLen = IPv6prefix ["-" 1*3DIGIT] IPv4prefixMaxLen = IPv4prefix ["-" 1*2DIGIT]
IPv6prefixMaxLen = IPv6prefix ["-" 1*3DIGIT]
ASnum = 1*DIGIT ASnum = 1*DIGIT
; This is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router certificate's ; This is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
; Subject Key Identifer, as described in certificate's
; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is the ; Subject Key Identifer, as described in
; value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length ; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is
; fields. the
; value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or
length
; fields.
RouterSKI = Base64 RouterSKI = Base64
; This is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router public
key's
; subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in
; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 DER
encoding
; of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and
length
; values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
RouterPubKey = Base64
; This is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router public key's Base64 = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/") 0*2"="
; subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in
; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding
; of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length
; values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
RouterPubKey = Base64
Base64 = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/") 0*2"=" 5. SLURM File Configuration
5.1. SLURM File Atomicity
To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as
if SLURM file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM
configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the
case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS
numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Adding Assertions.
If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown
state [RFC6483]. If both additions occur then both routes would be
in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other
does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid.
5.2. Multiple SLURM Files
An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM
files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output
Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions are the respective unions of Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions are the respective unions of
the inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for the inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for
multiple files is when the files have distinct scopes. For example, multiple files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance,
an organization may belong to two separate networks that use operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to
different private-use IP prefixes and AS numbers. To detect conflict frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files
between multiple SLURM files, a relying party SHOULD issue a warning to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from
in the following cases: different source it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict
among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP
1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation assertions SHOULD check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the
if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such INR assertions and report errors to the sources that created these
that X is contained by any prefix in any <addItemPrefixAS> or SLURM files in question.
<delItemPrefix> in file Y and X is contained by any prefix in any
<addItemPrefixAS> or <delItemPrefix> in file Z.
2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM
exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X is files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error
used in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Y and X is used report in the following cases:
in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Z.
5. Combining Mechanisms 1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation
assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM
files Y,Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any
<addItemPrefixAS> or <delItemPrefix> in file Y and X is
contained by any prefix in any <addItemPrefixAS> or
<delItemPrefix> in file Z.
In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both output 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there
filtering and locally added assertions. In this case, the resulting exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X
assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed is used in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Y and X
before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions is used in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Z.
MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
None. None
7. Security Considerations 7. Security considerations
The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
with additional ways to control its own network while making use of with additional ways to control make use of RPKI data while
RPKI data. These mechanisms are applied only locally; they do not preserving autonomy in address space and ASN management. These
influence how other network operators interpret RPKI data. mechanisms are applied only locally; they do not influence how other
Nonetheless, care should be taken in how these mechanisms are network operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be
employed. taken in how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is
possible to use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-
private INRs, e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed.
For example, a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a
network operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action.
Network operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use
extreme caution.
The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an
RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a
security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the
assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP
can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP. It could
declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice
versa. As a result, an RP must carefully consider the security
implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is
provided by a third party.
Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and
integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file
may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM
file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity
of the updated SLURM file.
8. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wesley Wang for the detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the
idea behind the target command, to Declan Ma for the idea behind use idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful
of multiple SLURM files, and to Richard Hansen for his careful reviews and Hui Zou for her editorial assistance.
reviews.
9. References 9. References
9.1. Informative References 9.1. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M., "An Overview of BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr- Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPsec",
bgpsec-overview-07 (work in progress), June 2015. draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-08 (work in progress),
June 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases] [I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases]
Bush, R., "RPKI Local Trust Anchor Use Cases", draft-ietf- Bush, R., "Use Cases for Localized Versions of the RPKI",
sidr-lta-use-cases-04 (work in progress), December 2015. draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases-07 (work in progress),
July 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", draft-ietf- Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol",
sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-07 (work in progress), March draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-07 (work in
2016. progress), March 2016.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996, BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation, [RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)", selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996, BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005, Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, DOI 10.17487/
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route [RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route
Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs)", RFC 6483, DOI 10.17487/RFC6483, February 2012, (ROAs)", RFC 6483, DOI 10.17487/RFC6483, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6483>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6483>.
[RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public [RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA", Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",
RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012, RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>.
[RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and [RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598,
2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>. April 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>.
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810, Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.
[RFC6890] Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., Bonica, R., Ed., and B. Haberman, [RFC6890] Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., Bonica, R., Ed., and B. Haberman,
"Special-Purpose IP Address Registries", BCP 153, "Special-Purpose IP Address Registries", BCP 153,
RFC 6890, DOI 10.17487/RFC6890, April 2013, RFC 6890, DOI 10.17487/RFC6890, April 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6890>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6890>.
[RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for [RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996,
2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>. July 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>.
[RFC7682] McPherson, D., Amante, S., Osterweil, E., Blunk, L., and
D. Mitchell, "Considerations for Internet Routing
Registries (IRRs) and Routing Policy Configuration",
RFC 7682, DOI 10.17487/RFC7682, December 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7682>.
9.2. Normative References 9.2. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Turner, S., "BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature
Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-14 (work in Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-15 (work in
progress), November 2015. progress), April 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "A Profile for BGPsec Router Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki- and Certification Requests",
profiles-16 (work in progress), March 2016. draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-18 (work in progress),
July 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax [RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, DOI 10.17487/
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008, RFC5234, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI 10.17487/
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, RFC6487, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
Appendix A. Example SLURM File Authors' Addresses
SLURM 1.0
# This file is only intended to be used on a relying party running
# on rpki.example.com.
target hostname=rpki.example.com # this is a comment
# Reserve IP prefixes for local use.
del origination 10.0.0.0/24
del origination fd0b:dd1d:2dcc::/48
# Reserve AS numbers for local use.
del bgpsec 64512
del bgpsec 64513
# Allow either 64512 or 64513 to originate routes to 10.0.0.0/24.
add origination 10.0.0.0/24 64512
add origination 10.0.0.0/24 64513
# 64512 originates fd0b:dd1d:2dcc::/52 and sub-prefixes up to length
# 56.
add origination fd0b:dd1d:2dcc::/52-56 64512
# However, 64513 originates fd0b:dd1d:2dcc:42::/64.
add origination fd0b:dd1d:2dcc:42::/64 64513
# 64513 also originates fd0b:dd1d:2dcc:100::/52
add origination fd0b:dd1d:2dcc:100::/52 64513
# Authorize router keys to sign BGPsec paths on behalf of the
# specified ASes. Note that the Base64 strings used in this
# example are not valid SKIs or router public keys, due to line
# length restrictions in RFCs.
add bgpsec 64512 Zm9v VGhpcyBpcyBub3QgYSByb3V0ZXIgcHVibGljIGtleQ==
add bgpsec 64512 YmFy b3IgYSBmbG9jayBvZiBkdWNrcw==
add bgpsec 64513 YWJj bWF5YmUgYSBkaWZmZXJlbnQgYXZpYW4gY2Fycmllcj8=
Author's Address
David Mandelberg David Mandelberg
BBN Technologies Unaffiliated
10 Moulton St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
US
Email: david@mandelberg.org Email: david@mandelberg.org
Di Ma
ZDNS
4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun
Haidian, Beijing 100190
China
Email: madi@zdns.cn
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