draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-02.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-03.txt 
SIDR D. Mandelberg SIDR D. Mandelberg
Internet-Draft Unaffiliated Internet-Draft Unaffiliated
Intended status: Standards Track D. Ma Intended status: Standards Track D. Ma
Expires: February 14, 2017 ZDNS Expires: August 15, 2017 ZDNS
August 13, 2016 T. Bruijnzeels
RIPE NCC
February 11, 2017
Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-02 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-03
Abstract Abstract
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to
validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to
establish a local view of the RPKI to control its own network while establish a local view of the RPKI to control its own network while
making use of RPKI data. The mechanisms described in this document making use of RPKI data. The mechanisms described in this document
provide a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a local, provide a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a local,
customized view of the RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data customized view of the RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data
as needed. as needed.
Status of this Memo Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. RPKI RPs with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. RPKI RPs with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. SLURM Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Validation Output Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Use of JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Locally Adding Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. SLURM File Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Combining Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. SLURM Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Format of the SLURM File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.4. Validation Output Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.5. Locally Added Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 11
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6) resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)
addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482]
to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to
skipping to change at page 4, line 32 skipping to change at page 4, line 26
but that is outside the scope of this document. but that is outside the scope of this document.
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+ +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation | | Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+ +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+
| |
+-------------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------+
| |
+------v-------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+ +------v-------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +--->BGP Speakers| | SLURM +---> SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers|
| | | | | | | Filters | | Assertions | | | | |
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+ +--------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+
Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the Relying Party Stack Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the Relying Party Stack
3. SLURM Mechanisms 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms
3.1. Validation Output Filtering 3.1. Use of JSON
To prevent the global RPKI from affecting routes with locally This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC7159] format. JSON
reserved INRs, a relying party is locally configured with a (possibly members that are not defined here MUST not be used in SLURM Files,
empty) list of IP prefixes and/or AS numbers that are used locally. however Relying Parties SHOULD ignore such unrecognized JSON members
(In general, these IP prefixes and AS numbers will be taken from when processing a file.
reserved INR spaces.) Any Origin Validation assertions where the IP
prefix is equal to or subsumed by a locally reserved IP prefix, are
removed from the relying party's output. (Note that an Origin
Validation assertion is not removed due to its AS number matching a
locally reserved AS number.) Any BGPsec assertion where the AS
number is equal to a locally reserved AS number is removed from the
relying party's output.
3.2. Locally Adding Assertions 3.2. SLURM File Overview
Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) list A SLURM file consists of:
of assertions. This list is added to the relying party's output.
3.3. Combining Mechanisms o A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1.0
o One or more slurmTarget (Section 3.3) lines:
* In this version of SLURM, there are two types of values for the
target: ASN or FQDN. If more than one target line is present,
all targets must be acceptable to the RP.
o Validation Output Filters (Section 3.4), consisting of:
* A list of zero or more Prefix Filters, described in
Section 3.4.1
* A list of zero or more BGPSec Filters, described in
Section 3.4.2
o Locally Added Assertions (Section 3.5), consisting of:
* A list of zero or more Prefix Assertions, described in
Section 3.5.1
* A list of zero or more BGPSec Assertions, described in
Section 3.5.2
In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both output In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both output
filtering and locally added assertions. In this case, the resulting filtering and locally added assertions. In this case, the resulting
assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed
before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions
MUST NOT be removed by output filtering. MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
4. Format of the SLURM File The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM
file that has no filters or assertions:
Relying party software SHOULD support the following configuration {
format for Validation Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions. "slurmVersion": 1.0,
The format is defined using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) "slurmTarget": [],
notation and core rules from [RFC5234] and the rules <IPv4address> "validationOutputFilters": {
and <IPv6address> from Appendix A of [RFC3986]. See Appendix A for "prefixFilters": [],
an example SLURM file. "bgpsecFilters": []
},
"locallyAddedAsserstions": {
"prefixAssertions": [],
"bgpsecAssertions": []
}
}
A SLURM file, <SLURMFile>, consists of a head and a body. The head Empty SLURM File
identifies the file as a SLURM file, specifies the version of SLURM
for which the file was written, and optionally contains other
information described below. The body contains the configuration for
Validation Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions.
SLURMFile = head body 3.3. SLURM Target
head = firstLine *(commentLine / headLine) The header MAY specify a target. If present, the target string
identifies the environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be
used. The meaning of the target string, if present, is determined by
the user. If a target is present, a relying party SHOULD verify that
the target is an acceptable value, and reject the SLURM file if the
target is not acceptable. If not present, it's up to local policy to
determine whether to accept a SLURM file.
body = *(commentLine / bodyLine) For instance, a large ISP may want some of its ASes to establish a
local view of RPKI while the others not. Accordingly, this ISP needs
to make its RPs aware of this distinction for different BGP speakers
by adding ASN(s) to SLURM file target, such as a target value of
"asn=65536".
firstLine = %x53.4c.55.52.4d SP "1.0" EOL ; "SLURM 1.0" "slurmTarget": [
{
"asn": 65536
}
]
commentLine = *WSP [comment] EOL slurmTarget example 1
headLine = *WSP headCommand [ 1*WSP [comment] ] EOL Also, for instance, an organization may share one trusted third-party
bodyLine = *WSP bodyCommand [ 1*WSP [comment] ] EOL SLURM file source. For the local control, or in the case of
Emergency Response Team Coordination, the SLURM file source may
generate a SLURM file that is to be applied to only one specific RP.
This file can take advantage of the "target" element to restrict the
ASes that will accept and use the file. Accordingly, the SLURM file
source needs to indicate which RP(s) should make use of the file by
adding the domain name(s) of the RP(s) to the SLURM file target,
e.g., a target value of "hostname=rpki.example.com".
comment = "#" *(VCHAR / WSP) "slurmTarget": [
{
"hostname": "rpki.example.com"
}
]
EOL = CRLF / LF slurmTarget example 2
The head may specify a target. If present, the target string 3.4. Validation Output Filters
identifies the environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be
used. The meaning of the target string, if present, is determined by
the user. If a target is present, a relying party SHOULD verify that
the target is an acceptable value, and reject the SLURM file if the
target is not acceptable. For example, the relying party could be
configured to accept SLURM files only if they do not specify a
target, have a target value of "hostname=rpki.example.com", or have a
target value of "as=65536". If more than one target line is present,
all targets must be acceptable to the RP.
headCommand = target 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters
target = The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters
%x74.61.72.67.65.74 1*WSP ; "target" (Prefix Filters in short). Each Prefix Filter can contain either an
1*VCHAR IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an AS number. It is RECOMMENDED that an
explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter, so that it
can be shown to users of the RP software.
The body contains zero or more configuration lines for Validation Any Validated ROA Prefix (VRP, [RFC6811]) that matches any configured
Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions. Each <del> command Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output.
specifies an INR to use for Validation Output Filtering. Each <add>
command specifies an assertion to use for Locally Adding Assertions.
bodyCommand = add / del A Validated ROA Prefix is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if
one of the following cases applies:
add = 1. A Prefix Filter contains an IPv4 or IPv6 Prefix only, a VRP is
%x61.64.64 1*WSP ; "add" considered to match the filter if the VRP Prefix is equal to or
addItem subsumed by the Prefix Filter.
del = 2. A Prefix Filter contains an AS number only, a VRP is considered
%x64.65.6c 1*WSP ; "del" to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix Filter ASN.
delItem
addItem = addItemPrefixAS / addItemASKey 3. A Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix AND an AS
Number, a VRP is considered to match if the VRP Prefix is equal
to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter AND the VRP ASN matches the
Prefix Filter ASN
; Add a mapping from a prefix and max length to an AS number. The following JSON structure represents an array of "prefixFilters"
addItemPrefixAS = with an element for each use case listed above:
%x6f.72.69.67.69.6e.61.74.69.6f.6e 1*WSP ; "origination"
IPprefixMaxLen 1*WSP
ASnum
; Add a mapping from an AS number to a router public key. "prefixFilters": [
addItemASKey = {
%x62.67.70.73.65.63 1*WSP ; "bgpsec" "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
ASnum 1*WSP "comment": "Filter all VRPs encompassed by prefix"
RouterSKI 1*WSP },
RouterPubKey {
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "Filter all VRPs matching ASN"
},
{
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"asn": 64497,
"comment": "Filter all VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
}
]
delItem = delItemPrefix / delItemAS prefixFilters examples
; Filter prefix-AS mappings, using the given prefix 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters
delItemPrefix =
%x6f.72.69.67.69.6e.61.74.69.6f.6e 1*WSP ; "origination"
IPprefix
; Filter AS-key mappings for the given AS The RP can configure zero or more BGPSec Assertion Filters (BGPSec
delItemAS = Filters in short). Each BGPSec Filter can contain an AS number and/
%x62.67.70.73.65.63 1*WSP ; "bgpsec" or a Router SKI.
ASnum
IPprefix = IPv4prefix / IPv6prefix The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-
bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1
OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length fields.
IPprefixMaxLen = IPv4prefixMaxLen / IPv6prefixMaxLen Furthermore it is RECOMMENDED that an explanatory comment is included
with each BGPSec Filter, so that it can be shown to users of the RP
software.
IPv4prefix = IPv4address "/" 1*2DIGIT Any BGPSec Assertion that matches any configured BGPSec Filter MUST
IPv6prefix = IPv6address "/" 1*3DIGIT be removed from the RPs output.
; In the following two rules, if the maximum length component A BGPSec Assertion is considered to match with a BGPSec Filter if one
is of the following cases applies:
; missing, it is treated as equal to the prefix length.
IPv4prefixMaxLen = IPv4prefix ["-" 1*2DIGIT]
IPv6prefixMaxLen = IPv6prefix ["-" 1*3DIGIT]
ASnum = 1*DIGIT 1. If the BGPSec Filter contains an AS number only, a BGPSec
Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the
Filter ASN.
; This is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router 2. If the BGPSec Filter contains a Router SKI only, a BGPSec
certificate's Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI
; Subject Key Identifer, as described in matches the Filter Router SKI.
; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is
the
; value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or
length
; fields.
RouterSKI = Base64 3. If the BGPSec Filter contains both an AS number AND a Router SKI,
; This is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router public then a BGPSec Assertion is considered to match if both the
key's Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI
; subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in matches the Filter Router SKI.
; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 DER
encoding
; of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and
length
; values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
RouterPubKey = Base64
Base64 = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/") 0*2"=" The following JSON structure represents an array of "bgpsecFilters"
with an element for each use case listed above:
5. SLURM File Configuration "bgpsecFilters": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "Filter all keys for ASN"
},
{
"routerSKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
"comment": "Filter key matching Router SKI"
},
{
"asn": 64497,
"routerSKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
"comment": "Filter key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
}
]
5.1. SLURM File Atomicity bgpsecFilters examples
3.5. Locally Added Assertions
3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions
Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) list
of ROA Prefix Assertions. This list is added to the RP's output.
Each ROA Prefix Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, an AS
number, optionally a MaxLength and optionally a comment that can be
shown to users of the RP software.
The following JSON structure represents an array of
"prefixAssertions" with an element for each use case listed above:
"prefixAssertions": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"comment": "My other important route"
},
{
"asn": 64496,
"prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
"maxPrefixLength": 48,
"comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
}
]
prefixAssertions examples
3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions
Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) list
of BGPSec Assertions. This list is added to the RP's output.
Each BGPSec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Router SKI, the
Router Public Key, and optionally a comment that can be shown to
users of the RP software.
The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
certificate's Subject Key Identifer, as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-
bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1
OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length fields.
The Router Public Key is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in [I-D.ietf-
sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of the
subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length values of
the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
The following JSON structure represents an array of
"bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above:
"bgpsecAssertions": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
"SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
"publicKey": "<some base64 public key>"
}
]
prefixAssertions examples
3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions
The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file
that uses all the elements described in the previous sections:
{
"slurmVersion": 1.0,
"slurmTarget":[
{
"asn":65536
},
{
"hostname":"rpki.example.com"
}
],
"validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [
{
"prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
"comment": "Filter all VRPs encompassed by prefix"
},
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "Filter all VRPs matching ASN"
},
{
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"asn": 64497,
"comment": "Filter all VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
}
],
"bgpsecFilters": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "Filter all keys for ASN"
},
{
"routerSKI": "Zm9v",
"comment": "Filter key matching Router SKI"
},
{
"asn": 64497,
"routerSKI": "YmFy",
"comment": "Filter key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
}
]
},
"locallyAddedAsserstions": {
"prefixAssertions": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"comment": "My other important route"
},
{
"asn": 64496,
"prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
"maxPrefixLength": 48,
"comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
}
],
"bgpsecAssertions": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
"SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
"publicKey": "<some base64 public key>"
}
]
}
}
Full SLURM File
4. SLURM File Configuration
4.1. SLURM File Atomicity
To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic. To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as
if SLURM file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM if SLURM file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM
configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the
case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS
numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Adding Assertions. numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Adding Assertions.
If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown
state [RFC6483]. If both additions occur then both routes would be state [RFC6483]. If both additions occur then both routes would be
in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other
does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid. does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid.
5.2. Multiple SLURM Files 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files
An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM
files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output
Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions are the respective unions of Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions are the respective unions of
the inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for the inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for
multiple files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance, multiple files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance,
operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to
frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files
to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from
different source it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict different source it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict
skipping to change at page 9, line 17 skipping to change at page 13, line 43
files Y,Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any files Y,Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any
<addItemPrefixAS> or <delItemPrefix> in file Y and X is <addItemPrefixAS> or <delItemPrefix> in file Y and X is
contained by any prefix in any <addItemPrefixAS> or contained by any prefix in any <addItemPrefixAS> or
<delItemPrefix> in file Z. <delItemPrefix> in file Z.
2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there
exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X
is used in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Y and X is used in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Y and X
is used in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Z. is used in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Z.
6. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
None None
7. Security considerations 6. Security considerations
The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
with additional ways to control make use of RPKI data while with additional ways to control make use of RPKI data while
preserving autonomy in address space and ASN management. These preserving autonomy in address space and ASN management. These
mechanisms are applied only locally; they do not influence how other mechanisms are applied only locally; they do not influence how other
network operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be network operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be
taken in how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is taken in how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is
possible to use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non- possible to use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-
private INRs, e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed. private INRs, e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed.
For example, a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a For example, a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a
skipping to change at page 10, line 7 skipping to change at page 14, line 36
versa. As a result, an RP must carefully consider the security versa. As a result, an RP must carefully consider the security
implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is
provided by a third party. provided by a third party.
Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and
integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file
may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM
file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity
of the updated SLURM file. of the updated SLURM file.
8. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the
idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful
reviews and Hui Zou for her editorial assistance. reviews and Hui Zou for her editorial assistance.
9. References 8. References
9.1. Informative References 8.1. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPsec", Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPsec",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-08 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-08 (work in progress),
June 2016. June 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases] [I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases]
Bush, R., "Use Cases for Localized Versions of the RPKI", Bush, R., "Use Cases for Localized Versions of the RPKI",
draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases-07 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases-07 (work in progress), July
July 2016. 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", draft-ietf-
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-07 (work in sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-08 (work in progress), January
progress), March 2016. 2017.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996, BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation, [RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)", selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996, BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005, Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, DOI 10.17487/ Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
RFC6482, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route [RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route
Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs)", RFC 6483, DOI 10.17487/RFC6483, February 2012, (ROAs)", RFC 6483, DOI 10.17487/RFC6483, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6483>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6483>.
[RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public [RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA", Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",
RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012, RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>.
[RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and [RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April
April 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>. 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>.
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810, Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC6890] Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., Bonica, R., Ed., and B. Haberman, [RFC6890] Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., Bonica, R., Ed., and B. Haberman,
"Special-Purpose IP Address Registries", BCP 153, "Special-Purpose IP Address Registries", BCP 153,
RFC 6890, DOI 10.17487/RFC6890, April 2013, RFC 6890, DOI 10.17487/RFC6890, April 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6890>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6890>.
[RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for [RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July
July 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>. 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7682] McPherson, D., Amante, S., Osterweil, E., Blunk, L., and [RFC7682] McPherson, D., Amante, S., Osterweil, E., Blunk, L., and
D. Mitchell, "Considerations for Internet Routing D. Mitchell, "Considerations for Internet Routing
Registries (IRRs) and Routing Policy Configuration", Registries (IRRs) and Routing Policy Configuration",
RFC 7682, DOI 10.17487/RFC7682, December 2015, RFC 7682, DOI 10.17487/RFC7682, December 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7682>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7682>.
9.2. Normative References 8.2. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
Turner, S., "BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Turner, S., "BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature
Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-15 (work in Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-16 (work in
progress), April 2016. progress), November 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-18 (work in progress), profiles-18 (work in progress), July 2016.
July 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, DOI 10.17487/
RFC5234, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI 10.17487/ X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
RFC6487, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
David Mandelberg David Mandelberg
Unaffiliated Unaffiliated
Email: david@mandelberg.org Email: david@mandelberg.org
Di Ma Di Ma
ZDNS ZDNS
4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun 4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun
Haidian, Beijing 100190 Haidian, Beijing 100190
China China
Email: madi@zdns.cn Email: madi@zdns.cn
Tim Bruijnzeels
RIPE NCC
Singel 258
Amsterdam 1016 AB
Netherlands
Email: tim@ripe.net
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