draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-03.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-04.txt 
SIDR D. Mandelberg SIDR D. Mandelberg
Internet-Draft Unaffiliated Internet-Draft Unaffiliated
Intended status: Standards Track D. Ma Intended status: Standards Track D. Ma
Expires: August 15, 2017 ZDNS Expires: September 14, 2017 ZDNS
T. Bruijnzeels T. Bruijnzeels
RIPE NCC RIPE NCC
February 11, 2017 March 13, 2017
Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-03 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-04
Abstract Abstract
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to
validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 15, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 3, line 24 skipping to change at page 3, line 24
recommends the creation of ROAs that would invalidate public routes recommends the creation of ROAs that would invalidate public routes
for reserved and unallocated address space, yet some ISPs might like for reserved and unallocated address space, yet some ISPs might like
to use BGP and the RPKI with private address space ([RFC1918], to use BGP and the RPKI with private address space ([RFC1918],
[RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]).
Local use of private address space and/or AS numbers is consistent Local use of private address space and/or AS numbers is consistent
with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot be verified by the with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot be verified by the
global RPKI. This motivates creation of mechanisms that enable a global RPKI. This motivates creation of mechanisms that enable a
network operator to publish a variant of RPKI hierarchy (for its own network operator to publish a variant of RPKI hierarchy (for its own
use and that of its customers) at its discretion. Additionally, a use and that of its customers) at its discretion. Additionally, a
network operator might wish to make use of a local override network operator might wish to make use of a local override
capability to protect routes from adverse actions [I-D.ietf-sidr- capability to protect routes from adverse actions
adverse-actions], until the results of such actions have been [I-D.ietf-sidr-adverse-actions], until the results of such actions
addressed. The mechanisms developed to provide this capability to have been addressed. The mechanisms developed to provide this
network operators are hereby called Simplified Local internet nUmber capability to network operators are hereby called Simplified Local
Resource Management with the RPKI (SLURM). internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI (SLURM).
SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by
generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6483], an generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6483], an
assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS
number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1 number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]. For BGPsec [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]. For BGPsec
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], an assertion is a tuple of {AS [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], an assertion is a tuple of {AS
number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki- number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki-
rtr version. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions rtr version 1. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions
are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions, are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions,
respectively.) respectively.)
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. RPKI RPs with SLURM 2. RPKI RPs with SLURM
SLURM provides a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a SLURM provides a simple way to enable RPs to establish a local,
local, customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository data if
data if needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes from
from consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI that
that are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec
assertions. assertions.
In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data
it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr
protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions
it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in
assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document
are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both
the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying
party software MAY modify other forms of output in comparable ways, party software MAY modify other forms of output in comparable ways,
skipping to change at page 4, line 41 skipping to change at page 4, line 41
Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the Relying Party Stack Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the Relying Party Stack
3. SLURM File and Mechanisms 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms
3.1. Use of JSON 3.1. Use of JSON
This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC7159] format. JSON This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC7159] format. JSON
members that are not defined here MUST not be used in SLURM Files, members that are not defined here MUST not be used in SLURM Files,
however Relying Parties SHOULD ignore such unrecognized JSON members however Relying Parties SHOULD ignore such unrecognized JSON members
when processing a file. at the top level, while any deviations from the specification at
lower levels MUST be considered an error.
3.2. SLURM File Overview 3.2. SLURM File Overview
A SLURM file consists of: A SLURM file consists of:
o A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1.0 o A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1
o One or more slurmTarget (Section 3.3) lines: o A slurmTarget element (Section 3.3) consisting of:
* In this version of SLURM, there are two types of values for the * Zero or more target elements. In this version of SLURM, there
target: ASN or FQDN. If more than one target line is present, are two types of values for the target: ASN or FQDN. If more
all targets must be acceptable to the RP. than one target line is present, all targets must be acceptable
to the RP.
o Validation Output Filters (Section 3.4), consisting of: o Validation Output Filters (Section 3.4), consisting of:
* A list of zero or more Prefix Filters, described in * An array of zero or more Prefix Filters, described in
Section 3.4.1 Section 3.4.1
* A list of zero or more BGPSec Filters, described in * An array of zero or more BGPSec Filters, described in
Section 3.4.2 Section 3.4.2
o Locally Added Assertions (Section 3.5), consisting of: o Locally Added Assertions (Section 3.5), consisting of:
* A list of zero or more Prefix Assertions, described in * An array of zero or more Prefix Assertions, described in
Section 3.5.1 Section 3.5.1
* A list of zero or more BGPSec Assertions, described in * An array of zero or more BGPSec Assertions, described in
Section 3.5.2 Section 3.5.2
In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both output In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both output
filtering and locally added assertions. In this case, the resulting filtering and locally added assertions. In this case, the resulting
assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed
before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions
MUST NOT be removed by output filtering. MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM
file that has no filters or assertions: file that has no filters or assertions:
{ {
"slurmVersion": 1.0, "slurmVersion": 1,
"slurmTarget": [], "slurmTarget": [],
"validationOutputFilters": { "validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [], "prefixFilters": [],
"bgpsecFilters": [] "bgpsecFilters": []
}, },
"locallyAddedAsserstions": { "locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [], "prefixAssertions": [],
"bgpsecAssertions": [] "bgpsecAssertions": []
} }
} }
Empty SLURM File Empty SLURM File
3.3. SLURM Target 3.3. SLURM Target
The header MAY specify a target. If present, the target string A SLURM filer MUST specify a "slurmTarget" element that identifies
identifies the environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be the environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be used. The
used. The meaning of the target string, if present, is determined by "slurmTarget" element MAY have an empty array as its value, which
the user. If a target is present, a relying party SHOULD verify that means "applies to all". The meaning of the "slurmTarget" element, if
the target is an acceptable value, and reject the SLURM file if the present, is determined by the user. If a "slurmTarget" element is
target is not acceptable. If not present, it's up to local policy to present, a relying party SHOULD verify that the target is an
determine whether to accept a SLURM file. acceptable value, and reject this SLURM file if the "slurmTarget"
element is not acceptable. Each "slurmTarget" element contains
merely one "asn" or one "hostname". An explanatory "comment" MAY be
included in each "slurmTarget" element so that it can be shown to
users of the RP software.
For instance, a large ISP may want some of its ASes to establish a For instance, a large ISP may want some of its ASes to establish a
local view of RPKI while the others not. Accordingly, this ISP needs local view of RPKI while the others not. Accordingly, this ISP needs
to make its RPs aware of this distinction for different BGP speakers to make its RPs aware of this distinction for different BGP speakers
by adding ASN(s) to SLURM file target, such as a target value of by adding ASN(s) to SLURM file target. Such a target value is an ASN
"asn=65536". expressed in number.
"slurmTarget": [ "slurmTarget": [
{ {
"asn": 65536 "asn": 65536
"comment": "This file is intended for BGP speakers in AS 65536"
} }
] ]
slurmTarget example 1 slurmTarget example 1
Also, for instance, an organization may share one trusted third-party Also, for instance, an organization may share one trusted third-party
SLURM file source. For the local control, or in the case of SLURM file source. For the local control, or in the case of
Emergency Response Team Coordination, the SLURM file source may Emergency Response Team Coordination, the SLURM file source may
generate a SLURM file that is to be applied to only one specific RP. generate a SLURM file that is to be applied to only one specific RP.
This file can take advantage of the "target" element to restrict the This file can take advantage of the "target" element to restrict the
ASes that will accept and use the file. Accordingly, the SLURM file ASes that will accept and use the file. Accordingly, the SLURM file
source needs to indicate which RP(s) should make use of the file by source needs to indicate which RP(s) should make use of the file by
adding the domain name(s) of the RP(s) to the SLURM file target, adding the domain name(s) of the RP(s) to the SLURM file target.
e.g., a target value of "hostname=rpki.example.com". Such a target value is a server name expressed in FQDN.
"slurmTarget": [ "slurmTarget": [
{ {
"hostname": "rpki.example.com" "hostname": "rpki.example.com"
} "comment": "This file is intended for RP server rpki.example.com"
] }
]
slurmTarget example 2 slurmTarget example 2
3.4. Validation Output Filters 3.4. Validation Output Filters
3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters
The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters
(Prefix Filters in short). Each Prefix Filter can contain either an (Prefix Filters in short). Each Prefix Filter can contain either an
IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an AS number. It is RECOMMENDED that an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an AS number. It is RECOMMENDED that an
explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter, so that it explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter, so that it
can be shown to users of the RP software. can be shown to users of the RP software.
Any Validated ROA Prefix (VRP, [RFC6811]) that matches any configured Any Validated ROA Prefix (VRP, [RFC6811]) that matches any configured
Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output. Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output.
A Validated ROA Prefix is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if A Validated ROA Prefix is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if
one of the following cases applies: one of the following cases applies:
1. A Prefix Filter contains an IPv4 or IPv6 Prefix only, a VRP is 1. If the Prefix Filter contains an IPv4 or IPv6 Prefix only, the
considered to match the filter if the VRP Prefix is equal to or VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP Prefix is equal
subsumed by the Prefix Filter. to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter.
2. A Prefix Filter contains an AS number only, a VRP is considered 2. If Prefix Filter contains an AS number only, the VRP is
to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix Filter ASN. considered to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix
Filter ASN.
3. A Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix AND an AS 3. If Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix AND an AS
Number, a VRP is considered to match if the VRP Prefix is equal Number, the VRP is considered to match if the VRP Prefix is equal
to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter AND the VRP ASN matches the to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter AND the VRP ASN matches the
Prefix Filter ASN Prefix Filter ASN
The following JSON structure represents an array of "prefixFilters" The following JSON structure represents an array of "prefixFilters"
with an element for each use case listed above: with an element for each use case listed above:
"prefixFilters": [ "prefixFilters": [
{ {
"prefix": "192.0.2.0/24", "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
"comment": "Filter all VRPs encompassed by prefix" "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
}, },
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment": "Filter all VRPs matching ASN" "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
}, },
{ {
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"asn": 64497, "asn": 64497,
"comment": "Filter all VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN" "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
} }
] ]
prefixFilters examples prefixFilters examples
3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters
The RP can configure zero or more BGPSec Assertion Filters (BGPSec The RP can configure zero or more BGPSec Assertion Filters (BGPSec
Filters in short). Each BGPSec Filter can contain an AS number and/ Filters in short). Each BGPSec Filter can contain an AS number and/
or a Router SKI. or a Router SKI.
The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
skipping to change at page 9, line 16 skipping to change at page 9, line 16
then a BGPSec Assertion is considered to match if both the then a BGPSec Assertion is considered to match if both the
Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI
matches the Filter Router SKI. matches the Filter Router SKI.
The following JSON structure represents an array of "bgpsecFilters" The following JSON structure represents an array of "bgpsecFilters"
with an element for each use case listed above: with an element for each use case listed above:
"bgpsecFilters": [ "bgpsecFilters": [
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment": "Filter all keys for ASN" "comment": "All keys for ASN"
}, },
{ {
"routerSKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>", "routerSKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
"comment": "Filter key matching Router SKI" "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
}, },
{ {
"asn": 64497, "asn": 64497,
"routerSKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>", "routerSKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
"comment": "Filter key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI" "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
} }
] ]
bgpsecFilters examples bgpsecFilters examples
3.5. Locally Added Assertions 3.5. Locally Added Assertions
3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions 3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions
Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) list Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty)
of ROA Prefix Assertions. This list is added to the RP's output. array of ROA Prefix Assertions. This array is added to the RP's
output.
Each ROA Prefix Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, an AS Each ROA Prefix Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, an AS
number, optionally a MaxLength and optionally a comment that can be number, optionally a MaxLength and optionally a comment that can be
shown to users of the RP software. shown to users of the RP software.
The following JSON structure represents an array of The following JSON structure represents an array of
"prefixAssertions" with an element for each use case listed above: "prefixAssertions" with an element for each use case listed above:
"prefixAssertions": [ "prefixAssertions": [
{ {
skipping to change at page 10, line 23 skipping to change at page 10, line 23
"prefix": "2001:DB8::/32", "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
"maxPrefixLength": 48, "maxPrefixLength": 48,
"comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes" "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
} }
] ]
prefixAssertions examples prefixAssertions examples
3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions 3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions
Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) list Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty)
of BGPSec Assertions. This list is added to the RP's output. array of BGPSec Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output.
Each BGPSec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Router SKI, the Each BGPSec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Router SKI, the
Router Public Key, and optionally a comment that can be shown to Router Public Key, and optionally a comment that can be shown to
users of the RP software. users of the RP software.
The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
certificate's Subject Key Identifer, as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr- certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in
bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is the value
OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length fields. of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length fields.
The Router Public Key is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router The Router Public Key is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in [I-D.ietf- public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in
sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of the [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of
subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length values
the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE. of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
The following JSON structure represents an array of The following JSON structure represents an array of
"bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above: "bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above:
"bgpsecAssertions": [ "bgpsecAssertions": [
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment" : "My known key for my important ASN", "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
"SKI": "<some base64 SKI>", "SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
"publicKey": "<some base64 public key>" "publicKey": "<some base64 public key>"
} }
] ]
prefixAssertions examples prefixAssertions examples
3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions 3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions
The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file
that uses all the elements described in the previous sections: that uses all the elements described in the previous sections:
{ {
"slurmVersion": 1.0, "slurmVersion": 1,
"slurmTarget":[ "slurmTarget":[
{ {
"asn":65536 "asn":65536
}, },
{ {
"hostname":"rpki.example.com" "hostname":"rpki.example.com"
} }
], ],
"validationOutputFilters": { "validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [ "prefixFilters": [
{ {
"prefix": "192.0.2.0/24", "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
"comment": "Filter all VRPs encompassed by prefix" "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
}, },
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment": "Filter all VRPs matching ASN" "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
}, },
{ {
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"asn": 64497, "asn": 64497,
"comment": "Filter all VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN" "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
} }
], ],
"bgpsecFilters": [ "bgpsecFilters": [
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment": "Filter all keys for ASN" "comment": "All keys for ASN"
}, },
{ {
"routerSKI": "Zm9v", "routerSKI": "Zm9v",
"comment": "Filter key matching Router SKI" "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
}, },
{ {
"asn": 64497, "asn": 64497,
"routerSKI": "YmFy", "routerSKI": "YmFy",
"comment": "Filter key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI" "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
} }
] ]
}, },
"locallyAddedAsserstions": { "locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [ "prefixAssertions": [
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"comment": "My other important route" "comment": "My other important route"
}, },
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"prefix": "2001:DB8::/32", "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
"maxPrefixLength": 48, "maxPrefixLength": 48,
"comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes" "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
} }
], ],
"bgpsecAssertions": [ "bgpsecAssertions": [
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment" : "My known key for my important ASN", "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
"SKI": "<some base64 SKI>", "SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
"publicKey": "<some base64 public key>" "publicKey": "<some base64 public key>"
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Full SLURM File Full SLURM File
4. SLURM File Configuration 4. SLURM File Configuration
4.1. SLURM File Atomicity 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity
To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic. To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as
if SLURM file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM if SLURM file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM
skipping to change at page 13, line 34 skipping to change at page 13, line 34
INR assertions and report errors to the sources that created these INR assertions and report errors to the sources that created these
SLURM files in question. SLURM files in question.
If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM
files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error
report in the following cases: report in the following cases:
1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation 1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation
assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM
files Y,Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any files Y,Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any
<addItemPrefixAS> or <delItemPrefix> in file Y and X is <prefixAssertions> or <prefixFilters> in file Y and X is
contained by any prefix in any <addItemPrefixAS> or contained by any prefix in any <prefixAssertions> or
<delItemPrefix> in file Z. <prefixFilters> in file Z.
2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there
exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X
is used in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Y and X is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in file Y
is used in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Z. and X is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in
file Z.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
None None
6. Security considerations 6. Security considerations
The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
with additional ways to control make use of RPKI data while with additional ways to control make use of RPKI data while
preserving autonomy in address space and ASN management. These preserving autonomy in address space and ASN management. These
skipping to change at page 14, line 41 skipping to change at page 14, line 41
integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file
may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM
file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity
of the updated SLURM file. of the updated SLURM file.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the
idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful
reviews and Hui Zou for her editorial assistance. reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their editorial assistance.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Informative References 8.1. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-adverse-actions]
Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification
Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", draft-ietf-sidr-
adverse-actions-04 (work in progress), January 2017.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPsec", Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPsec",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-08 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-08 (work in progress),
June 2016. June 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases]
Bush, R., "Use Cases for Localized Versions of the RPKI",
draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases-07 (work in progress), July
2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", draft-ietf- Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-08 (work in progress), January draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-09 (work in
2017. progress), February 2017.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996, BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation, [RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)", selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996, BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>.
skipping to change at page 16, line 15 skipping to change at page 16, line 15
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810, Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC6890] Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., Bonica, R., Ed., and B. Haberman,
"Special-Purpose IP Address Registries", BCP 153,
RFC 6890, DOI 10.17487/RFC6890, April 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6890>.
[RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for [RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July
2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>. 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>. 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7682] McPherson, D., Amante, S., Osterweil, E., Blunk, L., and
D. Mitchell, "Considerations for Internet Routing
Registries (IRRs) and Routing Policy Configuration",
RFC 7682, DOI 10.17487/RFC7682, December 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7682>.
8.2. Normative References 8.2. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
Turner, S., "BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-16 (work in Formats, & Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
progress), November 2016. algs-17 (work in progress), March 2017.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki- and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-18 (work in progress), July 2016. profiles-18 (work in progress), July 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
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