draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-04.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-05.txt 
SIDR D. Mandelberg SIDR D. Ma
Internet-Draft Unaffiliated Internet-Draft ZDNS
Intended status: Standards Track D. Ma Intended status: Standards Track D. Mandelberg
Expires: September 14, 2017 ZDNS Expires: August 9, 2018 Unaffiliated
T. Bruijnzeels T. Bruijnzeels
RIPE NCC RIPE NCC
March 13, 2017 February 5, 2018
Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-04 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-05
Abstract Abstract
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to
validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to
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as needed. as needed.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 9, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
skipping to change at page 2, line 44 skipping to change at page 2, line 44
3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 11 3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 11
4. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6) resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)
addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482]
to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to
validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is
described in [RFC6483], and validation of the path of a route is described in [RFC6811], and validation of the path of a route is
described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview].) described in [RFC8205].)
However, an RPKI relying party may want to override some of the However, an RPKI relying party may want to override some of the
information expressed via putative TAs and the certificates information expressed via putative TAs and the certificates
downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For instances, [RFC6491] downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For instances, [RFC6491]
recommends the creation of ROAs that would invalidate public routes recommends the creation of ROAs that would invalidate public routes
for reserved and unallocated address space, yet some ISPs might like for reserved and unallocated address space, yet some ISPs might like
to use BGP and the RPKI with private address space ([RFC1918], to use BGP and the RPKI with private address space ([RFC1918],
[RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]).
Local use of private address space and/or AS numbers is consistent Local use of private address space and/or AS numbers is consistent
with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot be verified by the with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot be verified by the
global RPKI. This motivates creation of mechanisms that enable a global RPKI. This motivates creation of mechanisms that enable a
network operator to publish a variant of RPKI hierarchy (for its own network operator to publish a variant of RPKI hierarchy (for its own
use and that of its customers) at its discretion. Additionally, a use and that of its customers) at its discretion. Additionally, a
network operator might wish to make use of a local override network operator might wish to make use of a local override
capability to protect routes from adverse actions capability to protect routes from adverse actions [RFC8211], until
[I-D.ietf-sidr-adverse-actions], until the results of such actions the results of such actions have been addressed. The mechanisms
have been addressed. The mechanisms developed to provide this developed to provide this capability to network operators are hereby
capability to network operators are hereby called Simplified Local called Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the
internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI (SLURM). RPKI (SLURM).
SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by
generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6483], an generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6811], an
assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS
number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1 number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]. For BGPsec [RFC8210]. For BGPsec [RFC8205], an assertion is a tuple of {AS
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], an assertion is a tuple of {AS
number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki- number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki-
rtr version 1. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions rtr version 1. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions
are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions, are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions,
respectively.) respectively.)
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec
assertions. assertions.
In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data
it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr
protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions
it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in
assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document
are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both
the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying
party software MAY modify other forms of output in comparable ways, party software may modify other forms of output in comparable ways,
but that is outside the scope of this document. but that is outside the scope of this document.
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+ +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation | | Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+ +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+
| |
+-------------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------+
| |
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| SLURM +---> SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers| | SLURM +---> SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers|
| Filters | | Assertions | | | | | | Filters | | Assertions | | | | |
+--------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+ +--------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+
Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the Relying Party Stack Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the Relying Party Stack
3. SLURM File and Mechanisms 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms
3.1. Use of JSON 3.1. Use of JSON
This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC7159] format. JSON This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC7159]format. JSON
members that are not defined here MUST not be used in SLURM Files, members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM Files.
however Relying Parties SHOULD ignore such unrecognized JSON members Relying Parties MUST consider any deviations from the specification
at the top level, while any deviations from the specification at an error. Future additions to the specifications in this document
lower levels MUST be considered an error. MUST use an incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member.
3.2. SLURM File Overview 3.2. SLURM File Overview
A SLURM file consists of: A SLURM file consists of:
o A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1 o A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1
o A slurmTarget element (Section 3.3) consisting of: o A slurmTarget element (Section 3.3) consisting of:
* Zero or more target elements. In this version of SLURM, there * Zero or more target elements. In this version of SLURM, there
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Section 3.4.2 Section 3.4.2
o Locally Added Assertions (Section 3.5), consisting of: o Locally Added Assertions (Section 3.5), consisting of:
* An array of zero or more Prefix Assertions, described in * An array of zero or more Prefix Assertions, described in
Section 3.5.1 Section 3.5.1
* An array of zero or more BGPSec Assertions, described in * An array of zero or more BGPSec Assertions, described in
Section 3.5.2 Section 3.5.2
In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both output In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both
filtering and locally added assertions. In this case, the resulting Validation Output Filters and Locally Added Assertions. In this
assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed case, the resulting assertions MUST be the same as if output
before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions filtering were performed before locally adding assertions. I.e.,
MUST NOT be removed by output filtering. locally added assertions MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM
file that has no filters or assertions: file that has no filters or assertions:
{ {
"slurmVersion": 1, "slurmVersion": 1,
"slurmTarget": [], "slurmTarget": [],
"validationOutputFilters": { "validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [], "prefixFilters": [],
"bgpsecFilters": [] "bgpsecFilters": []
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prefixFilters examples prefixFilters examples
3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters
The RP can configure zero or more BGPSec Assertion Filters (BGPSec The RP can configure zero or more BGPSec Assertion Filters (BGPSec
Filters in short). Each BGPSec Filter can contain an AS number and/ Filters in short). Each BGPSec Filter can contain an AS number and/
or a Router SKI. or a Router SKI.
The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr- certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and
bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the
OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length fields. ASN.1 tag or length fields.
Furthermore it is RECOMMENDED that an explanatory comment is included Furthermore it is RECOMMENDED that an explanatory comment is included
with each BGPSec Filter, so that it can be shown to users of the RP with each BGPSec Filter, so that it can be shown to users of the RP
software. software.
Any BGPSec Assertion that matches any configured BGPSec Filter MUST Any BGPSec Assertion that matches any configured BGPSec Filter MUST
be removed from the RPs output. be removed from the RPs output.
A BGPSec Assertion is considered to match with a BGPSec Filter if one A BGPSec Assertion is considered to match with a BGPSec Filter if one
of the following cases applies: of the following cases applies:
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3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions 3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions
Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty)
array of BGPSec Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output. array of BGPSec Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output.
Each BGPSec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Router SKI, the Each BGPSec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Router SKI, the
Router Public Key, and optionally a comment that can be shown to Router Public Key, and optionally a comment that can be shown to
users of the RP software. users of the RP software.
The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is the value [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the
of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length fields. ASN.1 tag or length fields.
The Router Public Key is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router The Router Public Key is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in [RFC8208].
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo,
the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length values including the ASN.1 tag and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo
of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE. SEQUENCE.
The following JSON structure represents an array of The following JSON structure represents an array of
"bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above: "bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above:
"bgpsecAssertions": [ "bgpsecAssertions": [
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment" : "My known key for my important ASN", "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
"SKI": "<some base64 SKI>", "SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
"publicKey": "<some base64 public key>" "publicKey": "<some base64 public key>"
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4. SLURM File Configuration 4. SLURM File Configuration
4.1. SLURM File Atomicity 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity
To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic. To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as
if SLURM file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM if SLURM file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM
configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the
case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS
numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Adding Assertions. numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions.
If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown
state [RFC6483]. If both additions occur then both routes would be state [RFC6811]. If both additions occur then both routes would be
in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other
does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid. does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid.
4.2. Multiple SLURM Files 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files
An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM
files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output
Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions are the respective unions of Filters and Locally Added Assertions are the respective unions of the
the inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for multiple
multiple files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance, files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance,
operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to
frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files
to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from
different source it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict different sources it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict
among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP MUST
SHOULD check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the INR
INR assertions and report errors to the sources that created these assertions and report errors to the sources that created these SLURM
SLURM files in question. files in question.
If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM
files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error
report in the following cases: report in the following cases:
1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation 1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation
assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM
files Y,Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any files Y,Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any
<prefixAssertions> or <prefixFilters> in file Y and X is <prefixAssertions> or <prefixFilters> in file Y and X is
contained by any prefix in any <prefixAssertions> or contained by any prefix in any <prefixAssertions> or
skipping to change at page 14, line 8 skipping to change at page 14, line 8
and X is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in and X is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in
file Z. file Z.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
None None
6. Security considerations 6. Security considerations
The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
with additional ways to control make use of RPKI data while with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving
preserving autonomy in address space and ASN management. These autonomy in address space and ASN management. These mechanisms are
mechanisms are applied only locally; they do not influence how other applied only locally; they do not influence how other network
network operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be taken in
taken in how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is possible to
possible to use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non- use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-private INRs,
private INRs, e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed. e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed. For example,
For example, a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a network
network operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action. operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action. Network
Network operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use extreme
extreme caution. caution.
The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an
RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a
security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the
assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP
can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP. It could can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP. It could
declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice
versa. As a result, an RP must carefully consider the security versa. As a result, an RP must carefully consider the security
implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is
provided by a third party. provided by a third party.
Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and
integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file
may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM
file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity
of the updated SLURM file. of the updated SLURM file. Yet the mechanism to update SLURM file to
guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this
document.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the
idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful
reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their editorial assistance. reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their editorial assistance.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Informative References 8.1. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-adverse-actions]
Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification
Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", draft-ietf-sidr-
adverse-actions-04 (work in progress), January 2017.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPsec",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-08 (work in progress),
June 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-09 (work in
progress), February 2017.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996, BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation, [RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)", selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996, BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005, Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route
Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs)", RFC 6483, DOI 10.17487/RFC6483, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6483>.
[RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public [RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA", Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",
RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012, RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>.
[RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and [RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April
2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>. 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>.
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for [RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July
2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>. 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
8.2. Normative References 8.2. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
Formats, & Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
algs-17 (work in progress), March 2017.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-18 (work in progress), July 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
Authors' Addresses [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.
David Mandelberg [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Unaffiliated Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
Email: david@mandelberg.org [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
[RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8208>.
[RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>.
[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.
[RFC8211] Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification
Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8211>.
Authors' Addresses
Di Ma Di Ma
ZDNS ZDNS
4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun 4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun
Haidian, Beijing 100190 Haidian, Beijing 100190
China China
Email: madi@zdns.cn Email: madi@zdns.cn
David Mandelberg
Unaffiliated
Email: david@mandelberg.org
URI: https://david.mandelberg.org
Tim Bruijnzeels Tim Bruijnzeels
RIPE NCC RIPE NCC
Singel 258 Stationsplein 11
Amsterdam 1016 AB Amsterdam 1012 AB
Netherlands Netherlands
Email: tim@ripe.net Email: tim@ripe.net
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