draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-06.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07.txt 
SIDR D. Ma SIDR D. Ma
Internet-Draft ZDNS Internet-Draft ZDNS
Intended status: Standards Track D. Mandelberg Intended status: Standards Track D. Mandelberg
Expires: August 10, 2018 Unaffiliated Expires: September 23, 2018 Unaffiliated
T. Bruijnzeels T. Bruijnzeels
RIPE NCC RIPE NCC
February 6, 2018 March 22, 2018
Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-06 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07
Abstract Abstract
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to assertions. ISPs can also be able to use the RPKI to validate the
validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to establish a local
establish a local view of the RPKI to control its own network while view of the RPKI to control its own network while making use of RPKI
making use of RPKI data. The mechanisms described in this document data. The mechanisms described in this document provide a simple way
provide a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a local, to enable INR holders to establish a local, customized view of the
customized view of the RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data as needed.
as needed.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 10, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 23, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. RPKI RPs with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. RP with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. SLURM File and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Use of JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Use of JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. SLURM File Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. SLURM File Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. SLURM Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. SLURM Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Validation Output Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.4. Validation Output Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5. Locally Added Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.5. Locally Added Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.5.2. BGPsec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 11 3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 11
4. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6) resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)
addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482]
to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to
validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is
described in [RFC6811], and validation of the path of a route is described in [RFC6811], and validation of the path of a route is
described in [RFC8205].) described in [RFC8205].)
However, an RPKI relying party may want to override some of the However, an "RPKI relying party" (RP) may want to override some of
information expressed via putative TAs and the certificates the information expressed via putative Trust Anchor(TA) and the
downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For instances, [RFC6491] certificates downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For
recommends the creation of ROAs that would invalidate public routes instances, [RFC6491] recommends the creation of ROAs that would
for reserved and unallocated address space, yet some ISPs might like invalidate public routes for reserved and unallocated address space,
to use BGP and the RPKI with private address space ([RFC1918], yet some ISPs might like to use BGP and the RPKI with private address
[RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). space ([RFC1918], [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers
Local use of private address space and/or AS numbers is consistent ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). Local use of private address space and/or AS
with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot be verified by the numbers is consistent with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot
global RPKI. This motivates creation of mechanisms that enable a be verified by the global RPKI. This motivates creation of
network operator to publish a variant of RPKI hierarchy (for its own mechanisms that enable a network operator to publish a variant of
use and that of its customers) at its discretion. Additionally, a RPKI hierarchy (for its own use and that of its customers) at its
network operator might wish to make use of a local override discretion. Additionally, a network operator might wish to make use
capability to protect routes from adverse actions [RFC8211], until of a local override capability to protect routes from adverse actions
the results of such actions have been addressed. The mechanisms [RFC8211], until the results of such actions have been addressed.
developed to provide this capability to network operators are hereby The mechanisms developed to provide this capability to network
called Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the operators are hereby called Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource
RPKI (SLURM). Management with the RPKI (SLURM).
SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by
generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6811], an generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6811], an
assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS
number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1 number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1
[RFC8210]. For BGPsec [RFC8205], an assertion is a tuple of {AS [RFC8210]. For BGPsec [RFC8205], an assertion is a tuple of {AS
number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki- number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki-
rtr version 1. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions rtr version 1. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions
are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions, are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions,
respectively.) respectively.)
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. RPKI RPs with SLURM 2. RP with SLURM
SLURM provides a simple way to enable RPs to establish a local, SLURM provides a simple way to enable an RP to establish a local,
customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository data if customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository data if
needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes from needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes from
consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI that consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI that
are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec
assertions. assertions.
In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data In general, the primary output of an RP is the data it sends to
it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr protocol enables
protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions routers to query an RP for all assertions it knows about (Reset
it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in Query) or for an update of only the changes in assertions (Serial
assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document Query). The mechanisms specified in this document are to be applied
are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both the old and new sets
the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying that are compared for a Serial Query. RP software may modify other
party software may modify other forms of output in comparable ways, forms of output in comparable ways, but that is outside the scope of
but that is outside the scope of this document. this document.
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+ +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation | | Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+ +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+
| |
+-------------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------+
| |
+------v-------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+ +------v-------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SLURM +---> SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers| | SLURM +---> SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers|
| Filters | | Assertions | | | | | | Filters | | Assertions | | | | |
+--------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+ +--------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+
Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the Relying Party Stack Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the RP Stack
3. SLURM File and Mechanisms 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms
3.1. Use of JSON 3.1. Use of JSON
This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC8259]format. JSON This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC8259] format. JSON
members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM Files. members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM Files.
Relying Parties MUST consider any deviations from the specification An RP MUST consider any deviations from the specification an error.
an error. Future additions to the specifications in this document Future additions to the specifications in this document MUST use an
MUST use an incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member. incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member.
3.2. SLURM File Overview 3.2. SLURM File Overview
A SLURM file consists of: A SLURM file consists of:
o A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1 o A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1
o A slurmTarget element (Section 3.3) consisting of: o A slurmTarget element (Section 3.3) consisting of:
* Zero or more target elements. In this version of SLURM, there * Zero or more target elements. In this version of SLURM, there
are two types of values for the target: ASN or FQDN. If more are two types of values for the target: ASN or Fully Qualified
than one target line is present, all targets must be acceptable Domain Name(FQDN). If more than one target line is present,
to the RP. all targets MUST be acceptable to the RP.
o Validation Output Filters (Section 3.4), consisting of: o Validation Output Filters (Section 3.4), consisting of:
* An array of zero or more Prefix Filters, described in * An array of zero or more Prefix Filters, described in
Section 3.4.1 Section 3.4.1
* An array of zero or more BGPSec Filters, described in * An array of zero or more BGPsec Filters, described in
Section 3.4.2 Section 3.4.2
o Locally Added Assertions (Section 3.5), consisting of: o Locally Added Assertions (Section 3.5), consisting of:
* An array of zero or more Prefix Assertions, described in * An array of zero or more Prefix Assertions, described in
Section 3.5.1 Section 3.5.1
* An array of zero or more BGPSec Assertions, described in * An array of zero or more BGPsec Assertions, described in
Section 3.5.2 Section 3.5.2
In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both In the envisioned typical use case, an RP uses both Validation Output
Validation Output Filters and Locally Added Assertions. In this Filters and Locally Added Assertions. In this case, the resulting
case, the resulting assertions MUST be the same as if output assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed
filtering were performed before locally adding assertions. I.e., before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions
locally added assertions MUST NOT be removed by output filtering. MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM
file that has no filters or assertions: file that has no filters or assertions:
{ {
"slurmVersion": 1, "slurmVersion": 1,
"slurmTarget": [], "slurmTarget": [],
"validationOutputFilters": { "validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [], "prefixFilters": [],
"bgpsecFilters": [] "bgpsecFilters": []
skipping to change at page 6, line 7 skipping to change at page 5, line 47
"locallyAddedAssertions": { "locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [], "prefixAssertions": [],
"bgpsecAssertions": [] "bgpsecAssertions": []
} }
} }
Empty SLURM File Empty SLURM File
3.3. SLURM Target 3.3. SLURM Target
A SLURM filer MUST specify a "slurmTarget" element that identifies A SLURM file MUST specify a "slurmTarget" element that identifies the
the environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be used. The environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be used. The
"slurmTarget" element MAY have an empty array as its value, which "slurmTarget" element MAY have an empty array as its value, which
means "applies to all". The meaning of the "slurmTarget" element, if means "applies to all". The meaning of the "slurmTarget" element, if
present, is determined by the user. If a "slurmTarget" element is present, is determined by the user. If a "slurmTarget" element is
present, a relying party SHOULD verify that the target is an present, an RP SHOULD verify that the target is an acceptable value,
acceptable value, and reject this SLURM file if the "slurmTarget" and reject this SLURM file if the "slurmTarget" element is not
element is not acceptable. Each "slurmTarget" element contains acceptable. Each "slurmTarget" element contains merely one "asn" or
merely one "asn" or one "hostname". An explanatory "comment" MAY be one "hostname". An explanatory "comment" MAY be included in each
included in each "slurmTarget" element so that it can be shown to "slurmTarget" element so that it can be shown to users of the RP
users of the RP software. software.
For instance, a large ISP may want some of its ASes to establish a For instance, a large ISP may want some of its ASes to establish a
local view of RPKI while the others not. Accordingly, this ISP needs local view of RPKI while the others not. Accordingly, this ISP needs
to make its RPs aware of this distinction for different BGP speakers to make its RPs aware of this distinction for different BGP speakers
by adding ASN(s) to SLURM file target. Such a target value is an ASN by adding ASN(s) to SLURM file target. Such a target value is an ASN
expressed in number. expressed in number.
"slurmTarget": [ "slurmTarget": [
{ {
"asn": 65536 "asn": 65536,
"comment": "This file is intended for BGP speakers in AS 65536" "comment": "This file is intended for BGP speakers in AS 65536"
} }
] ]
slurmTarget example 1 slurmTarget example 1
Also, for instance, an organization may share one trusted third-party Also, for instance, an organization may share one trusted third-party
SLURM file source. For the local control, or in the case of SLURM file source. For the local control, or in the case of
Emergency Response Team Coordination, the SLURM file source may Emergency Response Team Coordination, the SLURM file source may
generate a SLURM file that is to be applied to only one specific RP. generate a SLURM file that is to be applied to only one specific RP.
This file can take advantage of the "target" element to restrict the This file can take advantage of the "target" element to restrict the
ASes that will accept and use the file. Accordingly, the SLURM file ASes that will accept and use the file. Accordingly, the SLURM file
source needs to indicate which RP(s) should make use of the file by source needs to indicate which RP(s) should make use of the file by
adding the domain name(s) of the RP(s) to the SLURM file target. adding the domain name(s) of the RP(s) to the SLURM file target.
Such a target value is a server name expressed in FQDN. Such a target value is a server name expressed in FQDN.
"slurmTarget": [ "slurmTarget": [
{ {
"hostname": "rpki.example.com" "hostname": "rpki.example.com",
"comment": "This file is intended for RP server rpki.example.com" "comment": "This file is intended for RP server rpki.example.com"
} }
] ]
slurmTarget example 2 slurmTarget example 2
3.4. Validation Output Filters 3.4. Validation Output Filters
3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters
skipping to change at page 7, line 41 skipping to change at page 7, line 32
VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP Prefix is equal VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP Prefix is equal
to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter. to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter.
2. If Prefix Filter contains an AS number only, the VRP is 2. If Prefix Filter contains an AS number only, the VRP is
considered to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix considered to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix
Filter ASN. Filter ASN.
3. If Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix AND an AS 3. If Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix AND an AS
Number, the VRP is considered to match if the VRP Prefix is equal Number, the VRP is considered to match if the VRP Prefix is equal
to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter AND the VRP ASN matches the to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter AND the VRP ASN matches the
Prefix Filter ASN Prefix Filter ASN.
The following JSON structure represents an array of "prefixFilters" The following JSON structure represents an array of "prefixFilters"
with an element for each use case listed above: with an element for each use case listed above:
"prefixFilters": [ "prefixFilters": [
{ {
"prefix": "192.0.2.0/24", "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix" "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
}, },
{ {
skipping to change at page 8, line 25 skipping to change at page 8, line 25
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"asn": 64497, "asn": 64497,
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN" "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
} }
] ]
prefixFilters examples prefixFilters examples
3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters
The RP can configure zero or more BGPSec Assertion Filters (BGPSec The RP can configure zero or more BGPsec Assertion Filters (BGPsec
Filters in short). Each BGPSec Filter can contain an AS number and/ Filters in short). Each BGPsec Filter can contain an AS number and/
or a Router SKI. or a Router SKI.
The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and
[RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the
ASN.1 tag or length fields. ASN.1 tag or length fields.
Furthermore it is RECOMMENDED that an explanatory comment is included Furthermore it is RECOMMENDED that an explanatory comment is included
with each BGPSec Filter, so that it can be shown to users of the RP with each BGPsec Filter, so that it can be shown to users of the RP
software. software.
Any BGPSec Assertion that matches any configured BGPSec Filter MUST Any BGPsec Assertion that matches any configured BGPsec Filter MUST
be removed from the RPs output. be removed from the RP's output.
A BGPSec Assertion is considered to match with a BGPSec Filter if one A BGPsec Assertion is considered to match with a BGPsec Filter if one
of the following cases applies: of the following cases applies:
1. If the BGPSec Filter contains an AS number only, a BGPSec 1. If the BGPsec Filter contains an AS number only, a BGPsec
Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the
Filter ASN. Filter ASN.
2. If the BGPSec Filter contains a Router SKI only, a BGPSec 2. If the BGPsec Filter contains a Router SKI only, a BGPsec
Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI
matches the Filter Router SKI. matches the Filter Router SKI.
3. If the BGPSec Filter contains both an AS number AND a Router SKI, 3. If the BGPsec Filter contains both an AS number AND a Router SKI,
then a BGPSec Assertion is considered to match if both the then a BGPsec Assertion is considered to match if both the
Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI
matches the Filter Router SKI. matches the Filter Router SKI.
The following JSON structure represents an array of "bgpsecFilters" The following JSON structure represents an array of "bgpsecFilters"
with an element for each use case listed above: with an element for each use case listed above:
"bgpsecFilters": [ "bgpsecFilters": [
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment": "All keys for ASN" "comment": "All keys for ASN"
skipping to change at page 9, line 35 skipping to change at page 9, line 35
"comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI" "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
} }
] ]
bgpsecFilters examples bgpsecFilters examples
3.5. Locally Added Assertions 3.5. Locally Added Assertions
3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions 3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions
Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of ROA
array of ROA Prefix Assertions. This array is added to the RP's Prefix Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output.
output.
Each ROA Prefix Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, an AS Each ROA Prefix Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, an AS
number, optionally a MaxLength and optionally a comment that can be number, optionally a MaxLength and optionally a comment that can be
shown to users of the RP software. shown to users of the RP software.
The following JSON structure represents an array of The following JSON structure represents an array of
"prefixAssertions" with an element for each use case listed above: "prefixAssertions" with an element for each use case listed above:
"prefixAssertions": [ "prefixAssertions": [
{ {
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{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"prefix": "2001:DB8::/32", "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
"maxPrefixLength": 48, "maxPrefixLength": 48,
"comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes" "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
} }
] ]
prefixAssertions examples prefixAssertions examples
3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions 3.5.2. BGPsec Assertions
Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of BGPsec
array of BGPSec Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output. Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output.
Each BGPSec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Router SKI, the Each BGPsec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Router SKI, the
Router Public Key, and optionally a comment that can be shown to Router Public Key, and optionally a comment that can be shown to
users of the RP software. users of the RP software.
The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and
[RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the
ASN.1 tag or length fields. ASN.1 tag or length fields.
The Router Public Key is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router The Router Public Key is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in [RFC8208]. public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in [RFC8208].
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} }
} }
Full SLURM File Full SLURM File
4. SLURM File Configuration 4. SLURM File Configuration
4.1. SLURM File Atomicity 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity
To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic. To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as That is, the output of the RP must be either the same as if SLURM
if SLURM file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM
configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the
case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS
numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions. numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions.
If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown
state [RFC6811]. If both additions occur then both routes would be state [RFC6811]. If both additions occur then both routes would be
in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other
does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid. does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid.
4.2. Multiple SLURM Files 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files
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check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the INR check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the INR
assertions and report errors to the sources that created these SLURM assertions and report errors to the sources that created these SLURM
files in question. files in question.
If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM
files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error
report in the following cases: report in the following cases:
1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation 1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation
assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM
files Y,Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any files Y, Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any
<prefixAssertions> or <prefixFilters> in file Y and X is <prefixAssertions> or <prefixFilters> in file Y and X is
contained by any prefix in any <prefixAssertions> or contained by any prefix in any <prefixAssertions> or
<prefixFilters> in file Z. <prefixFilters> in file Z.
2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there
exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y, Z such that
is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in file Y X is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in file
and X is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in Y and X is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters>
file Z. in file Z.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
None None
6. Security considerations 6. Security Considerations
The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving
autonomy in address space and ASN management. These mechanisms are autonomy in address space and ASN management. These mechanisms are
applied only locally; they do not influence how other network applied only locally; they do not influence how other network
operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be taken in operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be taken in
how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is possible to how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is possible to
use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-private INRs, use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-private INRs,
e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed. For example, e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed. For example,
a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a network a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a network
skipping to change at page 14, line 38 skipping to change at page 14, line 38
provided by a third party. provided by a third party.
Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and
integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file
may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM
file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity
of the updated SLURM file. Yet the mechanism to update SLURM file to of the updated SLURM file. Yet the mechanism to update SLURM file to
guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this
document. document.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the
idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful
reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their editorial assistance. reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their editorial assistance.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Informative References 8.1. Informative References
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