draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-08.txt 
SIDR D. Ma SIDR D. Ma
Internet-Draft ZDNS Internet-Draft ZDNS
Intended status: Standards Track D. Mandelberg Intended status: Standards Track D. Mandelberg
Expires: September 23, 2018 Unaffiliated Expires: October 28, 2018 Unaffiliated
T. Bruijnzeels T. Bruijnzeels
RIPE NCC RIPE NCC
March 22, 2018 April 26, 2018
Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07 (SLURM)
draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-08
Abstract Abstract
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origin assertions.
assertions. ISPs can also be able to use the RPKI to validate the ISPs can also use the RPKI to validate the path of a BGP route.
path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to establish a local However, ISPs may want to establish a local view of exceptions to the
view of the RPKI to control its own network while making use of RPKI RPKI data in the form of local filters and additions. The mechanisms
data. The mechanisms described in this document provide a simple way described in this document provide a simple way to enable INR holders
to enable INR holders to establish a local, customized view of the to establish a local, customized view of the RPKI, overriding global
RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data as needed. RPKI repository data as needed.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 23, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 28, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. RP with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. RP with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. SLURM File and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Use of JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Use of JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. SLURM File Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. SLURM File Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. SLURM Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Validation Output Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Validation Output Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.4. Locally Added Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5. Locally Added Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.4.1. ROA Prefix Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.5.2. BGPsec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.5. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 11
3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 11 4. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6) resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)
addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] addresses can issue a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] to
to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to
validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is
described in [RFC6811], and validation of the path of a route is described in [RFC6811], and validation of the path of a route is
described in [RFC8205].) described in [RFC8205].)
However, an "RPKI relying party" (RP) may want to override some of However, an "RPKI relying party" (RP) may want to override some of
the information expressed via putative Trust Anchor(TA) and the the information expressed via configured Trust Anchors (TAs) and the
certificates downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For certificates downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For
instances, [RFC6491] recommends the creation of ROAs that would instances, [RFC6491] recommends the creation of ROAs that would
invalidate public routes for reserved and unallocated address space, invalidate public routes for reserved and unallocated address space,
yet some ISPs might like to use BGP and the RPKI with private address yet some ISPs might like to use BGP and the RPKI with private address
space ([RFC1918], [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers space ([RFC1918], [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers
([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). Local use of private address space and/or AS ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). Local use of private address space and/or AS
numbers is consistent with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot numbers is consistent with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot
be verified by the global RPKI. This motivates creation of be verified by the global RPKI. This motivates creation of
mechanisms that enable a network operator to publish a variant of mechanisms that enable a network operator to publish exception to the
RPKI hierarchy (for its own use and that of its customers) at its RPKI in the form of filters and additions (for its own use and that
discretion. Additionally, a network operator might wish to make use of its customers) at its discretion. Additionally, a network
of a local override capability to protect routes from adverse actions operator might wish to make use of a local override capability to
[RFC8211], until the results of such actions have been addressed. protect routes from adverse actions [RFC8211], until the results of
The mechanisms developed to provide this capability to network such actions have been addressed. The mechanisms developed to
operators are hereby called Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource provide this capability to network operators are hereby called
Management with the RPKI (SLURM). Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
(SLURM).
SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by
generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6811], an generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6811], an
assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS
number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1 number (ASN)} as used by rpki-rtr (the RPKI to Router Protocol)
[RFC8210]. For BGPsec [RFC8205], an assertion is a tuple of {AS version 0 [RFC6810] and rpki-rtr version 1 [RFC8210]. For BGPsec
number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki- [RFC8205], an assertion is a tuple of {ASN, subject key identifier,
rtr version 1. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions router public key} as used by rpki-rtr version 1. (For the remainder
are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions, of this document, these assertions are called ROA Prefix Assertions
respectively.) and BGPsec Assertions, respectively.)
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT","REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. RP with SLURM 2. RP with SLURM
SLURM provides a simple way to enable an RP to establish a local, SLURM provides a simple way to enable an RP to establish a local,
customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository data if customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository data if
needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes from needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes from
consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI that consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI that
are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec are overridden by local ROA Prefix Assertions and BGPsec Assertions.
assertions.
In general, the primary output of an RP is the data it sends to In general, the primary output of an RP is the data it sends to
routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr protocol enables routers over the rpki-rtr protocol [RFC8210]. The rpki-rtr protocol
routers to query an RP for all assertions it knows about (Reset enables routers to query an RP for all assertions it knows about
Query) or for an update of only the changes in assertions (Serial (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in assertions
Query). The mechanisms specified in this document are to be applied (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document are to be
to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both the old and new sets applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both the old and
that are compared for a Serial Query. RP software may modify other new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. RP software may
forms of output in comparable ways, but that is outside the scope of modify other forms of output in comparable ways, but that is outside
this document. the scope of this document.
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+ +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation | | Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+ +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+
| |
+-------------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------+
| |
+------v-------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+ +------v-------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+
skipping to change at page 4, line 35 skipping to change at page 4, line 43
| SLURM +---> SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers| | SLURM +---> SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers|
| Filters | | Assertions | | | | | | Filters | | Assertions | | | | |
+--------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+ +--------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+
Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the RP Stack Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the RP Stack
3. SLURM File and Mechanisms 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms
3.1. Use of JSON 3.1. Use of JSON
This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC8259] format. JSON SLURM filters and assertions are specified in JSON [RFC8259] format.
members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM Files. JSON members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM
An RP MUST consider any deviations from the specification an error. Files. An RP MUST consider any deviations from the specification
Future additions to the specifications in this document MUST use an errors. Future additions to the specifications in this document MUST
incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member. use an incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member.
3.2. SLURM File Overview 3.2. SLURM File Overview
A SLURM file consists of: A SLURM file consists of a single JSON object containing the
following members:
o A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1
o A slurmTarget element (Section 3.3) consisting of:
* Zero or more target elements. In this version of SLURM, there o A "slurmVersion" member that MUST be set to 1, encoded as a number
are two types of values for the target: ASN or Fully Qualified
Domain Name(FQDN). If more than one target line is present,
all targets MUST be acceptable to the RP.
o Validation Output Filters (Section 3.4), consisting of: o A "validationOutputFilters" member (Section 3.3), whose value is
an object. The object MUST contain exactly two members:
* An array of zero or more Prefix Filters, described in * A "prefixFilters" member, whose value is described in
Section 3.4.1 Section 3.3.1.
* An array of zero or more BGPsec Filters, described in * A "bgpsecFilters" member, whose value is described in
Section 3.4.2 Section 3.3.2.
o Locally Added Assertions (Section 3.5), consisting of: o A "locallyAddedAssertions" member (Section 3.4), whose value is an
object. The object MUST contain exactly two members:
* An array of zero or more Prefix Assertions, described in * A "prefixAssertions" member, whose value is described in
Section 3.5.1 Section 3.4.1.
* An array of zero or more BGPsec Assertions, described in * A "bgpsecAssertions" member, whose value is described in
Section 3.5.2 Section 3.4.2.
In the envisioned typical use case, an RP uses both Validation Output In the envisioned typical use case, an RP uses both Validation Output
Filters and Locally Added Assertions. In this case, the resulting Filters and Locally Added Assertions. In this case, the resulting
assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed
before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions before locally adding assertions. i.e. locally added assertions
MUST NOT be removed by output filtering. MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM
file that has no filters or assertions: file that has no filters or assertions:
{ {
"slurmVersion": 1, "slurmVersion": 1,
"slurmTarget": [],
"validationOutputFilters": { "validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [], "prefixFilters": [],
"bgpsecFilters": [] "bgpsecFilters": []
}, },
"locallyAddedAssertions": { "locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [], "prefixAssertions": [],
"bgpsecAssertions": [] "bgpsecAssertions": []
} }
} }
Empty SLURM File Empty SLURM File
3.3. SLURM Target 3.3. Validation Output Filters
A SLURM file MUST specify a "slurmTarget" element that identifies the
environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be used. The
"slurmTarget" element MAY have an empty array as its value, which
means "applies to all". The meaning of the "slurmTarget" element, if
present, is determined by the user. If a "slurmTarget" element is
present, an RP SHOULD verify that the target is an acceptable value,
and reject this SLURM file if the "slurmTarget" element is not
acceptable. Each "slurmTarget" element contains merely one "asn" or
one "hostname". An explanatory "comment" MAY be included in each
"slurmTarget" element so that it can be shown to users of the RP
software.
For instance, a large ISP may want some of its ASes to establish a 3.3.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters
local view of RPKI while the others not. Accordingly, this ISP needs
to make its RPs aware of this distinction for different BGP speakers
by adding ASN(s) to SLURM file target. Such a target value is an ASN
expressed in number.
"slurmTarget": [ The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters
{ (Prefix Filters in short). Each Prefix Filter can contain either an
"asn": 65536, IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an ASN. It is RECOMMENDED that an
"comment": "This file is intended for BGP speakers in AS 65536" explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter, so that it
} can be shown to users of the RP software.
]
slurmTarget example 1 The above is expressed as a value of the "prefixFilters" member, as
an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one of
either, or one each of both following members:
Also, for instance, an organization may share one trusted third-party o A "prefix" member, whose value is string representing either an
SLURM file source. For the local control, or in the case of IPv4 prefix (Section 3.1 of [RFC4632]) or an IPv6 prefix
Emergency Response Team Coordination, the SLURM file source may ([RFC5952]).
generate a SLURM file that is to be applied to only one specific RP.
This file can take advantage of the "target" element to restrict the
ASes that will accept and use the file. Accordingly, the SLURM file
source needs to indicate which RP(s) should make use of the file by
adding the domain name(s) of the RP(s) to the SLURM file target.
Such a target value is a server name expressed in FQDN.
"slurmTarget": [ o An "asn" member, whose value is a number.
{
"hostname": "rpki.example.com",
"comment": "This file is intended for RP server rpki.example.com"
}
]
slurmTarget example 2 In addition, each object MAY contain one optional "comment" member,
whose value is a string.
3.4. Validation Output Filters The following example JSON structure represents a "prefixFilters"
member with an array of example objects for each use case listed
above:
3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters "prefixFilters": [
{
"prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
},
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
},
{
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"asn": 64497,
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
}
]
The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters prefixFilters examples
(Prefix Filters in short). Each Prefix Filter can contain either an
IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an AS number. It is RECOMMENDED that an
explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter, so that it
can be shown to users of the RP software.
Any Validated ROA Prefix (VRP, [RFC6811]) that matches any configured Any Validated ROA Prefix (VRP, [RFC6811]) that matches any configured
Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output. Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output.
A Validated ROA Prefix is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if A VRP is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if one of the
one of the following cases applies: following cases applies:
1. If the Prefix Filter contains an IPv4 or IPv6 Prefix only, the 1. If the Prefix Filter contains an IPv4 or IPv6 Prefix only, the
VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP Prefix is equal VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP prefix is equal
to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter. to or covered by the Prefix Filter prefix.
2. If Prefix Filter contains an AS number only, the VRP is 2. If Prefix Filter contains an ASN only, the VRP is considered to
considered to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix Filter ASN.
Filter ASN.
3. If Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix AND an AS 3. If Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and an ASN,
Number, the VRP is considered to match if the VRP Prefix is equal the VRP is considered to match if the VRP prefix is equal to or
to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter AND the VRP ASN matches the covered by the Prefix Filter prefix and the VRP ASN matches the
Prefix Filter ASN. Prefix Filter ASN.
The following JSON structure represents an array of "prefixFilters" 3.3.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters
with an element for each use case listed above:
"prefixFilters": [ The RP can configure zero or more BGPsec Assertion Filters (BGPsec
{ Filters in short). Each BGPsec Filter can contain an ASN and/or the
"prefix": "192.0.2.0/24", Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a Router Subject Key Identifier (SKI),
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix" as described in [RFC8209] and [RFC6487]. It is RECOMMENDED that an
}, explanatory comment is also included with each BGPSec Filter, so that
{ it can be shown to users of the RP software.
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
},
{
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"asn": 64497,
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
}
]
prefixFilters examples The above is expressed as a value of the "bgpsecFilters" member, as
an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one of
either, or one each of both following members:
3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters o An "asn" member, whose value is a number
The RP can configure zero or more BGPsec Assertion Filters (BGPsec o An "SKI" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding without
Filters in short). Each BGPsec Filter can contain an AS number and/ trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the certificate's Subject
or a Router SKI. Public Key as described in Section 4.8.2. of [RFC6487] (This is
the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or
length fields.)
The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router In addition, each object MAY contain one optional "comment" member,
certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and whose value is a string.
[RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the
ASN.1 tag or length fields.
Furthermore it is RECOMMENDED that an explanatory comment is included The following example JSON structure represents a "bgpsecFilters"
with each BGPsec Filter, so that it can be shown to users of the RP member with an array of example objects for each use case listed
software. above:
"bgpsecFilters": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "All keys for ASN"
},
{
"SKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
"comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
},
{
"asn": 64497,
"SKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
"comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
}
]
bgpsecFilters examples
Any BGPsec Assertion that matches any configured BGPsec Filter MUST Any BGPsec Assertion that matches any configured BGPsec Filter MUST
be removed from the RP's output. be removed from the RP's output. A BGPsec Assertion is considered to
match with a BGPsec Filter if one of the following cases applies:
A BGPsec Assertion is considered to match with a BGPsec Filter if one 1. If the BGPsec Filter contains an ASN only, a BGPsec Assertion is
of the following cases applies: considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN.
1. If the BGPsec Filter contains an AS number only, a BGPsec 2. If the BGPsec Filter contains an SKI only, a BGPsec Assertion is
Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI matches the
Filter ASN. Filter SKI.
2. If the BGPsec Filter contains a Router SKI only, a BGPsec 3. If the BGPsec Filter contains both an ASN and a Router SKI, then
Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI a BGPsec Assertion is considered to match if both the Assertion
matches the Filter Router SKI. ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI matches
the Filter Router SKI.
3. If the BGPsec Filter contains both an AS number AND a Router SKI, 3.4. Locally Added Assertions
then a BGPsec Assertion is considered to match if both the
Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI
matches the Filter Router SKI.
The following JSON structure represents an array of "bgpsecFilters" 3.4.1. ROA Prefix Assertions
with an element for each use case listed above:
"bgpsecFilters": [ Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of ROA
{ Prefix Assertions (Prefix Assertion in short). Each ROA Prefix
"asn": 64496, Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and an ASN. It MAY
"comment": "All keys for ASN" include a value for the maximum length. It is RECOMMENDED that an
}, explanatory comment is also included with each, so that it can be
{ shown to users ofthe RP software.
"routerSKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
"comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
},
{
"asn": 64497,
"routerSKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
"comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
}
]
bgpsecFilters examples The above is expressed as a value of the "prefixAssertions" member,
as an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one
each of both following members:
3.5. Locally Added Assertions o A "prefix" member, whose value is string representing either an
IPv4 prefix (Section 3.1 of [RFC4632]) or an IPv6 prefix
([RFC5952]).
3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions o An "asn" member, whose value is a number.
Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of ROA In addition, each object MAY contain one of each of the following
Prefix Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output. members:
Each ROA Prefix Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, an AS o A "maxPrefixLength" member, whose value is a number.
number, optionally a MaxLength and optionally a comment that can be
shown to users of the RP software.
The following JSON structure represents an array of o A "comment" member, whose value is a string.
"prefixAssertions" with an element for each use case listed above:
The following example JSON structure represents a "prefixAssertions"
member with an array of example objects for each use case listed
above:
"prefixAssertions": [ "prefixAssertions": [
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"comment": "My other important route" "comment": "My other important route"
}, },
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"prefix": "2001:DB8::/32", "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
"maxPrefixLength": 48, "maxPrefixLength": 48,
"comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes" "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
} }
] ]
prefixAssertions examples prefixAssertions examples
3.5.2. BGPsec Assertions Note that the combination of the prefix, ASN and optional maximum
length describes a VRP as described in [RFC6811]. The RP MUST add
all Prefix Assertions found this way to the VRP found through RPKI
validation, and ensure that it sends the complete set of PDUs,
excluding duplicates when using the rpki-rtr protocol, see
Section 5.6 and 5.7 of [RFC8210].
Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of BGPsec 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertions
Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output.
Each BGPsec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Router SKI, the Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of BGPsec
Router Public Key, and optionally a comment that can be shown to Assertions. Each BGPsec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a
Router SKI, and the Router Public Key. It is RECOMMENDED that an
explanatory comment is also included, so that it can be shown to
users of the RP software. users of the RP software.
The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router The above is expressed as a value of the "bgpsecAssertions" member,
certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and as an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one
[RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the each of all of the following members:
ASN.1 tag or length fields.
The Router Public Key is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router An "asn" member, whose value is a number.
public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in [RFC8208].
This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, An "SKI" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding without
including the ASN.1 tag and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo trailing '=' (Section 5 of RFC4648 ) of the router's public key
SEQUENCE. equivalent to a certificate's Subject Public Key as described in
Section 4.8.2. of [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET
STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length fields.
A "routerPublicKey" member, whose value is is the Base64 encoding
without trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the equivalent to
a router certificate's public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as
described in [RFC8208]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of
the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length
values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
The following JSON structure represents an array of The following JSON structure represents an array of
"bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above: "bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above:
"bgpsecAssertions": [ "bgpsecAssertions": [
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
"SKI": "<some base64 SKI>", "SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
"publicKey": "<some base64 public key>" "publicKey": "<some base64 public key>",
"comment": "My known key for my important ASN"
} }
] ]
prefixAssertions examples bgpsecAssertions examples
3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions Note that a bgpsecAssertion matches the syntax of the Router Key PDU
described in section 5.10 of [RFC8210]. Relying Parties MUST add any
bgpsecAssertion thus found to the set of Router PDUs, excluding
duplicates, when using the RPKI-RTR protocol [RFC8210].
3.5. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions
The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file
that uses all the elements described in the previous sections: that uses all the elements described in the previous sections:
{ {
"slurmVersion": 1, "slurmVersion": 1,
"slurmTarget":[
{
"asn":65536
},
{
"hostname":"rpki.example.com"
}
],
"validationOutputFilters": { "validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [ "prefixFilters": [
{ {
"prefix": "192.0.2.0/24", "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix" "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
}, },
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment": "All VRPs matching ASN" "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
}, },
skipping to change at page 12, line 4 skipping to change at page 12, line 8
{ {
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"asn": 64497, "asn": 64497,
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN" "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
} }
], ],
"bgpsecFilters": [ "bgpsecFilters": [
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment": "All keys for ASN" "comment": "All keys for ASN"
}, },
{ {
"routerSKI": "Zm9v", "SKI": "Zm9v",
"comment": "Key matching Router SKI" "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
}, },
{ {
"asn": 64497, "asn": 64497,
"routerSKI": "YmFy", "SKI": "YmFy",
"comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI" "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
} }
] ]
}, },
"locallyAddedAssertions": { "locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [ "prefixAssertions": [
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"comment": "My other important route" "comment": "My other important route"
skipping to change at page 12, line 42 skipping to change at page 12, line 45
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment" : "My known key for my important ASN", "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
"SKI": "<some base64 SKI>", "SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
"publicKey": "<some base64 public key>" "publicKey": "<some base64 public key>"
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Full SLURM File Example of Full SLURM File
4. SLURM File Configuration 4. SLURM File Configuration
4.1. SLURM File Atomicity 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity
To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic. To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
That is, the output of the RP must be either the same as if SLURM That is, the output of the RP MUST be either the same as if SLURM
file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM file were not used, or it MUST reflect the entire SLURM
configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the
case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin
numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions. ASNs. Both routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions. If
If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown
state [RFC6811]. If both additions occur then both routes would be state [RFC6811]. If both additions occur then both routes would be
in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other
does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid. does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid.
4.2. Multiple SLURM Files 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files
An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM
files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output
Filters and Locally Added Assertions are the respective unions of the Filters and Locally Added Assertions are the respective unions of the
inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for multiple inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for multiple
files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance, files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance,
operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to
frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files
to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from
different sources it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict different sources it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict
among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP MUST among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP
check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the INR SHOULD check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the
assertions and report errors to the sources that created these SLURM INR assertions and report errors to the sources that created these
files in question. SLURM files in question. The RP gets multiple SLURM files as a set,
and the whole set MUST be rejected in case of any overlaps among
SLURM files.
If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM
files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error
report in the following cases: report in the following cases:
1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation 1. There may be conflicting changes to ROA Prefix Assertions if
assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM files Y, Z
files Y, Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any such that X is contained by any prefix in any
<prefixAssertions> or <prefixFilters> in file Y and X is <prefixAssertions> or <prefixFilters> in file Y and X is
contained by any prefix in any <prefixAssertions> or contained by any prefix in any <prefixAssertions> or
<prefixFilters> in file Z. <prefixFilters> in file Z.
2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec Assertions if there
exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y, Z such that exists an ASN X and distinct SLURM files Y, Z such that X is
X is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in file used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in file Y
Y and X is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> and X is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in
in file Z. file Z.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
None None
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving
autonomy in address space and ASN management. These mechanisms are autonomy in address space and ASN management. These mechanisms are
skipping to change at page 14, line 26 skipping to change at page 14, line 33
operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action. Network operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action. Network
operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use extreme operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use extreme
caution. caution.
The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an
RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a
security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the
assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP
can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP. It could can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP. It could
declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice
versa. As a result, an RP must carefully consider the security versa. As a result, an RP MUST carefully consider the security
implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is
provided by a third party. provided by a third party.
Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and
integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file
may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM
file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity
of the updated SLURM file. Yet the mechanism to update SLURM file to of the updated SLURM file. Yet the mechanism to update SLURM file to
guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this
document. document.
7. Acknowledgments 7. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to to Richard Hansen
idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful for his careful reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their
reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their editorial assistance. editorial assistance.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Informative References 8.1. Informative References
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996, BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
skipping to change at page 15, line 29 skipping to change at page 15, line 38
[RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public [RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA", Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",
RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012, RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>.
[RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and [RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>. 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>.
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.
[RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for [RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>. 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>.
[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.
[RFC8211] Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification [RFC8211] Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification
Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211, Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8211>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8211>.
8.2. Normative References 8.2. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5952] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
Address Text Representation", RFC 5952,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5952>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol [RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>. 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
[RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key [RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208, Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8208>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8208>.
[RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for [RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", RFC 8209, and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>.
[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Di Ma Di Ma
ZDNS ZDNS
4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun 4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun
Haidian, Beijing 100190 Haidian, Beijing 100190
China China
Email: madi@zdns.cn Email: madi@zdns.cn
David Mandelberg David Mandelberg
Unaffiliated Unaffiliated
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