draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-08.txt   rfc8416.txt 
SIDR D. Ma Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. Ma
Internet-Draft ZDNS Request for Comments: 8416 ZDNS
Intended status: Standards Track D. Mandelberg Category: Standards Track D. Mandelberg
Expires: October 28, 2018 Unaffiliated ISSN: 2070-1721 Unaffiliated
T. Bruijnzeels T. Bruijnzeels
RIPE NCC NLnet Labs
April 26, 2018 August 2018
Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI
(SLURM) (SLURM)
draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-08
Abstract Abstract
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origin assertions. (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origin assertions.
ISPs can also use the RPKI to validate the path of a BGP route. ISPs can also use the RPKI to validate the path of a BGP route.
However, ISPs may want to establish a local view of exceptions to the However, ISPs may want to establish a local view of exceptions to the
RPKI data in the form of local filters and additions. The mechanisms RPKI data in the form of local filters and additions. The mechanisms
described in this document provide a simple way to enable INR holders described in this document provide a simple way to enable INR holders
to establish a local, customized view of the RPKI, overriding global to establish a local, customized view of the RPKI, overriding global
RPKI repository data as needed. RPKI repository data as needed.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 28, 2018. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8416.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology ................................................4
2. RP with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. RP with SLURM ...................................................4
3. SLURM File and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. SLURM Files and Mechanisms ......................................5
3.1. Use of JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Use of JSON ................................................5
3.2. SLURM File Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. SLURM File Overview ........................................5
3.3. Validation Output Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. Validation Output Filters ..................................6
3.3.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters ........................6
3.3.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters ............................7
3.4. Locally Added Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.4. Locally Added Assertions ...................................9
3.4.1. ROA Prefix Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.4.1. ROA Prefix Assertions ...............................9
3.4.2. BGPsec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertions ..................................10
3.5. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 11 3.5. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions .......11
4. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4. SLURM File Configuration .......................................13
4.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity ......................................13
4.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files ......................................13
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5. IANA Considerations ............................................14
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. Security Considerations ........................................14
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. References .....................................................14
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.1. Normative References ......................................14
8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.2. Informative References ....................................16
8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Acknowledgments ...................................................17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Authors' Addresses ................................................17
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6) resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)
addresses can issue a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] to addresses can issue a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] to
authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to
validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is
described in [RFC6811], and validation of the path of a route is described in [RFC6811], and validation of the path of a route is
described in [RFC8205].) described in [RFC8205].)
However, an "RPKI relying party" (RP) may want to override some of However, an RPKI Relying Party (RP) may want to override some of the
the information expressed via configured Trust Anchors (TAs) and the information expressed via configured Trust Anchors (TAs) and the
certificates downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For certificates downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For
instances, [RFC6491] recommends the creation of ROAs that would instance, [RFC6491] recommends the creation of ROAs that would
invalidate public routes for reserved and unallocated address space, invalidate public routes for reserved and unallocated address space,
yet some ISPs might like to use BGP and the RPKI with private address yet some ISPs might like to use BGP and the RPKI with private address
space ([RFC1918], [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers space (see [RFC1918], [RFC4193], and [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers
([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). Local use of private address space and/or AS (see [RFC1930] and [RFC6996]). Local use of private address space
numbers is consistent with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot and/or AS numbers is consistent with the RFCs cited above, but such
be verified by the global RPKI. This motivates creation of use cannot be verified by the global RPKI. This motivates creation
mechanisms that enable a network operator to publish exception to the of mechanisms that enable a network operator to publish, at its
RPKI in the form of filters and additions (for its own use and that discretion, an exception to the RPKI in the form of filters and
of its customers) at its discretion. Additionally, a network additions (for its own use and that of its customers). Additionally,
operator might wish to make use of a local override capability to a network operator might wish to make use of a local override
protect routes from adverse actions [RFC8211], until the results of capability to protect routes from adverse actions [RFC8211], until
such actions have been addressed. The mechanisms developed to the results of such actions have been addressed. The mechanisms
provide this capability to network operators are hereby called developed to provide this capability to network operators are hereby
Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI called "Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management with the
(SLURM). RPKI (SLURM)".
SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by
generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6811], an generating sets of assertions. For origin validation [RFC6811], an
assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length,
number (ASN)} as used by rpki-rtr (the RPKI to Router Protocol) Autonomous System Number (ASN)} as used by the RPKI-Router protocol,
version 0 [RFC6810] and rpki-rtr version 1 [RFC8210]. For BGPsec version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1 [RFC8210]. For BGPsec [RFC8205],
[RFC8205], an assertion is a tuple of {ASN, subject key identifier, an assertion is a tuple of {ASN, subject key identifier, router
router public key} as used by rpki-rtr version 1. (For the remainder public key} as used by version 1 of the RPKI-Router protocol. (For
of this document, these assertions are called ROA Prefix Assertions the remainder of this document, these assertions are called "ROA
and BGPsec Assertions, respectively.) Prefix Assertions" and "BGPsec Assertions", respectively.)
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT","REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2. RP with SLURM 2. RP with SLURM
SLURM provides a simple way to enable an RP to establish a local, SLURM provides a simple way to enable an RP to establish a local,
customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository data if customized view of the RPKI, overriding RPKI repository data if
needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes from needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (i.e., removes
consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI that from consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI
are overridden by local ROA Prefix Assertions and BGPsec Assertions. that are overridden by local ROA Prefix Assertions and BGPsec
Assertions.
In general, the primary output of an RP is the data it sends to In general, the primary output of an RP is the data it sends to
routers over the rpki-rtr protocol [RFC8210]. The rpki-rtr protocol routers over the RPKI-Router protocol [RFC8210]. The RPKI-Router
enables routers to query an RP for all assertions it knows about protocol enables routers to query an RP for all assertions it knows
(Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in assertions about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in
(Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document are to be assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document
applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both the old and are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query and to both the
new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. RP software may old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. RP software
modify other forms of output in comparable ways, but that is outside may modify other forms of output in comparable ways, but that is
the scope of this document. outside the scope of this document.
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+ +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation | | Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+ +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+
| |
+-------------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------+
| |
+------v-------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+ +------v-------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +-------------+
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SLURM +---> SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers| | SLURM +---> SLURM +--->RPKI-Router+---> BGP Speakers|
| Filters | | Assertions | | | | | | Filters | | Assertions | | Protocol | | |
+--------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+ +--------------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +-------------+
Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the RP Stack Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the RP Stack
3. SLURM File and Mechanisms 3. SLURM Files and Mechanisms
3.1. Use of JSON 3.1. Use of JSON
SLURM filters and assertions are specified in JSON [RFC8259] format. SLURM filters and assertions are specified in JSON format [RFC8259].
JSON members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM JSON members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM
Files. An RP MUST consider any deviations from the specification files. An RP MUST consider any deviations from the specifications to
errors. Future additions to the specifications in this document MUST be errors. Future additions to the specifications in this document
use an incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member. MUST use an incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member.
3.2. SLURM File Overview 3.2. SLURM File Overview
A SLURM file consists of a single JSON object containing the A SLURM file consists of a single JSON object containing the
following members: following members:
o A "slurmVersion" member that MUST be set to 1, encoded as a number o A "slurmVersion" member that MUST be set to 1, encoded as a number
o A "validationOutputFilters" member (Section 3.3), whose value is o A "validationOutputFilters" member (Section 3.3), whose value is
an object. The object MUST contain exactly two members: an object. The object MUST contain exactly two members:
skipping to change at page 5, line 33 skipping to change at page 5, line 43
* A "prefixAssertions" member, whose value is described in * A "prefixAssertions" member, whose value is described in
Section 3.4.1. Section 3.4.1.
* A "bgpsecAssertions" member, whose value is described in * A "bgpsecAssertions" member, whose value is described in
Section 3.4.2. Section 3.4.2.
In the envisioned typical use case, an RP uses both Validation Output In the envisioned typical use case, an RP uses both Validation Output
Filters and Locally Added Assertions. In this case, the resulting Filters and Locally Added Assertions. In this case, the resulting
assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed
before locally adding assertions. i.e. locally added assertions before locally adding assertions; that is, Locally Added Assertions
MUST NOT be removed by output filtering. MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM
file that has no filters or assertions: file that has no filters or assertions:
{ {
"slurmVersion": 1, "slurmVersion": 1,
"validationOutputFilters": { "validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [], "prefixFilters": [],
"bgpsecFilters": [] "bgpsecFilters": []
}, },
"locallyAddedAssertions": { "locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [], "prefixAssertions": [],
"bgpsecAssertions": [] "bgpsecAssertions": []
} }
} }
Empty SLURM File Figure 2: Empty SLURM File
3.3. Validation Output Filters 3.3. Validation Output Filters
3.3.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters 3.3.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters
The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters
(Prefix Filters in short). Each Prefix Filter can contain either an ("Prefix Filters" for short). Each Prefix Filter can contain either
IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an ASN. It is RECOMMENDED that an an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an ASN. It is RECOMMENDED that an
explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter, so that it explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter so that it
can be shown to users of the RP software. can be shown to users of the RP software.
The above is expressed as a value of the "prefixFilters" member, as The above is expressed as a value of the "prefixFilters" member, as
an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one of an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain either 1)
either, or one each of both following members: one of the following members or 2) one of each of the following
members.
o A "prefix" member, whose value is string representing either an o A "prefix" member, whose value is a string representing either an
IPv4 prefix (Section 3.1 of [RFC4632]) or an IPv6 prefix IPv4 prefix (see Section 3.1 of [RFC4632]) or an IPv6 prefix (see
([RFC5952]). [RFC5952]).
o An "asn" member, whose value is a number. o An "asn" member, whose value is a number.
In addition, each object MAY contain one optional "comment" member, In addition, each object MAY contain one optional "comment" member,
whose value is a string. whose value is a string.
The following example JSON structure represents a "prefixFilters" The following example JSON structure represents a "prefixFilters"
member with an array of example objects for each use case listed member with an array of example objects for each use case listed
above: above:
skipping to change at page 7, line 21 skipping to change at page 7, line 21
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment": "All VRPs matching ASN" "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
}, },
{ {
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"asn": 64497, "asn": 64497,
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN" "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
} }
] ]
prefixFilters examples Figure 3: "prefixFilters" Examples
Any Validated ROA Prefix (VRP, [RFC6811]) that matches any configured Any Validated ROA Payload (VRP) [RFC6811] that matches any configured
Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output. Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output.
A VRP is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if one of the A VRP is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if one of the
following cases applies: following cases applies:
1. If the Prefix Filter contains an IPv4 or IPv6 Prefix only, the 1. If the Prefix Filter only contains an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, the
VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP prefix is equal VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP prefix is equal
to or covered by the Prefix Filter prefix. to or covered by the Prefix Filter prefix.
2. If Prefix Filter contains an ASN only, the VRP is considered to 2. If the Prefix Filter only contains an ASN, the VRP is considered
match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix Filter ASN. to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix Filter ASN.
3. If Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and an ASN, 3. If the Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and an
the VRP is considered to match if the VRP prefix is equal to or ASN, the VRP is considered to match if the VRP prefix is equal to
covered by the Prefix Filter prefix and the VRP ASN matches the or covered by the Prefix Filter prefix and the VRP ASN matches
Prefix Filter ASN. the Prefix Filter ASN.
3.3.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters 3.3.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters
The RP can configure zero or more BGPsec Assertion Filters (BGPsec The RP can configure zero or more BGPsec Assertion Filters ("BGPsec
Filters in short). Each BGPsec Filter can contain an ASN and/or the Filters" for short). Each BGPsec Filter can contain an ASN and/or
Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a Router Subject Key Identifier (SKI), the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a Router Subject Key Identifier
as described in [RFC8209] and [RFC6487]. It is RECOMMENDED that an (SKI), as described in [RFC8209] and [RFC6487]. It is RECOMMENDED
explanatory comment is also included with each BGPSec Filter, so that that an explanatory comment is also included with each BGPsec Filter,
it can be shown to users of the RP software. so that it can be shown to users of the RP software.
The above is expressed as a value of the "bgpsecFilters" member, as The above is expressed as a value of the "bgpsecFilters" member, as
an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one of an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one of
either, or one each of both following members: either, or one each of both following members:
o An "asn" member, whose value is a number o An "asn" member, whose value is a number
o An "SKI" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding without o An "SKI" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding without
trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the certificate's Subject trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the certificate's Subject
Public Key as described in Section 4.8.2. of [RFC6487] (This is Key Identifier as described in Section 4.8.2 of [RFC6487]. (This
the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or
length fields.) length fields.)
In addition, each object MAY contain one optional "comment" member, In addition, each object MAY contain one optional "comment" member,
whose value is a string. whose value is a string.
The following example JSON structure represents a "bgpsecFilters" The following example JSON structure represents a "bgpsecFilters"
member with an array of example objects for each use case listed member with an array of example objects for each use case listed
above: above:
"bgpsecFilters": [ "bgpsecFilters": [
skipping to change at page 8, line 40 skipping to change at page 8, line 36
"SKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>", "SKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
"comment": "Key matching Router SKI" "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
}, },
{ {
"asn": 64497, "asn": 64497,
"SKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>", "SKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
"comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI" "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
} }
] ]
bgpsecFilters examples Figure 4: "bgpsecFilters" Examples
Any BGPsec Assertion that matches any configured BGPsec Filter MUST Any BGPsec Assertion that matches any configured BGPsec Filter MUST
be removed from the RP's output. A BGPsec Assertion is considered to be removed from the RP's output. A BGPsec Assertion is considered to
match with a BGPsec Filter if one of the following cases applies: match with a BGPsec Filter if one of the following cases applies:
1. If the BGPsec Filter contains an ASN only, a BGPsec Assertion is 1. If the BGPsec Filter only contains an ASN, a BGPsec Assertion is
considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN. considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN.
2. If the BGPsec Filter contains an SKI only, a BGPsec Assertion is 2. If the BGPsec Filter only contains an SKI, a BGPsec Assertion is
considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI matches the considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI matches the
Filter SKI. Filter SKI.
3. If the BGPsec Filter contains both an ASN and a Router SKI, then 3. If the BGPsec Filter contains both an ASN and a Router SKI, then
a BGPsec Assertion is considered to match if both the Assertion a BGPsec Assertion is considered to match if both the Assertion
ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI matches ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI matches
the Filter Router SKI. the Filter SKI.
3.4. Locally Added Assertions 3.4. Locally Added Assertions
3.4.1. ROA Prefix Assertions 3.4.1. ROA Prefix Assertions
Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of ROA Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of ROA
Prefix Assertions (Prefix Assertion in short). Each ROA Prefix Prefix Assertions ("Prefix Assertions" for short). Each ROA Prefix
Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and an ASN. It MAY Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and an ASN. It MAY
include a value for the maximum length. It is RECOMMENDED that an include a value for the maximum length. It is RECOMMENDED that an
explanatory comment is also included with each, so that it can be explanatory comment is also included with each so that it can be
shown to users ofthe RP software. shown to users of the RP software.
The above is expressed as a value of the "prefixAssertions" member, The above is expressed as a value of the "prefixAssertions" member,
as an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one as an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one of
each of both following members: each of the following members:
o A "prefix" member, whose value is string representing either an o A "prefix" member, whose value is a string representing either an
IPv4 prefix (Section 3.1 of [RFC4632]) or an IPv6 prefix IPv4 prefix (see Section 3.1 of [RFC4632]) or an IPv6 prefix (see
([RFC5952]). [RFC5952]).
o An "asn" member, whose value is a number. o An "asn" member, whose value is a number.
In addition, each object MAY contain one of each of the following In addition, each object MAY contain one of each of the following
members: members:
o A "maxPrefixLength" member, whose value is a number. o A "maxPrefixLength" member, whose value is a number.
o A "comment" member, whose value is a string. o A "comment" member, whose value is a string.
skipping to change at page 10, line 19 skipping to change at page 9, line 51
"comment": "My other important route" "comment": "My other important route"
}, },
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"prefix": "2001:DB8::/32", "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
"maxPrefixLength": 48, "maxPrefixLength": 48,
"comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes" "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
} }
] ]
prefixAssertions examples Figure 5: "prefixAssertions" Examples
Note that the combination of the prefix, ASN and optional maximum Note that the combination of the prefix, ASN, and optional maximum
length describes a VRP as described in [RFC6811]. The RP MUST add length describes a VRP as described in [RFC6811]. The RP MUST add
all Prefix Assertions found this way to the VRP found through RPKI all Prefix Assertions found this way to the VRP found through RPKI
validation, and ensure that it sends the complete set of PDUs, validation and ensure that it sends the complete set of Protocol Data
excluding duplicates when using the rpki-rtr protocol, see Units (PDUs), excluding duplicates when using the RPKI-Router
Section 5.6 and 5.7 of [RFC8210]. protocol (see Sections 5.6 and 5.7 of [RFC8210]).
3.4.2. BGPsec Assertions 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertions
Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of BGPsec Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of BGPsec
Assertions. Each BGPsec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Assertions. Each BGPsec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a
Router SKI, and the Router Public Key. It is RECOMMENDED that an Router SKI, and the router public key. It is RECOMMENDED that an
explanatory comment is also included, so that it can be shown to explanatory comment is also included so that it can be shown to users
users of the RP software. of the RP software.
The above is expressed as a value of the "bgpsecAssertions" member, The above is expressed as a value of the "bgpsecAssertions" member,
as an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one as an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one
each of all of the following members: each of all of the following members:
An "asn" member, whose value is a number. o An "asn" member, whose value is a number.
An "SKI" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding without o An "SKI" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding without
trailing '=' (Section 5 of RFC4648 ) of the router's public key trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the certificate's Subject
equivalent to a certificate's Subject Public Key as described in Key Identifier as described in Section 4.8.2 of [RFC6487] (This is
Section 4.8.2. of [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or
STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length fields. length fields.)
A "routerPublicKey" member, whose value is is the Base64 encoding o A "routerPublicKey" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding
without trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the equivalent to without trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the equivalent to
a router certificate's public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as the subjectPublicKeyInfo value of the router certificate's public
described in [RFC8208]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of key, as described in [RFC8208]. This is the full ASN.1 DER
the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and
values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE. length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
The following JSON structure represents an array of The following example JSON structure represents a "bgpsecAssertions"
"bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above: member with one object as described above:
"bgpsecAssertions": [ "bgpsecAssertions": [
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"SKI": "<some base64 SKI>", "SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
"publicKey": "<some base64 public key>", "routerPublicKey": "<some base64 public key>",
"comment": "My known key for my important ASN" "comment": "My known key for my important ASN"
} }
] ]
bgpsecAssertions examples Figure 6: "bgpsecAssertions" Examples
Note that a bgpsecAssertion matches the syntax of the Router Key PDU Note that a "bgpsecAssertions" member matches the syntax of the
described in section 5.10 of [RFC8210]. Relying Parties MUST add any Router Key PDU described in Section 5.10 of [RFC8210]. Relying
bgpsecAssertion thus found to the set of Router PDUs, excluding Parties MUST add any "bgpsecAssertions" member thus found to the set
duplicates, when using the RPKI-RTR protocol [RFC8210]. of Router Key PDUs, excluding duplicates, when using the RPKI-Router
protocol [RFC8210].
3.5. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions 3.5. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions
The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file
that uses all the elements described in the previous sections: that uses all the elements described in the previous sections:
{ {
"slurmVersion": 1, "slurmVersion": 1,
"validationOutputFilters": { "validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [ "prefixFilters": [
skipping to change at page 12, line 39 skipping to change at page 12, line 20
"prefix": "2001:DB8::/32", "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
"maxPrefixLength": 48, "maxPrefixLength": 48,
"comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes" "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
} }
], ],
"bgpsecAssertions": [ "bgpsecAssertions": [
{ {
"asn": 64496, "asn": 64496,
"comment" : "My known key for my important ASN", "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
"SKI": "<some base64 SKI>", "SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
"publicKey": "<some base64 public key>" "routerPublicKey": "<some base64 public key>"
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Example of Full SLURM File Figure 7: Example of Full SLURM File
4. SLURM File Configuration 4. SLURM File Configuration
4.1. SLURM File Atomicity 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity
To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic. To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
That is, the output of the RP MUST be either the same as if SLURM That is, the output of the RP either MUST be the same as if a SLURM
file were not used, or it MUST reflect the entire SLURM file were not used or MUST reflect the entire SLURM configuration.
configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the For an example of why this is required, consider the case of two
case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin local routes for the same prefix but different origin ASNs. Both
ASNs. Both routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions. If routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions. If neither
neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown addition occurs, then both routes could be in the NotFound state
state [RFC6811]. If both additions occur then both routes would be [RFC6811]. If both additions occur, then both routes would be in the
in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other Valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other does not,
does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid. then one could be Invalid while the other is Valid.
4.2. Multiple SLURM Files 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files
An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM
files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output
Filters and Locally Added Assertions are the respective unions of the Filters and Locally Added Assertions are the respective unions of the
inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for multiple inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for multiple
files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance, files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance,
operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to
frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files
to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from to this RP independently. Before an RP configures SLURM files from
different sources it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict different sources, it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict
among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP
SHOULD check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the SHOULD check the entries of each SLURM file with regard to overlaps
INR assertions and report errors to the sources that created these of the INR assertions and report errors to the sources that created
SLURM files in question. The RP gets multiple SLURM files as a set, the SLURM files in question. The RP gets multiple SLURM files as a
and the whole set MUST be rejected in case of any overlaps among set, and the whole set MUST be rejected in case of any overlaps among
SLURM files. the SLURM files.
If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM
files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error files, the RP MUST NOT use them and SHOULD issue a warning as error
report in the following cases: report in the following cases:
1. There may be conflicting changes to ROA Prefix Assertions if 1. There may be conflicting changes to ROA Prefix Assertions if an
there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM files Y, Z IP address X and distinct SLURM files Y and Z exist such that X
such that X is contained by any prefix in any is contained by any prefix in any "prefixAssertions" or
<prefixAssertions> or <prefixFilters> in file Y and X is "prefixFilters" in file Y and X is contained by any prefix in any
contained by any prefix in any <prefixAssertions> or "prefixAssertions" or "prefixFilters" in file Z.
<prefixFilters> in file Z.
2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec Assertions if there 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec Assertions if an ASN X
exists an ASN X and distinct SLURM files Y, Z such that X is and distinct SLURM files Y and Z exist such that X is used in any
used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in file Y "bgpsecAssertions" or "bgpsecFilters" in file Y and X is used in
and X is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in any "bgpsecAssertions" or "bgpsecFilters" in file Z.
file Z.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
None This document has no IANA actions.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving
autonomy in address space and ASN management. These mechanisms are autonomy in address space and ASN management. These mechanisms are
applied only locally; they do not influence how other network only applied locally; they do not influence how other network
operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be taken in operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be taken in
how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is possible to how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is possible to
use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-private INRs, use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-private INRs,
e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed. For example, e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed. For example,
a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a network a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a network
operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action. Network operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action. Network
operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use extreme operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use extreme
caution. caution.
The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an
RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a
security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the
assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP
can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP. It could can undermine the security offered to that RP by the RPKI. A SLURM
declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice file could declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and
versa. As a result, an RP MUST carefully consider the security vice versa. As a result, an RP MUST carefully consider the security
implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is
provided by a third party. provided by a third party.
Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and
integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file
may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM may be preconfigured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM
file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity
of the updated SLURM file. Yet the mechanism to update SLURM file to of the updated SLURM file. The mechanism to update the SLURM file to
guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this
document. document.
7. Acknowledgments 7. References
The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to to Richard Hansen
for his careful reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their
editorial assistance.
8. References
8.1. Informative References
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",
RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>.
[RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>.
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.
[RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>.
[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.
[RFC8211] Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification
Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8211>.
8.2. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing [RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>. 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.
skipping to change at page 17, line 21 skipping to change at page 16, line 5
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", RFC 8209, and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",
RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>.
[RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>.
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.
[RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>.
[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.
[RFC8211] Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification
Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8211>.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
detailed reviews of this document. The authors would also like to
thank Richard Hansen for his careful reviews and Hui Zou and Chunlin
An for their editorial assistance.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Di Ma Di Ma
ZDNS ZDNS
4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun 4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun
Haidian, Beijing 100190 Haidian, Beijing 100190
China China
Email: madi@zdns.cn Email: madi@zdns.cn
David Mandelberg David Mandelberg
Unaffiliated Unaffiliated
Email: david@mandelberg.org Email: david@mandelberg.org
URI: https://david.mandelberg.org URI: https://david.mandelberg.org
Tim Bruijnzeels Tim Bruijnzeels
RIPE NCC NLnet Labs
Stationsplein 11 Science Park 400
Amsterdam 1012 AB Amsterdam 1098 XH
Netherlands The Netherlands
Email: tim@ripe.net Email: tim@nlnetlabs.nl
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