draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-01.txt   draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-02.txt 
S/MIME WG Sean Turner, IECA S/MIME WG Sean Turner, IECA
Internet Draft Dan Brown, Certicom Internet Draft Dan Brown, Certicom
Intended Status: Informational June 30, 2008 Intended Status: Informational September 22, 2008
Obsoletes: 3278 (once approved) Obsoletes: 3278 (once approved)
Expires: December 30, 2008 Expires: March 22, 2009
Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms
in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-01.txt draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-02.txt
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Abstract Abstract
This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The
ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the
exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content. The definition exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content. The definition
of the algorithm processing is based on the ANSI X9.62 standard, of the algorithm processing is based on the NIST FIPS 186-3 for
developed by the ANSI X9F1 working group, the IEEE 1363 standard, and digital signature, NIST SP800-56A for key agreement, RFC 3565 for key
the SEC 1 standard. wrap and content encryption, NIST FIPS 180-3 for message digest, and
RFCs 2104 and 4231 for message authentication code standards.
Discussion Discussion
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................2 1. Introduction...................................................3
1.1. Requirements Terminology..................................3 1.1. Requirements Terminology..................................3
1.2. Changes since RFC 3278....................................3 1.2. Changes since RFC 3278....................................3
2. SignedData using ECC...........................................4 2. SignedData using ECC...........................................5
2.1. SignedData using ECDSA....................................4 2.1. SignedData using ECDSA....................................5
3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms.............................6 3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms.............................6
3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH...............6 3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH...............6
3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV..........................7 3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV..........................8
4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC..............9 4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC.............11
4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV......................9 4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................11
4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................10 4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................12
5. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves....................10 5. Certificates using ECC........................................13
6. Certificates using ECC........................................12 6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC...........................13
7. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC...........................12 7. ASN.1 Syntax..................................................16
8. ASN.1 Syntax..................................................15 7.1. Algorithm Identifiers....................................16
8.1. Algorithm Identifiers....................................15 7.2. Other Syntax.............................................19
8.2. Other Syntax.............................................18 8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves....................20
9. Security Considerations.......................................19 9. Security Considerations.......................................22
10. IANA Considerations..........................................24 10. IANA Considerations..........................................27
11. References...................................................24 11. References...................................................27
11.1. Normative...............................................24 11.1. Normative...............................................27
11.2. Informative.............................................26 11.2. Informative.............................................29
Appendix A ASN.1 Modules.........................................27 Appendix A ASN.1 Modules.........................................30
Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module................................27 Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module................................30
Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module................................34 Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module................................37
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm
independent. This specification defines a profile for the use of independent. This specification defines a profile for the use of
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS.
The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content
types: types:
- 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods - 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods
skipping to change at page 3, line 17 skipping to change at page 3, line 25
- 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement - 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption
keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content
encryption encryption
- 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement - 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
encrypt MAC keys used for content authentication and integrity. encrypt MAC keys used for content authentication and integrity.
- 'AuthEnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
encrypt MAC keys used for authenticated encryption modes.
Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public- Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public-
key distribution in support of the specified techniques. key distribution in support of the specified techniques.
1.1. Requirements Terminology 1.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST]. document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST].
1.2. Changes since RFC 3278 1.2. Changes since RFC 3278
The following summarizes the changes: The following summarizes the changes:
- Section 2.1 added sentence indicating SHA is used with EDSA. - Abstract: The basis of the document was change to refer to NIST
FIPP 186-3 and SP800-56A.
- Section 2.1.1 limited the digest algorithm to SHA-1. This document - Section 1: A bullet was added to address AuthEnvelopedData.
expands the allowed algorithms to SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512.
- Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 - Delete e paragraph and update ANSI X9.42 - Section 2.1: A sentence was added to indicate [FIPS180-3] is used
references. with ECDSA. Replaced reference to [X9.62] with [FIPS186-3].
- Section 3.1 - Updates reference to CMS-ALG vice CMS for DH. - Section 2.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms were expanded from
SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
- Section 3.1.1 used SHA1 in the KDF with ECDH std and cofactor - Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3: The bullet addressing integer "e" was
methods. This document expands the set of allowed algorithms by deleted.
adding SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
- Section 3.2.1 used SHA1 in the KDF with ECMQV. This document - Section 3: Added explanation of why static-static ECDH is not
expands the set of allowed algorithms by adding SHA-224, SHA-256, included.
SHA-384, and SHA-512.
- Section 4.2 was added to address ECMQV use of AuthEnvelopedData. - Section 3.1: The reference for DH was changed from CMS to CMS-
ALG. Provided text to indicate fields of EnvelopedData are as
in CMS.
- Section 5 is updated to include requirements for hash algorithms - Section 3.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms for use with ECDH
and recommendations for matching curves and hash algorithms. It std and cofactor methods were expanded from SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-
also was expanded to indicate which ECDH and ECMQV variants, key 224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. Updated to include
wrap algorithms, and content encryption algorithms are required description of all KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields. Parameters for
for each of the content types used in this document.. id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL to ABSENT or ECPoint.
- Section 7 is updated to include S/MIME capabilities for ECDSA with - Section 3.2.1: The permitted digest algorithms for use with ECMQV
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. It was also updated to were expanded from SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
include S/MIME capabilities for ECDH and ECMQV using SHA2 and SHA-512. Updated to include description of all fields.
algorithms as the KDF. Parameters for id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL to ABSENT
or ECPoint.
- Section 8.1 listed the algorithm identifiers for SHA-1 and SHA-1 - Section 4.2: This section was added to address AuthEnvelopedData
with ECDSA. This document adds algorithm identifiers for SHA-224, with ECMQV.
SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as well as SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA. This document also updates the list
of algorithm identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV
with SHA2 algorithms as the KDF.
- Deleted summary paragraph. - Section 5: This section was moved to Section 8. The 1st paragraph
was modified as the requirements are difficult to test. The
requirements were updated for hash algorithms and
recommendations for matching curves and hash algorithms. Also
expanded to indicate which ECDH and ECMQV variants, key wrap
algorithms, and content encryption algorithms are required for
each of the content types used in this document.
- Updated references. - Section 6 (formerly 7): The S/MIME capabilities for ECDSA with
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 were added to the list of
S/MIME Capabilities. Also updated to include S/MIME capabilities
for ECDH and ECMQV using SHA2 algorithms as the KDF.
- Updated security considerations. Security considerations paragraph - Section 7.1 (formerly 8.1): Added sub-sections for digest,
referring to definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA- signature, originator public key, key agreement, content
512 is deleted. encryption, and message authentication code algorithms. SHA-
224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as well as SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA were added. Also added algorithm
identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV with SHA2
algorithms as the KDF. Message Authentication Code, Content
Encryption, Key Wrap.
- Section 7.2 (formerly 8.2): Updated to include AuthEnvelopedData.
Also, added text to address support requirement for compressed
and uncompressed keys, changed pointers to ANSI X9.61 to PKIX
(where ECDSA-Sig-Value is imported), changed pointers from SEC1
to NIST specs, and updated example of suppPubInfo to be AES-256.
keyInfo's parameters changed from NULL to any associated
parameters (AES wraps have absent parameters).
- Section 9: Replaced text, which was a summary paragraph, with an
updated security considerations section. Paragraph referring to
definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 is
deleted.
- Added ASN.1 modules. - Added ASN.1 modules.
- Updated acknowledgements section. - Updated acknowledgements section.
2. SignedData using ECC 2. SignedData using ECC
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
SignedData format to sign data. SignedData format to sign data.
2.1. SignedData using ECDSA 2.1. SignedData using ECDSA
This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData. ECDSA is specified in Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData. ECDSA is specified in
[X9.62]. The method is the elliptic curve analog of the Digital [FIPS186-3]. The method is the elliptic curve analog of the Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) [DSS]. ECDSA is used with the Secure Hash Signature Algorithm (DSA) [FIPS186-3]. ECDSA is used with the Secure
Algorithm (SHA) [SHS]. Hash Algorithm (SHA) [FIPS180-3].
In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the
following techniques and formats MUST be used. following techniques and formats MUST be used.
2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData 2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in
[CMS], but with the following restrictions: [CMS], but with the following restrictions:
digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
algorithm (see Section 8.1) which MUST be one of the following: algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be one of the following:
id-sha1 identifies the SHA-1 hash algorithm, id-sha224 identifies id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256 identifies, id-sha384, and id-
the SHA-224 hash algorithm, id-sha256 identifies the SHA-256 hash sha512.
algorithm, id-sha384 identifies the SHA-384 algorithm, and id-
sha512 identifies the SHA-512 algorithm.
signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier - signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier
(see Section 8.1): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa- (see Section 7.1): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa-
with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512. with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512.
signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a - signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a
value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 8.2). value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 7.2).
When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the
certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the
ECDSA signatures in SignedData. ECC certificates are discussed in ECDSA signatures in SignedData. ECC certificates are discussed in
Section 6. Section 5.
2.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 2.1.2. Actions of the sending agent
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the message When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the message
digest calculation process and signature generation process for digest calculation process and signature generation process for
SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To sign data, the sending SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To sign data, the sending
agent uses the signature method specified in [X9.62, Section 7.3]. agent uses the signature method specified in [FIPS186-3].
The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the ECDSA- The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the
Sig-Value syntax (see Section 8.2) and places it in the ECDSA-Sig-Value syntax (see Section 7.2) and places it in the
SignerInfosignature field. SignerInfo.signature field.
2.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 2.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the
message digest calculation process and signature verification process message digest calculation process and signature verification process
for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To verify SignedData, for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To verify SignedData,
the receiving agent uses the signature verification method specified the receiving agent uses the signature verification method specified
in [X9.62, Section 7.3]. in [FIPS186-3].
In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the
integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the received integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the received
message. message.
3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms 3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
EnvelopedData format. EnvelopedData format.
3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH 3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH
This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData. Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData,
Ephemeral-static ECDH is specified in [SEC1] and [IEEE1363]. method C(1, 1, ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A]. Ephemeral-static ECDH is
Ephemeral-static ECDH is the elliptic curve analog of the the elliptic curve analog of the ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key
ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm specified agreement algorithm specified jointly in the documents [CMS-ALG] and
jointly in the documents [CMS-ALG, Section 4.1.1] and [CMS-DH]. [CMS-DH].
In an implementation that uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData with key In an implementation uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData, the following
agreement, the following techniques and formats MUST be used. techniques and formats MUST be used.
The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS], as ECDH is a key
agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When
using ECDH, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY include the
certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of the
pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5.
3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as in [CMS], but with the following KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as follows:
restrictions:
originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey. The - version MUST be 3.
- originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey. The
originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey
object identifier (see Section 8.1) with NULL parameters. The object identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters associated
originatorKey publicKey field MUST contain the DER-encoding of a with id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent or ECPoint. NOTE: The
value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), which previous version of this document required NULL be present,
represents the sending agent's ephemeral EC public key. support for this is OPTIONAL. The originatorKey publicKey field
MUST contain the value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section
7.2), which represents the sending agent's ephemeral EC public
key. The ECPoint in uncompressed form MUST be supported.
keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the key encryption algorithm - ukm MAY be present or absent. However, message originators SHOULD
object identifier (see Section 8.1). The parameters field include the ukm. As specified in RFC 3852 [CMS], implementations
contains KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm MUST support ukm message recipient processing, so
identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm used interoperability is not a concern if the ukm is present or
to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with the absent. When present, the ukm is used to ensure that a
key-encryption key (KEK). Algorithm requirements are found in different key-encryption key is generated, even when the
paragraph 5. ephemeral private key is improperly used more than once, by
using the ECC-Shared-Info as input to in the key derivation
function (see Section 7.2).
- keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the key encryption algorithm
object identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters field
contains KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the
algorithm identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption
algorithm used to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with
the key-encryption key (KEK) and any associated parameters.
Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8.
- recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted
key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey
KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the
issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or
the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier
from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the
recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECDH
public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the
content-encryption key encrypted with the ephemeral-static,
ECDH-generated pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm
specified by the KeyWrapAlgorithm.
3.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 3.1.2. Actions of the sending agent
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending
agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain
parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate). The sending parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate). The sending
agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the
KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string
"SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see
Section 8.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and
the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section 6.1]. As a result the sending Scheme specified in [SP800-56A]. As a result the sending agent
agent obtains: obtains:
- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of the - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of the
type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit string and type ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string and
placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field, and placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field, and
- a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise
key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS]. key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].
3.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 3.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving
agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER
encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2), and the integer encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer
"keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The "keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The
receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the bit receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the bit
string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type
ECPoint (see Section 8.2) encapsulated as a bit string. The ECPoint (see Section 7.2) encapsulated as a bit string, and if
receiving agent performs the key agreement operation of the Elliptic present original supplied additional user key material from the ukm
Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section 6.1]. As a field. The receiving agent performs the key agreement operation of
result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K", the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SP800-56A].
which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK. As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string
"K", which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the
CEK.
3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV 3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData. ECMQV is (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, method
specified in [SEC1] and [IEEE1363]. Like the KEA algorithm [CMS- C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-KEA],
KEA], 1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a 1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a static
static key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the receiving
receiving agent. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it can agent. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it can be used
be used with both EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData. with both EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData.
In an implementation that uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData In an implementation uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData, the
with key agreement, the following techniques and formats MUST be following techniques and formats MUST be used.
used.
The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS], as 1-Pass ECMQV is a key
agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When
using 1-Pass ECMQV, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY
include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the
formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in
Section 5.
3.2.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 3.2.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the fields of When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the fields of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are: KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are:
originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender. It - version MUST be 3.
- originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender. It
SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or
subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's
certificates. certificates.
ukm MUST be present. The ukm field MUST contain an octet string - ukm MUST be present. The ukm field MUST contain an octet string
which is the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see which is the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see
Section 8.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey Section 7.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey
algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object
algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object identifier identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters associated with id-
(see Section 8.1) with NULL parameters field. The ecPublicKey MUST be abent or ECPoint. NOTE: The previous
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field MUST version of this document required NULL be present, support is
contain the DER-encoding of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section OPTIONAL. The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey
8.2) representing the sending agent's ephemeral EC public key. publicKey field MUST contain the DER-encoding of the ASN.1 type
The MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm field, if present, SHOULD ECPoint (see Section 7.2) representing the sending agent's
contain an octet string of additional user keying material of the ephemeral EC public key. The MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm
sending agent. field, if present, SHOULD contain an octet string of additional
user keying material of the sending agent.
keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST be the key encryption algorithm - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST be the key encryption algorithm
identifier (see Section 8.1), with the parameters field identifier (see Section 7.1), with the parameters field
KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric
encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK
generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm. Algorithm generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm and any associated
requirements are found in paragraph 5. parameters. Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8.
- recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted
key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey
KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the
issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or
the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier
from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the recipient's
certificate contains the recipient's static ECMQV public key.
RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the content-
encryption key encrypted with the 1-Pass ECMQV-generated
pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm specified by the
KeyWrapAlgorithm.
3.2.2. Actions of the sending agent 3.2.2. Actions of the sending agent
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first
obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters, (e.g. obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters (e.g.
from the recipient's certificate) and checks that the domain from the recipient's certificate), and checks that the domain
parameters are the same. The sending agent then determines an parameters are the same, as the sender's domain parameters. The
integer "keydatalen", which is the KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key- sending agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the
size in bits, and also a bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string
encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2). The sending agent "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see
then performs the key deployment and key agreement operations of the Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and
Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section 6.2]. As a key agreement operations of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified
result, the sending agent obtains: in [SP800-56A]. As a result, the sending agent obtains:
- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type
ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed
in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field
(see Section 8.2), and (see Section 7.2), and
- a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise
key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS]. key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].
The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an AuthenticatedData for The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an AuthenticatedData for
greater efficiency. greater efficiency.
3.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent 3.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent
determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2), and the integer "keydatalen" ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer "keydatalen"
from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving
agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the
originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in field originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in
and checks that the domain parameters are the same. The receiving Section 3.2.1, and its static EC public key identified in the rid
agent then performs the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve field and checks that the domain parameters are the same. The
MQV Scheme [SEC1, Section 6.2]. As a result, the receiving agent receiving agent then performs the key agreement operation of the
obtains a shared secret bit string "K" which is used as the pairwise Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme [SP800-56A]. As a result, the receiving
key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK. agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K" which is used as the
pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK.
4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC 4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation, AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation,
and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For example, and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For example,
the sending agent might not want the message to be authenticated when the sending agent might not want the message to be authenticated when
forwarded.) forwarded.)
This section also describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section also describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
AuthEnvelopedData format [CMS-AUTHENV]. AuthEnvelopedData supports AuthEnvelopedData format [CMS-AUTHENV]. AuthEnvelopedData supports
authentication and encryption, and in some instances is preferable to authentication and encryption, and in some instances is preferable to
signing and than encrypting data. signing and then encrypting data.
4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV 4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. ECMQV is (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. ECMQV is
specified in [SEC1]. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. An advantage of using 1-
can be used with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and Pass ECMQV is that it can be used with EnvelopedData,
AuthEnvelopedData. AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData.
When using ECMQV with AuthenticatedData, the fields of
AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS], but with the following
restrictions:
- macAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the message
authentication code algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be
one of the following: id-hmacWithSHA1, id-hmacWITHSHA224, id-
hmacWITHSHA256, id-hmacWITHSHA384, and id-hmacWITHSHA512.
- digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be one of the following:
id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, and id-sha512.
The fields of AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS], as 1-Pass ECMQV is a
key agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When
using 1-Pass ECMQV, the AuthenticatedData originatorInfo field MAY
include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the
formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in
Section 5.
4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document. KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.
4.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 4.1.2. Actions of the sending agent
The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
skipping to change at page 10, line 24 skipping to change at page 12, line 35
The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document. 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.
Note: see Note in Section 4.1.2. Note: see Note in Section 4.1.2.
4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV 4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthEnvelopedData. ECMQV is (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthEnvelopedData. ECMQV is
specified in [SEC1]. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. An advantage of using 1-
can be used with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and Pass ECMQV is that it can be used with EnvelopedData,
AuthEnvelopedData. AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData.
The fields of AuthEnvelopedData are as in [CMS], as 1-Pass ECMQV is a
key agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When
using 1-Pass ECMQV, the AuthEnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY
include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the
formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in
Section 5.
4.2.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 4.2.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
The AuthEnvelopedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the The AuthEnvelopedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document. KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.
4.2.2. Actions of the sending agent 4.2.2. Actions of the sending agent
The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 1- The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 1-
Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document. Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document.
The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an EnvelopedData for The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an EnvelopedData for
greater efficiency. greater efficiency.
4.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent 4.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent
The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document. 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.
5. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves 5. Certificates using ECC
Implementations of this specification MUST implement either
SignedData with ECDSA or EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH.
Implementations of this specification SHOULD implement both
SignedData with ECDSA and EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH.
Implementations MAY implement the other techniques specified, such as
AuthenticatedData and 1-Pass ECMQV.
Furthermore, in order to encourage interoperability, implementations
SHOULD use the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by ANSI
[X9.62], NIST [DSS] and SECG [SEC2]. It is RECOMMENDED that the
P-256 curve be used with SHA-256, the P-384 curve be used with
SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512.
Implementations of this specification MUST implement the SHA-256 hash
algorithm. The SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms MAY
be supported.
When ECDSA, ECDH, or ECMQV is used, it is RECOMMENDED that the
P-256 curve be used with SHA-256, the P-384 curve be used with
SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512.
Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData with
ephemeral-static ECDH standard primitive MUST support the
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also support
the id-aes128-wrap key wrap and id-aes128-cbc content encryption
algorithms. The dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme algorithms MAY be supported.
Likewise, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap
key wrap algorithms and the id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content
encryption algorithms MAY be supported.
Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData with
ephemeral-static ECDH cofactor primitive MUST support the
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also
support the id-aes128-wrap key wrap and id-aes128-cbc content
encryption algorithms. The dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme,
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-
sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
algorithms MAY be supported. Likewise, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-
aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap MAY be supported.
Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData with
ECMQV MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They
MUST also support the id-aes128-wrap and id-aes128-cbc algorithms.
The mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme,
mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme
algorithms MAY be supported. Likewise, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-
aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the id-
aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms MAY be
supported.
Implementations of this specification that support AuthenticatedData
with ECMQV MUST support the
mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also support the
id-aes128-wrap key wrap, id-aes128-cbc content encryption, and id-
hmacWithSHA256 message digest algorithms. The mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-
scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-
scheme, and mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme algorithms MAY be
supported. Likewise, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-
aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-
cbc content encryption algorithms MAY be supported. The
id-hmacWithSHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224, id-hmacWithSHA384, and id-
hmacWithSHA512 MAY be supported.
Implementations of this specification that support AuthEnvelopedData
with ECMQV MUST support the
mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also support the
id-aes128-wrap key wrap and id-aes128-cbc content encryption
algorithm. The mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-
scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-
scheme algorithms MAY be supported. Likewise, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap,
id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the id-
aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms MAY be
supported.
6. Certificates using ECC
Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with
this specification to distribute agents' public keys. The use of ECC this specification to distribute agents' public keys. The use of ECC
algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in
[PKI-ALG]. [PKI-ALG].
7. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC 6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC
A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports one A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports one
or more of the ECC algorithms in this document by using the or more of the ECC algorithms in this document by using the
SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG, Section 2.5.2]. SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG].
The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the ECDSA signature The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for one of the ECDSA
algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the signature algorithms is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field
object identifiers ecdsa-with-SHA* object identifiers (where * is 1, containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA* object identifiers
224, 256, 384, or 512) all with NULL parameters. The DER encodings (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) and with NULL parameters. The
are: DER encodings are:
ecdsa-with-SHA1: 30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA1: 30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00
ecdsa-with-SHA224: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 01 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA224: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 01 05 00
ecdsa-with-SHA256: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA256: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 05 00
ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03 05 00
ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04 05 00
skipping to change at page 15, line 20 skipping to change at page 16, line 5
05 00 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256
30 17 30 17
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02
30 0d 30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
05 00 05 00
8. ASN.1 Syntax 7. ASN.1 Syntax
The ASN.1 syntax used in this document is gathered in this section The ASN.1 syntax used in this document is gathered in this section
for reference purposes. for reference purposes.
8.1. Algorithm Identifiers 7.1. Algorithm Identifiers
The following object identifier indicates the hash algorithm used in
this document [SMIME-SHA2]:
id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { This section provides the object identifiers for the algorithms used
iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) in this document along with any associated parameters.
algorithm(2) 26 }
id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 7.1.1. Digest Algorithms
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 }
id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { Digest algorithm object identifiers are used in the SignedData
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) digestAlgorithms and digestAlgorithm fields, the AuthenticatedData
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 } digestAlgorithm field, and the AuthEnvelopedData digestAlgorithm
field. The digest algorithms used in this document are: SHA-1,
SHA224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The object identifiers and
parameters associated with these algorithms are found in [SMIME-
SHA2].
id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 7.1.2. Originator Public Key
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 }
id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator filed use the following object
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) identifier to indicate an elliptic curve public key:
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 }
The following object identifier is used in this document to indicate
an elliptic curve public key:
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 } id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 }
where where
ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
10045 } iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 }
When the object identifier id-ecPublicKey is used here with an When the object identifier id-ecPublicKey is used here with an
algorithm identifier, the associated parameters contain NULL. algorithm identifier, the associated parameters MUST be either absent
or ECPoint. Implementations MUST accept id-ecPublicKey with the
The following object identifier indicates the digital signature parameters field with absent, NULL, and ECPoint parameters. If
algorithm used in this document: ECPoint is present its value is ignored. Implementations SHOULD
generate absent parameters for the id-ecPublicKey object identifier
ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field.
ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) 1 }
ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }
ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 7.1.3. Signature Algorithms
ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { Signature algorithm identifiers are used in the SignedData
ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } signatureAlgorithm and signature field. The signature algorithms
used in this document are ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA
with SHA-256, ECDSA with SHA-384, and ECDSA with SHA-512. The object
identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found
in [PKI-ALG].
When the object identifiers ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, 7.1.4. Key Agreement Algorithms
ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512 are used
within an algorithm identifier, the associated parameters field
contains NULL.
The following object identifiers indicate the key agreement Key agreement algorithms are used in EnvelopedData,
algorithms used in this document: AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
keyEncryptionAlgorithm field. The following object identifiers
indicate the key agreement algorithms used in this document [SP800-
56A]:
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 2 } x9-63-scheme 2 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 0 } secg-scheme 11 0 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 1 } secg-scheme 11 1 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 2 } secg-scheme 11 2 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 3 } secg-scheme 11 3 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 3 } x9-63-scheme 3 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
skipping to change at page 18, line 4 skipping to change at page 18, line 23
where where
x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16)
x9(840) x9-63(63) schemes(0) } x9(840) x9-63(63) schemes(0) }
and and
secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }
When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm
identifier, the associated parameters field contains the CMS identifier, the associated parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm
KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier. to indicate the key wrap algorithm and any associated parameters.
8.2. Other Syntax 7.1.5. Key Wrap Algorithms
Key wrap algorithms are used as part of the parameters in the key
agreement algorithm. The key wrap algorithms used in this document
are Triple-DES, AES-128, AES-192, AES-256. The object identifier and
parameters for these algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-AES].
7.1.6. Content Encryption Algorithms
Content encryption algorithms are used in EnvelopedData and
AuthEnvelopedData in the EncryptedContentInfo
contentEncryptionAlgorithm field. The content encryption algorithms
used with EnvelopedData in this document are AES-128 in CBC mode,
AES-192 in CBC mode, and AES-256 in CBC mode. The object identifiers
and parameters associated with these algorithms are found in [CMS-
AES]. The content encryption algorithms used with AuthEnvelopedData
in this document are AES-128 in CCM mode, AES-192 in CCM mode, AES-
256 in CCM mode, AES-128 in GCM mode, AES-192 in GCM mode, and AES-
256 in GCM mode. The object identifiers and parameters associated
with these algorithms are found in [CMS-AESCG].
7.1.7. Message Authentication Code Algorithms
Message authentication code algorithms are used in AuthenticatedData
and AuthEnvelopedData in the macAlgorithm field. The message
authentication code algorithms used in this document are HMAC with
SHA-1, HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-1, HMAC with SHA-1, and HMAC
with SHA-1. The object identifiers and parameters associated with
these algorithms are found in [HMAC-SHA1] and [HMAC-SHA2].
7.2. Other Syntax
The following additional syntax is used here. The following additional syntax is used here.
When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded using When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded using
the type: the type:
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER, r INTEGER,
s INTEGER } s INTEGER }
ECDSA-Sig-Value is specified in [X9.62]. Within CMS, ECDSA-Sig-Value ECDSA-Sig-Value is specified in [PKI-ALG]. Within CMS, ECDSA-Sig-
is DER-encoded and placed within a signature field of SignedData. Value is DER-encoded and placed within a signature field of
SignedData.
When using ECDH and ECMQV with EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData, When using ECDH and ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
ephemeral and static public keys are encoded using the type ECPoint. AuthEnvelopedData, ephemeral and static public keys are encoded using
the type ECPoint. Implementations MUST support uncompressed keys and
MAY support compressed keys.
ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData, the When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
sending agent's ephemeral public key and additional keying material AuthEnvelopedData, the sending agent's ephemeral public key and
are encoded using the type: additional keying material are encoded using the type:
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL } addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL }
The ECPoint syntax in used to represent the ephemeral public key and The ECPoint syntax in used to represent the ephemeral public key and
placed in the ephemeralPublicKey field. The additional user keying placed in the ephemeralPublicKey field. The additional user keying
material is placed in the addedukm field. Then the material is placed in the addedukm field. Then the
MQVuserKeyingMaterial value is DER-encoded and placed within a ukm MQVuserKeyingMaterial value is DER-encoded and placed within a ukm
field of EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData. field of EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData.
When using ECDH or ECMQV with EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData, the When using ECDH or ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or
key-encryption keys are derived by using the type: AuthEnvelopedData, the key-encryption keys are derived by using the
type:
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier, keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier,
entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING } suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING }
The fields of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo are as follows: The fields of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo are as follows:
keyInfo contains the object identifier of the key-encryption keyInfo contains the object identifier of the key-encryption
algorithm (used to wrap the CEK) and NULL parameters. algorithm (used to wrap the CEK) and associated parameters. In
this specification, 3DES wrap has NULL parameters while the AES
wraps have absent parameters.
entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material
supplied by the sending agent. When used with ECDH and CMS, the supplied by the sending agent. When used with ECDH and CMS, the
entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm. When used with entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm. When used with
ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string addedukm ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string addedukm
(encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial). (encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial).
suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits, suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits,
represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH]. (E.g. for 3DES represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH] and [CMS-AES].
it would be 00 00 00 c0.) (E.g. for AES-256 it would be 00 00 01 00.)
Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to
the key derivation function, as specified in [SEC1, Section 3.6.1]. the key derivation function, as specified in [SP800-56A].
Note that ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in Note that ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in
[CMS-DH]. Here, a counter value is not included in the keyInfo field [CMS-DH]. Here, a counter value is not included in the keyInfo field
because the key derivation function specified in [SEC1, Section because the key derivation function specified in [SP800-56A] ensures
3.6.1] ensures that sufficient keying data is provided. that sufficient keying data is provided.
8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves
It is RECOMMEND that implementations of this specification support
SignedData. Support for EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData is
OPTIONAL.
In order to encourage interoperability, implementations SHOULD use
the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by [PKI-ALG].
Implementations that support SignedData with ECDSA:
- MUST support ECDSA with SHA-256.
- MAY support ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA with SHA-
384, and ECDSA with SHA-512.
When using ECDSA, it is RECOMMENDED that the P-224 curve be used with
SHA-224, the P-256 curve be used with SHA-256, the P-384 curve be
used with SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512.
If EnvelopedData is supported, then ephemeral-static ECDH standard
primitive MUST be supported.
Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static
ECDH standard primitive:
- MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key
agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and
the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm
- MAY support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme and
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms,
the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key
wrap algorithms and the id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content
encryption algorithms.
Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static
ECDH cofactor primitive:
- MUST support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme key
agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and
the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm.
- MAY support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme,
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-
sha512kdf-scheme key agreement, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-
aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the id-
aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms.
Implementations that support EnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:
- MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement
algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id-
aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm.
- MAY support mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-
alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
algorithms and the id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content
encryption algorithms.
Implementations that support AuthenticatedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:
- MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement,
the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, and the id-aes128-cbc content
encryption, the id-sha256 message digest, and id-hmacWithSHA256
message authentication code algorithms.
- MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-alg-
CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
algorithms, the id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content
encryption algorithms, the id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha384, and
id-sha512, message digest algorithms, and the id-hmacWithSHA1,
id-hmacWithSHA224, id-hmacWithSHA384, id-hmacWithSHA512 message
authentication code algorithms.
Implementations that support AuthEnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:
- MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement,
the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, the id-aes128-ccm authenticated-
content encryption, the id-sha256 message digest, and the id-
hmacWithSHA256 message authentication cod algorithms.
- MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-
alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
algorithms, the id-aes192-ccm and id-aes256-ccm authenticated-
content encryption algorithms, the id-sha1, id-sha224, id-
sha384, and id-sha512, message digest algorithms, and id-
hmacWithSHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224, id-hmacWithSHA384, id-
hmacWithSHA512 message authentication code algorithms.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
Cryptographic algorithms will be broken or weakened over time. Cryptographic algorithms will be broken or weakened over time.
Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic
algorithms listed in this document continue to provide the expected algorithms listed in this document continue to provide the expected
level of security. The IETF from time to time may issue documents level of security. The IETF from time to time may issue documents
dealing with the current state of the art. dealing with the current state of the art.
This specification is based on [CMS], [CMS-AUTHENV], [CMS-ALG], [CMS- Cryptographic algorithms rely on random number. See [RANDOM] for
AESCG], [X9.62], and [SEC1] and the appropriate security guidance on generation of random numbers.
Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that
encrypt messages, need to be cautious of cryptographic processing
usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys
larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could
send certificates with keys which would result in excessive
cryptographic processing, for example keys larger than those mandated
in this specification, which could swamp the processing element.
Agents which use such keys without first validating the certificate
to a trust anchor are advised to have some sort of cryptographic
resource management system to prevent such attacks.
Using secret keys of an appropriate size is crucial to the security
of a Diffie-Hellman exchange. For elliptic curve groups, the size of
the secret key must be equal to the size of n (the order of the group
generated by the point g). Using larger secret keys provides
absolutely no additional security, and using smaller secret keys is
likely to result in dramatically less security. (See [SP800-56A] for
more information on selecting secret keys.)
This specification is based on [CMS], [CMS-AUTHENV], [CMS-ALG],
[CMS-AESCG], [X9.62], [SEC1], and [SEC2] and the appropriate security
considerations of those documents apply. considerations of those documents apply.
In addition, implementors of AuthenticatedData should be aware of the In addition, implementors of AuthenticatedData should be aware of the
concerns expressed in [BON] when using AuthenticatedData to send concerns expressed in [BON] when using AuthenticatedData to send
messages to more than one recipient. Also, users of MQV should be messages to more than one recipient. Also, users of MQV should be
aware of the vulnerability in [K]. aware of the vulnerability in [K].
When implementing EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and When implementing EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
AuthEnvelopedData, there are five algorithm related choices that need AuthEnvelopedData, there are five algorithm related choices that need
to be made: to be made:
skipping to change at page 20, line 20 skipping to change at page 23, line 51
2) What is the KDF? 2) What is the KDF?
3) What is the key wrap algorithm? 3) What is the key wrap algorithm?
4) What is the content encryption algorithm? 4) What is the content encryption algorithm?
5) What is the curve? 5) What is the curve?
Consideration must be given to strength of the security provided by Consideration must be given to strength of the security provided by
each of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong each of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong
symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of
security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by
each are roughly equivalent. The following table provides comparable each are roughly equivalent. The following table provides comparable
minimum bits of security [NISTSP800-57] for the ECDH/ECMQV key sizes, minimum bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDH/ECMQV key sizes,
KDFs, key wrapping algorithms, and content encryption algorithms. It KDFs, key wrapping algorithms, and content encryption algorithms. It
also lists curves [PKI-ALG] for the key sizes. also lists curves [PKI-ALG] for the key sizes.
Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curves Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curves
Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption | Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption |
Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. | Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
80 | 160-223 | SHA1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | sect163k1 80 | 160-223 | SHA1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | sect163k1
| | SHA224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp163r2 | | SHA224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp163r2
| | SHA256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp192r1 | | SHA256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp192r1
skipping to change at page 22, line 33 skipping to change at page 25, line 33
1) What is the public key size? 1) What is the public key size?
2) What is the hash algorithm? 2) What is the hash algorithm?
3) What is the curve? 3) What is the curve?
Consideration must be given to the bits of security provided by each Consideration must be given to the bits of security provided by each
of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong
symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of
security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by
each choice are roughly equivalent. The following table provides each choice are roughly equivalent. The following table provides
comparable minimum bits of security [NISTSP800-57] for the ECDSA key comparable minimum bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDSA key
sizes and message digest algorithms. It also lists curves [PKI-ALG] sizes and message digest algorithms. It also lists curves [PKI-ALG]
for the key sizes. for the key sizes.
Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve
Bits of | Key Size | Digest | Bits of | Key Size | Digest |
Security | | Algorithm | Security | | Algorithm |
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
80 | 160-223 | SHA1 | sect163k1 80 | 160-223 | SHA1 | sect163k1
| | SHA224 | secp163r2 | | SHA224 | secp163r2
| | SHA256 | secp192r1 | | SHA256 | secp192r1
skipping to change at page 24, line 27 skipping to change at page 27, line 27
(AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message (AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003. Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003.
[CMS-AESCG] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated [CMS-AESCG] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated
Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS)", RFC 5084, November 2007. (CMS)", RFC 5084, November 2007.
[CMS-ALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS-ALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002. Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
[CMS-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
CMS", draft-ietf-smime-new-asn1, work-in-progress.
[CMS-AUTHENV] Housley, R. "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS-AUTHENV] Housley, R. "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083, Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083,
November 2007. November 2007.
[CMS-DH] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", [CMS-DH] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
RFC 2631, June 1999. RFC 2631, June 1999.
[IEEE1363] IEEE P1363, "Standard Specifications for Public Key [FIPS180-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology
Cryptography", Institute of Electrical and (NIST), FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard,
Electronics Engineers, 2000. June 2003.
[DSS] FIPS 186-2, "Digital Signature Standard", National [FIPS186-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology
Institute of Standards and Technology, January 2000. (NIST), FIPS Publication 186-3: Digital Signature
Standard, March 2006.
[HMAC-SHA] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC- [HMAC-SHA1] Krawczyk, M., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[HMAC-SHA2] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-
SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA- SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-
512", RFC 4231, December 2005. 512", RFC 4231, December 2005.
[MUST] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate [MUST] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[MSG] Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "S/MIME Version 3.2 [MSG] Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "S/MIME Version 3.2
Message Specification", work-in-progress. Message Specification", draft-ietf-smime-3851bis,
work-in-progress.
[PKI] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S. [PKI] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[PKI-ALG] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W. [PKI-ALG] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W.
Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", work-in-progress. Information", draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-subpubkeyinfo,
work-in-progress.
[PKI-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
PKIX", draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1, work-in-progress.
[RANDOM] Eastlake 3rd, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller,
"Randomness Recommendations for Security", RFC 4086,
June 2005.
[RSAOAEP] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for
use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005.
[SEC1] SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for [SEC1] SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for
Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000. Available from Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000. Available from
www.secg.org/collateral/sec1.pdf. www.secg.org/collateral/sec1.pdf.
[SEC2] SECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", [SEC2] SECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters",
Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000. Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000.
Available from www.secg.org/collateral/sec2.pdf. Available from www.secg.org/collateral/sec2.pdf.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), FIPS Publication 180-2: Secure Hash Standard,
August 2002.
[SMIME-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic [SMIME-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", work-in-progress. Message Syntax", work-in-progress.
[X9.62] ANSI X9.62-2005, "Public Key Cryptography For The [SP800-56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology
Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve (NIST), Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", American Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
National Standards Institute, 2005. Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), March 2007.
[X.208] ITU-T Recommendation X.208 (1998) | ISO/IEC 8824- [X9.62] American National Standards Institute (ANSI), ANS
1:1998. Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One X9.62-2005: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005.
[X.208] ITU-T Recommendation X.208 (1988) | ISO/IEC 8824-
1:1988. Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1). (ASN.1).
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- [X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
1 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 1 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One. Notation One.
[X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- [X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
2 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 2 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Information Object Specification. Notation One: Information Object Specification.
skipping to change at page 26, line 24 skipping to change at page 29, line 44
Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University
of Waterloo, 2000. Paper version available from of Waterloo, 2000. Paper version available from
http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps
[CMS-KEA] Pawling, J., "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC [CMS-KEA] Pawling, J., "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC
2876, July 2000. 2876, July 2000.
[K] B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerability", Posting to ANSI X9F1 [K] B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerability", Posting to ANSI X9F1
and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998. and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998.
[NISTSP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology [SP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation (NIST), Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation
for Key Management, August 2005. for Key Management, August 2005.
Appendix A ASN.1 Modules Appendix A ASN.1 Modules
Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.208]. [X.208].
Appendix A.2 provides an informative ASN.1 definitions for the Appendix A.2 provides an informative ASN.1 definitions for the
skipping to change at page 27, line 39 skipping to change at page 30, line 39
IMPORTS IMPORTS
-- From [PKI] -- From [PKI]
AlgorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 FROM PKIX1Explicit88
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0)
pkix1-explicit(18) } pkix1-explicit(18) }
-- From [CMS-AES] -- From [RSAOAEP]
id-aes128-CBC, id-aes192-CBC, id-aes256-CBC, AES-IV, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512
id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, id-aes1256-wrap FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms
FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) } id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs(33) }
-- From [CMS-AESCG] -- From [PKI-ALG]
id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters id-sha1, ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224,
id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, ecdsa-with-SHA512,
FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM id-ecPublicKey, ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) FROM PKIXAlgs-1988
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) } { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD }
-- From [CMS] -- From [CMS]
OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- From [CMS-ALG] -- From [CMS-ALG]
hMAC-SHA1, id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, CBCParameter hMAC-SHA1, des-ede3-cbc, id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, CBCParameter
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) } smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) }
-- From [PKI-ALG] -- From [CMS-AES]
id-ecPublicKey, ecdsa-with-SHA1 id-aes128-CBC, id-aes192-CBC, id-aes256-CBC, AES-IV,
FROM PKIXAlgs-1988 id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, id-aes256-wrap
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD } { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) }
-- From [CMS-AESCG]
id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters
id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters
FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) }
; ;
-- --
-- ECDSA with SHA-2 Algorithms -- ECDSA with SHA-2 Algorithms
-- --
-- Parameters are NULL
-- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Parameters are NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Parameters are NULL
-- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Parameters are ABSENT
ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Parameters are ABSENT
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }
ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Parameters are ABSENT
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Parameters are absent
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }
-- ECDSA Signature Value -- ECDSA Signature Value
-- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { -- ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER, -- r INTEGER,
s INTEGER -- s INTEGER
} -- }
-- --
-- Key Agreement Algorithms -- Key Agreement Algorithms
-- --
x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840) iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
x9-63(63) schemes(0) } x9-63(63) schemes(0) }
secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }
-- --
-- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs
-- --
-- Parameters are always present and indicate the Key Wrap Algorithm -- Parameters are always present and indicate the key wrap algorithm
-- with KeyWrapAlgorithm
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 2 } x9-63-scheme 2 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 0 } secg-scheme 11 0 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 1 } secg-scheme 11 1 }
skipping to change at page 31, line 8 skipping to change at page 34, line 8
mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 2 } secg-scheme 15 2 }
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 3 } secg-scheme 15 3 }
-- --
-- Key Wrap Algorithms -- Key Wrap Algorithms
-- --
KeyWrapAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-alg-CMS3DESwrap Parameters are NULL -- id-alg-CMS3DESwrap Parameters are NULL
-- id-aes128-wrap Parameters are ABSENT -- id-aes128-wrap Parameters are ABSENT
-- id-aes192-wrap Parameters are ABSENT -- id-aes192-wrap Parameters are ABSENT
-- id-aes256-wrap Parameters are ABSENT -- id-aes256-wrap Parameters are ABSENT
-- --
-- Content Encryption Algorithms -- Content Encryption Algorithms
-- --
-- des-ede3-cbc Parameters are CBCParameter -- des-ede3-cbc Parameters are CBCParameter
skipping to change at page 31, line 32 skipping to change at page 34, line 34
-- id-aes192-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters -- id-aes192-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
-- id-aes256-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters -- id-aes256-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
-- id-aes128-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters -- id-aes128-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters
-- id-aes192-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters -- id-aes192-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters
-- id-aes256-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters -- id-aes256-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters
-- --
-- Message Digest Algorithms -- Message Digest Algorithms
-- --
-- Parameters are NULL
-- HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, -- HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384,
-- HMAC with SHA-512 are specified in [HMAC-SHA] -- HMAC with SHA-512 are specified in [HMAC-SHA2]
-- Parameters are ABSENT
-- hMACWithSHA1 -- hMACWithSHA1
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
skipping to change at page 32, line 16 skipping to change at page 35, line 16
digestAlgorithm(2) 11 } digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }
-- --
-- Originator Public Key Algorithms -- Originator Public Key Algorithms
-- --
-- id-ecPublicKey Parameters are NULL -- id-ecPublicKey Parameters are NULL
-- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys
ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
-- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
-- ECMQV -- ECMQV
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL
} }
-- Format for ECDH and ECMQV key-encryption keys when using -- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with
-- EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData -- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier, keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier,
entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
} }
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities -- S/MIME Capabilities
-- --
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA2 Algorithms -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA1 and SHA2 Algorithms
-- --
-- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Type NULL
-- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Type NULL
-- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Type NULL
-- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Type NULL
-- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Type NULL
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard
-- --
skipping to change at page 34, line 19 skipping to change at page 37, line 19
smime(16) modules(0) TBD } smime(16) modules(0) TBD }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- EXPORTS ALL
IMPORTS IMPORTS
-- From [PKI-ALG] -- FROM [PKI-ASN]
ALGORITHM, algorithmIdentifier, MessageDigestAlgorithms, KEY-WRAP, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
SignatureAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY, MAC-ALGORITHM, CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, KEY-AGREE
ow-sha1, ow-sha224, ow-sha256, ow-sha384, ow-sha512, FROM AlgorithmInformation
sa-ecdsaWithSHA1
FROM PKIXAlgs-2008
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithInformation(TBD)}
-- From [CMS-AES] -- From [PKI-ASN]
id-aes128-CBC, id-aes192-CBC, id-aes256-CBC, AES-IV, mda-sha1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA224, sa-ecdsaWithSHA256,
id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, id-aes1256-wrap sa-ecdsaWithSHA384, sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, id-ecPublicKey,
FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) FROM PKIXAlgs-2008
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) } { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD }
-- From [CMS-AESCG] -- From [PKI-ASN]
id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters, mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512
id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms
FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD }
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) }
-- From [CMS] -- From [CMS]
OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- From [CMS-ALG] -- From [CMS-ASN]
hMAC-SHA1, id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, CBCParameter maca-hMAC-SHA1, cea-des-ede3-cbc, kwa-3DESWrap, CBCParameter
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) } smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) }
-- From [CMS-ASN]
cea-aes128-CBC, cea-aes192-CBC, cea-aes256-CBC, kwa-aes128-wrap,
kwa-aes192-wrap, kwa-aes256-wrap
FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) }
-- From [CMS-ASN]
cea-aes128-ccm, cea-aes192-ccm, cea-aes256-ccm, cea-aes128-gcm,
cea-aes192-gcm, cea-aes256-gcm
FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-aes-ccm-and-gcm(32) }
; ;
-- Constrains the SignedData digestAlgorithms field -- Constrains the SignedData digestAlgorithms field
-- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field
MessageDigestAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { -- MessageDigestAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
ow-sha1 | -- mda-sha1 |
ow-sha224 | -- mda-sha224 |
ow-sha256 | -- mda-sha256 |
ow-sha384 | -- mda-sha384 |
ow-sha512, -- mda-sha512,
... -- Extensible -- ... -- Extensible
} -- }
-- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field
SignatureAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { -- SignatureAlgorithms SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
sa-ecdsaWithSHA1 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA1 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHA512 , -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA512 ,
... -- Extensible -- ... -- Extensible
} -- }
--
-- ECDSA with SHA-2 Algorithms
--
-- Parameters are NULL
-- sa-ecdsa-withSHA1
sa-ecdsa-with-SHA224 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID ecdsa-with-SHA224 PARMS NULL }
ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }
sa-ecdsa-with-SHA256 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID ecdsa-with-SHA256 PARMS NULL }
ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
sa-ecdsa-with-SHA384 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID ecdsa-with-SHA384 PARMS NULL }
ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
sa-ecdsa-with-SHA512 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID ecdsa-with-SHA512 PARMS NULL }
ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }
-- ECDSA Signature Value -- ECDSA Signature Value
-- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER, r INTEGER,
s INTEGER s INTEGER
} }
-- --
-- Key Agreement Algorithms -- Key Agreement Algorithms
-- --
-- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo -- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
-- keyEncryption Algorithm field -- keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
skipping to change at page 37, line 17 skipping to change at page 40, line 4
-- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo -- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
-- keyEncryption Algorithm field -- keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- DH variants are not used with AuthenticatedData or -- DH variants are not used with AuthenticatedData or
-- AuthEnvelopedData -- AuthEnvelopedData
KeyAgreementAlgorithms KEY-AGREE ::= {
KeyAgreementAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf |
skipping to change at page 38, line 4 skipping to change at page 40, line 29
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf, kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
... -- Extensible ... -- Extensible
} }
x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840) iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
x9-63(63) schemes(0) } x9-63(63) schemes(0) }
secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }
-- --
-- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs
-- --
-- Parameters are always present and indicate the Key Wrap Algorithm -- Parameters are always present and indicate the Key Wrap Algorithm
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 2 } x9-63-scheme 2 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 0 } secg-scheme 11 0 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 1 } secg-scheme 11 1 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 2 } secg-scheme 11 2 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 3 } secg-scheme 11 3 }
-- --
-- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
-- --
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 3 } x9-63-scheme 3 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme
PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 0 } secg-scheme 14 0 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme
PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 1 } secg-scheme 14 1 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme
PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 2 } secg-scheme 14 2 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 3 } secg-scheme 14 3 }
-- --
-- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs -- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
-- --
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 16 } x9-63-scheme 16 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 0 } secg-scheme 15 0 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 1 } secg-scheme 15 1 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 2 } secg-scheme 15 2 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= { kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
OID mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms } IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent
}
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 3 } secg-scheme 15 3 }
-- --
-- Key Wrap Algorithms -- Key Wrap Algorithms
-- --
KeyWrapAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { KeyWrapAlgorithm KEY-WRAP ::= {
kwa-3des | kwa-3des |
kwa-aes128 | kwa-aes128 |
kwa-aes192 | kwa-aes192 |
kwa-aes256, kwa-aes256,
... -- Extensible ... -- Extensible
} }
kwa-3des ALGORITHM :: = {
OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NULL }
kwa-aes128 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes128-wrap PARMS ABSENT }
kwa-aes192 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes192-wrap PARMS ABSENT }
kwa-aes256 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes256-wrap PARMS ABSENT }
-- --
-- Content Encryption Algorithms -- Content Encryption Algorithms
-- --
-- Constrains the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent -- Constrains the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent
-- field and the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo -- field and the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo
-- contentEncryptionAlgorithm field -- contentEncryptionAlgorithm field
ContentEncryptionAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { -- ContentEncryptionAlgorithms CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= {
cea-des-ede3-cbc | -- cea-des-ede3-cbc |
cea-aes128-cbc | -- cea-aes128-cbc |
cea-aes192-cbc | -- cea-aes192-cbc |
cea-aes256-cbc | -- cea-aes256-cbc |
cea-aes128-ccm | -- cea-aes128-ccm |
cea-aes192-ccm | -- cea-aes192-ccm |
cea-aes256-ccm | -- cea-aes256-ccm |
cea-aes128-gcm | -- cea-aes128-gcm |
cea-aes192-gcm | -- cea-aes192-gcm |
cea-aes256-gcm, -- cea-aes256-gcm,
... -- Extensible -- ... -- Extensible
} -- }
-- des-ede3-cbc and aes*-cbc are used with EnvelopedData and -- des-ede3-cbc and aes*-cbc are used with EnvelopedData and
-- EncryptedData -- EncryptedData
cea-des-ede3-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
OID des-ede3-cbc PARMS CBCParameter }
cea-aes128-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes128-CBC PARMS AES-IV }
cea-aes192-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes192-CBC PARMS AES-IV }
cea-aes256-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes256-CBC PARMS AES-IV }
-- aes*-ccm are used with AuthEnvelopedData -- aes*-ccm are used with AuthEnvelopedData
cea-aes128-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes128-CCM PARMS CCMParameters }
cea-aes192-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes192-CCM PARMS CCMParameters }
cea-aes256-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes256-CCM PARMS CCMParameters }
-- aes*-gcm are used with AuthEnvelopedData -- aes*-gcm are used with AuthEnvelopedData
cea-aes128-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes128-GCM PARMS GCMParameters }
cea-aes192-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes192-GCM PARMS GCMParameters }
cea-aes256-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes256-GCM PARMS GCMParameters }
-- --
-- Message Digest Algorithms -- Message Digest Algorithms
-- --
-- HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, -- HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384,
-- HMAC with SHA-512 are specified in [HMAC-SHA] -- HMAC with SHA-512 are specified in [HMAC-SHA2]
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData
-- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData
-- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field
MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
maca-sha1 | maca-sha1 |
maca-sha224 | maca-sha224 |
maca-sha256 | maca-sha256 |
maca-sha384 | maca-sha384 |
maca-sha512, maca-sha512,
... -- Extensible ... -- Extensible
} }
maca-sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID hMAC-SHA1 PARMS NULL }
maca-sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-hmacWithSHA224 PARMS NULL }
-- Would love to import the HMAC224-512 OIDS but they're not in a -- Would love to import the HMAC224-512 OIDS but they're not in a
-- module (that I could find) -- module (that I could find)
maca-sha224 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA224
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
}
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }
maca-sha256 ALGORITHM ::= { maca-sha256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-hmacWithSHA256 PARMS NULL } IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA256
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
}
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
maca-sha384 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
maca-sha384 ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA384
OID id-hmacWithSHA384 PARMS NULL } PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
}
id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 10 } digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }
maca-sha512 ALGORITHM ::= { maca-sha512 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-hmacWithSHA512 PARMS NULL } IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA512
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
}
id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 11 } digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }
-- --
-- Originator Public Key Algorithms -- Originator Public Key Algorithms
-- --
-- Constraints on KeyAgreeRecipientInfo OriginatorIdentifierOrKey -- Constraints on KeyAgreeRecipientInfo OriginatorIdentifierOrKey
-- OriginatorPublicKey algorithm field -- OriginatorPublicKey algorithm field
-- PARMS are NULL -- PARAMS are NULL
OriginatorPKAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { OriginatorPKAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
opka-ec, opka-ec,
... -- Extensible ... -- Extensible
} }
opka-ec AGLORITHM ::={ opka-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::={
OID id-ecPublicKey PARMS NULL } IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey
KEY ECPoint
PARAMS TYPE CHOICE { n NULL, p ECPoint } ARE preferredAbsent
}
-- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys
ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
-- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
-- ECMQV -- ECMQV
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL
} }
-- Format for ECDH and ECMQV key-encryption keys when using
-- EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData -- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with
-- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier { KeyWrapAlgorithms }, keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier { KeyWrapAlgorithm },
entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
} }
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities -- S/MIME Capabilities
-- --
SMIME-CAPS ::= CLASS { SMIME-CAPS ::= CLASS {
&Type OPTIONAL, &Type OPTIONAL,
skipping to change at page 45, line 33 skipping to change at page 48, line 33
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf | cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf, cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
... -- Extensible ... -- Extensible
} }
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA2 Algorithms -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA2 Algorithms
-- --
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1 SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA1 } TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA1.&id }
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224 SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA224 } TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA224.&id }
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256 SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA256 } TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA256.&id }
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384 SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA384 } TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA384.&id }
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512 SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA512 } TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA512.&id }
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard
-- --
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf } TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf } TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf } TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf } TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf } TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf }
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Cofactor -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Cofactor
-- --
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf } IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf } IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf } IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf } IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf } IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf }
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECMQV, Single Pass, Standard -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECMQV, Single Pass, Standard
-- --
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf } TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf }
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf } TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf }
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf } TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf }
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf } TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf }
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf } TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf }
END END
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The methods described in this document are based on work done by the The methods described in this document are based on work done by the
ANSI X9F1 working group. The authors wish to extend their thanks to ANSI X9F1 working group. The authors wish to extend their thanks to
ANSI X9F1 for their assistance. The authors also wish to thank Peter ANSI X9F1 for their assistance. The authors also wish to thank Peter
de Rooij for his patient assistance. The technical comments of de Rooij for his patient assistance. The technical comments of
Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions. Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions.
Many thanks go out to the other authors of RFC 3278: Simon Blake- Many thanks go out to the other authors of RFC 3278: Simon Blake-
Wilson and Paul Lambert. Without the initial version of RFC3278 this Wilson and Paul Lambert. Without the initial version of RFC3278 this
version wouldn't exist. version wouldn't exist.
The authors also wish to thank Alfred Hoenes, Jim Schaad, and Russ The authors also wish to thank Alfred Hoenes, Paul Hoffman, Russ
Housley for their valuable input. Housley, and Jim Schaad for their valuable input.
Author's Addresses Author's Addresses
Sean Turner Sean Turner
IECA, Inc. IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031 Fairfax, VA 22031
USA USA
 End of changes. 191 change blocks. 
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