draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-03.txt   draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-04.txt 
S/MIME WG Sean Turner, IECA S/MIME WG Sean Turner, IECA
Internet Draft Dan Brown, Certicom Internet Draft Dan Brown, Certicom
Intended Status: Informational October 22, 2008 Intended Status: Informational December 11, 2008
Obsoletes: 3278 (once approved) Obsoletes: 3278 (once approved)
Expires: April 22, 2009 Expires: June 11, 2009
Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms
in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-03.txt draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-04.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract Abstract
This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The
ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the
exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content. The definition exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content. The definition
of the algorithm processing is based on the NIST FIPS 186-3 for of the algorithm processing is based on the NIST FIPS 186-3 for
digital signature, NIST SP800-56A for key agreement, RFC 3565 and RFC digital signature, NIST SP800-56A and SEC1 for key agreement, RFC
3370 for key wrap and content encryption, NIST FIPS 180-3 for message 3370 and RFC 3565 for key wrap and content encryption, NIST FIPS 180-
digest, and RFC 2104 and RFC 4231 for message authentication code 3 for message digest, SEC1 for key derivation, and RFC 2104 and RFC
standards. This document will obsolete RFC 3278. 4231 for message authentication code standards. This document
obsoletes RFC 3278.
Discussion Discussion
This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To
subscribe, send a message to ietf-smime-request@imc.org with the subscribe, send a message to ietf-smime-request@imc.org with the
single word subscribe in the body of the message. There is a Web site single word subscribe in the body of the message. There is a Web site
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................2 1. Introduction...................................................3
1.1. Requirements Terminology..................................3 1.1. Requirements Terminology..................................3
1.2. Changes since RFC 3278....................................3 2. SignedData using ECC...........................................3
2. SignedData using ECC...........................................5 2.1. SignedData using ECDSA....................................3
2.1. SignedData using ECDSA....................................6 3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms.............................5
3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms.............................7 3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH...............5
3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH...............7 3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV..........................7
3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV..........................9 4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC.............10
4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC.............12 4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................10
4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................12 4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................11
4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................13 5. Certificates using ECC........................................12
5. Certificates using ECC........................................14 6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC...........................12
6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC...........................14 7. ASN.1 Syntax..................................................20
7. ASN.1 Syntax..................................................17 7.1. Algorithm Identifiers....................................20
7.1. Algorithm Identifiers....................................17 7.2. Other Syntax.............................................24
7.2. Other Syntax.............................................20 8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves....................25
8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves....................22 9. Security Considerations.......................................28
9. Security Considerations.......................................24 10. IANA Considerations..........................................33
10. IANA Considerations..........................................29 11. References...................................................33
11. References...................................................29 11.1. Normative...............................................33
11.1. Normative...............................................29 11.2. Informative.............................................35
11.2. Informative.............................................31 Appendix A ASN.1 Modules.........................................36
Appendix A ASN.1 Modules.........................................33 Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module................................36
Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module................................33 Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module................................43
Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module................................40 Appendix B Changes since RFC 3278................................53
Acknowledgements.................................................56
Author's Addresses...............................................56
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm
independent. This specification defines a profile for the use of independent. This specification defines a profile for the use of
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS.
The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content
types: types:
- 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods - 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods
(ECDSA) to sign content; (ECDSA) to sign content;
- 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement - 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption
keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content
encryption; encryption;
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- 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods - 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods
(ECDSA) to sign content; (ECDSA) to sign content;
- 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement - 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption
keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content
encryption; encryption;
- 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement - 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
encrypt message authenticate code (MAC) keys used for content encrypt message-authentication keys used for content
authentication and integrity; and, authentication and integrity; and,
- 'AuthEnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement - 'AuthEnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
encrypt MAC keys used for authenticated encryption modes. encrypt message-authentication and content-encryption keys used
for content authentication, integrity, and encryption.
Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public- Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public-
key distribution in support of the specified techniques. key distribution in support of the specified techniques.
The document will obsolete [CMS-ECC]. The document will obsolete [CMS-ECC]. The technical changes
performed since RFC 3278 are detailed in Appendix B.
1.1. Requirements Terminology 1.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST]. document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST].
1.2. Changes since RFC 3278
The following summarizes the changes:
- Abstract: The basis of the document was changed to refer to NIST
FIPP 186-3 and SP800-56A.
- Section 1: A bullet was added to address AuthEnvelopedData.
- Section 2.1: A sentence was added to indicate FIPS180-3 is used
with ECDSA. Replaced reference to ANSI X9.62 with FIPS186-3.
- Section 2.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms were expanded from
SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
- Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3: The bullet addressing integer "e" was
deleted.
- Section 3: Added explanation of why static-static ECDH is not
included.
- Section 3.1: The reference for DH was changed from CMS to CMS-
ALG. Provided text to indicate fields of EnvelopedData are as
in CMS.
- Section 3.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms for use with ECDH
std and cofactor methods were expanded from SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-
224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. Updated to include
description of all KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields. Parameters for
id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL to absent or ECPoint.
Additional information about ukm was added.
- Section 3.2: The sentence describing the advantages of 1-Pass
ECMQV was rewritten.
- Section 3.2.1: The permitted digest algorithms for use with ECMQV
were expanded from SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
and SHA-512. Updated to include description of all fields.
Parameters for id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL to absent
or ECPoint.
- Sections 3.2.2 and 4.1.2: The re-use of ephemeral keys paragraph
was reworded.
- Section 4.1: The sentences describing the advantages of 1-Pass
ECMQV was moved to Section 4.
- Section 4.1.2: The note about the attack was moved to Section 4.
- Section 4.2: This section was added to address AuthEnvelopedData
with ECMQV.
- Section 5: This section was moved to Section 8. The 1st
paragraph was modified to require both SignedData and
EnvelopedData. The requirements were updated for hash
algorithms and recommendations for matching curves and hash
algorithms. Also the requirements were expanded to indicate
which ECDH and ECMQV variants, key wrap algorithms, and content
encryption algorithms are required for each of the content types
used in this document.
- Section 5 (formerly 6): This section was updated to allow for
SMIMECapabilities to be present certificates.
- Section 6 (formerly 7): The S/MIME capabilities for ECDSA with
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 were added to the list of
S/MIME Capabilities. Also updated to include S/MIME
capabilities for ECDH and ECMQV using the SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the KDF.
- Section 7.1 (formerly 8.1): Added sub-sections for digest,
signature, originator public key, key agreement, content
encryption, and message authentication code algorithms. Pointed
to algorithms and parameters in appropriate docummments for:
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as well as SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA. Also added algorithm
identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV with SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the KDF. Changed
id-ecPublicKey parameters to be absent, NULL, and ECParameters
and if present the originator's ECParameters must match the
recipient's ECParameters.
- Section 7.2 (formerly 8.2): Updated to include AuthEnvelopedData.
Also, added text to address support requirement for compressed
and uncompressed keys, changed pointers from ANSI X9.61 to PKIX
(where ECDSA-Sig-Value is imported), changed pointers from SECG
to NIST specs, and updated example of suppPubInfo to be AES-256.
keyInfo's parameters changed from NULL to any associated
parameters (AES wraps have absent parameters).
- Section 9: Replaced text, which was a summary paragraph, with an
updated security considerations section. Paragraph referring to
definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 is
deleted.
- Updated references.
- Added ASN.1 modules.
- Updated acknowledgements section.
2. SignedData using ECC 2. SignedData using ECC
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
SignedData format to sign data. SignedData format to sign data.
2.1. SignedData using ECDSA 2.1. SignedData using ECDSA
This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData. ECDSA is specified in Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData. ECDSA is specified in
[FIPS186-3]. The method is the elliptic curve analog of the Digital [FIPS186-3]. The method is the elliptic curve analog of the Digital
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In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the
following techniques and formats MUST be used. following techniques and formats MUST be used.
2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData 2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in
[CMS], but with the following restrictions: [CMS], but with the following restrictions:
- digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be one of the following: algorithm (see Section 7.1.1) which MUST be one of the
id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, or id-sha512. following: id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, or id-
sha512.
- signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier - signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier
(see Section 7.1): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa- (see Section 7.1.3): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa-
with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512. with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512.
- signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a - signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a
value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 7.2). value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 7.2).
When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the
certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the
ECDSA signatures in SignedData. ECC certificates are discussed in ECDSA signatures in SignedData. ECC certificates are discussed in
Section 5. Section 5.
2.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 2.1.2. Actions of the sending agent
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the message When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the message
digest calculation process and signature generation process for digest calculation process and signature generation process for
SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To sign data, the sending SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To sign data, the sending
agent uses the signature method specified in [FIPS186-3]. agent uses the signature method specified in [FIPS186-3].
The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the
ECDSA-Sig-Value syntax (see Section 7.2) and places it in the ECDSA-Sig-Value syntax (see Section 7.2) and places it in the
SignerInfo.signature field. SignerInfo signature field.
2.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 2.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the
message digest calculation process and signature verification process message digest calculation process and signature verification process
for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To verify SignedData, for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To verify SignedData,
the receiving agent uses the signature verification method specified the receiving agent uses the signature verification method specified
in [FIPS186-3]. in [FIPS186-3].
In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the
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3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms 3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
EnvelopedData format. EnvelopedData format.
This document does not specify the static-static ECDH, method C(0,2, This document does not specify the static-static ECDH, method C(0,2,
ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A]. Static-static ECDH is analogous to ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A]. Static-static ECDH is analogous to
static-static DH, which is specified in [CMS-ALG]. Ephemeral-static static-static DH, which is specified in [CMS-ALG]. Ephemeral-static
ECDH and 1-Pass ECMQV were specified because they provide better ECDH and 1-Pass ECMQV were specified because they provide better
security due the originator's ephemeral contribution to the key security due to the originator's ephemeral contribution to the key
agreement scheme. agreement scheme.
3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH 3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH
This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData,
method C(1, 1, ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A]. Ephemeral-static ECDH is method C(1, 1, ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A] and ECDH with the standard
the elliptic curve analog of the ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key primitive from Section 3.3.1 [SEC1]. Ephemeral-static ECDH is the
elliptic curve analog of the ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key
agreement algorithm specified jointly in the documents [CMS-ALG] and agreement algorithm specified jointly in the documents [CMS-ALG] and
[CMS-DH]. [CMS-DH].
If an implementation uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData, then the If an implementation uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData, then the
following techniques and formats MUST be used. following techniques and formats MUST be used.
The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS], as ECDH is a key The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS], as ECDH is a key
agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used.
using ECDH, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY include the
certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of the
pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5.
3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as follows: KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as follows:
- version MUST be 3. - version MUST be 3.
- originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey. The - originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey. The
originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey
object identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters associated object identifier (see Section 7.1.3). The parameters
with id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent or ECParameters. NOTE: The associated with id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent or ECParameters.
previous version of this document required NULL to be present, NOTE: The previous version of this document required NULL to be
support for this legacy form is OPTIONAL. The originatorKey present, support for this legacy form is OPTIONAL. The
publicKey field MUST contain the value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint originatorKey publicKey field MUST contain the value of the
(see Section 7.2), which represents the sending agent's ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section 7.2), which represents the
ephemeral EC public key. The ECPoint in uncompressed form MUST sending agent's ephemeral EC public key. The ECPoint in
be supported. uncompressed form MUST be supported.
- ukm MAY be present or absent. However, message originators - ukm MAY be present or absent. However, message originators
SHOULD include the ukm. As specified in RFC 3852 [CMS], SHOULD include the ukm. As specified in RFC 3852 [CMS],
implementations MUST support ukm message recipient processing, implementations MUST support ukm message recipient processing,
so interoperability is not a concern if the ukm is present or so interoperability is not a concern if the ukm is present or
absent. The ukm is placed in the entityUInfo field of the ECC- absent. The ukm is placed in the entityUInfo field of the ECC-
CMS-SharedInfo structure. When present, the ukm is used to CMS-SharedInfo structure. When present, the ukm is used to
ensure that a different key-encryption key is generated, even ensure that a different key-encryption key is generated, even
when the ephemeral private key is improperly used more than when the ephemeral private key is improperly used more than
once, by using the ECC-CMS-SharedInfo as an input to the key once, by using the ECC-CMS-SharedInfo as an input to the key
derivation function (see Section 7.2). derivation function (see Section 7.2).
- keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the key encryption algorithm - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the key encryption algorithm,
object identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters field which in this case is a key agreement algorithm, object
contains KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the identifier (see Section 7.1.4). The parameters field contains
algorithm identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm
algorithm used to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm
the key-encryption key (KEK) and any associated parameters. used to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with the key-
Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8. encryption key (KEK) and any associated parameters (see Section
7.1.5). Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8.
- recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted
key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey
KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the
issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or
the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier
from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the
recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECDH recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECDH
public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the
content-encryption key encrypted with the ephemeral-static, content-encryption key encrypted with the ephemeral-static,
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3.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 3.1.2. Actions of the sending agent
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending
agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain
parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate). The sending parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate). The sending
agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the
KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string
"SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see
Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and
the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
Scheme specified in [SP800-56A]. As a result the sending agent Scheme specified in [SP800-56A] or [SEC1]; in either case, use the
obtains: KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1] with the has algorithm
identified in the key agreement algorithm. As a result the sending
agent obtains:
- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of the - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of the
type ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string and type ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string and
placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field, and placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field, and
- a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise
key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS]. key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].
In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient,
then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for
that recipient in each of the different layers.
3.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 3.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving
agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER
encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer
"keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The "keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The
receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the bit receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the bit
string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type
ECPoint (see Section 7.2) encapsulated as a bit string, and if ECPoint (see Section 7.2) encapsulated as a bit string, and if
present, originally supplied additional user key material from the present, originally supplied additional user key material from the
ukm field. The receiving agent performs the key agreement operation ukm field. The receiving agent performs the key agreement operation
of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SP800-56A]. of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SP800-56A]
As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string or [SEC1]; in either case, use the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of
"K", which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the [SEC1]. As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit
CEK. string "K", which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to
unwrap the CEK.
3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV 3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, method (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, method
C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-KEA], C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-KEA],
1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a static 1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a static
key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the receiving key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the receiving
agent. Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for agent. Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for
knowledge of the message creator, this means that authentication can, knowledge of the message creator, this means that authentication can,
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- originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender. It - originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender. It
SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or
subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's
certificates. certificates.
- ukm MUST be present. The ukm field is an octet string which MUST - ukm MUST be present. The ukm field is an octet string which MUST
contain the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see contain the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see
Section 7.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey Section 7.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey
algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object
identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters associated with identifier (see Section 7.1.3). The parameters associated with
id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent or ECParameters. NOTE: The id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent or ECParameters. NOTE: The
previous version of this document required NULL to be present, previous version of this document required NULL to be present,
support for this legacy form is OPTIONAL. The support for this legacy form is OPTIONAL. The
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field MUST MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field MUST
contain the DER-encoding of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section contain the DER-encoding of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section
7.2) representing the sending agent's ephemeral EC public key. 7.2) representing the sending agent's ephemeral EC public key.
The MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm field, if present, contains The MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm field, if present, contains
additional user keying material from the sending agent. additional user keying material from the sending agent.
- keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST be the key encryption algorithm - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the key encryption algorithm,
identifier (see Section 7.1), with the parameters field which in this case is a key agreement algorithm, object
identifier (see Section 7.1.4). The parameters field contains
KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric
encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK
generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm and any associated generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm and any associated
parameters. Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8. parameters (see Section 7.1.5). Algorithm requirements are
found in Section 8.
- recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted
key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey
KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the
issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or
the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier
from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the
recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECMQV recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECMQV
public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the
content-encryption key encrypted with the 1-Pass ECMQV-generated content-encryption key encrypted with the 1-Pass ECMQV-generated
skipping to change at page 11, line 20 skipping to change at page 9, line 22
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first
obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters (e.g. obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters (e.g.
from the recipient's certificate), and checks that the domain from the recipient's certificate), and checks that the domain
parameters are the same as the sender's domain parameters. The parameters are the same as the sender's domain parameters. The
sending agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the sending agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the
KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string
"SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see
Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and
key agreement operations of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified key agreement operations of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified
in [SP800-56A]. As a result, the sending agent obtains: in [SP800-56A], but uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1].
As a result, the sending agent obtains:
- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type
ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed
in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field
(see Section 7.2), and (see Section 7.2), and
- a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise
key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS]. key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].
In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient,
skipping to change at page 11, line 43 skipping to change at page 9, line 46
3.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent 3.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent
determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer "keydatalen" ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer "keydatalen"
from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving
agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the
originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in
Section 3.2.1, and its static EC public key identified in the rid Section 3.2.1, and its static EC public key identified in the rid
field and checks that the domain parameters are the same as the field and checks that the originator's domain parameters are the same
recipient's domain parameters. The receiving agent then performs the as the recipient's domain parameters. The receiving agent then
key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme [SP800-56A]. performs the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme
As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string [SP800-56A], but uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. As
"K" which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K"
CEK. which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK.
4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC 4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation, AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation,
and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For example, and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For example,
the sending agent might not want the message to be authenticated when the sending agent might not want the message to be authenticated when
forwarded.) forwarded.)
This section also describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section also describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
AuthEnvelopedData format [CMS-AUTHENV]. AuthEnvelopedData supports AuthEnvelopedData format [CMS-AUTHENV]. AuthEnvelopedData supports
authentication and encryption, and in some instances is preferable to authentication and encryption, and in some instances is preferable to
signing and then encrypting data. signing and then encrypting data.
For both AuthentictedData and AuthEnvelopedData, data origin For both AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData, data origin
authentication with 1-Pass ECMQV can only be provided when there is authentication with 1-Pass ECMQV can only be provided when there is
one and only one recipient. When there are multiple recipients, an one and only one recipient. When there are multiple recipients, an
attack is possible where one recipient modifies the content without attack is possible where one recipient modifies the content without
other recipients noticing [BON]. A sending agent who is concerned other recipients noticing [BON]. A sending agent who is concerned
with such an attack SHOULD use a separate AuthenticatedData or with such an attack SHOULD use a separate AuthenticatedData or
AuthEnvelopedData for each recipient. AuthEnvelopedData for each recipient.
Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for
knowledge of the message creator, this means that authentication can, knowledge of the message creator; this means that authentication can,
in some circumstances, be obtained for AuthEnvelopedData and in some circumstances, be obtained for AuthEnvelopedData and
AuthenticatedData. This means that 1-Pass ECMQV can be a common AuthenticatedData. This means that 1-Pass ECMQV can be a common
algorithm for EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData algorithm for EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData
while ECDH can only be used in EnvelopedData. while ECDH can only be used in EnvelopedData.
4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV 4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. ECMQV is (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. ECMQV is
method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A].
When using ECMQV with AuthenticatedData, the fields of When using ECMQV with AuthenticatedData, the fields of
AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS], but with the following AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS], but with the following
restrictions: restrictions:
- macAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the message - macAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the message
authentication code algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be authentication code (MAC) algorithm (see Section 7.1.7) which
one of the following: hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWITHSHA224, id- MUST be one of the following: hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWITHSHA224, id-
hmacWITHSHA256, id-hmacWITHSHA384, or id-hmacWITHSHA512. hmacWITHSHA256, id-hmacWITHSHA384, or id-hmacWITHSHA512.
- digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be one of the following: algorithm (see Section 7.1.1) which MUST be one of the
id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, and id-sha512. following: id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, and id-
sha512.
As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari
choice is used in the AuthenticatedData. When using 1-Pass ECMQV, choice is used in the AuthenticatedData. When using 1-Pass ECMQV,
the AuthenticatedData originatorInfo field MAY include the the AuthenticatedData originatorInfo field MAY include the
certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of the
pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5. pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5.
4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
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The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document. 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.
4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV 4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthEnvelopedData. ECMQV is (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthEnvelopedData. ECMQV is
method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A].
When using ECMQV with AuthEnvelopedData, the fields of When using ECMQV with AuthEnvelopedData, the fields of
AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS-AUTHENV], but with the following AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS-AUTHENV].
restriction:
- macAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the message
authentication code algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be
one of the following: hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWITHSHA224, id-
hmacWITHSHA256, id-hmacWITHSHA384, or id-hmacWITHSHA512.
As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari
choice is used. When using 1-Pass ECMQV, the AuthEnvelopedData choice is used. When using 1-Pass ECMQV, the AuthEnvelopedData
originatorInfo field MAY include the certificate(s) for the EC public originatorInfo field MAY include the certificate(s) for the EC public
key(s) used in the formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates key used in the formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are
are discussed in Section 5. discussed in Section 5.
4.2.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 4.2.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
The AuthEnvelopedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the The AuthEnvelopedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document. KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.
4.2.2. Actions of the sending agent 4.2.2. Actions of the sending agent
The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 1- The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 1-
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algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in [PKI- algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in [PKI-
ALG]. ALG].
6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC 6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC
A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports one A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports one
or more of the ECC algorithms specified in this document by using the or more of the ECC algorithms specified in this document by using the
SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG] in either a signed message SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG] in either a signed message
or a certificate [CERTCAP]. or a certificate [CERTCAP].
The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for one of the ECDSA The SMIMECapabilities attribute value indicates support for one of
signature algorithms is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field the ECDSA signature algorithms in a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID
containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA* (where * is 1, 224, field containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 with NULL
256, 384, or 512) with NULL parameters. The DER encodings are: parameters and ecdsa-with-SHA1* (where * is 224, 256, 384, or 512)
with absent parameters. The DER encodings are:
ecdsa-with-SHA1: 30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA1: 30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00
ecdsa-with-SHA224: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 01 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA224: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 01
ecdsa-with-SHA256: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA256: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02
ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03
ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04
NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities indicates that parameters for ECDSA NOTE: The S/MIMECapabilities attribute indicates that parameters for
with SHA-* are NULL (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512), however, ECDSA with SHA-1 are NULL, however, the parameters are absent when
the parameters are absent when used to generate a digital signature. used to generate a digital signature.
The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for The SMIMECapabilities attribute value indicates support for
a) the standard ECDH key agreement algorithm, a) the standard ECDH key agreement algorithm,
b) the cofactor ECDH key agreement algorithm, or b) the cofactor ECDH key agreement algorithm, or
c) the 1-Pass ECMQV key agreement algorithm c) the 1-Pass ECMQV key agreement algorithm
is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object
identifier identifier
a) dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha*kdf-scheme, a) dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha*kdf-scheme,
b) dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha*kdf-scheme, or b) dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha*kdf-scheme, or
c) mqvSinglePass-sha*kdf-scheme c) mqvSinglePass-sha*kdf-scheme
respectively (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the respectively (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the
parameters present. The parameters indicate the supported key- parameters present. The parameters indicate the supported key-
encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier. encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.
Example DER encodings that indicate some capabilities are as follows The DER encodings that indicate capabilities are as follows (KA is
(KA is key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key wrap
wrap algorithm): algorithm):
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 1c 30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86
06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00
30 0f
06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=Triple-DES
05 00
30 19 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 00 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01
09 10 03 06 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 19 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01
09 10 03 06 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 19 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01
09 10 03 06 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 19 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 03 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01
09 10 03 06 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-128
30 1a 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01
65 03 04 01 05 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-128
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 00 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 05 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128
30 17 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 01 05 05 00
30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-128
05 00
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 05 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-128
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 03 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 05 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-192
30 1a 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01
65 03 04 01 2D 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-192
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 00 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-192
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-192
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-192
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 03 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-256
30 1a 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01
65 03 04 01 2D 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-256
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 00 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-256
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256
30 17 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 01 2D 05 00
30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-256
05 00
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 03 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 1c 30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86
06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00
30 0f
06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=Triple-DES
05 00
30 19 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 00 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01
09 10 03 06 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 19 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01
09 10 03 06 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 19 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01
09 10 03 06 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 19 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 03 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01
09 10 03 06 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-128
30 1a 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01
65 03 04 01 05 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-128
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 00 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 05 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128
30 17 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 01 05 05 00
30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-128
05 00
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 05 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-128
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 03 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 05 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-192
30 1a 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01
65 03 04 01 19 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-192
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 00 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 19 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-192
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 19 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-192
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 19 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-192
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 03 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 19 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-256
30 1a 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01
65 03 04 01 2D 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-256
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 00 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-256
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256
30 17 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 01 2D 05 00
30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-256
05 00
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 03 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 1c 30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86
06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00
30 0f
06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=Triple-DES
05 00
30 19 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 00 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01
09 10 03 06 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 19 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01
09 10 03 06 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 19 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01
09 10 03 06 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 19 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01
09 10 03 06 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-128
30 1a 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01
65 03 04 01 05 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-128
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 00 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 05 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128
30 17 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 01 05 05 00
30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-128
05 00
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 05 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-128
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 05 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-192
30 1a 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01
65 03 04 01 2D 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-192
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 00 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 19 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-192
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 19 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-192
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 19 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-192
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 19 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-256
30 1a 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01
65 03 04 01 2D 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-256
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 00 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-256
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256
30 17 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 01 2D 05 00
30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
05 00
NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities indicates that parameters for the key KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-256
30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 05 00
NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities indicate that parameters for the key
wrap algorithm AES-* (where * is 128, 192, or 256) are NULL; however, wrap algorithm AES-* (where * is 128, 192, or 256) are NULL; however,
the parameters are absent when used to encrypt/decrypt a content the parameters are absent when used to encrypt/decrypt a content
encryption key. encryption key.
NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities for the supported AES content
encryption key sizes are defined in [CMS-AES].
NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities for the supported MAC algorithms are
defined in [CMS-ASN].
7. ASN.1 Syntax 7. ASN.1 Syntax
The ASN.1 syntax used in this document is gathered in this section The ASN.1 syntax used in this document is gathered in this section
for reference purposes. for reference purposes.
7.1. Algorithm Identifiers 7.1. Algorithm Identifiers
This section provides the object identifiers for the algorithms used This section provides the object identifiers for the algorithms used
in this document along with any associated parameters. in this document along with any associated parameters.
skipping to change at page 18, line 4 skipping to change at page 21, line 14
identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found
in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-SHA2]. in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-SHA2].
7.1.2. Originator Public Key 7.1.2. Originator Public Key
The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field use the following object The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field use the following object
identifier to indicate an elliptic curve public key: identifier to indicate an elliptic curve public key:
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 } ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 }
where where
ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 } iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 }
When the object identifier id-ecPublicKey is used here with an When the object identifier id-ecPublicKey is used here with an
algorithm identifier, the associated parameters MUST be either absent algorithm identifier, the associated parameters MUST be either absent
or ECParameters. Implementations MUST accept id-ecPublicKey with or ECParameters. Implementations MUST accept id-ecPublicKey with
absent, and ECParameters parameters. If ECParameters is present, its absent and ECParameters parameters. If ECParameters is present, its
value MUST match the recipients ECParameters. Implementations SHOULD value MUST match the recipient's ECParameters. Implementations
generate absent parameters for the id-ecPublicKey object identifier SHOULD generate absent parameters for the id-ecPublicKey object
in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field. identifier in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field.
NOTE: [CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for NULL NOTE: [CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for this
parameters is OPTIONAL. legacy form is OPTIONAL.
7.1.3. Signature Algorithms 7.1.3. Signature Algorithms
Signature algorithm identifiers are used in the SignedData Signature algorithm identifiers are used in the SignedData
signatureAlgorithm and signature field. The signature algorithms signatureAlgorithm and signature fields. The signature algorithms
used in this document are ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA used in this document are ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA
with SHA-256, ECDSA with SHA-384, and ECDSA with SHA-512. The object with SHA-256, ECDSA with SHA-384, and ECDSA with SHA-512. The object
identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found
in [PKI-ALG]. in [PKI-ALG].
NOTE: [CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for NULL NOTE: [CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for NULL
parameters is OPTIONAL. parameters is OPTIONAL.
7.1.4. Key Agreement Algorithms 7.1.4. Key Agreement Algorithms
Key agreement algorithms are used in EnvelopedData, Key agreement algorithms are used in EnvelopedData,
AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
keyEncryptionAlgorithm field. The following object identifiers keyEncryptionAlgorithm field. The following object identifiers
indicate the key agreement algorithms used in this document [SP800- indicate the key agreement algorithms used in this document:
56A]:
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 2 } x9-63-scheme 2 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 0 } secg-scheme 11 0 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 1 } secg-scheme 11 1 }
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algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-AES]. The content algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-AES]. The content
encryption algorithms used with AuthEnvelopedData in this document encryption algorithms used with AuthEnvelopedData in this document
are AES-128 in CCM mode, AES-192 in CCM mode, AES-256 in CCM mode, are AES-128 in CCM mode, AES-192 in CCM mode, AES-256 in CCM mode,
AES-128 in GCM mode, AES-192 in GCM mode, and AES-256 in GCM mode. AES-128 in GCM mode, AES-192 in GCM mode, and AES-256 in GCM mode.
The object identifiers and parameters associated with these The object identifiers and parameters associated with these
algorithms are found in [CMS-AESCG]. algorithms are found in [CMS-AESCG].
7.1.7. Message Authentication Code Algorithms 7.1.7. Message Authentication Code Algorithms
Message authentication code algorithms are used in AuthenticatedData Message authentication code algorithms are used in AuthenticatedData
and AuthEnvelopedData in the macAlgorithm field. The message in the macAlgorithm field. The message authentication code
authentication code algorithms used in this document are HMAC with algorithms used in this document are HMAC with SHA-1, HMAC with SHA-
SHA-1, HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, and 224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, and HMAC with SHA-512.
HMAC with SHA-512. The object identifiers and parameters associated The object identifiers and parameters associated with these
with these algorithms are found in [HMAC-SHA1] and [HMAC-SHA2]. algorithms are found in [HMAC-SHA1] and [HMAC-SHA2].
7.1.8. Key Derivation Algorithm
The KDF used in this document is as specified in 3.6.1 of [SEC1].
The hash algorithm is identified in key agreement algorithm. For
example, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme uses the KDF from [SEC1]
but uses SHA-256 instead of SHA-1.
7.2. Other Syntax 7.2. Other Syntax
The following additional syntax is used here. The following additional syntax is used here.
When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded using When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded using
the type: the type:
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER, r INTEGER,
s INTEGER } s INTEGER }
ECDSA-Sig-Value is specified in [PKI-ALG]. Within CMS, ECDSA-Sig- ECDSA-Sig-Value is specified in [PKI-ALG]. Within CMS, ECDSA-Sig-
Value is DER-encoded and placed within a signature field of Value is DER-encoded and placed within a signature field of
SignedData. SignedData.
When using ECDH and ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and When using ECDH and ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
AuthEnvelopedData, ephemeral and static public keys are encoded using AuthEnvelopedData, ephemeral and static public keys are encoded using
the type ECPoint. Implementations MUST support uncompressed keys and the type ECPoint. Implementations MUST support uncompressed keys, MAY
MAY support compressed keys. support compressed keys, and MUST NOT support hybrid keys.
ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
AuthEnvelopedData, the sending agent's ephemeral public key and AuthEnvelopedData, the sending agent's ephemeral public key and
additional keying material are encoded using the type: additional keying material are encoded using the type:
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL } addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL }
skipping to change at page 22, line 4 skipping to change at page 25, line 35
entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material
supplied by the sending agent. When used with ECDH and CMS, the supplied by the sending agent. When used with ECDH and CMS, the
entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm. When used with entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm. When used with
ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string addedukm ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string addedukm
(encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial). (encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial).
suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits, suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits,
represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH] and [CMS-AES]. represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH] and [CMS-AES].
(E.g. for AES-256 it would be 00 00 01 00.) (E.g. for AES-256 it would be 00 00 01 00.)
Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to
the key derivation function, as specified in [SP800-56A]. the key derivation function, as specified in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1].
Note that ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in NOTE: ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in
[CMS-DH]. Here, a counter value is not included in the keyInfo field [CMS-DH]. Here, a counter value is not included in the keyInfo field
because the key derivation function specified in [SP800-56A] ensures because the key derivation function specified in Section 3.6.1 of
that sufficient keying data is provided. [SEC1] ensures that sufficient keying data is provided.
8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves 8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves
It is RECOMMEND that implementations of this specification support It is RECOMMENDED that implementations of this specification support
SignedData and EnvelopedData. Support for AuthenticatedData and SignedData and EnvelopedData. Support for AuthenticatedData and
AuthEnvelopedData is OPTIONAL. AuthEnvelopedData is OPTIONAL.
In order to encourage interoperability, implementations SHOULD use In order to encourage interoperability, implementations SHOULD use
the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by [PKI-ALG]. the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by [PKI-ALG].
Implementations that support SignedData with ECDSA: Implementations that support SignedData with ECDSA:
- MUST support ECDSA with SHA-256; and, - MUST support ECDSA with SHA-256; and,
- MAY support ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA with SHA- - MAY support ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA with SHA-
384, and ECDSA with SHA-512. Other digital signature algorithms 384, and ECDSA with SHA-512; other digital signature algorithms
MAY also be supported. MAY also be supported.
When using ECDSA, it is RECOMMENDED that the P-224 curve be used with When using ECDSA, to promote interoperability it is RECOMMENDED that
SHA-224, the P-256 curve be used with SHA-256, the P-384 curve be the P-192, P-224, and the P-256 curves be used with SHA-256, the P-
used with SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512. 384 curve be used with SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-
512.
If EnvelopedData is supported, then ephemeral-static ECDH standard If EnvelopedData is supported, then ephemeral-static ECDH standard
primitive MUST be supported. Support for ephemeral-static ECDH co- primitive MUST be supported. Support for ephemeral-static ECDH co-
factor is OPTIONAL and support for 1-Pass ECMQV is also OPTIONAL. factor is OPTIONAL and support for 1-Pass ECMQV is also OPTIONAL.
Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static
ECDH standard primitive: ECDH standard primitive:
- MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key - MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key
agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and
the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and, the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and,
- MAY support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass- - MAY support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme and stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme and
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms,
the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key
wrap algorithms and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc and id- wrap algorithms and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-
aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms. Other algorithms MAY aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY
also be supported. also be supported.
Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static
ECDH cofactor primitive: ECDH cofactor primitive:
- MUST support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme key - MUST support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme key
agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and
the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and, the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and,
- MAY support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme, - MAY support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme,
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-cofactorDH- cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-
sha512kdf-scheme key agreement, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id- sha512kdf-scheme key agreement, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-
aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the des- aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the des-
ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content encryption ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-aes256-cbc content encryption
algorithms. Other algorithms MAY also be supported. algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported.
Implementations that support EnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: Implementations that support EnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:
- MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement
algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id- algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id-
aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and, aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and,
- MAY support mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- - MAY support mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-
alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
algorithms and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc algorithms and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-aes256-
content encryption algorithms. Other algorithms MAY also be cbc content encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be
supported. supported.
Implementations that support AuthenticatedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: Implementations that support AuthenticatedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:
- MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement, - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement,
the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, the id-sha256 message digest, and the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, the id-sha256 message digest, and
id-hmacWithSHA256 message authentication code algorithms; and, id-hmacWithSHA256 message authentication code algorithms; and,
- MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- - MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-alg- sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-alg-
CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
algorithms, the id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha384, and id-sha512, algorithms, the id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha384, and id-sha512,
message digest algorithms, and the hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224, message digest algorithms, and the hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224,
id-hmacWithSHA384, id-hmacWithSHA512 message authentication code id-hmacWithSHA384, and id-hmacWithSHA512 message authentication
algorithms. Other algorithms MAY also be supported. code algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported.
Implementations that support AuthEnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: Implementations that support AuthEnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:
- MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement, - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement,
the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, the id-aes128-ccm authenticated- the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, and the id-aes128-ccm
content encryption, and the id-hmacWithSHA256 message authenticated-content encryption; and,
authentication code algorithms; and,
- MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- - MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-
alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
algorithms, the id-aes192-ccm and id-aes256-ccm authenticated- algorithms, the id-aes192-ccm and id-aes256-ccm authenticated-
content encryption algorithms, and hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224, content encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be
id-hmacWithSHA384, id-hmacWithSHA512 message authentication code supported.
algorithms. Other algorithms MAY also be supported.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
Cryptographic algorithms will be broken or weakened over time. Cryptographic algorithms will be broken or weakened over time.
Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic
algorithms listed in this document continue to provide the expected algorithms listed in this document continue to provide the expected
level of security. The IETF from time to time may issue documents level of security. The IETF from time to time may issue documents
dealing with the current state of the art. dealing with the current state of the art.
Cryptographic algorithms rely on random number. See [RANDOM] for Cryptographic algorithms rely on random numbers. See [RANDOM] for
guidance on generation of random numbers. guidance on generation of random numbers.
Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that
encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing
usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys
larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could
send keys and/or certificates with keys which would result in send keys and/or certificates with keys which would result in
excessive cryptographic processing, for example keys larger than excessive cryptographic processing, for example keys larger than
those mandated in this specification, which could swamp the those mandated in this specification, which could swamp the
processing element. Agents which use such keys without first processing element. Agents which use such keys without first
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Using secret keys of an appropriate size is crucial to the security Using secret keys of an appropriate size is crucial to the security
of a Diffie-Hellman exchange. For elliptic curve groups, the size of of a Diffie-Hellman exchange. For elliptic curve groups, the size of
the secret key must be equal to the size of n (the order of the group the secret key must be equal to the size of n (the order of the group
generated by the point g). Using larger secret keys provides generated by the point g). Using larger secret keys provides
absolutely no additional security, and using smaller secret keys is absolutely no additional security, and using smaller secret keys is
likely to result in dramatically less security. (See [SP800-56A] for likely to result in dramatically less security. (See [SP800-56A] for
more information on selecting secret keys.) more information on selecting secret keys.)
This specification is based on [CMS], [CMS-AES], [CMS-AESCG], [CMS- This specification is based on [CMS], [CMS-AES], [CMS-AESCG], [CMS-
ALG], [CMS-AUTHENV], [CMS-DH], [CMS_SHA2], [FIPS180-3], [FIPS186-3], ALG], [CMS-AUTHENV], [CMS-DH], [CMS-SHA2], [FIPS180-3], [FIPS186-3],
[HMAC-SHA1], and [HMAC-SHA2], and the appropriate security [HMAC-SHA1], and [HMAC-SHA2], and the appropriate security
considerations of those documents apply. considerations of those documents apply.
In addition, implementors of AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData In addition, implementers of AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData
should be aware of the concerns expressed in [BON] when using should be aware of the concerns expressed in [BON] when using
AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData to send messages to more than AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData to send messages to more than
one recipient. Also, users of MQV should be aware of the one recipient. Also, users of MQV should be aware of the
vulnerability in [K]. vulnerability in [K].
When implementing EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and When implementing EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
AuthEnvelopedData, there are five algorithm related choices that need AuthEnvelopedData, there are five algorithm related choices that need
to be made: to be made:
1) What is the public key size? 1) What is the public key size?
skipping to change at page 27, line 18 skipping to change at page 31, line 18
Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. | Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
80 | 192 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp192r1 80 | 192 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp192r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
112 | 224 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1 112 | 224 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
128 | 256 | SHA-256 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1 128 | 256 | SHA-256 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
192 | 384 | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp384r1 192 | 384 | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp384r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
256 | 512 | SHA-512 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1 256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
When implementing SignedData, there are three algorithm related When implementing SignedData, there are three algorithm related
choices that need to be made: choices that need to be made:
1) What is the public key size? 1) What is the public key size?
2) What is the hash algorithm? 2) What is the hash algorithm?
3) What is the curve? 3) What is the curve?
Consideration must be given to the bits of security provided by each Consideration must be given to the bits of security provided by each
skipping to change at page 29, line 8 skipping to change at page 33, line 8
128 | 256 | SHA-256 | secp256r1 128 | 256 | SHA-256 | secp256r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
192 | 384 | SHA-384 | secp384r1 192 | 384 | SHA-384 | secp384r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | secp521r1 256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | secp521r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
This document makes extensive use of object identifiers to register This document makes extensive use of object identifiers to register
originator public key types and algorithms. The algorithms object originator public key types and algorithms. The algorithm object
identifiers are registered in the ANSI X9.62, ANSI X9.63, NIST, RSA, identifiers are registered in the ANSI X9.62, ANSI X9.63, NIST, RSA,
and SECG arcs. Additionally, object identifiers are used to identify and SECG arcs. Additionally, object identifiers are used to identify
the ASN.1 modules found in Appendix A. These are defined in an arc the ASN.1 modules found in Appendix A. These are defined in an arc
delegated by IANA to the SMIME Working Group. No further action by delegated by IANA to the SMIME Working Group. No further action by
IANA is necessary for this document or any anticipated updates. IANA is necessary for this document or any anticipated updates.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative 11.1. Normative
skipping to change at page 29, line 33 skipping to change at page 33, line 33
(AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message (AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003. Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003.
[CMS-AESCG] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated [CMS-AESCG] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated
Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS)", RFC 5084, November 2007. (CMS)", RFC 5084, November 2007.
[CMS-ALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS-ALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002. Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
[CMS-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
CMS", draft-ietf-smime-new-asn1, work-in-progress.
[CMS-AUTHENV] Housley, R. "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS-AUTHENV] Housley, R. "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083, Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083,
November 2007. November 2007.
[CMS-DH] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", [CMS-DH] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
RFC 2631, June 1999. RFC 2631, June 1999.
[CMS-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic [CMS-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", work-in-progress. Message Syntax", draft-ietf-smime-sha2, work-in-
progress.
[FIPS180-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology [FIPS180-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard, (NIST), FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard,
(draft) June 2003. October 2008.
[FIPS186-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology [FIPS186-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), FIPS Publication 186-3: Digital Signature (NIST), FIPS Publication 186-3: Digital Signature
Standard, (draft) March 2006. Standard, (draft) November 2008.
[HMAC-SHA1] Krawczyk, M., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: [HMAC-SHA1] Krawczyk, M., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997. February 1997.
[HMAC-SHA2] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC- [HMAC-SHA2] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-
SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA- SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-
512", RFC 4231, December 2005. 512", RFC 4231, December 2005.
[MUST] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate [MUST] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
skipping to change at page 30, line 40 skipping to change at page 34, line 44
[RANDOM] Eastlake 3rd, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller, [RANDOM] Eastlake 3rd, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller,
"Randomness Recommendations for Security", RFC 4086, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", RFC 4086,
June 2005. June 2005.
[RSAOAEP] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional [RSAOAEP] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for
use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005. Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005.
[SEC1] SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for
Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000. Available from
www.secg.org/collateral/sec1.pdf.
[SP800-56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology [SP800-56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation (NIST), Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), March 2007. Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), March 2007.
[X.208] ITU-T Recommendation X.208 (1988) | ISO/IEC 8824- [X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
1:1988. Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One 1:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
(ASN.1). Notation One.
11.2. Informative 11.2. Informative
[BON] D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC", [BON] D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC",
Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000, Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000,
Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University
of Waterloo, 2000. Paper version available from of Waterloo, 2000. Paper version available from
http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps
[CERTCAP] Santesson, S., "X.509 Certificate Extension for [CERTCAP] Santesson, S., "X.509 Certificate Extension for
skipping to change at page 31, line 25 skipping to change at page 35, line 29
Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005. Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005.
[CMS-ECC] Blake-Wilson, S., Brown, D., and P. Lambert, "Use of [CMS-ECC] Blake-Wilson, S., Brown, D., and P. Lambert, "Use of
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3278, April Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3278, April
2002. 2002.
[CMS-KEA] Pawling, J., "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC [CMS-KEA] Pawling, J., "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC
2876, July 2000. 2876, July 2000.
[CMS-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
CMS", draft-ietf-smime-new-asn1, work-in-progress.
[K] B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerability", Posting to ANSI X9F1 [K] B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerability", Posting to ANSI X9F1
and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998. and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998.
[PKI-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for [PKI-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
PKIX", draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1, work-in-progress. PKIX", draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1, work-in-progress.
[SP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology [SP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation (NIST), Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation
for Key Management - Part 1 (Revised), March 2007. for Key Management - Part 1 (Revised), March 2007.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
1 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One.
[X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- [X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
2 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 2 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Information Object Specification. Notation One: Information Object Specification.
[X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- [X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
3 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 3 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Constraint Specification. Notation One: Constraint Specification.
[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- [X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1 Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1
Specifications, 2002. Specifications, 2002.
Appendix A ASN.1 Modules Appendix A ASN.1 Modules
Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.208]. [X.680] for compilers that support the 1988 ASN.1.
Appendix A.2 provides an informative ASN.1 definitions for the Appendix A.2 provides an informative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683]. This appendix contains the [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683] for compilers that support the
same information as Appendix A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1 2002 ASN.1. This appendix contains the same information as Appendix
notation, however Appendix A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict. A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1 notation, however Appendix
A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict.
Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module
SMIMEECCAlgs-1988 SMIMEECCAlgs-1988
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) TBA } smime(16) modules(0) TBA1 }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- EXPORTS ALL
IMPORTS IMPORTS
-- From [PKI] -- From [PKI]
skipping to change at page 34, line 8 skipping to change at page 37, line 8
id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512 id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512
FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs(33) } id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs(33) }
-- From [PKI-ALG] -- From [PKI-ALG]
id-sha1, ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, id-sha1, ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224,
ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, ecdsa-with-SHA512, ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, ecdsa-with-SHA512,
id-ecPublicKey, ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint id-ecPublicKey, ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint, ECParameters
FROM PKIXAlgs-2008 FROM PKIXAlgIDs-2008
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA1 }
-- From [CMS] -- From [CMS]
OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- From [CMS-ALG] -- From [CMS-ALG]
hMAC-SHA1, des-ede3-cbc, id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, CBCParameter hMAC-SHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224, id-hmacWithSHA256, id-hmacWithSHA384,
id-hmacWithSHA512, des-ede3-cbc, id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, CBCParameter
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) } smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2008(TBD) }
-- From [CMS-AES] -- From [CMS-AES]
id-aes128-CBC, id-aes192-CBC, id-aes256-CBC, AES-IV, id-aes128-CBC, id-aes192-CBC, id-aes256-CBC, AES-IV,
id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, id-aes256-wrap id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, id-aes256-wrap
FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) } smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) }
-- From [CMS-AESCG] -- From [CMS-AESCG]
id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters
id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters
FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) } smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) }
; ;
-- --
-- ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 -- Message Digest Algorithms
-- Algorithms. --
-- id-sha1 Parameters are preferred absent
-- id-sha224 Parameters are preferred absent
-- id-sha256 Parameters are preferred absent
-- id-sha384 Parameters are preferred absent
-- id-sha512 Parameters are preferred absent
--
-- Signature Algorithms
-- --
-- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Parameters are NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Parameters are NULL
-- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Parameters are absent -- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Parameters are absent
-- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Parameters are absent -- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Parameters are absent
-- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Parameters are absent -- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Parameters are absent
-- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Parameters are absent -- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Parameters are absent
-- ECDSA Signature Value -- ECDSA Signature Value
-- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING
skipping to change at page 35, line 33 skipping to change at page 39, line 4
-- --
-- Key Agreement Algorithms -- Key Agreement Algorithms
-- --
x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840) iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
x9-63(63) schemes(0) } x9-63(63) schemes(0) }
secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }
-- --
-- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs
-- --
-- Parameters are always present and indicate the key wrap algorithm -- Parameters are always present and indicate the key wrap algorithm
-- with KeyWrapAlgorithm -- with KeyWrapAlgorithm.
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 2 } x9-63-scheme 2 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 0 } secg-scheme 11 0 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 1 } secg-scheme 11 1 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 2 } secg-scheme 11 2 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 3 } secg-scheme 11 3 }
-- --
-- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
-- --
skipping to change at page 37, line 31 skipping to change at page 40, line 43
-- id-aes192-CBC Parameters are AES-IV -- id-aes192-CBC Parameters are AES-IV
-- id-aes256-CBC Parameters are AES-IV -- id-aes256-CBC Parameters are AES-IV
-- id-aes128-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters -- id-aes128-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
-- id-aes192-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters -- id-aes192-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
-- id-aes256-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters -- id-aes256-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
-- id-aes128-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters -- id-aes128-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters
-- id-aes192-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters -- id-aes192-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters
-- id-aes256-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters -- id-aes256-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters
-- --
-- Message Digest Algorithms -- Message Authentication Code Algorithms
-- --
-- HMAC with SHA-1 -- hMAC-SHA1 Parameters are preferred absent
-- id-hmacWithSHA224 Parameters are absent
-- Parameters SHOULD be absent, MAY be NULL -- id-hmacWithSHA256 Parameters are absent
-- id-hmacWithSHA384 Parameters are absent
-- hMAC-SHA1 -- id-hmacWithSHA512 Parameters are absent
-- HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384,
-- and HMAC with SHA-512
-- Parameters are absent
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }
id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }
-- --
-- Originator Public Key Algorithms -- Originator Public Key Algorithms
-- --
-- id-ecPublicKey Parameters are absent, NULL, or ECParameters -- id-ecPublicKey Parameters are absent, NULL, or ECParameters
-- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys
-- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
-- ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
-- namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- commented out in [PKI-ALG] implicitCurve NULL
-- commented out in [PKI-ALG] specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
-- commented out in [PKI-ALG] Extensible
-- }
-- implicitCurve and specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX.
-- Details for SpecifiedECDomain can be found in [X9.62].
-- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated
-- with ANSI X9.
-- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
-- ECMQV -- ECMQV
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL
} }
-- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with -- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with
-- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData -- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier, keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier,
entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
} }
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities -- S/MIME Capabilities
-- An identifier followed by type.
-- --
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, -- S/MIME Capabilities: Message Digest Algorithms
-- and SHA-512 Algorithms --
-- Found in [CMS-SHA2].
--
-- S/MIME Capabilities: Signature Algorithms
-- --
-- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Type NULL
-- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Type absent
-- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Type absent
-- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Type absent
-- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Type absent
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard
-- --
-- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
-- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
-- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
-- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
-- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
skipping to change at page 40, line 9 skipping to change at page 43, line 20
-- mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
-- mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
-- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
END END
Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module
SMIMEECCAlgs-2008 SMIMEECCAlgs-2008
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) TBA } smime(16) modules(0) TBA2 }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- EXPORTS ALL
IMPORTS IMPORTS
-- FROM [PKI-ASN]
KEY-WRAP, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
PUBLIC-KEY, MAC-ALGORITHM, CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, KEY-AGREE
FROM AlgorithmInformation
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithInformation(TBA) }
-- From [PKI-ALG] -- From [PKI-ALG]
id-ecPublicKey, ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint mda-sha1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA224, sa-ecdsaWithSHA256,
sa-ecdsaWithSHA384, sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, id-ecPublicKey,
ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint, ECParameters
FROM PKIXAlgIDs-2008 FROM PKIXAlgIDs-2008
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA2 }
-- From [PKI-ALG] -- FROM [PKI-ASN]
mda-sha1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA224, sa-ecdsaWithSHA256, KEY-WRAP, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
sa-ecdsaWithSHA384, sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, ECParameters PUBLIC-KEY, MAC-ALGORITHM, CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, KEY-AGREE
FROM PKIXAlgs-2008 FROM AlgorithmInformation
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation(TBA5) }
-- From [PKI-ASN] -- From [PKI-ASN]
mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512 mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512
FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA7 }
-- From [CMS] -- From [CMS]
OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- From [CMS-ASN] -- From [CMS-ASN]
maca-hMAC-SHA1, cea-des-ede3-cbc, kwa-3DESWrap, CBCParameter maca-hMAC-SHA1, maca-hMAC-SHA224, maca-hMAC-SHA256, maca-hMAC-SHA384,
maca-hMAC-SHA512, cea-des-ede3-cbc, kwa-3DESWrap, CBCParameter
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) } smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) }
-- From [CMS-ASN] -- From [CMS-ASN]
cea-aes128-CBC, cea-aes192-CBC, cea-aes256-CBC, kwa-aes128-wrap, cea-aes128-CBC, cea-aes192-CBC, cea-aes256-CBC, kwa-aes128-wrap,
kwa-aes192-wrap, kwa-aes256-wrap kwa-aes192-wrap, kwa-aes256-wrap
FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
skipping to change at page 41, line 35 skipping to change at page 45, line 4
-- From [CMS-ASN] -- From [CMS-ASN]
cea-aes128-ccm, cea-aes192-ccm, cea-aes256-ccm, cea-aes128-gcm, cea-aes128-ccm, cea-aes192-ccm, cea-aes256-ccm, cea-aes128-gcm,
cea-aes192-gcm, cea-aes256-gcm cea-aes192-gcm, cea-aes256-gcm
FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-aes-ccm-and-gcm(32) } smime(16) modules(0) cms-aes-ccm-and-gcm(32) }
; ;
-- Constrains the SignedData digestAlgorithms field -- Constrains the SignedData digestAlgorithms field
-- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field
-- MessageDigestAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { -- MessageDigestAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- mda-sha1 | -- mda-sha1 |
-- mda-sha224 | -- mda-sha224 |
-- mda-sha256 | -- mda-sha256 |
-- mda-sha384 | -- mda-sha384 |
-- mda-sha512, -- mda-sha512,
-- ... -- Extensible -- ... -- Extensible
-- } -- }
-- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field
-- SignatureAlgorithms SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { -- SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA1 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA1 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA512,
-- ... -- Extensible -- ... -- Extensible
-- } -- }
-- ECDSA Signature Value -- ECDSA Signature Value
-- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING
skipping to change at page 43, line 4 skipping to change at page 46, line 4
-- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo -- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
-- keyEncryption Algorithm field -- keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- DH variants are not used with AuthenticatedData or -- DH variants are not used with AuthenticatedData or
-- AuthEnvelopedData -- AuthEnvelopedData
KeyAgreementAlgorithms KEY-AGREE ::= { KeyAgreementAlgs KEY-AGREE ::= {
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf | kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf | kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf | kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf | kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf | kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf, kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme,
... -- Extensible ... -- Extensible
} }
x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840) iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
x9-63(63) schemes(0) } x9-63(63) schemes(0) }
secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }
-- --
-- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs
-- --
-- Parameters are always present and indicate the Key Wrap Algorithm -- Parameters are always present and indicate the Key Wrap Algorithm
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme }
} }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 2 } x9-63-scheme 2 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme }
} }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 0 } secg-scheme 11 0 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme }
} }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 1 } secg-scheme 11 1 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme }
} }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 2 } secg-scheme 11 2 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme }
} }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 3 } secg-scheme 11 3 }
-- --
-- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
-- --
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme }
} }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 3 } x9-63-scheme 3 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme }
} }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 0 } secg-scheme 14 0 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme }
} }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 1 } secg-scheme 14 1 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme }
} }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 2 } secg-scheme 14 2 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme }
} }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 3 } secg-scheme 14 3 }
-- --
-- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs -- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
-- --
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme }
} }
mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 16 } x9-63-scheme 16 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme }
} }
mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 0 } secg-scheme 15 0 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme }
} }
mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 1 } secg-scheme 15 1 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme }
} }
mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 2 } secg-scheme 15 2 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM IS preferredPresent UKM TYPE -- unecndoded data -- IS preferredPresent
SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme }
} }
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 3 } secg-scheme 15 3 }
-- --
-- Key Wrap Algorithms -- Key Wrap Algorithms
-- --
KeyWrapAlgorithm KEY-WRAP ::= { KeyWrapAlgorithm ::= KeyWrapAlgs
KeyWrapAlgs KEY-WRAP ::= {
kwa-3des | kwa-3des |
kwa-aes128 | kwa-aes128 |
kwa-aes192 | kwa-aes192 |
kwa-aes256, kwa-aes256,
... -- Extensible ... -- Extensible
} }
-- --
-- Content Encryption Algorithms -- Content Encryption Algorithms
-- --
-- Constrains the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent -- Constrains the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent
-- field and the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo -- field and the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo
-- contentEncryptionAlgorithm field -- contentEncryptionAlgorithm field
-- ContentEncryptionAlgorithms CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= { -- ContentEncryptionAlgorithms CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= {
-- cea-des-ede3-cbc | -- cea-des-ede3-cbc |
skipping to change at page 48, line 4 skipping to change at page 51, line 31
-- cea-aes192-gcm | -- cea-aes192-gcm |
-- cea-aes256-gcm, -- cea-aes256-gcm,
-- ... -- Extensible -- ... -- Extensible
-- } -- }
-- des-ede3-cbc and aes*-cbc are used with EnvelopedData and -- des-ede3-cbc and aes*-cbc are used with EnvelopedData and
-- EncryptedData -- EncryptedData
-- aes*-ccm are used with AuthEnvelopedData -- aes*-ccm are used with AuthEnvelopedData
-- aes*-gcm are used with AuthEnvelopedData -- aes*-gcm are used with AuthEnvelopedData
-- (where * is 128, 192, and 256) -- (where * is 128, 192, and 256)
-- --
-- Message Digest Algorithms -- Message Authentication Code Algorithms
-- --
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData
-- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData --
-- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field
MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
maca-sha1 |
maca-sha224 |
maca-sha256 |
maca-sha384 |
maca-sha512,
... -- Extensible
}
maca-sha224 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA224
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
}
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }
maca-sha256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA256
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
}
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
maca-sha384 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA384
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
}
id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }
maca-sha512 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA512
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
}
id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }
-- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- maca-sha1 |
-- maca-sha224 |
-- maca-sha256 |
-- maca-sha384 |
-- maca-sha512,
-- ... -- Extensible
-- }
-- --
-- Originator Public Key Algorithms -- Originator Public Key Algorithms
-- --
-- Constraints on KeyAgreeRecipientInfo OriginatorIdentifierOrKey -- Constraints on KeyAgreeRecipientInfo OriginatorIdentifierOrKey
-- OriginatorPublicKey algorithm field -- OriginatorPublicKey algorithm field
-- PARAMS are NULL -- PARAMS are NULL
OriginatorPKAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY ::= { OriginatorPKAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
skipping to change at page 49, line 37 skipping to change at page 52, line 28
opka-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::={ opka-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::={
IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey
KEY ECPoint KEY ECPoint
PARAMS TYPE CHOICE { n NULL, p ECParameters } ARE preferredAbsent PARAMS TYPE CHOICE { n NULL, p ECParameters } ARE preferredAbsent
} }
-- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys
-- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
-- ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
-- namedCurve CURVE.&id({NamedCurve})
-- commented out in [PKI-ALG] implicitCurve NULL
-- commented out in [PKI-ALG] specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
-- commented out in [PKI-ALG] ... Extensible
-- }
-- implicitCurve and specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX.
-- Details for SpecifiedECDomain can be found in [X9.62].
-- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated
-- with ANSI X.9.
-- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
-- ECMQV -- ECMQV
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL
} }
-- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with -- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with
-- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData -- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier { KeyWrapAlgorithm }, keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier { KeyWrapAlgorithm },
entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
} }
-- END
-- S/MIME Capabilities
--
SMIME-CAPS ::= CLASS {
&Type OPTIONAL,
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE
}
WITH SYNTAX {TYPE &Type IDENTIFIED BY &id }
SMIMECapability ::= SEQUENCE { Appendix B Changes since RFC 3278
capabilityID SMIME-CAPS.&id({SMimeCapsSet}),
parameters SMIME-CAPS.
&Type({SMimeCapsSet}{@capabilityID}) OPTIONAL
}
SMimeCapsSet SMIME-CAPS ::= {
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1 |
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224 |
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256 |
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384 |
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512 |
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
... -- Extensible
}
-- The following summarizes the changes:
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
-- and SHA-512 Algorithms
--
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1 SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Abstract: The basis of the document was changed to refer to NIST
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA1.&id } FIPS 186-3 and SP800-56A. However, to maintain backwards
capability the Key Derivation Function from ANSI/SEC1 is
retained.
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224 SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 1: A bullet was added to address AuthEnvelopedData.
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA224.&id }
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256 SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 2.1: A sentence was added to indicate FIPS180-3 is used
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA256.&id } with ECDSA. Replaced reference to ANSI X9.62 with FIPS186-3.
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384 SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 2.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms were expanded from
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA384.&id } SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512 SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3: The bullet addressing integer "e" was
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA512.&id } deleted.
--
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard
--
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 3: Added explanation of why static-static ECDH is not
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf } included.
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 3.1: The reference for DH was changed from CMS to CMS-
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf } ALG. Provided text to indicate fields of EnvelopedData are as
in CMS.
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 3.1.1: The text was updated to include description of all
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf } KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields. Parameters for id-ecPublicKey
field changed from NULL to absent or ECParameter. Additional
information about ukm was added.
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 3.2: The sentence describing the advantages of 1-Pass
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf } ECMQV was rewritten.
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 3.2.1: The text was updated to include description of all
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf } fields. Parameters for id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL
to absent or ECPoint.
-- - Sections 3.2.2 and 4.1.2: The re-use of ephemeral keys paragraph
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Cofactor was reworded.
--
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 4.1: The sentences describing the advantages of 1-Pass
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ECMQV was moved to Section 4.
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 4.1.2: The note about the attack was moved to Section 4.
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 4.2: This section was added to address AuthEnvelopedData
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm with ECMQV.
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 5: This section was moved to Section 8. The 1st
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm paragraph was modified to recommend both SignedData and
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf } EnvelopedData. The requirements were updated for hash
algorithms and recommendations for matching curves and hash
algorithms. Also the requirements were expanded to indicate
which ECDH and ECMQV variants, key wrap algorithms, and content
encryption algorithms are required for each of the content types
used in this document. The permitted digest algorithms used in
key derivations functions (KDFs) were expanded from SHA-1 to
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 6 (formerly 7): This section was updated to allow for
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm SMIMECapabilities to be present in certificates. The S/MIME
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf } capabilities for ECDSA with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-
-- 512 were added to the list of S/MIME Capabilities. Also updated
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECMQV, Single Pass, Standard to include S/MIME capabilities for ECDH and ECMQV using the SHA-
-- 224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the KDF.
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 7.1 (formerly 8.1): Added sub-sections for digest,
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf } signature, originator public key, key agreement, content
encryption, key wrap, and message authentication code
algorithms. Pointed to algorithms and parameters in appropriate
documents for: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as well as
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA. Also added
algorithm identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV
with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the
KDF. Changed id-ecPublicKey parameters to be absent, NULL, and
ECParameters and if present the originator's ECParameters must
match the recipient's ECParameters.
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 7.2 (formerly 8.2): Updated to include AuthEnvelopedData.
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf } Also, added text to address support requirement for compressed,
uncompressed, and hybrid keys, changed pointers from ANSI X9.61
to PKIX (where ECDSA-Sig-Value is imported), changed pointers
from SECG to NIST specs, and updated example of suppPubInfo to
be AES-256. keyInfo's parameters changed from NULL to any
associated parameters (AES wraps have absent parameters).
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Section 9: Replaced text, which was a summary paragraph, with an
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf } updated security considerations section. Paragraph referring to
definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 is
deleted.
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Updated references.
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf }
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= { - Added ASN.1 modules.
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf }
END - Updated acknowledgements section.
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The methods described in this document are based on work done by the The methods described in this document are based on work done by the
ANSI X9F1 working group. The authors wish to extend their thanks to ANSI X9F1 working group. The authors wish to extend their thanks to
ANSI X9F1 for their assistance. The authors also wish to thank Peter ANSI X9F1 for their assistance. The authors also wish to thank Peter
de Rooij for his patient assistance. The technical comments of de Rooij for his patient assistance. The technical comments of
Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions. Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions.
Many thanks go out to the other authors of RFC 3278: Simon Blake- Many thanks go out to the other authors of RFC 3278: Simon Blake-
 End of changes. 186 change blocks. 
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