draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-09.txt   rfc5753.txt 
S/MIME WG Sean Turner, IECA
Internet Draft Dan Brown, Certicom
Intended Status: Informational June 5, 2009
Obsoletes: 3278 (once approved)
Expires: December 5, 2009
Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms
in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-09.txt
Status of this Memo
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Turner
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any Request for Comments: 5753 IECA
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference Obsoletes: 3278 D. Brown
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Category: Informational Certicom
ISSN: 2070-1721 January 2010
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Abstract Abstract
This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The public key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The
ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the
exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content. The definition exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content. The definition
of the algorithm processing is based on the NIST FIPS 186-3 for of the algorithm processing is based on the NIST FIPS 186-3 for
digital signature, NIST SP800-56A and SEC1 for key agreement, RFC digital signature, NIST SP800-56A and SEC1 for key agreement, RFC
3370 and RFC 3565 for key wrap and content encryption, NIST FIPS 180- 3370 and RFC 3565 for key wrap and content encryption, NIST FIPS
3 for message digest, SEC1 for key derivation, and RFC 2104 and RFC 180-3 for message digest, SEC1 for key derivation, and RFC 2104 and
4231 for message authentication code standards. This document RFC 4231 for message authentication code standards. This document
obsoletes RFC 3278. obsoletes RFC 3278.
Discussion Status of This Memo
This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
subscribe, send a message to ietf-smime-request@imc.org with the published for informational purposes.
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for the mailing list at <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/>.
Table of Contents This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
1. Introduction...................................................3 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
1.1. Requirements Terminology..................................4 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
2. SignedData using ECC...........................................4 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5753.
2.1. SignedData using ECDSA....................................4
3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms.............................5
3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH...............6
3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV..........................8
4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC.............11
4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................11
4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................12
5. Certificates using ECC........................................13 Copyright Notice
6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC...........................13
7. ASN.1 Syntax..................................................21
7.1. Algorithm Identifiers....................................21
7.2. Other Syntax.............................................25
8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves....................27
9. Security Considerations.......................................29
10. IANA Considerations..........................................34
11. References...................................................34
11.1. Normative...............................................34
11.2. Informative.............................................36
Appendix A ASN.1 Modules.........................................37
Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module................................37
Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module................................46
Appendix B Changes since RFC 3278................................61
Acknowledgements.................................................63
Author's Addresses...............................................63
1. Introduction Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Requirements Terminology ...................................3
2. SignedData Using ECC ............................................3
2.1. SignedData Using ECDSA .....................................4
3. EnvelopedData Using ECC Algorithms ..............................5
3.1. EnvelopedData Using (ephemeral-static) ECDH ................5
3.2. EnvelopedData Using 1-Pass ECMQV ...........................8
4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData Using ECC ..............11
4.1. AuthenticatedData Using 1-Pass ECMQV ......................11
4.2. AuthEnvelopedData Using 1-Pass ECMQV ......................12
5. Certificates Using ECC .........................................13
6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC ............................13
7. ASN.1 Syntax ...................................................21
7.1. Algorithm Identifiers .....................................21
7.2. Other Syntax ..............................................24
8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves .....................26
9. Security Considerations ........................................28
10. IANA Considerations ...........................................33
11. References ....................................................33
11.1. Normative References .....................................33
11.2. Informative References ...................................35
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules.........................................37
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module.........................................37
A.2. 2004 ASN.1 Module.........................................45
Appendix B. Changes since RFC 3278.................................59
Acknowledgements...................................................61
1. Introduction
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm
independent. This specification defines a profile for the use of independent. This specification defines a profile for the use of
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS.
The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content
types: types:
- 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods - 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods
(ECDSA) to sign content; (ECDSA) to sign content;
- 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement - 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public key agreement methods
methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content encrypt content-encryption keys used for content encryption;
encryption;
- 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement - 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public key agreement
methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
encrypt message-authentication keys used for content encrypt message-authentication keys used for content
authentication and integrity; and, authentication and integrity; and
- 'AuthEnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement - 'AuthEnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public key agreement
methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
encrypt message-authentication and content-encryption keys used encrypt message-authentication and content-encryption keys used
for content authentication, integrity, and encryption. for content authentication, integrity, and encryption.
Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public- Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public
key distribution in support of the specified techniques. key distribution in support of the specified techniques.
The document will obsolete [CMS-ECC]. The technical changes The document will obsolete [CMS-ECC]. The technical changes
performed since RFC 3278 are detailed in Appendix B. performed since RFC 3278 are detailed in Appendix B.
1.1. Requirements Terminology 1.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST]. document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST].
2. SignedData using ECC 2. SignedData Using ECC
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
SignedData format to sign data. SignedData format to sign data.
2.1. SignedData using ECDSA 2.1. SignedData Using ECDSA
This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData. ECDSA is specified in Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData. ECDSA is specified in
[FIPS186-3]. The method is the elliptic curve analog of the Digital [FIPS186-3]. The method is the elliptic curve analog of the Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) [FIPS186-3]. ECDSA is used with the Secure Signature Algorithm (DSA) [FIPS186-3]. ECDSA is used with the Secure
Hash Algorithm (SHA) [FIPS180-3]. Hash Algorithm (SHA) [FIPS180-3].
In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the
following techniques and formats MUST be used. following techniques and formats MUST be used.
2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData 2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in
[CMS], but with the following restrictions: [CMS], but with the following restrictions:
- digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
algorithm (see Section 7.1.1) which MUST be one of the algorithm (see Section 7.1.1), which MUST be one of the following:
following: id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, or id- id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, or id-sha512.
sha512.
- signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier - signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier
(see Section 7.1.3): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa- (see Section 7.1.3): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa-
with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512. The hash with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512. The hash
algorithm identified in the name of the signature algorithm MUST algorithm identified in the name of the signature algorithm MUST
be the same as the digestAlgorithm (e.g., digestAlgorithm is id- be the same as the digestAlgorithm (e.g., digestAlgorithm is id-
sha256 therefore signatureAlgorithm is ecdsa-with-SHA256). sha256 therefore signatureAlgorithm is ecdsa-with-SHA256).
- signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a - signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a
value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 7.2). value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 7.2).
When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the
certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the
ECDSA signatures in SignedData. ECC certificates are discussed in ECDSA signatures in SignedData. ECC certificates are discussed in
Section 5. Section 5.
2.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 2.1.2. Actions of the Sending Agent
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the message When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the message
digest calculation process and signature generation process for digest calculation process and signature generation process for
SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To sign data, the sending SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To sign data, the sending
agent uses the signature method specified in [FIPS186-3]. agent uses the signature method specified in [FIPS186-3].
The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the ECDSA-
ECDSA-Sig-Value syntax (see Section 7.2) and places it in the Sig-Value syntax (see Section 7.2) and places it in the SignerInfo
SignerInfo signature field. signature field.
2.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 2.1.3. Actions of the Receiving Agent
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the
message digest calculation process and signature verification process message digest calculation process and signature verification process
for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To verify SignedData, for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To verify SignedData,
the receiving agent uses the signature verification method specified the receiving agent uses the signature verification method specified
in [FIPS186-3]. in [FIPS186-3].
In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the
integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the received integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the received
message. message.
3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms 3. EnvelopedData Using ECC Algorithms
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
EnvelopedData format. EnvelopedData format.
This document does not specify the static-static ECDH, method C(0,2, This document does not specify the static-static ECDH, method C(0,2,
ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A]. Static-static ECDH is analogous to ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A]. Static-static ECDH is analogous to
static-static DH, which is specified in [CMS-ALG]. Ephemeral-static static-static DH, which is specified in [CMS-ALG]. Ephemeral-static
ECDH and 1-Pass ECMQV were specified because they provide better ECDH and 1-Pass ECMQV were specified because they provide better
security due to the originator's ephemeral contribution to the key security due to the originator's ephemeral contribution to the key
agreement scheme. agreement scheme.
3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH 3.1. EnvelopedData Using (ephemeral-static) ECDH
This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData.
method C(1, 1, ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A] and ECDH with the standard This algorithm has two variations:
primitive from Section 3.3.1 of [SEC1]. Ephemeral-static ECDH is the
elliptic curve analog of the ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key - 'Standard' ECDH, described as the 'Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
agreement algorithm specified jointly in the documents [CMS-ALG] and Scheme' with the 'Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Primitive' in
[CMS-DH]. [SEC1], and
- 'Co-factor' ECDH, described as the 'One-Pass Diffie-Hellman scheme'
(method C(1, 1, ECC CDH)) in [SP800-56A].
Both variations of ephemeral-static ECDH are elliptic curve analogs
of the ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm
specified jointly in the documents [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-DH].
If an implementation uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData, then the If an implementation uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData, then the
following techniques and formats MUST be used. following techniques and formats MUST be used.
The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS]; as ECDH is a key The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS]; as ECDH is a key
agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari choice is used.
3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as follows: KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as follows:
- version MUST be 3. - version MUST be 3.
- originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey. The - originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey. The
originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey
object identifier (see Section 7.1.2). The parameters object identifier (see Section 7.1.2). The parameters associated
associated with id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent, ECParameters, or with id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent, ECParameters, or NULL. The
NULL. The parameters associated with id-ecPublicKey SHOULD be parameters associated with id-ecPublicKey SHOULD be absent or
absent or ECParameters, and NULL is allowed to support legacy ECParameters, and NULL is allowed to support legacy
implementations. The previous version of this document required implementations. The previous version of this document required
NULL to be present. If the parameters are ECParameters, then NULL to be present. If the parameters are ECParameters, then they
they MUST be namedCurve. The originatorKey publicKey field MUST MUST be namedCurve. The originatorKey publicKey field MUST
contain the DER-encoding of the value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint contain the DER encoding of the value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint
(see Section 7.2), which represents the sending agent's (see Section 7.2), which represents the sending agent's ephemeral
ephemeral EC public key. The ECPoint in uncompressed form MUST EC public key. The ECPoint in uncompressed form MUST be
be supported. supported.
- ukm MAY be present or absent. However, message originators - ukm MAY be present or absent. However, message originators SHOULD
SHOULD include the ukm. As specified in RFC 3852 [CMS], include the ukm. As specified in RFC 3852 [CMS], implementations
implementations MUST support ukm message recipient processing, MUST support ukm message recipient processing, so interoperability
so interoperability is not a concern if the ukm is present or is not a concern if the ukm is present or absent. The ukm is
absent. The ukm is placed in the entityUInfo field of the ECC- placed in the entityUInfo field of the ECC-CMS-SharedInfo
CMS-SharedInfo structure. When present, the ukm is used to structure. When present, the ukm is used to ensure that a
ensure that a different key-encryption key is generated, even different key-encryption key is generated, even when the ephemeral
when the ephemeral private key is improperly used more than private key is improperly used more than once, by using the ECC-
once, by using the ECC-CMS-SharedInfo as an input to the key CMS-SharedInfo as an input to the key derivation function (see
derivation function (see Section 7.2). Section 7.2).
- keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the object identifier of the - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the object identifier of the
key encryption algorithm, which in this case is a key agreement key-encryption algorithm, which in this case is a key agreement
algorithm (see Section 7.1.4). The parameters field contains algorithm (see Section 7.1.4). The parameters field contains
KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm
identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm used
used to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with the key- to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with the key-
encryption key (KEK) and any associated parameters (see Section encryption key (KEK) and any associated parameters (see Section
7.1.5). Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8. 7.1.5). Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8.
- recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted key
key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey
KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the
issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or
the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier
from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the recipient's
recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECDH certificate contains the recipient's static ECDH public key.
public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the
content-encryption key encrypted with the ephemeral-static,
ECDH-generated pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm
specified by the KeyWrapAlgorithm.
3.1.2. Actions of the sending agent RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the content-
encryption key encrypted with the ephemeral-static, ECDH-generated
pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm specified by the
KeyWrapAlgorithm.
3.1.2. Actions of the Sending Agent
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending
agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain
parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate). The sending parameters (e.g., from the recipient's certificate). The sending
agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the agent then performs one of the two ECDH variations mentioned above:
KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string
"SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see
Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and
the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
Scheme specified in [SP800-56A] or [SEC1]; in either case, use the
KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1] with the hash algorithm
identified in the key agreement algorithm. As a result the sending
agent obtains:
- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of the - If the value of keyEncryptionAlgorithm indicates the use of
type ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string and 'standard' Diffie-Hellman, then the sending agent performs the
placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator originatorKey 'Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme' with the 'Elliptic Curve
publicKey field, and Diffie-Hellman Primitive' in [SEC1].
- a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise - If the value of keyEncryptionAlgorithm indicates the use of 'co-
key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS]. factor' Diffie-Hellman, then the sending agent performs the 'One-
Pass Diffie-Hellman scheme' (method C(1, 1, ECC CDH)) in
[SP800-56A].
In both of these cases, the sending agent uses the KDF defined in
Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1] with the hash algorithm identified by the
value of keyEncryptionAlgorithm. As a result, the sending agent
obtains:
- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of the
type ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string and
placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator originatorKey
publicKey field, and
- a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise key-
encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].
In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient,
then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for
that recipient in each of the different layers. that recipient in each of the different layers.
3.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 3.1.3. Actions of the Receiving Agent
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving
agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER
encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer
"keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The "keydatalen" from the key size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm.
receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the bit The receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the
string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type bit string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type
ECPoint (see Section 7.2) encapsulated as a bit string, and if ECPoint (see Section 7.2) encapsulated as a bit string, and if
present, originally supplied additional user key material from the present, originally supplied additional user key material from the
ukm field. The receiving agent performs the key agreement operation ukm field. The receiving agent then performs one of the two ECDH
of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SP800-56A] variations mentioned above:
or [SEC1]; in either case, use the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of
[SEC1]. As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit
string "K", which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to
unwrap the CEK.
3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV - If the value of keyEncryptionAlgorithm indicates the use of
'standard' Diffie-Hellman, then the receiving agent performs the
'Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme' with the 'Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman Primitive' in [SEC1].
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV - If the value of keyEncryptionAlgorithm indicates the use of 'co-
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, method factor' Diffie-Hellman, then the receiving agent performs the 'One-
C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-KEA], Pass Diffie-Hellman scheme' (method C(1, 1, ECC CDH)) in
1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a static [SP800-56A].
key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the receiving
agent. Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for In both of these cases, the receiving agent uses the KDF defined in
knowledge of the message creator, this means that authentication can, Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1] with the hash algorithm identified by the
in some circumstances, be obtained for AuthEnvelopedData and value of keyEncryptionAlgorithm. As a result, the receiving agent
AuthenticatedData. This means that 1-Pass ECMQV can be a common obtains a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise
algorithm for EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData, key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK.
while ECDH can only be used in EnvelopedData.
3.2. EnvelopedData Using 1-Pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass Elliptic Curve Menezes-
Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData,
method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. Like the KEA algorithm
[CMS-KEA], 1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair,
a static key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the
receiving agent. Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair
allows for knowledge of the message creator; this means that
authentication can, in some circumstances, be obtained for
AuthEnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData. This means that 1-Pass
ECMQV can be a common algorithm for EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData,
and AuthEnvelopedData, while ECDH can only be used in EnvelopedData.
If an implementation uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData, then If an implementation uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData, then
the following techniques and formats MUST be used. the following techniques and formats MUST be used.
The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS]; as 1-Pass ECMQV is a key The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS]; as 1-Pass ECMQV is a key
agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When
using 1-Pass ECMQV, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY using 1-Pass ECMQV, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY
include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the
formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in
Section 5. Section 5.
3.2.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 3.2.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the fields of When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the fields of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are: KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as follows:
- version MUST be 3. - version MUST be 3.
- originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender. It - originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender. It
SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or
subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's
certificates. certificates.
- ukm MUST be present. The ukm field is an octet string which MUST - ukm MUST be present. The ukm field is an octet string that MUST
contain the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see contain the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see
Section 7.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey Section 7.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey
algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object identifier
identifier (see Section 7.1.2). The parameters associated with (see Section 7.1.2). The parameters associated with id-
id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent, ECParameters, or NULL. The ecPublicKey MUST be absent, ECParameters, or NULL. The parameters
parameters associated with id-ecPublicKey SHOULD be absent or associated with id-ecPublicKey SHOULD be absent or ECParameters,
ECParameters, as NULL is allowed to support legacy as NULL is allowed to support legacy implementations. The
implementations. The previous version of this document required previous version of this document required NULL to be present. If
NULL to be present. If the parameters are ECParameters, then the parameters are ECParameters, then they MUST be namedCurve.
they MUST be namedCurve. The MQVuserKeyingMaterial The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field MUST
ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field MUST contain the DER-encoding contain the DER encoding of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section
of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section 7.2) representing the 7.2) representing the sending agent's ephemeral EC public key.
sending agent's ephemeral EC public key. The The MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm field, if present, contains
MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm field, if present, contains additional user keying material from the sending agent.
additional user keying material from the sending agent.
- keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the object identifier of the - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the object identifier of the
key encryption algorithm, which in this case is a key agreement key-encryption algorithm, which in this case is a key agreement
algorithm (see Section 7.1.4). The parameters field contains algorithm (see Section 7.1.4). The parameters field contains
KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric
encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK
generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm and any associated generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm and any associated
parameters (see Section 7.1.5). Algorithm requirements are parameters (see Section 7.1.5). Algorithm requirements are found
found in Section 8. in Section 8.
- recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted key
key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey
KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the
issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or
the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier
from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the recipient's
recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECMQV certificate contains the recipient's static ECMQV public key.
public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the content-
content-encryption key encrypted with the 1-Pass ECMQV-generated encryption key encrypted with the 1-Pass ECMQV-generated pairwise
pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm specified by the key-encryption key using the algorithm specified by the
KeyWrapAlgorithm. KeyWrapAlgorithm.
3.2.2. Actions of the sending agent 3.2.2. Actions of the Sending Agent
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first
obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters (e.g. obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters (e.g.,
from the recipient's certificate), and checks that the domain from the recipient's certificate), and checks that the domain
parameters are the same as the sender's domain parameters. The parameters are the same as the sender's domain parameters. The
sending agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the sending agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the
KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key size in bits, and also a bit string
"SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see
Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and
key agreement operations of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified key agreement operations of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified
in [SP800-56A], but uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. in [SP800-56A], but uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1].
As a result, the sending agent obtains: As a result, the sending agent obtains:
- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type
ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed in
in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field (see
(see Section 7.2), and Section 7.2), and
- a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise key-
key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS]. encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].
In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient,
then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for
that recipient in each of the different layers. that recipient in each of the different layers.
3.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent 3.2.3. Actions of the Receiving Agent
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent
determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer "keydatalen" ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer "keydatalen"
from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving from the key size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving
agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the
originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in
Section 3.2.1, and its static EC public key identified in the rid Section 3.2.1, and its static EC public key identified in the rid
field and checks that the originator's domain parameters are the same field and checks that the originator's domain parameters are the same
as the recipient's domain parameters. The receiving agent then as the recipient's domain parameters. The receiving agent then
performs the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme performs the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme
[SP800-56A], but uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. As [SP800-56A], but uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. As
a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K", a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K",
which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK. which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK.
4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC 4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData Using ECC
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation, AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation,
and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For example, and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For example,
the sending agent might not want the message to be authenticated when the sending agent might not want the message to be authenticated when
forwarded.) forwarded.)
This section also describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section also describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
AuthEnvelopedData format [CMS-AUTHENV]. AuthEnvelopedData supports AuthEnvelopedData format [CMS-AUTHENV]. AuthEnvelopedData supports
authentication and encryption, and in some instances is preferable to authentication and encryption, and in some instances is preferable to
skipping to change at page 11, line 37 skipping to change at page 11, line 33
with such an attack SHOULD use a separate AuthenticatedData or with such an attack SHOULD use a separate AuthenticatedData or
AuthEnvelopedData for each recipient. AuthEnvelopedData for each recipient.
Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for
knowledge of the message creator; this means that authentication can, knowledge of the message creator; this means that authentication can,
in some circumstances, be obtained for AuthEnvelopedData and in some circumstances, be obtained for AuthEnvelopedData and
AuthenticatedData. This means that 1-Pass ECMQV can be a common AuthenticatedData. This means that 1-Pass ECMQV can be a common
algorithm for EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData algorithm for EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData
while ECDH can only be used in EnvelopedData. while ECDH can only be used in EnvelopedData.
4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV 4.1. AuthenticatedData Using 1-Pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass ECMQV key agreement
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. ECMQV is algorithm with AuthenticatedData. ECMQV is method C(1, 2, ECC MQV)
method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. from [SP800-56A].
When using ECMQV with AuthenticatedData, the fields of When using ECMQV with AuthenticatedData, the fields of
AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS], but with the following AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS], but with the following
restrictions: restrictions:
- macAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the message - macAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the message
authentication code (MAC) algorithm (see Section 7.1.7) which authentication code (MAC) algorithm (see Section 7.1.7), which MUST
MUST be one of the following: hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWITHSHA224, id- be one of the following: hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWITHSHA224, id-
hmacWITHSHA256, id-hmacWITHSHA384, or id-hmacWITHSHA512. hmacWITHSHA256, id-hmacWITHSHA384, or id-hmacWITHSHA512.
- digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
algorithm (see Section 7.1.1) which MUST be one of the algorithm (see Section 7.1.1), which MUST be one of the following:
following: id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, and id- id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, or id-sha512.
sha512.
As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari
choice is used in the AuthenticatedData. When using 1-Pass ECMQV, choice is used in the AuthenticatedData. When using 1-Pass ECMQV,
the AuthenticatedData originatorInfo field MAY include the the AuthenticatedData originatorInfo field MAY include the
certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of the
pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5. pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5.
4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document. KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.
4.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 4.1.2. Actions of the Sending Agent
The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document. 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document.
In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient,
then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for
that recipient in each of the different layers. that recipient in each of the different layers.
4.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 4.1.3. Actions of the Receiving Agent
The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document. 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.
4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV 4.2. AuthEnvelopedData Using 1-Pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass ECMQV key agreement
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthEnvelopedData. ECMQV is algorithm with AuthEnvelopedData. ECMQV is method C(1, 2, ECC MQV)
method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. from [SP800-56A].
When using ECMQV with AuthEnvelopedData, the fields of When using ECMQV with AuthEnvelopedData, the fields of
AuthEnvelopedData are as in [CMS-AUTHENV]. AuthEnvelopedData are as in [CMS-AUTHENV].
As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari
choice is used. When using 1-Pass ECMQV, the AuthEnvelopedData choice is used. When using 1-Pass ECMQV, the AuthEnvelopedData
originatorInfo field MAY include the certificate(s) for the EC public originatorInfo field MAY include the certificate(s) for the EC public
key used in the formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are key used in the formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are
discussed in Section 5. discussed in Section 5.
4.2.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 4.2.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
The AuthEnvelopedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the The AuthEnvelopedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document. KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.
4.2.2. Actions of the sending agent 4.2.2. Actions of the Sending Agent
The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 1- The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document. 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document.
In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient,
then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for
that recipient in each of the different layers. that recipient in each of the different layers.
4.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent 4.2.3. Actions of the Receiving Agent
The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document. 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.
5. Certificates using ECC 5. Certificates Using ECC
Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with
this specification to distribute agents' public keys. The use of ECC this specification to distribute agents' public keys. The use of ECC
algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in [PKI- algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in
ALG]. [PKI-ALG].
6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC 6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC
A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports one A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports one
or more of the ECC algorithms specified in this document by using the or more of the ECC algorithms specified in this document by using the
SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG] in either a signed message SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG] in either a signed message
or a certificate [CERTCAP]. or a certificate [CERTCAP].
The SMIMECapabilities attribute value indicates support for one of The SMIMECapabilities attribute value indicates support for one of
the ECDSA signature algorithms in a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID the ECDSA signature algorithms in a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID
field containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 with NULL field containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 with NULL
parameters and ecdsa-with-SHA* (where * is 224, 256, 384, or 512) parameters and ecdsa-with-SHA* (where * is 224, 256, 384, or 512)
skipping to change at page 14, line 26 skipping to change at page 14, line 6
ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03 ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03
ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04 ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04
NOTE: The SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates that parameters for NOTE: The SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates that parameters for
ECDSA with SHA-1 are NULL; however, the parameters are absent when ECDSA with SHA-1 are NULL; however, the parameters are absent when
used to generate a digital signature. used to generate a digital signature.
The SMIMECapabilities attribute value indicates support for The SMIMECapabilities attribute value indicates support for
a) the standard ECDH key agreement algorithm,
b) the cofactor ECDH key agreement algorithm, or a) the standard ECDH key agreement algorithm,
c) the 1-Pass ECMQV key agreement algorithm and b) the cofactor ECDH key agreement algorithm, or
c) the 1-Pass ECMQV key agreement algorithm and
is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object
identifier identifier
a) dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha*kdf-scheme,
b) dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha*kdf-scheme, or a) dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha*kdf-scheme,
c) mqvSinglePass-sha*kdf-scheme b) dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha*kdf-scheme, or
c) mqvSinglePass-sha*kdf-scheme
respectively (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the respectively (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the
parameters present. The parameters indicate the supported key- parameters present. The parameters indicate the supported key-
encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier. encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.
The DER encodings that indicate capabilities are as follows (KA is The DER encodings that indicate capabilities are as follows (KA is
key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key wrap key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key wrap
algorithm): algorithm):
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES
skipping to change at page 21, line 30 skipping to change at page 21, line 10
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256
30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 01 2D
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-256 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-256
30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04
01 2D 01 2D
NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities for the supported AES content NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities for the supported AES content-
encryption key sizes are defined in [CMS-AES]. encryption key sizes are defined in [CMS-AES].
NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities for the supported MAC algorithms are NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities for the supported MAC algorithms are
defined in [CMS-ASN]. defined in [CMS-ASN].
7. ASN.1 Syntax 7. ASN.1 Syntax
The ASN.1 syntax [X.680], [X.681], X.682], [X.683] used in this The ASN.1 syntax [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], [X.683] used in this
document is gathered in this section for reference purposes. document is gathered in this section for reference purposes.
7.1. Algorithm Identifiers 7.1. Algorithm Identifiers
This section provides the object identifiers for the algorithms used This section provides the object identifiers for the algorithms used
in this document along with any associated parameters. in this document along with any associated parameters.
7.1.1. Digest Algorithms 7.1.1. Digest Algorithms
Digest algorithm object identifiers are used in the SignedData Digest algorithm object identifiers are used in the SignedData
digestAlgorithms and digestAlgorithm fields and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithms and digestAlgorithm fields and the AuthenticatedData
digestAlgorithm field. The digest algorithms used in this document digestAlgorithm field. The digest algorithms used in this document
are: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The object are SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The object
identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found
in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-SHA2]. in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-SHA2].
7.1.2. Originator Public Key 7.1.2. Originator Public Key
The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field uses the following object The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field uses the following object
identifier to indicate an elliptic curve public key: identifier to indicate an elliptic curve public key:
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 } ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 }
where where
ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
skipping to change at page 22, line 33 skipping to change at page 22, line 11
algorithm identifier, the associated parameters MUST be either absent algorithm identifier, the associated parameters MUST be either absent
or ECParameters. Implementations MUST accept id-ecPublicKey with or ECParameters. Implementations MUST accept id-ecPublicKey with
absent and ECParameters parameters. If ECParameters is present, its absent and ECParameters parameters. If ECParameters is present, its
value MUST match the recipient's ECParameters. Implementations value MUST match the recipient's ECParameters. Implementations
SHOULD generate absent parameters for the id-ecPublicKey object SHOULD generate absent parameters for the id-ecPublicKey object
identifier in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field. identifier in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field.
[CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for this [CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for this
legacy form is OPTIONAL. legacy form is OPTIONAL.
7.1.3. Signature Algorithms 7.1.3. Signature Algorithms
Signature algorithm identifiers are used in the SignedData Signature algorithm identifiers are used in the SignedData
signatureAlgorithm and signature fields. The signature algorithms signatureAlgorithm and signature fields. The signature algorithms
used in this document are ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA used in this document are ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA
with SHA-256, ECDSA with SHA-384, and ECDSA with SHA-512. The object with SHA-256, ECDSA with SHA-384, and ECDSA with SHA-512. The object
identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found
in [PKI-ALG]. in [PKI-ALG].
[CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for this [CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for this
legacy form is OPTIONAL. legacy form is OPTIONAL.
7.1.4. Key Agreement Algorithms 7.1.4. Key Agreement Algorithms
Key agreement algorithms are used in EnvelopedData, Key agreement algorithms are used in EnvelopedData,
AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
keyEncryptionAlgorithm field. The following object identifiers keyEncryptionAlgorithm field. The following object identifiers
indicate the key agreement algorithms used in this document [SP800- indicate the key agreement algorithms used in this document
56A], [SEC1]: [SP800-56A], [SEC1]:
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 2 } x9-63-scheme 2 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 0 } secg-scheme 11 0 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 1 } secg-scheme 11 1 }
skipping to change at page 24, line 23 skipping to change at page 23, line 44
and and
secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }
When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm
identifier, the associated parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm identifier, the associated parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm
to indicate the key wrap algorithm and any associated parameters. to indicate the key wrap algorithm and any associated parameters.
7.1.5. Key Wrap Algorithms 7.1.5. Key Wrap Algorithms
Key wrap algorithms are used as part of the parameters in the key Key wrap algorithms are used as part of the parameters in the key
agreement algorithm. The key wrap algorithms used in this document agreement algorithm. The key wrap algorithms used in this document
are Triple-DES, AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256. The object are Triple-DES, AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256. The object
identifiers and parameters for these algorithms are found in [CMS- identifiers and parameters for these algorithms are found in
ALG] and [CMS-AES]. [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-AES].
7.1.6. Content Encryption Algorithms 7.1.6. Content Encryption Algorithms
Content encryption algorithms are used in EnvelopedData and Content encryption algorithms are used in EnvelopedData and
AuthEnvelopedData in the EncryptedContentInfo AuthEnvelopedData in the EncryptedContentInfo
contentEncryptionAlgorithm field. The content encryption algorithms contentEncryptionAlgorithm field. The content encryption algorithms
used with EnvelopedData in this document are 3-Key Triple DES in CBC used with EnvelopedData in this document are 3-Key Triple DES in CBC
mode, AES-128 in CBC mode, AES-192 in CBC mode, and AES-256 in CBC mode, AES-128 in CBC mode, AES-192 in CBC mode, and AES-256 in CBC
mode. The object identifiers and parameters associated with these mode. The object identifiers and parameters associated with these
algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-AES]. The content algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-AES]. The content
encryption algorithms used with AuthEnvelopedData in this document encryption algorithms used with AuthEnvelopedData in this document
are AES-128 in CCM mode, AES-192 in CCM mode, AES-256 in CCM mode, are AES-128 in CCM mode, AES-192 in CCM mode, AES-256 in CCM mode,
AES-128 in GCM mode, AES-192 in GCM mode, and AES-256 in GCM mode. AES-128 in GCM mode, AES-192 in GCM mode, and AES-256 in GCM mode.
The object identifiers and parameters associated with these The object identifiers and parameters associated with these
algorithms are found in [CMS-AESCG]. algorithms are found in [CMS-AESCG].
7.1.7. Message Authentication Code Algorithms 7.1.7. Message Authentication Code Algorithms
Message authentication code algorithms are used in AuthenticatedData Message authentication code algorithms are used in AuthenticatedData
in the macAlgorithm field. The message authentication code in the macAlgorithm field. The message authentication code
algorithms used in this document are HMAC with SHA-1, HMAC with SHA- algorithms used in this document are HMAC with SHA-1, HMAC with
224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, and HMAC with SHA-512. SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, and HMAC with SHA-512.
The object identifiers and parameters associated with these The object identifiers and parameters associated with these
algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [HMAC-SHA2]. algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [HMAC-SHA2].
NOTE: [HMAC-SHA2] defines the object identifiers for HMAC with SHA- NOTE: [HMAC-SHA2] defines the object identifiers for HMAC with
224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, and HMAC with SHA-512, but SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, and HMAC with SHA-512,
there is no ASN.1 module from which to import these object but there is no ASN.1 module from which to import these object
identifiers. Therefore, the object identifiers for these algorithms identifiers. Therefore, the object identifiers for these algorithms
are included in the ASN.1 modules defined in Appendix A. are included in the ASN.1 modules defined in Appendix A.
7.1.8. Key Derivation Algorithm 7.1.8. Key Derivation Algorithm
The KDF used in this document is as specified in 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. The KDF used in this document is as specified in Section 3.6.1 of
The hash algorithm is identified in key agreement algorithm. For [SEC1]. The hash algorithm is identified in the key agreement
example, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme uses the KDF from [SEC1] algorithm. For example, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme uses the
but uses SHA-256 instead of SHA-1. KDF from [SEC1] but uses SHA-256 instead of SHA-1.
7.2. Other Syntax 7.2. Other Syntax
The following additional syntax is used here. The following additional syntax is used here.
When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded using When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded using
the type: the type:
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER, r INTEGER,
s INTEGER } s INTEGER }
ECDSA-Sig-Value is specified in [PKI-ALG]. Within CMS, ECDSA-Sig- ECDSA-Sig-Value is specified in [PKI-ALG]. Within CMS, ECDSA-Sig-
Value is DER-encoded and placed within a signature field of Value is DER-encoded and placed within a signature field of
SignedData. SignedData.
When using ECDH and ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and When using ECDH and ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
AuthEnvelopedData, ephemeral and static public keys are encoded using AuthEnvelopedData, ephemeral and static public keys are encoded using
the type ECPoint. Implementations MUST support uncompressed keys, MAY the type ECPoint. Implementations MUST support uncompressed keys,
support compressed keys, and MUST NOT support hybrid keys. MAY support compressed keys, and MUST NOT support hybrid keys.
ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
AuthEnvelopedData, the sending agent's ephemeral public key and AuthEnvelopedData, the sending agent's ephemeral public key and
additional keying material are encoded using the type: additional keying material are encoded using the type:
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL } addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL }
The ECPoint syntax is used to represent the ephemeral public key and The ECPoint syntax is used to represent the ephemeral public key and
is placed in the ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field. The additional is placed in the ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field. The additional
user keying material is placed in the addedukm field. Then the user keying material is placed in the addedukm field. Then the
MQVuserKeyingMaterial value is DER-encoded and placed within the ukm MQVuserKeyingMaterial value is DER-encoded and placed within the ukm
field of EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData. field of EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData.
When using ECDH or ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or When using ECDH or ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or
AuthEnvelopedData, the key-encryption keys are derived by using the AuthEnvelopedData, the key-encryption keys are derived by using the
type: type:
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier, keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier,
entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING } suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING }
The fields of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo are as follows: The fields of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo are as follows:
keyInfo contains the object identifier of the key-encryption keyInfo contains the object identifier of the key-encryption
algorithm (used to wrap the CEK) and associated parameters. In algorithm (used to wrap the CEK) and associated parameters. In
this specification, 3DES wrap has NULL parameters while the AES this specification, 3DES wrap has NULL parameters while the AES
wraps have absent parameters. wraps have absent parameters.
entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material
supplied by the sending agent. When used with ECDH and CMS, the supplied by the sending agent. When used with ECDH and CMS, the
entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm. When used with entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm. When used with
ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string addedukm ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string addedukm
(encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial). (encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial).
suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits, suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits,
represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH] and [CMS-AES]. represented as a 32-bit number, as in [CMS-DH] and [CMS-AES].
(E.g. for AES-256 it would be 00 00 01 00.) (For example, for AES-256 it would be 00 00 01 00.)
Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to
the key derivation function, as specified in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. the key derivation function, as specified in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1].
NOTE: ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in NOTE: ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in
[CMS-DH]. Here, a counter value is not included in the keyInfo field [CMS-DH]. Here, a counter value is not included in the keyInfo field
because the key derivation function specified in Section 3.6.1 of because the key derivation function specified in Section 3.6.1 of
[SEC1] ensures that sufficient keying data is provided. [SEC1] ensures that sufficient keying data is provided.
8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves 8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves
It is RECOMMENDED that implementations of this specification support It is RECOMMENDED that implementations of this specification support
SignedData and EnvelopedData. Support for AuthenticatedData and SignedData and EnvelopedData. Support for AuthenticatedData and
AuthEnvelopedData is OPTIONAL. AuthEnvelopedData is OPTIONAL.
In order to encourage interoperability, implementations SHOULD use In order to encourage interoperability, implementations SHOULD use
the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by [PKI-ALG]. the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by [PKI-ALG].
Implementations that support SignedData with ECDSA: Implementations that support SignedData with ECDSA:
- MUST support ECDSA with SHA-256; and, - MUST support ECDSA with SHA-256; and
- MAY support ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA with SHA- - MAY support ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA with
384, and ECDSA with SHA-512; other digital signature algorithms SHA-384, and ECDSA with SHA-512; other digital signature
MAY also be supported. algorithms MAY also be supported.
When using ECDSA, to promote interoperability it is RECOMMENDED that When using ECDSA, to promote interoperability it is RECOMMENDED that
the P-192, P-224, and the P-256 curves be used with SHA-256, the P- the P-192, P-224, and P-256 curves be used with SHA-256; the P-384
384 curve be used with SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA- curve be used with SHA-384; and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512.
512.
If EnvelopedData is supported, then ephemeral-static ECDH standard If EnvelopedData is supported, then ephemeral-static ECDH standard
primitive MUST be supported. Support for ephemeral-static ECDH co- primitive MUST be supported. Support for ephemeral-static ECDH co-
factor is OPTIONAL and support for 1-Pass ECMQV is also OPTIONAL. factor is OPTIONAL, and support for 1-Pass ECMQV is also OPTIONAL.
Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static
ECDH standard primitive: ECDH standard primitive:
- MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key - MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key
agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and
the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and, the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and
- MAY support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass- - MAY support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme and stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms;
the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key
wrap algorithms and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id- wrap algorithms; and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-
aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY
also be supported. also be supported.
Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static
ECDH cofactor primitive: ECDH cofactor primitive:
- MUST support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme key - MUST support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme key
agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and
the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and, the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and
- MAY support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme, - MAY support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme,
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-cofactorDH- cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-
sha512kdf-scheme key agreement, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id- sha512kdf-scheme key agreement; the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-
aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the des- aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms; and the
ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-aes256-cbc content encryption des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-aes256-cbc content
algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported. encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported.
Implementations that support EnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: Implementations that support EnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:
- MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement
algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id- algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id-
aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and, aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and
- MAY support mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- - MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms; the id-
alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
algorithms and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-aes256- algorithms; and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-
cbc content encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY
supported. also be supported.
Implementations that support AuthenticatedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: Implementations that support AuthenticatedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:
- MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement, - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement,
the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, the id-sha256 message digest, and the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, the id-sha256 message digest, and
id-hmacWithSHA256 message authentication code algorithms; and, id-hmacWithSHA256 message authentication code algorithms; and
- MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- - MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-alg- sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms; the id-alg-
CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
algorithms, the id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha384, and id-sha512, algorithms; the id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha384, and id-sha512,
message digest algorithms, and the hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224, message digest algorithms; and the hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224,
id-hmacWithSHA384, and id-hmacWithSHA512 message authentication id-hmacWithSHA384, and id-hmacWithSHA512 message authentication
code algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported. code algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported.
Implementations that support AuthEnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: Implementations that support AuthEnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:
- MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement, - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement,
the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, and the id-aes128-ccm the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, and the id-aes128-ccm
authenticated-content encryption; and, authenticated-content encryption; and
- MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- - MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms; the id-
alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
algorithms, the id-aes192-ccm, id-aes256-ccm, id-aes128-gcm, id- algorithms; and the id-aes192-ccm, id-aes256-ccm, id-aes128-gcm,
aes192-gcm, and id-aes256-ccm authenticated-content encryption id-aes192-gcm, and id-aes256-ccm authenticated-content
algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported. encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
Cryptographic algorithms will be broken or weakened over time. Cryptographic algorithms will be broken or weakened over time.
Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic
algorithms listed in this document continue to provide the expected algorithms listed in this document continue to provide the expected
level of security. The IETF from time to time may issue documents level of security. The IETF from time to time may issue documents
dealing with the current state of the art. dealing with the current state of the art.
Cryptographic algorithms rely on random numbers. See [RANDOM] for Cryptographic algorithms rely on random numbers. See [RANDOM] for
guidance on generation of random numbers. guidance on generation of random numbers.
Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that
encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing
usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys
larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could
send keys and/or certificates with keys which would result in send keys and/or certificates with keys that would result in
excessive cryptographic processing, for example keys larger than excessive cryptographic processing, for example, keys larger than
those mandated in this specification, which could swamp the those mandated in this specification, which could swamp the
processing element. Agents which use such keys without first processing element. Agents that use such keys without first
validating the certificate to a trust anchor are advised to have some validating the certificate to a trust anchor are advised to have some
sort of cryptographic resource management system to prevent such sort of cryptographic resource management system to prevent such
attacks. attacks.
Using secret keys of an appropriate size is crucial to the security Using secret keys of an appropriate size is crucial to the security
of a Diffie-Hellman exchange. For elliptic curve groups, the size of of a Diffie-Hellman exchange. For elliptic curve groups, the size of
the secret key must be equal to the size of n (the order of the group the secret key must be equal to the size of n (the order of the group
generated by the point g). Using larger secret keys provides generated by the point g). Using larger secret keys provides
absolutely no additional security, and using smaller secret keys is absolutely no additional security, and using smaller secret keys is
likely to result in dramatically less security. (See [SP800-56A] for likely to result in dramatically less security. (See [SP800-56A] for
more information on selecting secret keys.) more information on selecting secret keys.)
This specification is based on [CMS], [CMS-AES], [CMS-AESCG], [CMS- This specification is based on [CMS], [CMS-AES], [CMS-AESCG],
ALG], [CMS-AUTHENV], [CMS-DH], [CMS-SHA2], [FIPS180-3], [FIPS186-3], [CMS-ALG], [CMS-AUTHENV], [CMS-DH], [CMS-SHA2], [FIPS180-3],
and [HMAC-SHA2], and the appropriate security considerations of those [FIPS186-3], and [HMAC-SHA2], and the appropriate security
documents apply. considerations of those documents apply.
In addition, implementers of AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData In addition, implementers of AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData
should be aware of the concerns expressed in [BON] when using should be aware of the concerns expressed in [BON] when using
AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData to send messages to more than AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData to send messages to more than
one recipient. Also, users of MQV should be aware of the one recipient. Also, users of MQV should be aware of the
vulnerability described in [K]. vulnerability described in [K].
When implementing EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and When implementing EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
AuthEnvelopedData, there are five algorithm related choices that need AuthEnvelopedData, there are five algorithm-related choices that need
to be made: to be made:
1) What is the public key size? 1) What is the public key size?
2) What is the KDF? 2) What is the KDF?
3) What is the key wrap algorithm? 3) What is the key wrap algorithm?
4) What is the content encryption algorithm? 4) What is the content encryption algorithm?
5) What is the curve? 5) What is the curve?
Consideration must be given to the strength of the security provided Consideration must be given to the strength of the security provided
by each of these choices. Security algorithm strength is measured in by each of these choices. Security algorithm strength is measured in
bits, where bits is measured in equivalence to a symmetric cipher bits, where bits is measured in equivalence to a symmetric cipher
algorithm. Thus a strong symmetric cipher algorithm with a key of X algorithm. Thus, a strong symmetric cipher algorithm with a key of X
bits is said to provide X bits of security. For other algorithms, the bits is said to provide X bits of security. For other algorithms,
key size is mapped to an equivalent symmetric cipher strength. It is the key size is mapped to an equivalent symmetric cipher strength.
recommended that the bits of security provided by each are roughly It is recommended that the bits of security provided by each are
equivalent. The following table provides comparable minimum bits of roughly equivalent. The following table provides comparable minimum
security [SP800-57] for the ECDH/ECMQV key sizes, KDFs, key wrapping bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDH/ECMQV key sizes, KDFs, key
algorithms, and content encryption algorithms. It also lists curves wrapping algorithms, and content encryption algorithms. It also
[PKI-ALG] for the key sizes. lists curves [PKI-ALG] for the key sizes.
Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curves Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curves
Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption | Bits of | ECMQV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption |
Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. | Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
80 | 160-223 | SHA-1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | sect163k1 80 | 160-223 | SHA-1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | sect163k1
| | SHA-224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp163r2 | | SHA-224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp163r2
| | SHA-256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp192r1 | | SHA-256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp192r1
| | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | | | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC |
| | SHA-512 | | | | | SHA-512 | | |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
112 | 224-255 | SHA-1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1 112 | 224-255 | SHA-1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1
| | SHA-224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | sect233k1 | | SHA-224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | sect233k1
skipping to change at page 32, line 7 skipping to change at page 31, line 7
| | SHA-384 | | | sect409r1 | | SHA-384 | | | sect409r1
| | SHA-512 | | | | | SHA-512 | | |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
256 | 512+ | SHA-256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1 256 | 512+ | SHA-256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1
| | SHA-384 | | | sect571k1 | | SHA-384 | | | sect571k1
| | SHA-512 | | | sect571r1 | | SHA-512 | | | sect571r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED: To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED:
Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curve Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curve
Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption | Bits of | ECMQV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption |
Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. | Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
80 | 192 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp192r1 80 | 192 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp192r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
112 | 224 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1 112 | 224 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
128 | 256 | SHA-256 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1 128 | 256 | SHA-256 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
192 | 384 | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp384r1 192 | 384 | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp384r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1 256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
When implementing SignedData, there are three algorithm related When implementing SignedData, there are three algorithm-related
choices that need to be made: choices that need to be made:
1) What is the public key size? 1) What is the public key size?
2) What is the hash algorithm? 2) What is the hash algorithm?
3) What is the curve? 3) What is the curve?
Consideration must be given to the bits of security provided by each Consideration must be given to the bits of security provided by each
of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong
symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of
security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by
each choice are roughly equivalent. The following table provides each choice are roughly equivalent. The following table provides
comparable minimum bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDSA key comparable minimum bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDSA key
sizes and message digest algorithms. It also lists curves [PKI-ALG] sizes and message digest algorithms. It also lists curves [PKI-ALG]
for the key sizes. for the key sizes.
Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve
Bits of | Key Size | Digest | Bits of | Key Size | Digest |
Security | | Algorithm | Security | | Algorithm |
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
80 | 160-223 | SHA-1 | sect163k1 80 | 160-223 | SHA-1 | sect163k1
| | SHA-224 | secp163r2 | | SHA-224 | secp163r2
| | SHA-256 | secp192r1 | | SHA-256 | secp192r1
| | SHA-384 | | | SHA-384 |
skipping to change at page 34, line 5 skipping to change at page 33, line 5
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
112 | 224 | SHA-256 | secp224r1 112 | 224 | SHA-256 | secp224r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
128 | 256 | SHA-256 | secp256r1 128 | 256 | SHA-256 | secp256r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
192 | 384 | SHA-384 | secp384r1 192 | 384 | SHA-384 | secp384r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | secp521r1 256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | secp521r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
This document makes extensive use of object identifiers to register This document makes extensive use of object identifiers to register
originator public key types and algorithms. The algorithm object originator public key types and algorithms. The algorithm object
identifiers are registered in the ANSI X9.62, ANSI X9.63, NIST, RSA, identifiers are registered in the ANSI X9.62, ANSI X9.63, NIST, RSA,
and SECG arcs. Additionally, object identifiers are used to identify and SECG arcs. Additionally, object identifiers are used to identify
the ASN.1 modules found in Appendix A (there are two). These are the ASN.1 modules found in Appendix A (there are two). These are
defined by the SMIME WG Registrar in an arc delegated by RSA to the defined by the SMIME WG Registrar in an arc delegated by RSA to the
SMIME Working Group: iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) SMIME Working Group: iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0). No action by IANA is pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0). No action by IANA is
necessary for this document or any anticipated updates. necessary for this document or any anticipated updates.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative 11.1. Normative References
[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC [CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC
3852, July 2004. 5652, September 2009.
[CMS-AES] Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard [CMS-AES] Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message (AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003. Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003.
[CMS-AESCG] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated [CMS-AESCG] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated
Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
(CMS)", RFC 5084, November 2007. RFC 5084, December 2007.
[CMS-ALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS-ALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002. Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
[CMS-AUTHENV] Housley, R. "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS-AUTHENV] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083, Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083,
November 2007. November 2007.
[CMS-DH] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", [CMS-DH] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
RFC 2631, June 1999. RFC 2631, June 1999.
[CMS-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic [CMS-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", draft-ietf-smime-sha2, work-in- Message Syntax", RFC 5754, January 2010.
progress.
[FIPS180-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology [FIPS180-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
(NIST), FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard, FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard, October
October 2008. 2008.
[FIPS186-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology [FIPS186-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
(NIST), FIPS Publication 186-3: Digital Signature FIPS Publication 186-3: Digital Signature Standard,
Standard, (draft) November 2008. June 2009.
[HMAC-SHA2] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC- [HMAC-SHA2] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-
SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA- SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-
512", RFC 4231, December 2005. SHA-512", RFC 4231, December 2005.
[MUST] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate [MUST] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[MSG] Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "S/MIME Version 3.2 [MSG] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose
Message Specification", draft-ietf-smime-3851bis, Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
work-in-progress. Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.
[PKI] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S. [PKI] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[PKI-ALG] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W. [PKI-ALG] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T.
Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, March 2009. Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.
[RANDOM] Eastlake 3rd, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller, [RANDOM] Eastlake, D., 3rd, Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Recommendations for Security", RFC 4086, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC
June 2005. 4086, June 2005.
[RSAOAEP] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional [RSAOAEP] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for
use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005. Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005.
[SEC1] SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for [SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Efficient Cryptography Group, 2002. Available from Elliptic Curve Cryptography", version 2.0, May 2009,
http://www.secg.org/download/aid-780/sec1-v2.pdf. available from www.secg.org.
[SP800-56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology [SP800-56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
(NIST), Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation Pair-Wise
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), March 2007. Cryptography (Revised), March 2007.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- [X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC
1:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 8824-1:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One. Notation One.
11.2. Informative 11.2. Informative References
[BON] D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC", [BON] D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC",
Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000, Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000,
Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University
of Waterloo, 2000. Paper version available from of Waterloo, 2000. Paper version available from
http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps
[CERTCAP] Santesson, S., "X.509 Certificate Extension for [CERTCAP] Santesson, S., "X.509 Certificate Extension for
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005. Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005.
[CMS-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for [CMS-ASN] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for CMS
CMS", draft-ietf-smime-new-asn1, work-in-progress. and S/MIME", Work in Progress, August 2009.
[CMS-ECC] Blake-Wilson, S., Brown, D., and P. Lambert, "Use of [CMS-ECC] Blake-Wilson, S., Brown, D., and P. Lambert, "Use of
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3278, April Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3278, April
2002. 2002.
[CMS-KEA] Pawling, J., "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC [CMS-KEA] Pawling, J., "Use of the KEA and SKIPJACK Algorithms
2876, July 2000. in CMS", RFC 2876, July 2000.
[K] B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerability", Posting to ANSI X9F1 [K] B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerability", Posting to ANSI X9F1
and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998. and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998.
[PKI-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for [PKI-ASN] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
PKIX", draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1, work-in-progress. PKIX", Work in Progress, August 2009.
[SP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology [SP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
(NIST), Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
for Key Management - Part 1 (Revised), March 2007. Management - Part 1 (Revised), March 2007.
[X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- [X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (2002) | ISO/IEC
2:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 8824-2:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Information Object Specification. Notation One: Information Object Specification.
[X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- [X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC
3:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 8824-3:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Constraint Specification. Notation One: Constraint Specification.
[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- [X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC
4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 8824-4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1 Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1
Specifications, 2002. Specifications, 2002.
Appendix A ASN.1 Modules [X9.62] X9.62-2005, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Standard (ECDSA)", November, 2005.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.680] for compilers that support the 1988 ASN.1. [X.680] for compilers that support the 1988 ASN.1.
Appendix A.2 provides informative ASN.1 definitions for the Appendix A.2 provides informative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683] for compilers that support the [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683] for compilers that support the
2002 ASN.1. This appendix contains the same information as Appendix 2002 ASN.1. This appendix contains the same information as Appendix
A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1 notation, however Appendix A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1 notation; however, Appendix
A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict. A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict.
NOTE: The values for the TBAs will be included during AUTH48. A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module
//** RFC Editor: Remove this note prior to publication **//
Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module
CMSECCAlgs-2009-88 CMSECCAlgs-2009-88
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-ecc-alg-2009-88(45) } smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-ecc-alg-2009-88(45) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
--
-- Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
-- authors of the code. All rights reserved.
--
-- Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
-- without modification, are permitted provided that the following
-- conditions are met:
--
-- - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-- notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
--
-- - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
-- copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
-- disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided
-- with the distribution.
--
-- - Neither the name of Internet Society, IETF or IETF Trust, nor
-- the names of specific contributors, may be used to endorse or
-- promote products derived from this software without specific
-- prior written permission.
--
--
--
-- THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND
-- CONTRIBUTORS 'AS IS' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
-- INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-- MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
-- DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR
-- CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-- SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
-- LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS
-- OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
-- CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-- STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-- ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
-- ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
--
-- This version of the ASN.1 module is part of RFC XXXX;
-- see the RFC itself for full legal notices.
--
-- EXPORTS ALL -- EXPORTS ALL
IMPORTS IMPORTS
-- From [PKI] -- From [PKI]
AlgorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 FROM PKIX1Explicit88
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0)
skipping to change at page 46, line 16 skipping to change at page 45, line 5
-- --
-- hMACSHA1 Type is preferred absent -- hMACSHA1 Type is preferred absent
-- id-hmacWithSHA224 Type is absent -- id-hmacWithSHA224 Type is absent
-- if-hmacWithSHA256 Type is absent -- if-hmacWithSHA256 Type is absent
-- id-hmacWithSHA384 Type is absent -- id-hmacWithSHA384 Type is absent
-- id-hmacWithSHA512 Type is absent -- id-hmacWithSHA512 Type is absent
END END
Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module A.2. 2004 ASN.1 Module
CMSECCAlgs-2009-02
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-ecc-alg-2009-02(46) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- CMSECCAlgs-2009-02
-- Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
-- authors of the code. All rights reserved. smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-ecc-alg-2009-02(46) }
--
-- Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
-- without modification, are permitted provided that the following
-- conditions are met:
--
-- - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-- notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
--
-- - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
-- copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
-- disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided
-- with the distribution.
--
-- - Neither the name of Internet Society, IETF or IETF Trust, nor
-- the names of specific contributors, may be used to endorse or
-- promote products derived from this software without specific
-- prior written permission.
--
--
--
-- THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND
-- CONTRIBUTORS 'AS IS' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
-- INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-- MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
-- DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR
-- CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-- SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
-- LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS
-- OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
-- CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-- STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-- ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
-- ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
--
-- This version of the ASN.1 module is part of RFC XXXX;
-- see the RFC itself for full legal notices.
--
-- EXPORTS ALL DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
IMPORTS BEGIN
-- From [PKI-ASN] -- EXPORTS ALL
mda-sha1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA224, sa-ecdsaWithSHA256, IMPORTS
sa-ecdsaWithSHA384, sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, id-ecPublicKey,
ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint, ECParameters
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
-- From [PKI-ASN] -- From [PKI-ASN]
mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512 mda-sha1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA224, sa-ecdsaWithSHA256,
FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009 sa-ecdsaWithSHA384, sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, id-ecPublicKey,
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint, ECParameters
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) FROM PKIXAlgs-2009
id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) } { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
-- FROM [CMS-ASN] -- From [PKI-ASN]
KEY-WRAP, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512
PUBLIC-KEY, MAC-ALGORITHM, CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, KEY-AGREE, SMIME-CAPS, FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009
AlgorithmIdentifier{} { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) }
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
-- From [CMS-ASN] -- FROM [CMS-ASN]
OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial KEY-WRAP, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 PUBLIC-KEY, MAC-ALGORITHM, CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, KEY-AGREE, SMIME-CAPS,
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) AlgorithmIdentifier{}
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) } FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
-- From [CMS-ASN] -- From [CMS-ASN]
maca-hMAC-SHA1, cea-3DES-cbc, kwa-3DESWrap, CBCParameter OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms-2009 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cmsalg-2001-02(37) } smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) }
-- From [CMS-ASN] -- From [CMS-ASN]
cea-aes128-cbc, cea-aes192-cbc, cea-aes256-cbc, kwa-aes128-wrap, maca-hMAC-SHA1, cea-3DES-cbc, kwa-3DESWrap, CBCParameter
kwa-aes192-wrap, kwa-aes256-wrap FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms-2009
FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep-2009 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cmsalg-2001-02(37) }
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes-02(38) }
-- From [CMS-ASN] -- From [CMS-ASN]
cea-aes128-CCM, cea-aes192-CCM, cea-aes256-CCM, cea-aes128-GCM, cea-aes128-cbc, cea-aes192-cbc, cea-aes256-cbc, kwa-aes128-wrap,
cea-aes192-GCM, cea-aes256-GCM kwa-aes192-wrap, kwa-aes256-wrap
FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM-2009 FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep-2009
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes-ccm-gcm-02(44) } smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes-02(38) }
; -- From [CMS-ASN]
-- Constrains the SignedData digestAlgorithms field
-- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field
- <span class="insert">From [CMS-ASN]</span> cea-aes128-CCM, cea-aes192-CCM, cea-aes256-CCM, cea-aes128-GCM,
-- Message Digest Algorithms: Imported from [PKI-ASN] cea-aes192-GCM, cea-aes256-GCM
FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM-2009
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes-ccm-gcm-02(44) }
-- MessageDigestAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { ;
-- mda-sha1 |
-- mda-sha224 |
-- mda-sha256 |
-- mda-sha384 |
-- mda-sha512,
-- ...
-- }
-- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field -- Constrains the SignedData digestAlgorithms field
-- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field
-- Signature Algorithms: Imported from [PKI-ASN] -- Message Digest Algorithms: Imported from [PKI-ASN]
-- SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { -- MessageDigestAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA1 | -- mda-sha1 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 | -- mda-sha224 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 | -- mda-sha256 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 | -- mda-sha384 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, -- mda-sha512,
-- ... -- ...
-- } -- }
- } -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field
-- ECDSA Signature Value: Imported from [PKI-ALG]
-- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING
- <span class="insert">Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field</span> -- Signature Algorithms: Imported from [PKI-ASN]
-- ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
-- r INTEGER,
-- s INTEGER
-- }
- <span class="insert">Signature Algorithms: Imported from [PKI-ASN]</span> -- SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA1 |
-- Key Agreement Algorithms -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 |
-- -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA512,
-- ...
-- }
-- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo -- ECDSA Signature Value: Imported from [PKI-ALG]
-- keyEncryption Algorithm field -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
- <span class="insert">Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING</span> -- ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
-- DH variants are not used with AuthenticatedData or -- r INTEGER,
-- AuthEnvelopedData -- s INTEGER
-- }
KeyAgreementAlgs KEY-AGREE ::= { --
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme | -- Key Agreement Algorithms
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme | --
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme,
...
}
x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840) -- keyEncryption Algorithm field
x9-63(63) schemes(0) } -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- DH variants are not used with AuthenticatedData or
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } -- AuthEnvelopedData
-- KeyAgreementAlgs KEY-AGREE ::= {
-- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme |
-- kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme,
...
}
x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
x9-63(63) schemes(0) }
-- Parameters are always present and indicate the Key Wrap Algorithm secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { --
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required --
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme
}
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 2 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { -- Parameters are always present and indicate the Key Wrap Algorithm
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme
}
- <span class="insert">Parameters are always present and indicate the Key Wrap Algorithm</span> kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme
secg-scheme 11 0 } PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme
}
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme x9-63-scheme 2 }
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme
}
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
secg-scheme 11 1 } IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme
}
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme secg-scheme 11 0 }
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme
}
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
secg-scheme 11 2 } IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme
}
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme secg-scheme 11 1 }
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme
}
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
secg-scheme 11 3 } IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme
}
-- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs secg-scheme 11 2 }
--
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme
} }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 3 } secg-scheme 11 3 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { --
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required --
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme
}
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
secg-scheme 14 0 } IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme
}
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme x9-63-scheme 3 }
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme
}
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
secg-scheme 14 1 } IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme
}
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme secg-scheme 14 0 }
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme
}
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
secg-scheme 14 2 } IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme
}
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme secg-scheme 14 1 }
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
}
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
secg-scheme 14 3 } IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme
}
-- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs secg-scheme 14 2 }
--
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
} }
mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 16 } secg-scheme 14 3 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { --
IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme -- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required --
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme
}
mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
secg-scheme 15 0 } IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme
}
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme x9-63-scheme 16 }
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme
}
mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
secg-scheme 15 1 } IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme
}
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme secg-scheme 15 0 }
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme
}
mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
secg-scheme 15 2 } IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme
}
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme secg-scheme 15 1 }
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme
}
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
secg-scheme 15 3 } IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme
}
-- mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- Key Wrap Algorithms: Imported from [CMS-ASN] secg-scheme 15 2 }
--
KeyWrapAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {KEY-WRAP, { KeyWrapAlgs } } kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= {
IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme
PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent
SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme
}
KeyWrapAlgs KEY-WRAP ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
kwa-3DESWrap | secg-scheme 15 3 }
kwa-aes128-wrap |
kwa-aes192-wrap |
kwa-aes256-wrap,
...
}
--
-- Content Encryption Algorithms: Imported from [CMS-ASN]
--
-- Constrains the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent --
-- field and the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo -- Key Wrap Algorithms: Imported from [CMS-ASN]
-- contentEncryptionAlgorithm field --
KeyWrapAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { KEY-WRAP, { KeyWrapAlgs } }
-- ContentEncryptionAlgs CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= { KeyWrapAlgs KEY-WRAP ::= {
-- cea-3DES-cbc | kwa-3DESWrap |
-- cea-aes128-cbc | kwa-aes128-wrap |
-- cea-aes192-cbc | kwa-aes192-wrap |
-- cea-aes256-cbc | kwa-aes256-wrap,
-- cea-aes128-ccm | ...
-- cea-aes192-ccm | }
-- cea-aes256-ccm |
-- cea-aes128-gcm |
-- cea-aes192-gcm |
-- cea-aes256-gcm,
-- ...
-- }
-- des-ede3-cbc and aes*-cbc are used with EnvelopedData and --
-- EncryptedData -- Content Encryption Algorithms: Imported from [CMS-ASN]
-- aes*-ccm are used with AuthEnvelopedData --
-- aes*-gcm are used with AuthEnvelopedData
-- (where * is 128, 192, and 256)
- -- Constrains the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent
-- -- field and the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo
-- Message Authentication Code Algorithms -- contentEncryptionAlgorithm field
--
- <span class="insert">contentEncryptionAlgorithm field</span> -- ContentEncryptionAlgs CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= {
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData -- cea-3DES-cbc |
-- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field -- cea-aes128-cbc |
-- -- cea-aes192-cbc |
-- cea-aes256-cbc |
-- cea-aes128-ccm |
-- cea-aes192-ccm |
-- cea-aes256-ccm |
-- cea-aes128-gcm |
-- cea-aes192-gcm |
-- cea-aes256-gcm,
-- ...
-- }
MessageAuthAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { -- des-ede3-cbc and aes*-cbc are used with EnvelopedData and
-- maca-hMAC-SHA1 | -- EncryptedData
maca-hMAC-SHA224 | -- aes*-ccm are used with AuthEnvelopedData
maca-hMAC-SHA256 | -- aes*-gcm are used with AuthEnvelopedData
maca-hMAC-SHA384 | -- (where * is 128, 192, and 256)
maca-hMAC-SHA512,
...
}
maca-hMAC-SHA224 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA224
PARAMS ARE absent
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS cap-hMAC-SHA224
}
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { --
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) -- Message Authentication Code Algorithms
digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } --
maca-hMAC-SHA256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA256 -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field
PARAMS ARE absent --
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE MessageAuthAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
SMIME-CAPS cap-hMAC-SHA256 -- maca-hMAC-SHA1 |
} maca-hMAC-SHA224 |
maca-hMAC-SHA256 |
maca-hMAC-SHA384 |
maca-hMAC-SHA512,
...
}
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { maca-hMAC-SHA224 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA224
digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } PARAMS ARE absent
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS cap-hMAC-SHA224
}
maca-hMAC-SHA384 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA384 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
PARAMS ARE absent digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS cap-hMAC-SHA384
}
id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { maca-hMAC-SHA256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA256
digestAlgorithm(2) 10 } PARAMS ARE absent
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS cap-hMAC-SHA256
}
maca-hMAC-SHA512 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA512 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
PARAMS ARE absent digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS cap-hMAC-SHA512
}
id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { maca-hMAC-SHA384 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA384
digestAlgorithm(2) 11 } PARAMS ARE absent
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS cap-hMAC-SHA384
}
-- id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- Originator Public Key Algorithms iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
-- digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }
-- Constraints on KeyAgreeRecipientInfo OriginatorIdentifierOrKey maca-hMAC-SHA512 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- OriginatorPublicKey algorithm field IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA512
PARAMS ARE absent
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS cap-hMAC-SHA512
}
id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }
OriginatorPKAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY ::= { --
opka-ec, -- Originator Public Key Algorithms
... --
}
opka-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::={ -- Constraints on KeyAgreeRecipientInfo OriginatorIdentifierOrKey
IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey -- OriginatorPublicKey algorithm field
KEY ECPoint
PARAMS TYPE CHOICE { n NULL, p ECParameters } ARE preferredAbsent
}
-- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys: Imported from OriginatorPKAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
-- [PKI-ALG] opka-ec,
...
}
-- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING opka-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::={
IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey
KEY ECPoint
PARAMS TYPE CHOICE { n NULL, p ECParameters } ARE preferredAbsent
}
-- ECParameters ::= CHOICE { -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys: Imported from
-- namedCurve CURVE.&id({NamedCurve}) -- [PKI-ALG]
-- commented out in [PKI-ALG] implicitCurve NULL
-- commented out in [PKI-ALG] specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
-- commented out in [PKI-ALG] ...
-- }
-- implicitCurve and specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX.
-- Details for SpecifiedECDomain can be found in [X9.62].
-- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated
-- with ANSI X.9.
- <span class="insert">[PKI-ALG]</span> -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
-- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
-- ECMQV
- <span class="insert">ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING</span> -- ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { -- namedCurve CURVE.&id({NamedCurve})
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] implicitCurve NULL
addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
} -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] ...
-- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with -- }
-- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData -- implicitCurve and specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX.
-- Details for SpecifiedECDomain can be found in [X9.62].
-- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated
-- with ANSI X.9.
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
keyInfo KeyWrapAlgorithm, -- ECMQV
entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
}
-- MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
-- S/MIME CAPS for algorithms in this document ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
-- addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL
}
-- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with
-- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData
- <span class="insert">EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData</span> ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
SMimeCAPS SMIME-CAPS ::= { keyInfo KeyWrapAlgorithm,
-- mda-sha1.&smimeCaps | entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- mda-sha224.&smimeCaps | suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
-- mda-sha256.&smimeCaps | }
-- mda-sha384.&smimeCaps |
-- mda-sha512.&smimeCaps |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA1.&smimeCaps |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA224.&smimeCaps |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA256.&smimeCaps |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA384.&smimeCaps |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA512.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
-- kwa-3des.&smimeCaps |
-- kwa-aes128.&smimeCaps |
-- kwa-aes192.&smimeCaps |
-- kwa-aes256.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-3DES-cbc.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes128-cbc.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes192-cbc.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes256-cbc.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes128-ccm.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes192-ccm.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes256-ccm.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes128-gcm.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes192-gcm.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes256-gcm.&smimeCaps |
-- maca-hMAC-SHA1.&smimeCaps |
maca-hMAC-SHA224.&smimeCaps |
maca-hMAC-SHA256.&smimeCaps |
maca-hMAC-SHA384.&smimeCaps |
maca-hMAC-SHA512.&smimeCaps,
...
}
cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= { --
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm -- S/MIME CAPS for algorithms in this document
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme --
} SMimeCAPS SMIME-CAPS ::= {
-- mda-sha1.&smimeCaps |
-- mda-sha224.&smimeCaps |
-- mda-sha256.&smimeCaps |
-- mda-sha384.&smimeCaps |
-- mda-sha512.&smimeCaps |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA1.&smimeCaps |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA224.&smimeCaps |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA256.&smimeCaps |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA384.&smimeCaps |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA512.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps |
-- kwa-3des.&smimeCaps |
-- kwa-aes128.&smimeCaps |
-- kwa-aes192.&smimeCaps |
-- kwa-aes256.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-3DES-cbc.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes128-cbc.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes192-cbc.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes256-cbc.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes128-ccm.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes192-ccm.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes256-ccm.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes128-gcm.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes192-gcm.&smimeCaps |
-- cea-aes256-gcm.&smimeCaps |
-- maca-hMAC-SHA1.&smimeCaps |
maca-hMAC-SHA224.&smimeCaps |
maca-hMAC-SHA256.&smimeCaps |
maca-hMAC-SHA384.&smimeCaps |
maca-hMAC-SHA512.&smimeCaps,
...
}
cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme
}
cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme
} }
cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme
} }
cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme
} }
cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme
} }
cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme
} }
cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme
}
cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme
} }
cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme
} }
cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme
} }
cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
}
cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme
} }
cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme
} }
cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme
} }
cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme
} }
cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme
} }
cap-hMAC-SHA224 SMIME-CAPS ::={ IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA224 }
cap-hMAC-SHA256 SMIME-CAPS ::={ IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA256 } cap-hMAC-SHA224 SMIME-CAPS ::={ IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA224 }
cap-hMAC-SHA384 SMIME-CAPS ::={ IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA384 } cap-hMAC-SHA256 SMIME-CAPS ::={ IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA256 }
cap-hMAC-SHA512 SMIME-CAPS ::={ IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA512 } cap-hMAC-SHA384 SMIME-CAPS ::={ IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA384 }
END cap-hMAC-SHA512 SMIME-CAPS ::={ IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA512 }
Appendix B Changes since RFC 3278 END
Appendix B. Changes since RFC 3278
The following summarizes the changes: The following summarizes the changes:
- Abstract: The basis of the document was changed to refer to NIST - Abstract: The basis of the document was changed to refer to NIST
FIPS 186-3 and SP800-56A. However, to maintain backwards FIPS 186-3 and SP800-56A. However, to maintain backwards
compatibility the Key Derivation Function from ANSI/SEC1 is compatibility the Key Derivation Function from ANSI/SEC1 is
retained. retained.
- Section 1: A bullet was added to address AuthEnvelopedData. - Section 1: A bullet was added to address AuthEnvelopedData.
- Section 2.1: A sentence was added to indicate FIPS180-3 is used - Section 2.1: A sentence was added to indicate FIPS180-3 is used
with ECDSA. Replaced reference to ANSI X9.62 with FIPS186-3. with ECDSA. Replaced reference to ANSI X9.62 with FIPS186-3.
- Section 2.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms were expanded from - Section 2.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms were expanded from
SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
- Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3: The bullet addressing integer "e" was - Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3: The bullet addressing integer "e" was
deleted. deleted.
- Section 3: Added explanation of why static-static ECDH is not - Section 3: Added explanation of why static-static ECDH is not
included. included.
- Section 3.1: The reference for DH was changed from RFC 3852 to - Section 3.1: The reference for DH was changed from RFC 3852 to RFC
RFC 3370. Provided text to indicate fields of EnvelopedData are 3370. Provided text to indicate fields of EnvelopedData are as in
as in CMS. CMS.
- Section 3.1.1: The text was updated to include description of all - Section 3.1.1: The text was updated to include description of all
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields. Parameters for id-ecPublicKey KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields. Parameters for id-ecPublicKey field
field changed from NULL to absent or ECParameter. Additional changed from NULL to absent or ECParameter. Additional information
information about ukm was added. about ukm was added.
- Section 3.2: The sentence describing the advantages of 1-Pass - Section 3.2: The sentence describing the advantages of 1-Pass ECMQV
ECMQV was rewritten. was rewritten.
- Section 3.2.1: The text was updated to include description of all - Section 3.2.1: The text was updated to include description of all
fields. Parameters for id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL fields. Parameters for id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL to
to absent or ECParameters. absent or ECParameters.
- Sections 3.2.2 and 4.1.2: The re-use of ephemeral keys paragraph - Sections 3.2.2 and 4.1.2: The re-use of ephemeral keys paragraph
was reworded. was reworded.
- Section 4.1: The sentences describing the advantages of 1-Pass - Section 4.1: The sentences describing the advantages of 1-Pass
ECMQV was moved to Section 4. ECMQV was moved to Section 4.
- Section 4.1.2: The note about the attack was moved to Section 4. - Section 4.1.2: The note about the attack was moved to Section 4.
- Section 4.2: This section was added to address AuthEnvelopedData - Section 4.2: This section was added to address AuthEnvelopedData
with ECMQV. with ECMQV.
- Section 5: This section was moved to Section 8. The 1st - Section 5: This section was moved to Section 8. The 1st paragraph
paragraph was modified to recommend both SignedData and was modified to recommend both SignedData and EnvelopedData. The
EnvelopedData. The requirements were updated for hash requirements were updated for hash algorithms and recommendations
algorithms and recommendations for matching curves and hash for matching curves and hash algorithms. Also, the requirements
algorithms. Also the requirements were expanded to indicate were expanded to indicate which ECDH and ECMQV variants, key wrap
which ECDH and ECMQV variants, key wrap algorithms, and content algorithms, and content encryption algorithms are required for each
encryption algorithms are required for each of the content types of the content types used in this document. The permitted digest
used in this document. The permitted digest algorithms used in algorithms used in KDFs were expanded from SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224,
key derivations functions (KDFs) were expanded from SHA-1 to SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
- Section 6 (formerly 7): This section was updated to allow for - Section 6 (formerly 7): This section was updated to allow for
SMIMECapabilities to be present in certificates. The S/MIME SMIMECapabilities to be present in certificates. The S/MIME
capabilities for ECDSA with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA- capabilities for ECDSA with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
512 were added to the list of S/MIME Capabilities. Also updated were added to the list of S/MIME Capabilities. Also, updated to
to include S/MIME capabilities for ECDH and ECMQV using the SHA- include S/MIME capabilities for ECDH and ECMQV using the SHA-224,
224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the KDF. SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the KDF.
- Section 7.1 (formerly 8.1): Added sub-sections for digest, - Section 7.1 (formerly 8.1): Added sub-sections for digest,
signature, originator public key, key agreement, content signature, originator public key, key agreement, content
encryption, key wrap, and message authentication code encryption, key wrap, and message authentication code algorithms.
algorithms. Pointed to algorithms and parameters in appropriate Pointed to algorithms and parameters in appropriate documents for:
documents for: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as well as SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as well as SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA. Also added SHA-384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA. Also, added algorithm identifiers
algorithm identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV with SHA-224, SHA-256,
with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the KDF. Changed id-ecPublicKey
KDF. Changed id-ecPublicKey parameters to be absent, NULL, or parameters to be absent, NULL, or ECParameters, and if present the
ECParameters, and if present the originator's ECParameters must originator's ECParameters must match the recipient's ECParameters.
match the recipient's ECParameters.
- Section 7.2 (formerly 8.2): Updated to include AuthEnvelopedData. - Section 7.2 (formerly 8.2): Updated to include AuthEnvelopedData.
Also, added text to address support requirement for compressed, Also, added text to address support requirement for compressed,
uncompressed, and hybrid keys, changed pointers from ANSI X9.61 uncompressed, and hybrid keys; changed pointers from ANSI X9.61 to
to PKIX (where ECDSA-Sig-Value is imported), changed pointers PKIX (where ECDSA-Sig-Value is imported); changed pointers from
from SECG to NIST specs, and updated example of suppPubInfo to SECG to NIST specs; and updated example of suppPubInfo to be
be AES-256. keyInfo's parameters changed from NULL to any AES-256. keyInfo's parameters changed from NULL to any associated
associated parameters (AES wraps have absent parameters). parameters (AES wraps have absent parameters).
- Section 9: Replaced text, which was a summary paragraph, with an - Section 9: Replaced text, which was a summary paragraph, with an
updated security considerations section. Paragraph referring to updated security considerations section. Paragraph referring to
definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 is definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 is deleted.
deleted.
- Updated references. - Updated references.
- Added ASN.1 modules. - Added ASN.1 modules.
- Updated acknowledgements section. - Updated acknowledgements section.
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The methods described in this document are based on work done by the The methods described in this document are based on work done by the
ANSI X9F1 working group. The authors wish to extend their thanks to ANSI X9F1 working group. The authors wish to extend their thanks to
ANSI X9F1 for their assistance. The authors also wish to thank Peter ANSI X9F1 for their assistance. The authors also wish to thank Peter
de Rooij for his patient assistance. The technical comments of de Rooij for his patient assistance. The technical comments of
Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions. Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions.
Many thanks go out to the other authors of RFC 3278: Simon Blake- Many thanks go out to the other authors of RFC 3278: Simon Blake-
Wilson and Paul Lambert. Without RFC 3278 this version wouldn't Wilson and Paul Lambert. Without RFC 3278, this version wouldn't
exist. exist.
The authors also wish to thank Alfred Hoenes, Paul Hoffman, Russ The authors also wish to thank Alfred Hoenes, Jonathan Herzog, Paul
Housley, and Jim Schaad for their valuable input. Hoffman, Russ Housley, and Jim Schaad for their valuable input.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Sean Turner Sean Turner
IECA, Inc. IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031 Fairfax, VA 22031
USA USA
Email: turners@ieca.com EMail: turners@ieca.com
Daniel R. L. Brown
Daniel R. L. Brown
Certicom Corp Certicom Corp
5520 Explorer Drive #400 5520 Explorer Drive #400
Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1 Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1
CANADA Canada
Email: dbrown@certicom.com EMail: dbrown@certicom.com
 End of changes. 308 change blocks. 
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