draft-ietf-smime-camellia-00.txt   draft-ietf-smime-camellia-01.txt 
S/MIME Working Group S. Moriai S/MIME Working Group S. Moriai
Internet Draft Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation Internet Draft NTT Corporation
Expiration Date: April 2003 A. Kato Expiration Date: September 2003 A. Kato
NTT Software Corporation NTT Software Corporation
October 2002 March 2003
Use of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm in CMS Use of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm in CMS
<draft-ietf-smime-camellia-00.txt> <draft-ietf-smime-camellia-01.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts. Drafts.
skipping to change at page 1, line 41 skipping to change at page 1, line 41
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Comments or suggestions for improvement may be made on the Comments or suggestions for improvement may be made on the
"ietf-smime" mailing list, or directly to the author. "ietf-smime" mailing list, or directly to the author.
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies how to incorporate the Camellia encryption This document specifies how to incorporate the Camellia encryption
algorithm into the S/MIME Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as an algorithm into the S/MIME Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as an
additional algorithm for symmetric encryption. The relevant OIDs additional algorithm for symmetric encryption. The relevant object
and processing steps are provided so that Camellia may be included identifiers (OIDs) and processing steps are provided so that
in the CMS specification (RFC 3369, RFC 3370) for content and key Camellia may be used in the CMS specification (RFC 3369, RFC 3370)
encryption. for content and key encryption.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD
NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in
uppercase, as shown) are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document specifies the conventions for using the Camellia This document specifies the conventions for using the Camellia
encryption algorithm [CamelliaSpec][CamelliaID] for encryption with encryption algorithm [CamelliaSpec][CamelliaID] for encryption with
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS]. the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS].
Camellia is a block cipher with 128-bit block size and 128-, 192-,
and 256-bit keys, i.e. the same interface as the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES). Camellia offers excellent efficiency on both
software and hardware platforms in addition to a high level of
security [CamelliaTech].
CMS values are generated using ASN.1 (X.208-88), using the Basic CMS values are generated using ASN.1 (X.208-88), using the Basic
Encoding Rules (BER) (X.209-88) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules Encoding Rules (BER) (X.209-88) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER) (X.509-88). (DER) (X.509-88).
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD 1.1 Camellia
NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in
uppercase, as shown) are to be interpreted as described in Camellia was jointly developed by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
[RFC2119]. Corporation and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation in 2000. Camellia
specifies the 128-bit block size and 128-, 192-, and 256-bit key
sizes, the same interface as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
Camellia is characterized by its suitability for both software and
hardware implementations as well as its high level of security.
From a practical viewpoint, it is designed to enable flexibility in
software and hardware implementations on 32-bit processors widely
used over the Internet and many applications, 8-bit processors used
in smart cards, cryptographic hardware, embedded systems, and so on
[CamelliaTech]. Moreover, its key setup time is excellent, and its
key agility is superior to that of AES.
Camellia has been scrutinized by the wide cryptographic community
during several projects for evaluating crypto algorithms. In
particular, Camellia was selected as a recommended cryptographic
primitive by the EU NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signatures,
Integrity and Encryption) project [NESSIE] and also included in the
list of cryptographic techniques for Japanese e-Government systems
which are selected by the Japan CRYPTREC (Cryptography Research and
Evaluation Committees) [CRYPTREC].
2. Object Identifiers for Content and Key Encryption 2. Object Identifiers for Content and Key Encryption
This section provides the OIDs and processing information necessary This section provides the OIDs and processing information necessary
for Camellia to be used for content and key encryption in CMS. for Camellia to be used for content and key encryption in CMS.
Camellia is added to the set of optional symmetric encryption Camellia is added to the set of optional symmetric encryption
algorithms in CMS by providing two classes of unique object algorithms in CMS by providing two classes of unique object
identifiers (OIDs). One OID class defines the content encryption identifiers (OIDs). One OID class defines the content encryption
algorithms and the other defines the key encryption algorithms. algorithms and the other defines the key encryption algorithms.
Thus a CMS agent can apply Camellia either for content or key Thus a CMS agent can apply Camellia either for content or key
encryption by selecting the corresponding object identifier, encryption by selecting the corresponding object identifier,
supplying the required parameter, and starting the program code. supplying the required parameter, and starting the program code.
2.1 OIDs for Content Encryption 2.1 OIDs for Content Encryption
For content encryption the use of Camellia in cipher block chaining Camellia is added to the set of symmetric content encryption
(CBC) mode is RECOMMENDED. The Camellia content-encryption algorithms defined in [CMSALG]. The Camellia content-encryption
algorithm, in CBC mode, for the three different key sizes are algorithm, in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, for the three
identified by the following object identifiers: different key sizes are identified by the following object
identifiers:
id-camellia128-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-camellia128-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1) algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1)
camellia128-cbc(2) } camellia128-cbc(2) }
id-camellia192-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-camellia192-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1) algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1)
camellia192-cbc(3) } camellia192-cbc(3) }
id-camellia256-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-camellia256-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1) algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1)
camellia256-cbc(4) } camellia256-cbc(4) }
skipping to change at page 2, line 55 skipping to change at page 3, line 14
id-camellia192-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-camellia192-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1) algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1)
camellia192-cbc(3) } camellia192-cbc(3) }
id-camellia256-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-camellia256-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1) algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1)
camellia256-cbc(4) } camellia256-cbc(4) }
To determine the value of IV, the above algorithms take parameter The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present, and the
as: parameters field MUST contain the value of IV:
CamelliaCBCParameter ::= CamelliaIV -- Initialization Vector CamelliaCBCParameter ::= CamelliaIV -- Initialization Vector
CamelliaIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) CamelliaIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
When these object identifiers are used, plaintext is padded before The plain text is padded according to Section 6.3 of [CMS].
encrypt it. At least 1 padding octet is appended at the end of the
plaintext to make the length of the plaintext to the multiple of 16
octets. The value of these octets is as same as the number of
appended octets. (e.g., If 10 octets are needed to pad, the value
is 0x0a.)
2.2 OIDs for Key Encryption 2.2 OIDs for Key Encryption
The key-wrap/unwrap procedures used to encrypt/decrypt a Camellia The key-wrap/unwrap procedures used to encrypt/decrypt a Camellia
content-encryption key (CEK) with a Camellia key-encryption key content-encryption key (CEK) with a Camellia key-encryption key
(KEK) are specified in Section 3. Generation and distribution of (KEK) are specified in Section 3. Generation and distribution of
key-encryption keys are beyond the scope of this document. key-encryption keys are beyond the scope of this document.
The Camellia key-encryption algorithm has the following object The Camellia key-encryption algorithm has the following object
identifier: identifier:
   id-camellia128-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-camellia128-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
    { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
    algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3) algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
    camellia128-wrap(2) } camellia128-wrap(2) }
   id-camellia192-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-camellia192-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
    { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
    algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3) algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
    camellia192-wrap(3) } camellia192-wrap(3) }
   id-camellia256-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-camellia256-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
    { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
    algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3) algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
    camellia256-wrap(4) } camellia256-wrap(4) }
In all cases the parameters field of AlgorithmIdentifier MUST be In all cases the parameters field of AlgorithmIdentifier MUST be
NULL. The OID gives the KEK key size, but does not make any absent, because the key wrapping procedure itself defines how and
statements as to the size of the wrapped Camellia CEK. when to use an IV. The OID gives the KEK key size, but does not
make any statements as to the size of the wrapped Camellia CEK.
Implementations MAY use different KEK and CEK sizes. Implements Implementations MAY use different KEK and CEK sizes. Implements
MUST support the CEK and the KEK having the same length. If MUST support the CEK and the KEK having the same length. If
different lengths are supported, the KEK MUST be of equal or greater different lengths are supported, the KEK MUST be of equal or greater
length than the CEK. length than the CEK.
We don't need additional parameter information associated with this
object identifier contains, because the key wrapping procedure
itself defines how and when to use an IV.
3. Key Wrap Algorithm 3. Key Wrap Algorithm
Camellia key wrapping and unwrapping is done in conformance with the Camellia key wrapping and unwrapping is done in conformance with the
AES key wrap algorithm [AES-WRAP][RFC3394], because Camellia and AES AES key wrap algorithm [AES-WRAP][RFC3394], because Camellia and AES
have the same block and key sizes, i.e. the block size of 128 bits have the same block and key sizes, i.e. the block size of 128 bits
and key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits. and key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
3.1 Camellia Key Wrap 3.1 Notation and Definitions
Key wrapping with Camellia is identical to [RFC3394], Section 2.2.1, The following notation is used in the description of the key
with "AES" replaced by "Camellia". wrapping algorithms:
3.2 Camellia Key Unwrap Camellia(K, W)
Encrypt W using the Camellia codebook with key K
Camellia-1(K, W)
Decrypt W using the Camellia codebook with key K
MSB(j, W) Return the most significant j bits of W
LSB(j, W) Return the least significant j bits of W
B1 ^ B2 The bitwise exclusive or (XOR) of B1 and B2
B1 | B2 Concatenate B1 and B2
K The key-encryption key K
n The number of 64-bit key data blocks
s The number of steps in the wrapping process, s = 6n
P[i] The ith plaintext key data block
C[i] The ith ciphertext data block
A The 64-bit integrity check register
R[i] An array of 64-bit registers where
i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n
A[t], R[i][t] The contents of registers A and R[i] after encryption
step t.
IV The 64-bit initial value used during the wrapping
process.
Key unwrapping with Camellia is identical to [RFC3394], Section In the key wrap algorithm, the concatenation function will be used
2.2.2, with "AES" replaced by "Camellia". to concatenate 64-bit quantities to form the 128-bit input to the
Camellia codebook. The extraction functions will be used to split
the 128-bit output from the Camellia codebook into two 64-bit
quantities.
4. Security Considerations 3.2 Camellia Key Wrap
Key wrapping with Camellia is identical to Section 2.2.1 of
[RFC3394] with "AES" replaced by "Camellia".
The inputs to the key wrapping process are the KEK and the plaintext
to be wrapped. The plaintext consists of n 64-bit blocks,
containing the key data being wrapped. The key wrapping process is
described below.
Inputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P1, P2, ..., Pn}, and
Key, K (the KEK).
Outputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C0, C1, ..., Cn}.
1) Initialize variables.
Set A0 to an initial value (see Section 3.4)
For i = 1 to n
R[0][i] = P[i]
2) Calculate intermediate values.
For t = 1 to s, where s = 6n
A[t] = MSB(64, Camellia(K, A[t-1] | R[t-1][1])) ^ t
For i = 1 to n-1
R[t][i] = R[t-1][i+1]
R[t][n] = LSB(64, Camellia(K, A[t-1] | R[t-1][1]))
3) Output the results.
Set C[0] = A[t]
For i = 1 to n
C[i] = R[t][i]
An alternative description of the key wrap algorithm involves
indexing rather than shifting. This approach allows one to
calculate the wrapped key in place, avoiding the rotation in the
previous description. This produces identical results and is more
easily implemented in software.
Inputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P1, P2, ..., Pn}, and
Key, K (the KEK).
Outputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C0, C1, ..., Cn}.
1) Initialize variables.
Set A = IV, an initial value (see Section 3.4)
For i = 1 to n
R[i] = P[i]
2) Calculate intermediate values.
For j = 0 to 5
For i=1 to n
B = Camellia(K, A | R[i])
A = MSB(64, B) ^ t where t = (n*j)+i
R[i] = LSB(64, B)
3) Output the results.
Set C[0] = A
For i = 1 to n
C[i] = R[i]
3.3 Camellia Key Unwrap
Key unwrapping with Camellia is identical to Section 2.2.2 of
[RFC3394], with "AES" replaced by "Camellia".
The inputs to the unwrap process are the KEK and (n+1) 64-bit blocks
of ciphertext consisting of previously wrapped key. It returns n
blocks of plaintext consisting of the n 64-bit blocks of the
decrypted key data.
Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C0, C1, ..., Cn}, and
Key, K (the KEK).
Outputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P1, P2, ..., Pn}.
1) Initialize variables.
Set A[s] = C[0] where s = 6n
For i = 1 to n
R[s][i] = C[i]
2) Calculate the intermediate values.
For t = s to 1
A[t-1] = MSB(64, Camellia-1(K, ((A[t] ^ t) | R[t][n]))
R[t-1][1] = LSB(64, Camellia-1(K, ((A[t]^t) | R[t][n]))
For i = 2 to n
R[t-1][i] = R[t][i-1]
3) Output the results.
If A[0] is an appropriate initial value (see Section 3.4),
Then
For i = 1 to n
P[i] = R[0][i]
Else
Return an error
The unwrap algorithm can also be specified as an index based
operation, allowing the calculations to be carried out in place.
Again, this produces the same results as the register shifting
approach.
Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C0, C1, ..., Cn}, and
Key, K (the KEK).
Outputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P0, P1, K, Pn}.
1) Initialize variables.
Set A = C[0]
For i = 1 to n
R[i] = C[i]
2) Compute intermediate values.
For j = 5 to 0
For i = n to 1
B = Camellia-1(K, (A ^ t) | R[i]) where t = n*j+i
A = MSB(64, B)
R[i] = LSB(64, B)
3) Output results.
If A is an appropriate initial value (see Section 3.4),
Then
For i = 1 to n
P[i] = R[i]
Else
Return an error
3.4 Key Data Integrity -- the Initial Value
The initial value (IV) refers to the value assigned to A[0] in the
first step of the wrapping process. This value is used to obtain an
integrity check on the key data. In the final step of the
unwrapping process, the recovered value of A[0] is compared to the
expected value of A[0]. If there is a match, the key is accepted as
valid, and the unwrapping algorithm returns it. If there is not a
match, then the key is rejected, and the unwrapping algorithm
returns an error.
The exact properties achieved by this integrity check depend on the
definition of the initial value. Different applications may call
for somewhat different properties; for example, whether there is
need to determine the integrity of key data throughout its lifecycle
or just when it is unwrapped. This specification defines a default
initial value that supports integrity of the key data during the
period it is wrapped (in Section 3.4.1). Provision is also made to
support alternative initial values (in Section 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Default Initial Value
The default initial value (IV) is defined to be the hexadecimal
constant:
A[0] = IV = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6
The use of a constant as the IV supports a strong integrity check on
the key data during the period that it is wrapped. If unwrapping
produces A[0] = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6, then the chance that the key data
is corrupt is 2^-64. If unwrapping produces A[0] any other value,
then the unwrap must return an error and not return any key data.
3.4.2 Alternative Initial Values
When the key wrap is used as part of a larger key management
protocol or system, the desired scope for data integrity may be more
than just the key data or the desired duration for more than just
the period that it is wrapped. Also, if the key data is not just an
Camellia key, it may not always be a multiple of 64 bits.
Alternative definitions of the initial value can be used to address
such problems. According to [RFC3394], NIST will define alternative
initial values in future key management publications as needed. In
order to accommodate a set of alternatives that may evolve over
time, key wrap implementations that are not application-specific
will require some flexibility in the way that the initial value is
set and tested.
4. SMIMECapabilities Attribute
An S/MIME client SHOULD announce the set of cryptographic functions
it supports by using the S/MIME capabilities attribute. This
attribute provides a partial list of OIDs of cryptographic functions
and MUST be signed by the client. The functions' OIDs SHOULD be
logically separated in functional categories and MUST be ordered
with respect to their preference.
RFC 2633 [RFC2633], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities
signed attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability
SEQUENCEs) to be used to specify a partial list of algorithms that
the software announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support.
If an S/MIME client is required to support symmetric encryption with
Camellia, the capabilities attribute MUST contain the Camellia OID
specified above in the category of symmetric algorithms. The
parameter associated with this OID MUST be CamelliaSMimeCapability.
CamelliaSMimeCapabilty ::= NULL
The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing Camellia MUST be
DER-encoded as the following hexadecimal strings:
Key Size Capability
128 30 0d 06 0b 2a 83 08 8c 9a 4b 3d 01 01 01 02
196 30 0d 06 0b 2a 83 08 8c 9a 4b 3d 01 01 01 03
256 30 0d 06 0b 2a 83 08 8c 9a 4b 3d 01 01 01 04
When a sending agent creates an encrypted message, it has to decide
which type of encryption algorithm to use. In general the decision
process involves information obtained from the capabilities lists
included in messages received from the recipient, as well as other
information such as private agreements, user preferences, legal
restrictions, and so on. If users require Camellia for symmetric
encryption, it MUST be supported by the S/MIME clients on both the
sending and receiving side, and it MUST be set in the user
preferences.
5. Security Considerations
This document specifies the use of Camellia for encrypting the This document specifies the use of Camellia for encrypting the
content of a CMS message and for encrypting the symmetric key used content of a CMS message and for encrypting the symmetric key used
to encrypt the content of a CMS message. Since Camellia supports to encrypt the content of a CMS message, and the other mechanisms
the key length of 128, 192 and 256 bits, it provides enough security are the same as the existing ones. Therefore, the security
against exhaustive key attacks. Against other attacks Camellia is considerations described in the CMS specifications [CMS][CMSALG] and
believed to be secure, and it has withstood extensive cryptanalytic the AES key wrap algorithm [AES-WRAP][RFC3394] can be applied to
efforts in several open, worldwide cryptographic evaluation this document. As described in Section 3.4, the key wrap algorithm
projects. includes a strong integrity check on the key data. If unwrapping
produces the expected check value in A[0], then the chance that the
key data is corrupt is 2^-64. If unwrapping produces an unexpected
value, then the algorithm implementation MUST return an error, and
it MUST NOT return any key data [AES-WRAP][RFC3394]. In this case,
the error message should not include detailed information about the
error, since attackers can exploit information in the error message
to recover the key data.
For other security considerations, please refer to the security Implementations must protect the KEK from disclosure. Compromise of
considerations of the CMS specifications [CMS][CMSALG] and the AES the KEK may result in the disclosure of all key data protected with
key wrap algorithm [AES-WRAP][RFC3394]. that KEK [RFC3394].
5. Intellectual Property Statement No security problem has been found on Camellia [CRYPTREC][NESSIE].
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (Mitsubishi Electric) and Nippon 6. Intellectual Property Statement
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT) have pending applications
or filed patents which are essential to Camellia. License policy Mitsubishi Electric Corporation and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
for these essential patents will be available on the IETF page of Corporation have pending applications or filed patents which are
Intellectual Property Rights Notices. essential to Camellia. License policy for these essential patents
will be available on the IETF page of Intellectual Property Rights
Notices.
References References
[AES] National Institute of Standards.
FIPS Pub 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). 26
November 2001.
[DES] National Institute of Standards and Technology.
FIPS Pub 46: Data Encryption Standard. 15 January 1977.
[AES-WRAP] National Institute of Standards and Technology. AES Key [AES-WRAP] National Institute of Standards and Technology. AES Key
Wrap Specification. 17 November 2001. Wrap Specification. 17 November 2001.
http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/kms/key-wrap.pdf http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/kms/key-wrap.pdf
[CamelliaID] J. Nakajima and S. Moriai, "A Description of the [CamelliaID] J. Nakajima and S. Moriai, "A Description of the
Camellia Encryption Algorithm", Internet-Draft, July 2001. Camellia Encryption Algorithm", Internet-Draft, July 2001.
draft-nakajima-camellia-02.txt draft-nakajima-camellia-02.txt
[CamelliaSpec] K. Aoki, T. Ichikawa, M. Kanda, M. Matsui, S. Moriai, [CamelliaSpec] K. Aoki, T. Ichikawa, M. Kanda, M. Matsui, S. Moriai,
J. Nakajima, and T. Tokita ``Specification of Camellia - a J. Nakajima, and T. Tokita "Specification of Camellia - a
128-bit Block Cipher''. http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/camellia/ 128-bit Block Cipher". http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/camellia/
[CamelliaTech] K. Aoki, T. Ichikawa, M. Kanda, M. Matsui, S. Moriai, [CamelliaTech] K. Aoki, T. Ichikawa, M. Kanda, M. Matsui, S. Moriai,
J. Nakajima, and T. Tokita ``Camellia: A 128-Bit Block Cipher J. Nakajima, and T. Tokita "Camellia: A 128-Bit Block Cipher
Suitable for Multiple Platforms - Design and Analysis -'', In Suitable for Multiple Platforms - Design and Analysis -", In
Selected Areas in Cryptography, 7th Annual International Selected Areas in Cryptography, 7th Annual International
Workshop, SAC 2000, August 2000, Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Workshop, SAC 2000, August 2000, Proceedings, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science 2012, pp.39--56, Springer-Verlag, 2001. Computer Science 2012, pp.39--56, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[CMS] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3369, August [CMS] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3369, August
2002. 2002.
[CMSALG] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMSALG] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002. Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
[CRYPTREC] Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan,
CRYPTREC. http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/enc/CRYPTREC/index-e.html
[NESSIE] New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and
Encryption (NESSIE) project. http://www.cryptonessie.org
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2633] Ramsdell, B., Editor. S/MIME Version 3 Message
Specification. RFC 2633. June 1999.
[RFC3394] J. Schaad and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard [RFC3394] J. Schaad and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002. (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
Authors' Address Authors' Address
Shiho Moriai Shiho Moriai
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
Phone: +81-468-59-2007 Phone: +81-468-59-2007
FAX: +81-468-59-3858 FAX: +81-468-59-3858
Email: shiho@isl.ntt.co.jp Email: shiho@isl.ntt.co.jp
Akihiro Kato Akihiro Kato
NTT Software Corporation NTT Software Corporation
Phone: +81-45-212-7404 Phone: +81-45-212-7404
FAX: +81-45-212-7410 FAX: +81-45-212-7410
Email: akato@po.ntts.co.jp Email: akato@po.ntts.co.jp
Appendix A ASN.1 Module
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- Camellia using CBC-chaining mode for key sizes of 128, 192, 256
id-camellia128-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1)
camellia128-cbc(2) }
id-camellia192-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1)
camellia192-cbc(3) }
id-camellia256-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1)
camellia256-cbc(4) }
-- Camellia-IV is a the parameter for all the above object identifiers.
Camellia-IV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
-- Camellia S/MIME Capabilty parameter for all the above object
-- identifiers.
CamelliaSMimeCapability ::= NULL
-- Camellia Key Wrap Algorithm identifiers - Parameter is absent
id-camellia128-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
camellia128-wrap(2) }
id-camellia192-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
camellia192-wrap(3) }
id-camellia256-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
camellia256-wrap(4) }
END
 End of changes. 

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