Internet Draft                                 Editor:  Blake Ramsdell,
draft-ietf-smime-cert-00.txt
draft-ietf-smime-cert-01.txt                   Worldtalk
November 20, 1997
January 28, 1998
Expires in six months

                 S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling

Status of this memo

This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
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1. Overview

S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions), described in
[SMIME-MSG], provides a method to send and receive secure MIME
messages. In order to validate the keys of a message sent to it, an
S/MIME agent needs to certify that the key is valid. This draft
describes the mechanisms S/MIME uses to create and validate keys using
certificates.

This specification is compatible with the Cryptographic Message Syntax
[CMS] in that it uses the data types defined by CMS. It also inherits
all the varieties of architectures for certificate-based key
management supported by CMS. Note that the method S/MIME messages make
certificate requests is defined in [SMIME-MSG].

In order to handle S/MIME certificates, an agent has to follow
specifications in this draft, as well as some of the specifications
listed in the following documents:
 - ''PKCS #1: RSA Encryption'', [PKCS-1].
 - ''Cryptographic Message Syntax'', [CMS].
 - ''PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax'', [PKCS-10].

1.1 Definitions

For the purposes of this draft, the following definitions apply.

ASN.1: Abstract Syntax Notation One, as defined in CCITT X.680-689.

Attribute Certificate (AC): An X.509 AC is a separate structure from a
subject's public key X.509 Certificate.  A subject may have multiple
X.509 ACs associated with each of its public key X.509 Certificates.
Each X.509 AC binds a SEQUENCE OF Attributes with one of the subject's
public key X.509 Certificates.  The X.509 AC syntax is defined in
[X.509]

BER: Basic Encoding Rules for ASN.1, as defined in CCITT X.690.

Certificate: A type that binds an entity's distinguished name to a
public key with a digital signature. This type is defined in CCITT
X.509 [X.509]. This type also contains the distinguished name of the
certificate issuer (the signer), an issuer-specific serial number, the
issuer's signature algorithm identifier, and a validity period.

Certificate Revocation List (CRL): A type that contains information
about certificates whose validity an issuer has prematurely revoked.
The information consists of an issuer name, the time of issue, the
next scheduled time of issue, and a list of certificate serial numbers
and their associated revocation times. The CRL is signed by the
issuer. The type intended by this specification is the one defined in
[KEYM].

DER: Distinguished Encoding Rules for ASN.1, as defined in CCITT
X.690.

1.2 Compatibility with Prior Practice of S/MIME

Appendix C contains important information about how S/MIME agents
following this specification should act in order to have the greatest
interoperability with earlier implementations of S/MIME.

1.3 Terminology

Throughout this draft, the terms MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD, and SHOULD
NOT are used in capital letters. This conforms to the definitions in
[MUSTSHOULD]. [MUSTSHOULD] defines the use of these key words to help
make the intent of standards track documents as clear as possible. The
same key words are used in this document to help implementors achieve
interoperability.

1.4 Discussion of This Draft

This draft is being discussed on the "ietf-smime" mailing list.
To subscribe, send a message to:
     ietf-smime-request@imc.org
with the single word
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in the body of the message. There is a Web site for the mailing list
at <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/>.

2. CMS Options

The CMS message format allows for a wide variety of options in content
and algorithm support. This section puts forth a number of support
requirements and recommendations in order to achieve a base level of
interoperability among all S/MIME implementations. Most of the CMS
format for S/MIME messages is defined in [SMIME-MSG].

2.1 CertificateRevocationLists

Receiving agents MUST support for the Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) format defined in [KEYM]. If sending agents include CRLs in
outgoing messages, the CRL format defined in [KEYM] MUST be used.

All agents MUST validate CRLs and check certificates against CRLs, if
available, in accordance with [KEYM]. All agents SHOULD check the
nextUpdate field in the CRL against the current time. If the current
time is later than the nextUpdate time, the action that the agent
takes is a local decision. For instance, it could warn a human user,
it could retrieve a new CRL if able, and so on.

Receiving agents MUST recognize CRLs in received S/MIME messages.

Clients MUST use revocation information included as a CRL in an S/MIME
message when verifying the signature and certificate path validity in
that message.  Clients SHOULD store CRLs received in messages for use
in processing later messages.

Clients MUST handle multiple valid Certificate Authority (CA)
certificates containing the same subject name and the same public keys
but with overlapping validity intervals.

2.2 CertificateChoices

Receiving agents MUST support X.509 v1 and X.509 v3 certificates. See
[KEYM] for details about the profile for certificate formats. End
entity certificates MUST include an Internet mail address, as
described in section 3.1.

Receiving agents SHOULD support X.509 attribute certificates.

2.2.1 Historical Note About CMS Certificates

The CMS message format supports a choice of certificate two formats
for public key content types: X.509 and PKCS #6 Extended Certificates.
The PKCS #6 format is not in widespread use. In addition, proposed
revisions of X.509 certificates address much of the same functionality
and flexibility as was intended in the PKCS #6. Thus, sending and
receiving agents MUST NOT use PKCS #6 extended certificates.

2.3 CertificateSet

Receiving agents MUST be able to handle an arbitrary number of
certificates of arbitrary relationship to the message sender and to
each other in arbitrary order. In many cases, the certificates
included in a signed message may represent a chain of certification
from the sender to a particular root. There may be, however,
situations where the certificates in a signed message may be unrelated
and included for convenience.

Sending agents SHOULD include any certificates for the user's public
key(s) and associated issuer certificates. This increases the
likelihood that the intended recipient can establish trust in the
originator's public key(s). This is especially important when sending
a message to recipients that may not have access to the sender's
public key through any other means or when sending a signed message to
a new recipient. The inclusion of certificates in outgoing messages
can be omitted if S/MIME objects are sent within a group of
correspondents that has established access to each other's
certificates by some other means such as a shared directory or manual
certificate distribution. Receiving S/MIME agents SHOULD be able to
handle messages without certificates using a database or directory
lookup scheme.

A sending agent SHOULD include at least one chain of certificates up
to, but not including, a Certificate Authority (CA) that it believes
that the recipient may trust as authoritative. A receiving agent
SHOULD be able to handle an arbitrarily large number of certificates
and chains.

Clients MAY send CA certificates, that is, certificates that are self-
signed and can be considered the "root" of other chains. Note that
receiving agents SHOULD NOT simply trust any self-signed certificates
as valid CAs, but SHOULD use some other mechanism to determine if this
is a CA that should be trusted.

Receiving agents MUST support chaining based on the distinguished name
fields. Other methods of building certificate chains may be supported
but are not currently recommended.

Receiving agents SHOULD support X.509 attribute certificates.  At a
minimum, receiving agents SHOULD at least support the decoding of
X.509 attribute certificates.  Please note that there is no
requirement that the same CA create both the public key X.509
Certificate and X.509 attribute certificate(s) for a user.  Each
organization's local policy will define how X.509 attribute
certificates are validated and used.  The implications of performing
multiple certification path validations should be considered when
defining local policy.  Exchanges between a subject and the CA dealing
with the generation of X.509 attribute certificates are outside the
scope of this specification.

3. Distinguished Names in Certificates

3.1 Using Distinguished Names for Internet Mail

The format of an X.509 certificate includes fields for the subject
name and issuer name. The subject name identifies the owner of a
particular public key/private key pair while the issuer name is meant
to identify the entity that "certified" the subject (that is, who
signed the subject's certificate). The subject name and issuer name
are defined by X.509 as Distinguished Names.

Distinguished Names are defined by a CCITT standard X.501 [X.501]. A
Distinguished Name is broken into one or more Relative Distinguished
Names. Each Relative Distinguished Name is comprised of one or more
Attribute-Value Assertions. Each Attribute-Value Assertion consists of
a Attribute Identifier and its corresponding value information, such
as CountryName=US. Distinguished Names were intended to identify
entities in the X.500 directory tree [X.500]. Each Relative
Distinguished Name can be thought of as a node in the tree which is
described by some collection of Attribute-Value Assertions. The entire
Distinguished Name is some collection of nodes in the tree that
traverse a path from the root of the tree to some end node which
represents a particular entity.

The goal of the directory was to provide an infrastructure to uniquely
name every communications entity everywhere. However, adoption of a
global X.500 directory infrastructure has been slower than expected.
Consequently, there is no requirement for X.500 directory service
provision in the S/MIME environment, although such provision would
almost undoubtedly be of great value in facilitating key management
for S/MIME.

The use of Distinguished Names in accordance with the X.500 directory
is not very widespread. By contrast, Internet mail addresses, as
described in RFC 822 [RFC-822], are used almost exclusively in the
Internet environment to identify originators and recipients of
messages. However, Internet mail addresses bear no resemblance to
X.500 Distinguished Names (except, perhaps, that they are both
hierarchical in nature). Some method is needed to map Internet mail
addresses to entities that hold public keys. Some people have
suggested that the X.509 certificate format should be abandoned in
favor of other binding mechanisms. Instead, S/MIME keeps the X.509
certificate and Distinguished Name mechanisms while tailoring the
content of the naming information to suit the Internet mail
environment.

End-entity certificates MUST contain an Internet mail address as
described in [RFC-822]. The address must be an "addr-spec" as defined
in Section 6.1 of that specification.  The email address SHOULD be in
the subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT be in the subject
distinguished name.

Receiving agents MUST recognize email addresses in the subjectAltName
field. Receiving agents MUST recognize email addresses in the
Distinguished Name field.

Sending agents SHOULD make the address in the From header in a mail
message match an Internet mail address in the signer's certificate.
Receiving agents MUST check that the address in the From header of a
mail message matches an Internet mail address in the signer's
certificate. A receiving agent MUST provide some explicit alternate
processing of the message if this comparison fails, which may be to
reject the message.

All subject and issuer names MUST be non-NULL in S/MIME-compliant v3
X.509 Certificates, except that the subject DN in a user's (i.e. end-
entity) certificate MAY be NULL in which case the subjectAltName
extension will include the subject's identifier and MUST be marked as
critical.

3.2 Required Name Attributes

Receiving agents MUST support parsing of zero, one, or more instances
of each of the following set of name attributes within the
Distinguished Names in certificates.

Sending agents MUST include the Internet mail address during
Distinguished Name creation. Guidelines for the inclusion, omission,
and ordering of the remaining name attributes during the creation of a
distinguished name will most likely be dictated by the policies
associated with the certification service which will certify the
corresponding name and public key.

CountryName
StateOrProvinceName
Locality
CommonName
Title
Organization
OrganizationalUnit
StreetAddress
PostalCode
PhoneNumber
EmailAddress

All attributes other than EmailAddress are described in X.520 [X.520].
EmailAddress is an IA5String that can have multiple attribute values.

4. Certificate Processing

A receiving agent needs to provide some certificate retrieval
mechanism in order to gain access to certificates for recipients of
digital envelopes. There are many ways to implement certificate
retrieval mechanisms. X.500 directory service is an excellent example
of a certificate retrieval-only mechanism that is compatible with
classic X.500 Distinguished Names. The PKIX Working Group is
investigating other mechanisms. Another method under consideration by
the IETF is to provide certificate retrieval services as part of the
existing Domain Name System (DNS). Until such mechanisms are widely
used, their utility may be limited by the small number of
correspondent's certificates that can be retrieved. At a minimum, for
initial S/MIME deployment, a user agent could automatically generate a
message to an intended recipient requesting that recipient's
certificate in a signed return message.

Receiving and sending agents SHOULD also provide a mechanism to allow
a user to "store and protect" certificates for correspondents in such
a way so as to guarantee their later retrieval. In many environments,
it may be desirable to link the certificate retrieval/storage
mechanisms together in some sort of certificate database. In its
simplest form, a certificate database would be local to a particular
user and would function in a similar way as a "address book" that
stores a user's frequent correspondents. In this way, the certificate
retrieval mechanism would be limited to the certificates that a user
has stored (presumably from incoming messages).  A comprehensive
certificate retrieval/storage solution may combine two or more
mechanisms to allow the greatest flexibility and utility to the user.
For instance, a secure Internet mail agent may resort
to checking a centralized certificate retrieval mechanism for a
certificate if it can not be found in a user's local certificate
storage/retrieval database.

Receiving and sending agents SHOULD provide a mechanism for the import
and export of certificates, using a PKCS #7 certs-only message. This
allows for import and export of full certificate chains as opposed to
just a single certificate. This is described in [SMIME-MSG].

4.1 Certificate Revocation Lists

A receiving agent SHOULD have access to some certificate-revocation
list (CRL) retrieval mechanism in order to gain access to certificate-
revocation information when validating certificate chains. A receiving
or sending agent SHOULD also provide a mechanism to allow a user to
store incoming certificate-revocation information for correspondents
in such a way so as to guarantee its later retrieval. However, it is
always better to get the latest information from the CA than to get
information stored away from incoming messages.

Receiving and sending agents SHOULD retrieve and utilize CRL
information every time a certificate is verified as part of a
certificate chain validation even if the certificate was already
verified in the past. However, in many instances (such as off-line
verification) access to the latest CRL information may be difficult or
impossible. The use of CRL information, therefore, may be dictated by
the value of the information that is protected. The value of the CRL
information in a particular context is beyond the scope of this draft
but may be governed by the policies associated with particular
certificate hierarchies.

4.2 Certificate Chain Validation

In creating a user agent for secure messaging, certificate, CRL, and
certificate chain validation SHOULD be highly automated while still
acting in the best interests of the user. Certificate, CRL, and chain
validation MUST be performed when validating a correspondent's public
key. This is necessary when a) verifying a signature from a
correspondent and, b) creating a digital envelope with the
correspondent as the intended recipient.

Certificates and CRLs are made available to the chain validation
procedure in two ways: a) incoming messages, and b) certificate and
CRL retrieval mechanisms. Certificates and CRLs in incoming messages
are not required to be in any particular order nor are they required
to be in any way related to the sender or recipient of the message
(although in most cases they will be related to the sender). Incoming
certificates and CRLs SHOULD be cached for use in chain validation and
optionally stored for later use. This temporary certificate and CRL
cache SHOULD be used to augment any other certificate and CRL
retrieval mechanisms for chain validation on incoming signed messages.

4.3 Certificate and CRL Signing Algorithms

Certificates and Certificate-Revocation Lists (CRLs) are signed by the
certificate issuer. A receiving agent MUST be capable of verifying the
signatures on certificates and CRLs made with id-dsa-with-sha1.

A receiving agent SHOULD be capable of verifying the signatures on
certificates and CRLs made with md2WithRSAEncryption,
md5WithRSAEncryption and sha-1WithRSAEncryption signature algorithms
with key sizes from 512 bits to 2048 bits described in [SMIME-MSG].

4.4 X.509 Version 3 Certificate Extensions

The X.509 v3 standard describes an extensible framework in which the
basic certificate information can be extended and how such extensions
can be used to control the process of issuing and validating
certificates. The PKIX Working Group has ongoing efforts to identify
and create extensions which have value in particular certification
environments. As such, there is
still a fair amount of profiling work to be done before there is
widespread agreement on which v3 extensions will be used. Further,
there are active efforts underway to issue X.509 v3 certificates for
business purposes. This draft identifies the minumum required set of
certificate extensions which have the greatest value in the S/MIME
environment. The basicConstraints, and keyUsage extensions are defined
in [X.509].

Sending and receiving agents MUST correctly handle the v3 Basic
Constraints Certificate Extension, the Key Usage Certificate
Extension, authorityKeyID, subjectKeyID, and the subjectAltNames when
they appear in end-user certificates. Some mechanism SHOULD exist to
handle the defined v3 certificate extensions when they appear in
intermediate or CA certificates.

Certificates issued for the S/MIME environment SHOULD NOT contain any
critical extensions other than those listed here. These extensions
SHOULD be marked as non-critical unless the proper handling of the
extension is deemed critical to the correct interpretation of the
associated certificate. Other extensions may be included, but those
extensions SHOULD NOT be marked as critical.

4.4.1 Basic Constraints Certificate Extension

The basic constraints extension serves to delimit the role and
position of an issuing authority or end-user certificate plays in a
chain of certificates.

For example, certificates issued to CAs and subordinate CAs contain a
basic constraint extension that identifies them as issuing authority
certificates. End-user subscriber certificates contain an extension
that constrains the certificate from being an issuing authority
certificate.

Certificates SHOULD contain a basicContstraints extension.

4.4.2 Key Usage Certificate Extension

The key usage extension serves to limit the technical purposes for
which a public key listed in a valid certificate may be used. Issuing
authority certificates may contain a key usage extension that
restricts the key to signing certificates, certificate revocation
lists and other data.

For example, a certification authority may create subordinate issuer
certificates which contain a keyUsage extension which specifies that

he
the corresponding public key can be used to sign end user certs and
sign CRLs.

If a key usage extension is included in a v3 X.509 Certificate, then
it MUST be marked as critical.

5. Generating Keys and Certification Requests

5.1 Binding Names and Keys

An S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility or function
MUST be capable of generating a certification request given a user's
public key and associated name information. In most cases, the user's
public key/private key pair will be generated simultaneously. However,
there are cases where the keying information may be generated by an
external process (such as when a key pair is generated on a
cryptographic token or by a "key recovery" service).

There SHOULD NOT be multiple valid (that is, non-expired and non-
revoked) certificates for the same key pair bound to different
Distinguished Names. Otherwise, a security flaw exists where an
attacker can substitute one valid certificate for another in such a
way that can not be detected by a message recipient. If a users wishes
to change their name (or create an alternate name), the user agent
SHOULD generate a new key pair. If the user wishes to reuse an
existing key pair with a new or alternate name, the user SHOULD first
have any valid certificates for the existing public key revoked.

In general, it is possible for a user to request certification for the
same name and different public key from the same or different
certification authorities.  This is acceptable both for end-entity and
issuer certificates and can be useful in supporting a change of issuer
keys in a smooth fashion.

CAs that re-use their own name with distinct keys MUST include the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier extension in certificates that they issue, and
MUST have the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension in their own certificate.
CAs SHOULD use these extensions uniformly.

Clients SHOULD handle multiple valid CA certificates that certify
different public keys but contain the same subject name (in this case,
that CA's name).

When selecting an appropriate issuer's certificate to use to verify a
given certificate, clients SHOULD process the AuthorityKeyIdentifier
and SubjectKeyIdentifier extensions.  Use of these extensions SHOULD
be compliant with [KEYM].

5.2 Using PKCS #10 for Certification Requests

PKCS #10 Certificate Acquisition

A public key certification request is formed as a flexible and extensible message format for representing
the results of cryptographic operations on some data. CertReqMessages
object as defined in [CRMF].  The choice of
naming information  corresponding response is largely dictated by CMS
encapsulation of the policies requested certificate and its associated non-Root
CA certificate(s) as defined in Section 5.6.

Both the CertReqMessages content and the resulting response SHOULD be
encapsulated within a full CMS security envelope.  This encapsulation
enables Registration Authorities to place a signature across a
certificate request.  It includes other information relevant to the
processing and handling of a certification request. The request,
response, required CMS encapsulation and transaction handling is
collectively referred to as the Certification Request Syntax (CRS).

Some existing implementations of these mechanisms utilize a simplified
form of this exchange.  In these implementations, an unencapsulated
PKCS10 object is provided to the Certification Authority, which
responds with an unencapsulated CertRep syntax.

5.2.1  Encapsulating PKI Messages in CMS

CMS-encapsulated certification requests and responses SHALL be
constructed as follows.   The contentInfo field of a signedData type
is populated with the envelopedData content type if the content is
encrypted or Data content type if the data is sent in cleartext form.
The content contains one of the following message bodies:

- PKCSReq              -- Request for a certificate
- CertRep              -- Response to a certificate request

The presence of a particular message body type in either the
encryptedContent of an envelopedData content type or the content of a
Data content type SHALL be indicated by value of the messageType
authenticated attribute of the outermost SignedData.

Two options exist with respect to the use of encryption.  One usage
produces an encrypted message body encapsulated by a signed, cleartext
envelope.  Organizations that wish to protect against the leakage of
sensitive data via cleartext channels may chose instead to produce a
cleartext message body which is placed with a signed envelope which is
in turn encapsulated by an encrypted envelope.  These options are
illustrated as:

Option 1                         Option 2
--------                         --------
SignedData                       EnvelopedData
  EnvelopedData                    SignedData
    Data                              <message body>
      <message body>

CRS message bodies MAY be encrypted or transmitted in the clear.
Support SHALL be provided for encryption option 1 and SHOULD be
provided for both.

5.2.1.2 CRS Service Indicators

The SignerInfos portion of SignedData carries one or more Service
Indicators as authenticatedAttributes. [CMS] requires that the value
of authenticatedAttributes is hashed using the algorithm specified by
digestAlgorithm, signed using the message originator's private key
corresponding  to digestEncryptionAlgorithm, the result encoded as an
OCTET STRING and assigned to the encryptedDigest field of SignedData.

The following Service Indicators are defined:

- version
- messageType
- pkiStatus
- failinfo
- transactionId
- senderNonce
- recipientNonce

The version service indicator indicate CRS protocol version.  If
absent, a value of 0 SHALL be assumed.  This specification is CRS
version 1.

The messageType service indicator identifies the syntax carried in the
message body.  Every CRS message SHALL include a value for messageType
appropriate to the message.

The messageType service indicator specifies the type of operation
performed by the  transaction. This attribute is required in all
messages. The following values for messageType are defined:

Message           MessageType Value
-------           ----------
CertReq           (19)  -- Certification request
CertRep           (3)   -- Response to certificate request

The value given for messageType value is set in the messageType
service indicator for messages of the indicated type. This service
indicator SHALL be included in every message.

The pkiStatus service indicator is used to convey information relevant
to a requested operation. This service indicator SHALL be included in
every message.

Response messages SHALL include transaction status information which
is defined as pkiStatus service indicator:

Status            pkiStatus value
-------           ---------------
SUCCESS           (0)   -- request successful
PENDING        (1)   -- request is pending
FAILURE           (2)   -- request rejected

This pKIStatus service indicator is required for all PKI messages. The
value given for pkiStatus value is set in the pkiStatus service
indicator for status of the indicated type.

The failInfo service indicator conveys information relevant to the
interpretation of a failure condition. This service indicator is
mandatory in every message.

The messageType, pkiStatus, and procedures failInfo service indicators are
mandatory for all messages.  If additional transaction management or
replay protection is desired, transactionID, senderNonce and
recipientNonce MAY be implemented.

The transactionId service indicator identifies a given transaction.
It is used between client and server to manage the state of an
operation. It MAY be included in service request messages.  If
included, responses SHALL included the transmitted value.

The senderNonce and recipientNonce service indicator can be used to
provide application-level replay prevention. They MAY be included in
service request messages.  Originating messages include only a value
for senderNonce. If included, responses SHALL include the transmitted
value of the previously received senderNonce as recipientNonce and
include a value for senderNonce.

If nonces are used, in the first message of a transaction, no
recipientNonce is transmitted; a senderNonce is instantiated by the
message originator and retained for later reference.  The recipient of
a sender nonce reflects this value back to the originator as a
recipientNonce and includes it's own senderNonce.  Upon receipt by the
transaction originator of this message, the originator compares the
value of recipientNonce to its retained value.  If the values match,
the message can be accepted for further security processing.  The
received value for senderNonce is also retained for inclusion in the
next message associated with the intended same transaction.

If a transaction originator includes a value for the senderNonce
service indicator, responses SHALL include this value as a value for
recipientNonce AND include a value for the SenderNonce service
indicator.  If a transaction originator includes a value for the
transaction-id service indicator in a service request, responses SHALL
include this value as a value for transaction-id service indicator.

5.2.1.2  Service Indicators Identification and Syntax

When included in a CMS message, AuthenticatedAttributes must consist
of at a minimum:

- A PKCS #9 content-type attribute having as its value the content
type of the ContentInfo value being signed.

- A PKCS #9 message-digest attribute, having as its value the message
digest of the content.

Each Service Indicator is uniquely identified by an Object Identifier.
KEYM establishes a registration arc for objects associated with
certificate management protocols.  The value of id-it is imported from
that reference.  This specification extends id-it as follows:

id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= { id-pkix 4 }   -- imported from PKIX
id-si OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= { id-it 1   }   -- CRS service indicators

-- CRS service indicators
id-si-version          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-si 1 }
id-si-transactionID    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-si 2 }
id-si-messageType      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-si 3 }
id-si-pkiStatus        OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-si 4 }
id-si-failInfo         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-si 5 }
id-si-senderNonce      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-si 6 }
id-si-recipientNonce   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-si 7 }

The corresponding value syntax for each is:

Service Indicator      Syntax
-----------------      -------
version                INTEGER
TransactionId          INTEGER
messageType            INTEGER
pkiStatus              INTEGER
failInfo               INTEGER
senderNonce            OCTET STRING
recipientNonce         OCTET STRING

5.2.2 Common Certification Request Requirements

This specification establishes two forms of certification service.

In addition to key request:
CRMF and naming information, the PKCS #10 format
supports the inclusion of optional attributes, signed PKCS10.  Applications MUST support CRMF; they MAY support
PKCS10.  The CRMF (Certificate Request Message Format) syntax and
semantics are defined in [CRMF].  The syntax and semantics defining
PKCS10 is defined by the entity
requesting certification. [PKCS10].

This allows for section specifies information processing requirements common to be conveyed
in a certification request which may be useful to
both methods.  Section 5.3 defines the request process,
but not necessarily part of requirements unique to PKCS10.
Section 5.4 defines the Distinguished Name being certified. requirements unique to CRMF.

Receiving agents MUST support the identification of an RSA key with
the rsa defined in X.509 and the rsaEncryption OID. Certification
authorities MUST support sha-1WithRSAEncryption and
md5WithRSAEncryption and SHOULD support md2WithRSAEncryption for
verification of signatures on certificate requests as described in
[SMIME-MSG].

For the creation and submission of certification-requests, RSA keys
SHOULD be identified with the rsaEncryption OID and signed with the
sha-1WithRSAEncryption signature algorithm.  Certification-requests
MUST NOT be signed with the md2WithRSAEncryption signature algorithm.

Certification requests MUST include a valid Internet mail address,
either as part of the certificate (as described in 3.2) associated
with the message carrying the certificate request or as part of the PKCS #10 attribute list.
certificate request information produced by the subscriber.
Certification authorities MUST check that the address in the "From:"
header matches either of these addresses. CAs SHOULD allow the CA
operator to configure processing of messages whose addresses do not match.
match

5.3 Using PKCS #10 for Certification Requests

PKCS #10 is a flexible and extensible message format for representing
the results of cryptographic operations on some data. The choice of
naming information is largely dictated by the policies and procedures
associated with the intended certification service.

In addition to key and naming information, the PKCS #10 format
supports the inclusion of optional attributes, signed by the entity
requesting certification. This allows for information to be conveyed
in a certification request which may be useful to the request process,
but not necessarily part of the Distinguished Name being certified.

Certification authorities SHOULD support parsing of zero or one
instance of each of the following set of certification-request
attributes on incoming messages. Attributes that a particular
implementation does not support may generate a warning message to the
requestor, or may be silently ignored. Inclusion of the following
attributes during the creation and submission of a certification-
request will most likely be dictated by the policies associated with
the certification service which will certify the corresponding name
and public key.

postalAddress
challengePassword
unstructuredAddress

postalAddress is described in [X.520].

5.2.1

5.3.1 Challenge Password

The challenge-password attribute type specifies a password by which an
entity may request certificate revocation. The interpretation of the
password is intended to be specified by the issuer of the certificate;
no particular interpretation is required. The challenge-password
attribute type is intended for PKCS #10 certification requests.

Challenge-password attribute values have ASN.1 type ChallengePassword:

ChallengePassword ::= CHOICE {
  PrintableString, T61String }

A challenge-password attribute must have a single attribute value.

It is expected that if UCS becomes an ASN.1 type (e.g., UNIVERSAL
STRING), ChallengePassword will become a CHOICE type:

ChallengePassword ::= CHOICE {
    PrintableString, T61String, UNIVERSAL STRING }

5.2.2

5.3.2 Unstructured Address

The unstructured-address attribute type specifies the address or
addresses of the subject of a certificate as an unstructured ASCII or
T.61 string. The interpretation of the addresses is intended to be
specified by the issuer of the certificate; no particular
interpretation is required. A likely interpretation is as an
alternative to the X.520 postalAddress attribute type. The
unstructured-address attribute type is intended for PKCS #10
certification requests.

Unstructured-address attribute values have ASN.1 type
UnstructuredAddress:

UnstructuredAddress ::= CHOICE {
  PrintableString, T61String }

An unstructured-address attribute can have multiple attribute values.

Note: T.61's newline character (hexadecimal code 0d) is recommended as
a line separator in multi-line addresses.

It is expected that if UCS becomes an ASN.1 type (e.g., UNIVERSAL
STRING), UnstructuredAddress will become a CHOICE type:

UnstructuredAddress ::= CHOICE {
    PrintableString, T61String, UNIVERSAL STRING }

5.3

5.4 Use of CRMF for Certification Requests

Construction of a CRMF-formatted certification request involves the
following steps:

1. A CertRequest value is constructed.  This value consists of the
public key, all or portion of the end-entity's name, other requested
certificate fields, plus additional control information related to the
registration process.
2. A proof of possession value is calculated across the CertRequest
value.
3. Additional registration information, if required, is combined with
the proof of possession value and the CertRequest structure to form a
CertReqMessage.
4. Additional CertReqMessage objects are generated using steps 1-4 as
needed.
5. The result of step 4 is encoded as a CertReqMessages object.
6. The result of step 5 is encapsulated as a CRS message body as
described in Section 5.2.1.

[CRMF] details requirements on this process and the objects mentioned
in this description.

5.5 Fulfilling a Certification Request

Certification authorities SHOULD use the id-dsa-with-sha1 signature
algorithm when signing certificates.

Certification authorities MAY use the sha-1WithRSAEncryption signature algorithms
algorithm when signing certificates.

5.4

5.6 Using CMS for Fulfilled Certificate Response

[CMS] supports a degenerate case of the SignedData content type where
there are no signers on the content (and hence, the content value is
"irrelevant"). This degenerate case is used to convey certificate and
CRL information. Certification authorities MUST use this format for
returning certificate information resulting from the successful
fulfillment of a certification request. At a minimum, the fulfilled
certificate response MUST include the actual subject certificate
(corresponding to the information in the certification request). The
response SHOULD include other certificates which link the issuer to
higher level certification authorities and corresponding certificate-
revocation lists. Unrelated certificates and revocation information is
also acceptable.

Receiving agents MUST parse this degenerate CMS message type and
handle the certificates and CRLs according to the requirements and
recommendations in Section 4.

6. Security Considerations

All of the security issues faced by any cryptographic application must
be faced by a S/MIME agent. Among these issues are protecting the
user's private key, preventing various attacks, and helping the user
avoid mistakes such as inadvertently encrypting a message for the
wrong recipient. The entire list of security considerations is beyond
the scope of this document, but some significant concerns are listed
here.

When processing certificates, there are many situations where the
processing might fail. Because the processing may be done by a user
agent, a security gateway, or other program, there is no single way to
handle such failures. Just because the methods to handle the failures
has not been listed, however, the reader should not assume that they
are not important. The opposite is true: if a certificate is not
provably valid and associated with the message, the processing
software should take immediate and noticable steps to inform the end
user about it.

Some of the many places where signature and certificate checking might
fail include:
- no Internet mail addresses in a certificate match the sender of a
message
- no certificate chain leads to a trusted CA
- no ability to check the CRL for a certificate
- an invalid CRL was received
- the CRL being checked is expired
- the certificate is expired
- the certificate has been revoked
There are certainly other instances where a certificate may be
invalid, and it is the responsibility of the processing software to
check them all thoroughly, and to decide what to do if the check
fails.

A. Object Identifiers and Syntax

Sections A.1 through A.4 are adopted from [SMIME-MSG].

A.5 Name Attributes

emailAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1}

CountryName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) 6}

StateOrProvinceName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) 8}

locality OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) 7}

CommonName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) 3}

Title OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) 12}

Organization OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) 10}

OrganizationalUnit OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) 11}

StreetAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) 9}

Postal Code OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) 17}

Phone Number OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) 20}

A.6 Certification Request Attributes

postalAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) 16}

challengePassword OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 7}

unstructuredAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 8}

A.7 X.509 V3 Certificate Extensions

basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29 19 }

The ASN.1 definition of basicConstraints certificate extension is:

basicConstraints basicConstraints EXTENSION ::= {
     SYNTAX  BasicConstraintsSyntax
     IDENTIFIED BY { id-ce 19 } }

BasicConstraintsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE {
     cA                 BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
     pathLenConstraint  INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }

keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29 15 }

The ASN.1 definition of keyUsage certificate extension is:

keyUsage EXTENSION ::= {
     SYNTAX  KeyUsage
     IDENTIFIED BY { id-ce 15 }}

KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
     digitalSignature      (0),
     nonRepudiation        (1),
     keyEncipherment       (2),
     dataEncipherment      (3),
     keyAgreement          (4),
     keyCertSign           (5),
     cRLSign               (6)}

B. References

[CERTV2] "S/MIME Certificate Handling", Internet Draft draft-dusse-
smime-cert

[KEYM] PKIX Part 1. At the time of this writing, PKIX is in

[CMS] "Cryptographic Message Syntax", Internet Draft stage, but it is expected that there will be standards-track
RFCs at some point in the future. draft-housley-
smime-cms

[CRMF] "Certificate Request Message Format", Internet Draft draft-ietf-
pkix-crmf

[KEYM] "Internet Public Key Infrastructure X.509 Certificate and CRL
Profile", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-part1

[MUSTSHOULD] "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", RFC 2119

[PKCS-1], "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption", draft has been submitted for RFC
status

[PKCS-10], "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax", draft has been
submitted for RFC status

[RFC-822], "Standard For The Format Of ARPA Internet Text Messages",
RFC 822.

[SMIME-MSG] "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification ", Internet Draft
draft-ietf-smime-msg

[X.500] ITU-T Recommendation X.500 (1997) | ISO/IEC 9594-1:1997,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
Overview of concepts, models and services

[X.501] ITU-T Recommendation X.501 (1997) | ISO/IEC 9594-2:1997,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
Models

[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:1997,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
Authentication framework

[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520 (1997) | ISO/IEC 9594-6:1997,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
Selected attribute types.

C. Compatibility with Prior Practice in S/MIME

S/MIME was originally developed by RSA Data Security, Inc. Many
developers implemented S/MIME agents before this document was
published. All S/MIME receiving agents SHOULD make every attempt to
interoperate with these earlier implementations of S/MIME.

D. Changes from S/MIME v2

Reworded section 4.3 for signing algorithms to MUST id-dsa-with-sha1
and SHOULD all others
Changed [SMIME-MSG] to draft-ietf-smime-msg
Changed references to PKCS #7 and [PKCS-7] to Cryptographic Message
Specification and [CMS]
Section 2.2 is now "CertificateChoices" instead of
"ExtendedCertificatesOrCertificate"
Section 2.3 is now "CertificateSet" instead of
"ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates"
Attribute certificates added
Section 5.3 is now SHOULD id-dsa-with-sha1 and MAY sha-
1WithRSAEncryption
Added CRMF for certificate requests in section 5
Section 4.4.2 X.509v3 key usage extension MUST be critical if present

E. Acknowledgements

This document is largely based on [CERTV2] written by Steve Dusse,
Paul Hoffman, Blake Ramsdell, and Jeff Weinstein.

Significant comments and additions were made by Michael Myers, John
Pawling and Jim Schaad.

F. Needed changes

UNIVERSAL STRING for Challenge Password?  Should this simply be
BMPString?
Algorithms for certs
Capitalization of OIDs
Stronger MD2 / MD5 language needed?
Names for chaining
Only one "official" email address?
Rewrite 5.2 for CMP and id-dsa-with-sha1
Make references [PKCS-*] consistent with smime-msg spec
2.2.1 -- are they "proposed" revisions, or actual revisions?
Attribute certificates?
Section A.7 -- bit 7 is encipherOnly, bit 8 is decipherOnly.  Are we
going to use these?

G. Changes from last draft

Added section G, changes from last draft
Added attribute certificate definition in section 1.1, text from John
Pawling
Added attribute certificate SHOULD support in section 2.2 text from
John Pawling
Added attribute certificate SHOULD support in section 2.3 text from
John Pawling
Changed 5.3 (renumbered to section 5.5) to SHOULD id-dsa-with-sha1 and
MAY sha-1WithRSAEncryption
Added [CMS]
Inserted new section 5.2, text from Michael Myers
Added some acknowledgements to section E
Added [CRMF]
Cleaned up [KEYM] reference
Section 4.4.2 now makes key usage critical if present
Added possible NULL DN language in section 3.1
Added SHOULD for email address in subjectAltName, and SHOULD NOT be in
subject DN in section 3.1

H. Editor's address

Blake Ramsdell
Worldtalk
13122 NE 20th St., Suite C
Bellevue, WA 98005
(425) 882-8861
blaker@deming.com