draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-01.txt   draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-02.txt 
S/MIME Working Group B. Kaliski S/MIME Working Group B.Kaliski/J.Randall
Internet Draft RSA Laboratories Internet Draft RSA Laboratories
Document: draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-01.txt October 2003 Document: draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-02.txt March 2006
Category: Standards Category: Standards
Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in CMS Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in CMS
<draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-01.txt> <draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-02.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Abstract Abstract
The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward) The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward)
mechanism for transporting keying data to a recipient using the mechanism for transporting keying data to a recipient using the
recipient's RSA public key. This document specifies the conventions recipient's RSA public key. This document specifies the conventions
for using the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm with the Cryptographic for using the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm with the Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS). This version (-01) updates the ASN.1 syntax to Message Syntax (CMS). This version (-02) updates the ASN.1 syntax to
align with the latest drafts of ANS X9.44 and ISO/IEC 18033-2, and align with the latest draft of ANS X9.44 and ISO/IEC 18033-2, and
adds material on certificate conventions and S/MIME capabilities. adds material on Camillia algorirthm.
Conventions Used in This Document Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119
[STDWORDS]. [STDWORDS].
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
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of the message, and the key-encrypting key KEK is derived from it in of the message, and the key-encrypting key KEK is derived from it in
a strong way. As a result, the algorithm enjoys a "tight" security a strong way. As a result, the algorithm enjoys a "tight" security
proof in the random oracle model. It is also architecturally proof in the random oracle model. It is also architecturally
convenient because the public-key operations are separate from the convenient because the public-key operations are separate from the
symmetric operations on the keying data. One benefit is that the symmetric operations on the keying data. One benefit is that the
length of the keying data is bounded only by the symmetric key- length of the keying data is bounded only by the symmetric key-
wrapping scheme, not the size of the RSA modulus. wrapping scheme, not the size of the RSA modulus.
The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in various forms is being adopted The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in various forms is being adopted
in several draft standards including the draft ANS X9.44 [ANS-X9.44] in several draft standards including the draft ANS X9.44 [ANS-X9.44]
and the draft ISO/IEC 18033-2 [ISO-IEC-18033-2]. It has also been and ISO/IEC 18033-2. It has also been recommended by the NESSIE
recommended by the NESSIE project [NESSIE]. Although the other project [NESSIE]. For completeness, a specification of the algorithm
standards are still in development, the algorithm is stable across
the drafts. For completeness, a specification of the algorithm is is given in Appendix A of this document; ASN.1 syntax is given in
given in Appendix A of this document; ASN.1 syntax is given in
Appendix B. Appendix B.
NOTE: The term KEM stands for "key encapsulation mechanism" and NOTE: The term KEM stands for "key encapsulation mechanism" and
refers to the first three steps of the process above. The refers to the first three steps of the process above. The
formalization of key transport algorithms (or more generally, formalization of key transport algorithms (or more generally,
asymmetric encryption schemes) in terms of key encapsulation asymmetric encryption schemes) in terms of key encapsulation
mechanisms is described further in research by Victor Shoup leading mechanisms is described further in research by Victor Shoup leading
to the development of the ISO/IEC 18033-2 standard [SHOUP]. to the development of the ISO/IEC 18033-2 standard [SHOUP].
2. Use in CMS 2. Use in CMS
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has also been proposed as a replacement (see [PKCS1] and [CMS- has also been proposed as a replacement (see [PKCS1] and [CMS-
OAEP]). RSA-KEM has the advantage over RSAES-OAEP of a tighter OAEP]). RSA-KEM has the advantage over RSAES-OAEP of a tighter
security proof, but the disadvantage of slightly longer encrypted security proof, but the disadvantage of slightly longer encrypted
keying data. keying data.
2.1 Underlying Components 2.1 Underlying Components
A CMS implementation that supports the RSA-KEM Key Transport A CMS implementation that supports the RSA-KEM Key Transport
Algorithm MUST support at least the following underlying components: Algorithm MUST support at least the following underlying components:
* For the key derivation function, KDF2 (see [ANS-X9.44][IEEE- * For the key derivation function, KDF2 or KDF3 (see [ANS-X9.44]
P1363a]) based on SHA-1 (see [FIPS-180-2]) (this function is [IEEE-P1363a]) based on SHA-1 (see [FIPS-180-2]) (this function
also specified as the key derivation function in [ANS-X9.63]) is also specified as the key derivation function in [ANS-X9.63])
* For the key-wrapping scheme, AES-Wrap-128, i.e., the AES Key * For the key-wrapping scheme, AES-Wrap-128, i.e., the AES Key
Wrap with a 128-bit key encrypting key (see [AES-WRAP]) Wrap with a 128-bit key encrypting key (see [AES-WRAP])
An implementation SHOULD also support KDF2 based on SHA-256 (see An implementation SHOULD also support KDF2 and KDF3 based on SHA-256
[FIPS-180-2]), and the Triple-DES Key Wrap (see [3DES-WRAP]). It MAY (see [FIPS-180-2]), the Triple-DES Key Wrap (see [3DES-WRAP]) and the
support other underlying components. Camillia key wrap algorithm (see [Camillia]). It MAY support other
underlying components. When AES or Camilla are used the data block
size is 128 bits while the key size can be 128, 192, or 256 bits
while Triple DES requires a data block size of 64 bits and a key size
of 112 or 168 bits.
2.2 RecipientInfo Conventions 2.2 RecipientInfo Conventions
When the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is employed for a recipient, When the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is employed for a recipient,
recipient, the RecipientInfo alternative for that recipient MUST be the RecipientInfo alternative for that recipient MUST be
KeyTransRecipientInfo. The algorithm-specific fields of the KeyTransRecipientInfo. The algorithm-specific fields of the
KeyTransRecipientInfo value MUST have the following values: KeyTransRecipientInfo value MUST have the following values:
* keyEncryptionAlgorithm.algorithm MUST be id-ac-generic-hybrid * keyEncryptionAlgorithm.algorithm MUST be id-ac-generic-hybrid
(see Appendix B) (see Appendix B)
* keyEncryptionAlgorithm.parameters MUST be a value of type * keyEncryptionAlgorithm.parameters MUST be a value of type
GenericHybridParameters, identifying the RSA-KEM key GenericHybridParameters, identifying the RSA-KEM key
encapsulation mechanism (see Appendix B) encapsulation mechanism (see Appendix B)
* encryptedKey MUST be the encrypted keying data output by the * encryptedKey MUST be the encrypted keying data output by the
algorithm (see Appendix A) algorithm, where the keying data is the content-encryption key.
(see Appendix A)
2.3 Certificate Conventions 2.3 Certificate Conventions
The conventions specified in this section augment RFC 3280 [PROFILE]. The conventions specified in this section augment RFC 3280 [PROFILE].
A recipient who employs the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm MAY A recipient who employs the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm MAY
identify the public key in a certificate by the same identify the public key in a certificate by the same
AlgorithmIdentifier as for the PKCS #1 v1.5 algorithm, i.e., using AlgorithmIdentifier as for the PKCS #1 v1.5 algorithm, i.e., using
the rsaEncryption object identifier [PKCS1]. the rsaEncryption object identifier [PKCS1].
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usage certificate extension (see [PROFILE], Section 4.2.1.3). If the usage certificate extension (see [PROFILE], Section 4.2.1.3). If the
keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that conveys an RSA keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that conveys an RSA
public key with the id-ac-generic-hybrid object identifier as public key with the id-ac-generic-hybrid object identifier as
discussed above, then the key usage extension MUST contain the discussed above, then the key usage extension MUST contain the
following value: following value:
keyEncipherment. keyEncipherment.
dataEncipherment SHOULD NOT be present. That is, a key intended to be dataEncipherment SHOULD NOT be present. That is, a key intended to be
employed only with the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm SHOULD NOT employed only with the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm SHOULD NOT
also be employed for data encryption. also be employed for data encryption or for authentication such as in
signatures. Good cryptographic practice employs a given RSA key pair
in only one scheme. This practice avoids the risk that vulnerability
in one scheme may compromise the security of the other, and may be
essential to maintain provable security.
2.4 SMIMECapabilities Attribute Conventions 2.4 SMIMECapabilities Attribute Conventions
RFC 2633 [MSG], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities signed RFC 2633 [MSG], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities signed
attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs) to be attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs) to be
used to specify a partial list of algorithms that the software used to specify a partial list of algorithms that the software
announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support. When constructing a announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support. When constructing a
signedData object, compliant software MAY include the signedData object, compliant software MAY include the
SMIMECapabilities signed attribute announcing that it supports the SMIMECapabilities signed attribute announcing that it supports the
RSA-KEM Key Transport algorithm. RSA-KEM Key Transport algorithm.
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encapsulation mechanism [SHOUP]. While in practice a random-oracle encapsulation mechanism [SHOUP]. While in practice a random-oracle
result does not provide an actual security proof for any particular result does not provide an actual security proof for any particular
key derivation function, the result does provide assurance that the key derivation function, the result does provide assurance that the
general construction is reasonable; a key derivation function would general construction is reasonable; a key derivation function would
need to be particularly weak to lead to an attack that is not need to be particularly weak to lead to an attack that is not
possible in the random oracle model. possible in the random oracle model.
The RSA key size and the underlying components should be selected The RSA key size and the underlying components should be selected
consistent with the desired symmetric security level for an consistent with the desired symmetric security level for an
application. Several security levels have been identified in [NIST- application. Several security levels have been identified in [NIST-
GUIDELINE]. For brevity, the first three levels are mentioned here: FIPS PUB 800-57]. For brevity, the first three levels are mentioned
here:
* 80-bit security. The RSA key size SHOULD be at least 1024 bits, * 80-bit security. The RSA key size SHOULD be at least 1024 bits,
the hash function underlying KDF2 SHOULD be SHA-1 or above, and the hash function underlying the KDF SHOULD be SHA-1 or above,
the symmetric key-wrapping scheme SHOULD be AES Key Wrap or and the symmetric key-wrapping scheme SHOULD be AES Key Wrap,
Triple-DES Key Wrap. Triple-DES Key Wrap, or Camillia Key Wrap.
* 112-bit security. The RSA key size SHOULD be at least 2048 * 112-bit security. The RSA key size SHOULD be at least 2048
bits, the hash function underlying KDF2 SHOULD be SHA-224 or bits, the hash function underlying the KDF SHOULD be SHA-224 or
above, and the symmetric key-wrapping scheme SHOULD be AES Key above, and the symmetric key-wrapping scheme SHOULD be AES Key
Wrap or Triple-DES Key Wrap. Wrap, Triple-DES Key Wrap, or Camillia Key Wrap.
* 128-bit security. The RSA key size SHOULD be at least 3072 * 128-bit security. The RSA key size SHOULD be at least 3072
bits, the hash function underlying KDF2 SHOULD be SHA-256 or bits, the hash function underlying the KDF SHOULD be SHA-256 or
above, and the symmetric key-wrapping scheme SHOULD be AES Key above, and the symmetric key-wrapping scheme SHOULD be AES Key
Wrap. Wrap or Camillia Key Wrap.
Note that the AES Key Wrap MAY be used at all three of these levels; Note that the AES Key Wrap or Camillia Key Wrap MAY be used at all
the use of AES does not require a 128-bit security level for other three of these levels; the use of AES or Camillia does not require a
components. 128-bit security level for other components.
Implementations MUST protect the RSA private key and the content- Implementations MUST protect the RSA private key and the content-
encryption key. Compromise of the RSA private key may result in the encryption key. Compromise of the RSA private key may result in the
disclosure of all messages protected with that key. Compromise of the disclosure of all messages protected with that key. Compromise of the
content-encryption key may result in disclosure of the associated content-encryption key may result in disclosure of the associated
encrypted content. encrypted content.
Additional considerations related to key management may be found in Additional considerations related to key management may be found in
[NIST-GUIDELINE]. [NIST-GUIDELINE].
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Accordingly, an RSA key pair used for the RSA-KEM Key Transport Accordingly, an RSA key pair used for the RSA-KEM Key Transport
Algorithm SHOULD NOT also be used for digital signatures. (Indeed, Algorithm SHOULD NOT also be used for digital signatures. (Indeed,
ASC X9 requires such a separation between key establishment key pairs ASC X9 requires such a separation between key establishment key pairs
and digital signature key pairs.) Continuing this principle of key and digital signature key pairs.) Continuing this principle of key
separation, a key pair used for the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm separation, a key pair used for the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm
SHOULD NOT be used with other key establishment schemes, or for data SHOULD NOT be used with other key establishment schemes, or for data
encryption, or with more than one set of underlying algorithm encryption, or with more than one set of underlying algorithm
components. components.
Parties MAY wish to formalize the assurance that one another's Parties MAY formalize the assurance that one another's
implementations are correct through implementation validation, e.g. implementations are correct through implementation validation, e.g.
NIST's Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). NIST's Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP).
4. References 4. References
4.1 Normative References 4.1 Normative References
3DES-WRAP Housley, R. Triple-DES and RC2 Key Wrapping. RFC 3DES-WRAP Housley, R. Triple-DES and RC2 Key Wrapping. RFC
3217. December 2001. 3217. December 2001.
AES-WRAP Schaad, J. and R. Housley. Advanced Encryption AES-WRAP Schaad, J. and R. Housley. Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm. RFC 3394. Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm. RFC 3394.
September 2002. September 2002.
ANS-X9.63 American National Standard X9.63-2002: Public Key ANS-X9.63 American National Standard X9.63-2002: Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry:
Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic
Curve Cryptography. Curve Cryptography.
CAMILLIA Kato, A., Moriai, S., and Kanda, M.: The Camellia
Cipher Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec. RFC 4312.
December 2005
CMS Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax. RFC CMS Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax. RFC
3369. August 2002. 3369. August 2002.
CMSALGS Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) CMSALGS Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms. RFC 3370. August 2002. Algorithms. RFC 3370. August 2002.
FIPS-180-2 National Institute of Standards and Technology FIPS-180-2 National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). FIPS 180-2: Secure Hash Standard. August (NIST). FIPS 180-2: Secure Hash Standard. August
2002. 2002.
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Profile. RFC 3280. April 2002. Profile. RFC 3280. April 2002.
STDWORDS Bradner, S. Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate STDWORDS Bradner, S. Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels. RFC 2119. March 1997. Requirement Levels. RFC 2119. March 1997.
4.2 Informative References 4.2 Informative References
ANS-X9.44 ASC X9F1 Working Group. Draft American National ANS-X9.44 ASC X9F1 Working Group. Draft American National
Standard X9.44: Public Key Cryptography for the Standard X9.44: Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry -- Key Establishment Financial Services Industry -- Key Establishment
Using Integer Factorization Cryptography. Draft D6, Using Integer Factorization Cryptography. Draft
October 15, 2003. D11, January 2006.
CMS-OAEP Housley, R. Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport CMS-OAEP Housley, R. Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport
Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS). RFC 3560. July 2003. (CMS). RFC 3560. July 2003.
IEEE-P1363a IEEE P1363 Working Group. IEEE P1363a: Standard IEEE-P1363a IEEE Std 1363a-2004: Standard Specifications for
Specifications for Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography: Additional Techniques.
Additional Techniques. Draft D12, May 12, 2003. IEEE, 2004.
Available via http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363.
ISO-IEC-18033-2 ISO/IEC 18033-2: Information technology -- Security ISO-IEC-18033-2 ISO/IEC 18033-2:2005 Information technology --
techniques -- Encryption algorithms Part 2: Security techniques -- Encryption algorithms
Asymmetric Ciphers. 2nd Committee Draft, July 10, Part 2: Asymmetric Ciphers. ISO/IEC, 2005.
2003.
NESSIE NESSIE Consortium. Portfolio of Recommended NESSIE NESSIE Consortium. Portfolio of Recommended
Cryptographic Primitives. February 27, 2003. Cryptographic Primitives. February 27, 2003.
Available via http://www.cryptonessie.org/. Available via http://www.cryptonessie.org/.
NIST-GUIDELINE National Institute of Standards and Technology. NIST-GUIDELINE National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
Management. Part 1: General Guideline. Draft, Management. Part 1: General Guideline. August 2005.
January 2003. Available via Available via http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/index.html.
http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/tkkeymgmt.html.
PKCS1 Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski. PKCS #1: RSA PKCS1 Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski. PKCS #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1. RFC 3447. Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1. RFC 3447.
February 2003. February 2003.
RANDOM Eastlake, D., S. Crocker, and J. Schiller. RANDOM Eastlake, D., S. Crocker, and J. Schiller.
Randomness Recommendations for Security. RFC 1750. Randomness Recommendations for Security. RFC 1750.
December 1994. December 1994.
SHOUP Shoup, V. A Proposal for an ISO Standard for SHOUP Shoup, V. A Proposal for an ISO Standard for
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were assigned in other IETF documents, in ISO/IEC standards were assigned in other IETF documents, in ISO/IEC standards
documents, by the National Institute of Standards and Technology documents, by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), and in Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) documents. (NIST), and in Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) documents.
The one exception is that the ASN.1 module's identifier (see Appendix The one exception is that the ASN.1 module's identifier (see Appendix
B.3) is assigned in this document. No further action by the IANA is B.3) is assigned in this document. No further action by the IANA is
necessary for this document or any anticipated updates. necessary for this document or any anticipated updates.
6. Acknowledgments 6. Acknowledgments
This document is one part of a strategy to align algorithm standards This document is one part of a strategy to align algorithm standards
produced by ASC X9, ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27, NIST, and the IETF. I would produced by ASC X9, ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27, NIST, and the IETF. We would
like to thank the members of the ASC X9F1 working group for their like to thank the members of the ASC X9F1 working group for their
contributions to drafts of ANS X9.44 which led to this specification. contributions to drafts of ANS X9.44 which led to this specification.
My thanks as well to Russ Housley as well for his guidance and Our thanks to Russ Housley as well for his guidance and
encouragement. I also appreciate the helpful direction I've received encouragement. We also appreciate the helpful direction we've
from Blake Ramsdell and Jim Schaad in bringing this document to received from Blake Ramsdell and Jim Schaad in bringing this document
fruition. to fruition.
7. Author's Address 7. Authors' Addresses
James Randall
Burt Kaliski Burt Kaliski
RSA Laboratories RSA Laboratories
174 Middlesex Turnpike 174 Middlesex Turnpike
Bedford, MA 01730 Bedford, MA 01730
USA USA
bkaliski@rsasecurity.com {jrandall, bkaliski}@rsasecurity.com
Appendix A. RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm Appendix A. RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm
The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward) The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward)
mechanism for transporting keying data to a recipient using the mechanism for transporting keying data to a recipient using the
recipient's RSA public key. recipient's RSA public key.
With this type of algorithm, a sender encrypts the keying data using With this type of algorithm, a sender encrypts the keying data using
the recipient's public key to obtain encrypted keying data. The the recipient's public key to obtain encrypted keying data. The
recipient decrypts the encrypted keying data using the recipient's recipient decrypts the encrypted keying data using the recipient's
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specified length from a shared secret value specified length from a shared secret value
* Wrap, a symmetric key-wrapping scheme, which encrypts keying * Wrap, a symmetric key-wrapping scheme, which encrypts keying
data using a key-encrypting key data using a key-encrypting key
In the following, kekLen denotes the length in bytes of the key- In the following, kekLen denotes the length in bytes of the key-
encrypting key for the underlying symmetric key-wrapping scheme. encrypting key for the underlying symmetric key-wrapping scheme.
In this scheme, the length of the keying data to be transported MUST In this scheme, the length of the keying data to be transported MUST
be among the lengths supported by the underlying symmetric key- be among the lengths supported by the underlying symmetric key-
wrapping scheme. (The AES Key Wrap, for instance, requires the length wrapping scheme. (Bothe the AES and Camillia Key Wraps, for instance,
of the keying data to be a multiple of 8 bytes, and at least 16 require the length of the keying data to be a multiple of 8 bytes,
bytes.) Usage and formatting of the keying data (e.g., parity and at least 16 bytes.) Usage and formatting of the keying data
adjustment for Triple-DES keys) is outside the scope of this (e.g., parity adjustment for Triple-DES keys) is outside the scope of
algorithm. this algorithm. With some key derivation functions, it is possible to
include other information besides the shared secret value in the
With some key derivation functions, it is possible to include other input to the function. Also, with some symmetric key-wrapping
information besides the shared secret value in the input to the schemes, it is possible to associate a label with the keying data.
function. Also, with some symmetric key-wrapping schemes, it is Such uses are outside the scope of this document, as they are not
possible to associate a label with the keying data. Such uses are directly supported by CMS.
outside the scope of this document, as they are not directly
supported by CMS.
A.2 Sender's Operations A.2 Sender's Operations
Let (n,e) be the recipient's RSA public key (see [PKCS1] for details) Let (n,e) be the recipient's RSA public key (see [PKCS1] for details)
and let K be the keying data to be transported. and let K be the keying data to be transported.
Let nLen denote the length in bytes of the modulus n, i.e., the least Let nLen denote the length in bytes of the modulus n, i.e., the least
integer such that 2^{8*nLen} > n. integer such that 2^{8*nLen} > n.
The sender performs the following operations: The sender performs the following operations:
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of the implementation SHOULD be the same at these steps for all of the implementation SHOULD be the same at these steps for all
ciphertexts C that are in range. (For example, IntegerToString ciphertexts C that are in range. (For example, IntegerToString
conversion should take the same amount of time regardless of the conversion should take the same amount of time regardless of the
actual value of the integer z.) The integer z, the string Z and other actual value of the integer z.) The integer z, the string Z and other
intermediate results MUST be securely deleted when they are no longer intermediate results MUST be securely deleted when they are no longer
needed. needed.
Appendix B. ASN.1 Syntax Appendix B. ASN.1 Syntax
The ASN.1 syntax for identifying the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm The ASN.1 syntax for identifying the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm
is an extension of the syntax for the "generic hybrid cipher" in the is an extension of the syntax for the "generic hybrid cipher" in
draft ISO/IEC 18033-2 [ISO-IEC-18033-2], and is the same as employed ISO/IEC 18033-2 [ISO-IEC-18033-2], and is the same as employed in the
in the draft ANS X9.44 [ANS-X9.44]. The syntax for the scheme is draft ANS X9.44 [ANS-X9.44]. The syntax for the scheme is given in
given in Section B.1. The syntax for selected underlying components Section B.1. The syntax for selected underlying components including
including those mentioned above is given in B.2. those mentioned above is given in B.2.
The following object identifier prefixes are used in the definitions The following object identifier prefixes are used in the definitions
below: below:
is18033-2 OID ::= { iso(1) standard(0) is18033(18033) part2(2) } is18033-2 OID ::= { iso(1) standard(0) is18033(18033) part2(2) }
nistAlgorithm OID ::= { nistAlgorithm OID ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
} }
skipping to change at page 12, line 18 skipping to change at page 13, line 4
The following object identifier prefixes are used in the definitions The following object identifier prefixes are used in the definitions
below: below:
is18033-2 OID ::= { iso(1) standard(0) is18033(18033) part2(2) } is18033-2 OID ::= { iso(1) standard(0) is18033(18033) part2(2) }
nistAlgorithm OID ::= { nistAlgorithm OID ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
} }
pkcs-1 OID ::= { pkcs-1 OID ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1)
} }
NullParms is a more descriptive synonym for NULL when an algorithm NullParms is a more descriptive synonym for NULL when an algorithm
identifier has null parameters: identifier has null parameters:
NullParms ::= NULL NullParms ::= NULL
The material in this Appendix is based on a draft standard and is The material in this Appendix is based on a draft standard, ANS
SUBJECT TO CHANGE as that standard is developed. X9.44, and is SUBJECT TO CHANGE as that standard is developed.
B.1 RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm B.1 RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm
The object identifier for the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is the The object identifier for the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is the
same as for the "generic hybrid cipher" in the draft ANS ISO/IEC same as for the "generic hybrid cipher" in the draft ANS ISO/IEC
18033-2, id-ac-generic-hybrid, which is defined in the draft as 18033-2, id-ac-generic-hybrid, which is defined in the draft as
id-ac-generic-hybrid OID ::= { id-ac-generic-hybrid OID ::= {
is18033-2 asymmetric-cipher(1) generic-hybrid(2) is18033-2 asymmetric-cipher(1) generic-hybrid(2)
} }
skipping to change at page 12, line 54 skipping to change at page 13, line 39
GenericHybridParameters ::= { GenericHybridParameters ::= {
kem KeyEncapsulationMechanism, kem KeyEncapsulationMechanism,
dem DataEncapsulationMechanism dem DataEncapsulationMechanism
} }
The fields of type GenericHybridParameters have the following The fields of type GenericHybridParameters have the following
meanings: meanings:
* kem identifies the underlying key encapsulation mechanism. For * kem identifies the underlying key encapsulation mechanism. For
the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm, the scheme is RSA-KEM from the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm, the scheme is RSA-KEM from
the draft ISO/IEC 18033-2. ISO/IEC 18033-2.
The object identifier for RSA-KEM (as a key encapsulation The object identifier for RSA-KEM (as a key encapsulation
mechanism) is id-kem-rsa, which is defined in the draft ISO/IEC mechanism) is id-kem-rsa, which is defined in ISO/IEC 18033-2
18033-2 as as
id-kem-rsa OID ::= { id-kem-rsa OID ::= {
is18033-2 key-encapsulation-mechanism(2) rsa(4) is18033-2 key-encapsulation-mechanism(2) rsa(4)
} }
The associated parameters for id-kem-rsa have type The associated parameters for id-kem-rsa have type
RsaKemParameters: RsaKemParameters:
RsaKemParameters ::= { RsaKemParameters ::= {
keyDerivationFunction KeyDerivationFunction, keyDerivationFunction KeyDerivationFunction,
keyLength KeyLength keyLength KeyLength
} }
The fields of type RsaKemParameters have the following The fields of type RsaKemParameters have the following
meanings: meanings:
* keyDerivationFunction identifies the underlying key * keyDerivationFunction identifies the underlying key
derivation function. For alignment with the draft ANS derivation function. For alignment with the draft ANS
X9.44, it MUST be KDF2. However, other key derivation X9.44, it MUST be KDF2 or KDF3. However, other key
functions MAY be used with CMS. Please see B.2.1 for the derivation functions MAY be used with CMS. Please see
syntax for KDF2. B.2.1 for the syntax for KDF2 and KDF3.
KeyDerivationFunction ::= KeyDerivationFunction ::=
AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDFAlgorithms}} AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDFAlgorithms}}
KDFAlgorithms ALGORITHMS ::= { KDFAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
kdf2, kdf2 | kdf3,
... -- implementations may define other methods ... -- implementations may define other methods
} }
* keyLength is the length in bytes of the key-encrypting * keyLength is the length in bytes of the key-encrypting
key, which depends on the underlying symmetric key- key, which depends on the underlying symmetric key-
wrapping scheme. wrapping scheme.
KeyLength ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) KeyLength ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
* dem identifies the underlying data encapsulation mechanism. * dem identifies the underlying data encapsulation mechanism.
For alignment with the draft ANS X9.44, it MUST be an X9- For alignment with the draft ANS X9.44, it MUST be an X9-
approved symmetric key-wrapping scheme. (See Note.) However, approved symmetric key-wrapping scheme. (See Note.) However,
other symmetric key-wrapping schemes MAY be used with CMS. other symmetric key-wrapping schemes MAY be used with CMS.
Please see B.2.2 for the syntax for the AES and Triple-DES Key Please see B.2.2 for the syntax for the AES, Triple-DES, and
Wraps. Camillia Key Wraps.
DataEncapsulationMechanism ::= DataEncapsulationMechanism ::=
AlgorithmIdentifier {{DEMAlgorithms}} AlgorithmIdentifier {{DEMAlgorithms}}
DEMAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { DEMAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes, X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes,
Camillia-KeyWrappingSchemes,
... -- implementations may define other methods ... -- implementations may define other methods
} }
X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= { X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= {
aes128-Wrap | aes192-Wrap | aes256-Wrap | tdes-Wrap, aes128-Wrap | aes192-Wrap | aes256-Wrap | tdes-Wrap,
... -- allows for future expansion ... -- allows for future expansion
} }
Camillia-KeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= {
camillia128-Wrap | camillia192-Wrap | camillia256-Wrap
}
NOTE: The generic hybrid cipher in the draft ISO/IEC 18033-2 can NOTE: The generic hybrid cipher in ISO/IEC 18033-2 can encrypt
encrypt arbitrary data, hence the term "data encapsulation arbitrary data, hence the term "data encapsulation mechanism". The
mechanism". The symmetric key-wrapping schemes take the role of data symmetric key-wrapping schemes take the role of data encapsulation
encapsulation mechanisms in the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm. The mechanisms in the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm. ISO/IEC 18033-2
draft ISO/IEC 18033-2 currently allows only three particular data allows only three specific data encapsulation mechanisms, not
encapsulation mechanisms, not including any of these symmetric key- including any of these symmetric key-wrapping schemes. However, the
wrapping schemes. However, the ASN.1 syntax in that document expects ASN.1 syntax in that document expects that additional algorithms will
that additional algorithms will be allowed. be allowed.
B.2 Selected Underlying Components B.2 Selected Underlying Components
B.2.1 Key Derivation Functions B.2.1 Key Derivation Functions
The object identifier for KDF2 (see [ISO-IEC-18033-2]) is The object identifier for KDF2 (see [ISO-IEC-18033-2]) is
id-kdf-kdf2 OID ::= {
is18033-2 key-derivation-functions(5) kdf2(2)
}
The associated parameters identify the underlying hash function. For The associated parameters identify the underlying hash function. For
alignment with the draft ANS X9.44, the hash function MUST be an ASC alignment with the draft ANS X9.44, the hash function MUST be an ASC
X9-approved hash function. (See Note.) However, other hash functions X9-approved hash function. However, other hash functions MAY be used
MAY be used with CMS. with CMS.
kdf2 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-kdf-kdf2 PARMS KDF2-HashFunction }} kdf2 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-kdf-kdf2 PARMS KDF2-HashFunction }}
KDF2-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDF2-HashFunctions}} KDF2-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDF2-HashFunctions}}
KDF2-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= { KDF2-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
X9-HashFunctions, X9-HashFunctions,
... -- implementations may define other methods ... -- implementations may define other methods
} }
skipping to change at page 14, line 53 skipping to change at page 16, line 4
sha1 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512, sha1 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512,
... -- allows for future expansion ... -- allows for future expansion
} }
The object identifier for SHA-1 is The object identifier for SHA-1 is
id-sha1 OID ::= { id-sha1 OID ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
algorithms(2) sha1(26) algorithms(2) sha1(26)
} }
The object identifiers for SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 are
The object identifiers for SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 are id-sha224 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha224(4) }
id-sha256 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(1) } id-sha256 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(1) }
id-sha384 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha384(2) } id-sha384 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha384(2) }
id-sha512 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha512(3) } id-sha512 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha512(3) }
There has been some confusion over whether the various SHA object There has been some confusion over whether the various SHA object
identifiers have a NULL parameter, or no associated parameters. As identifiers have a NULL parameter, or no associated parameters. As
also discussed in [PKCS1], implementations SHOULD generate algorithm also discussed in [PKCS1], implementations SHOULD generate algorithm
identifiers without parameters, and MUST accept algorithm identifiers identifiers without parameters, and MUST accept algorithm identifiers
either without parameters, or with NULL parameters. either without parameters, or with NULL parameters.
sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha1 }} -- NULLParms MUST be sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha1 }} -- NULLParms MUST be
sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha224 }} -- accepted for these sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha224 }} -- accepted for these
sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha256 }} -- OIDs sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha256 }} -- OIDs
sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha384 }} - "" sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha384 }} - ""
sha512 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha512 }} - "" sha512 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha512 }} - ""
NOTE: As of this writing, only SHA-1 is an ASC X9-approved hash The object identifier for KDF3 is:
function; SHA-224 and above are in the process of being approved. The
object identifier for SHA-224 has not yet been assigned. id-kdf-kdf3 OID ::= {
to be assigned
}
The associated parameters identify the underlying hash function. For
alignment with the draft ANS X9.44, the hash function MUST be an ASC
X9-approved hash function. (See Note.) However, other hash functions
MAY be used with CMS.
kdf3 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-kdf-kdf3 PARMS KDF3-HashFunction }}
KDF3-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDF3-HashFunctions}}
KDF3-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
X9-HashFunctions,
... -- implementations may define other methods
}
B.2.2 Symmetric Key-Wrapping Schemes B.2.2 Symmetric Key-Wrapping Schemes
The object identifiers for the AES Key Wrap depends on the size of The object identifiers for the AES Key Wrap depends on the size of
the key encrypting key. There are three object identifiers (see the key encrypting key. There are three object identifiers (see
[AES-WRAP]): [AES-WRAP]):
id-aes128-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes128-Wrap(5) } id-aes128-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes128-Wrap(5) }
id-aes192-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes192-Wrap(25) } id-aes192-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes192-Wrap(25) }
id-aes256-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes256-Wrap(45) } id-aes256-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes256-Wrap(45) }
skipping to change at page 16, line 5 skipping to change at page 17, line 26
} }
This object identifier has a NULL parameter. This object identifier has a NULL parameter.
tdes-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= tdes-Wrap ALGORITHM ::=
{{ OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NullParms }} {{ OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NullParms }}
NOTE: As of this writing, the AES Key Wrap and the Triple-DES Key NOTE: As of this writing, the AES Key Wrap and the Triple-DES Key
Wrap are in the process of being approved by ASC X9. Wrap are in the process of being approved by ASC X9.
The object identifiers for the Camillia Key Wrap depends on the size of
the key encrypting key. There are three object identifiers:
id-camellia128-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
camellia128-wrap(2) }
id-camellia192-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
camellia192-wrap(3) }
id-camellia256-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
camellia256-wrap(4) }
These object identifiers have no associated parameters.
camellia128-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-camellia128-wrap }}
camellia192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-camellia192-wrap }}
camellia256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-camellia256-wrap }}
B.3 ASN.1 module B.3 ASN.1 module
CMS-RSA-KEM CMS-RSA-KEM
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms-rsa-kem(21) } [[check]] pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms-rsa-kem(21) } [[check]]
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- EXPORTS ALL
skipping to change at page 17, line 27 skipping to change at page 19, line 27
} }
RsaKemParameters ::= { RsaKemParameters ::= {
keyDerivationFunction KeyDerivationFunction, keyDerivationFunction KeyDerivationFunction,
keyLength KeyLength keyLength KeyLength
} }
KeyDerivationFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDFAlgorithms}} KeyDerivationFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDFAlgorithms}}
KDFAlgorithms ALGORITHMS ::= { KDFAlgorithms ALGORITHMS ::= {
kdf2, kdf2 | kdf3,
... -- implementations may define other methods ... -- implementations may define other methods
} }
KeyLength ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) KeyLength ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
DataEncapsulationMechanism ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{DEMAlgorithms}} DataEncapsulationMechanism ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{DEMAlgorithms}}
DEMAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { DEMAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes, X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes,
Camillia-KeyWrappingSchemes,
... -- implementations may define other methods ... -- implementations may define other methods
} }
X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= { X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= {
aes128-Wrap | aes192-Wrap | aes256-Wrap | tdes-Wrap, aes128-Wrap | aes192-Wrap | aes256-Wrap | tdes-Wrap,
... -- allows for future expansion ... -- allows for future expansion
} }
Camillia-KeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= {
camillia128-Wrap | camillia192-Wrap | camillia128-Wrap
}
-- Key Derivation Functions -- Key Derivation Functions
id-kdf-kdf2 OID ::= { is18033-2 key-derivation-functions(5) kdf2(2) } id-kdf-kdf2 OID ::= { is18033-2 key-derivation-functions(5) kdf2(2) }
kdf2 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-kdf-kdf2 PARMS KDF2-HashFunction }} kdf2 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-kdf-kdf2 PARMS KDF2-HashFunction }}
KDF2-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDF2-HashFunctions}} KDF2-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDF2-HashFunctions}}
KDF2-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= { KDF2-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
X9-HashFunctions, X9-HashFunctions,
... -- implementations may define other methods ... -- implementations may define other methods
} }
-- id-kdf-kdf3 OID ::= (to be assigned)
kdf3 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-kdf-kdf2 PARMS KDF3-HashFunction }}
KDF3-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDF3-HashFunctions}}
KDF3-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
X9-HashFunctions,
... -- implementations may define other methods
}
-- Hash Functions -- Hash Functions
X9-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= { X9-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
sha1 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512, sha1 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512,
... -- allows for future expansion ... -- allows for future expansion
} }
id-sha1 OID ::= { id-sha1 OID ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
algorithms(2) sha1(26) algorithms(2) sha1(26)
} }
id-sha224 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(4) }
id-sha256 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(1) } id-sha256 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(1) }
id-sha384 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha384(2) } id-sha384 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha384(2) }
id-sha512 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha512(3) } id-sha512 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha512(3) }
sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha1 }} -- NullParms MUST be sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha1 }} -- NullParms MUST be
sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha224 }} -- accepted for these sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha224 }} -- accepted for these
sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha256 }} -- OIDs sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha256 }} -- OIDs
sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha384 }} - "" sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha384 }} - ""
sha512 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha512 }} - "" sha512 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha512 }} - ""
skipping to change at page 18, line 43 skipping to change at page 21, line 15
aes192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-aes192-wrap }} aes192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-aes192-wrap }}
aes256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-aes256-wrap }} aes256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-aes256-wrap }}
id-alg-CMS3DESwrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg-CMS3DESwrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) alg(3) 6 smime(16) alg(3) 6
} }
tdes-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NullParms }} tdes-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NullParms }}
id-camellia128-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
camellia128-wrap(2) }
id-camellia192-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
camellia192-wrap(3) }
id-camellia256-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
camellia256-wrap(4) }
camellia128-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-camellia128-wrap }}
camellia192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-camellia192-wrap }}
camellia256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-camellia256-wrap }}
B.4 Examples B.4 Examples
As an example, if the key derivation function is KDF2 based on As an example, if the key derivation function is KDF2 based on
SHA-256 and the symmetric key-wrapping scheme is the AES Key Wrap SHA-256 and the symmetric key-wrapping scheme is the AES Key Wrap
with a 128-bit KEK, the AlgorithmIdentifier for the RSA-KEM Key with a 128-bit KEK, the AlgorithmIdentifier for the RSA-KEM Key
Transport Algorithm will have the following value: Transport Algorithm will have the following value:
SEQUENCE { SEQUENCE {
id-ac-generic-hybrid, -- generic cipher id-ac-generic-hybrid, -- generic cipher
SEQUENCE { -- GenericHybridParameters SEQUENCE { -- GenericHybridParameters
skipping to change at page 20, line 11 skipping to change at page 23, line 33
30 4f 06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 01 02 30 44 30 21 06 30 4f 06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 01 02 30 44 30 21 06
07 28 81 8c 71 02 02 04 30 16 30 12 06 07 28 81 07 28 81 8c 71 02 02 04 30 16 30 12 06 07 28 81
8c 71 02 05 02 30 07 06 05 2b 0e 03 02 1a 02 10 8c 71 02 05 02 30 07 06 05 2b 0e 03 02 1a 02 10
30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05
00 00
* KDF2 based on SHA-224, Triple-DES Key Wrap with a 192-bit * KDF2 based on SHA-224, Triple-DES Key Wrap with a 192-bit
KEK (three-key triple-DES) KEK (three-key triple-DES)
[[to be defined, awaiting OID for SHA-224]] [[to be defined]]
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph
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