draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-03.txt   draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-04.txt 
S/MIME Working Group J. Randall S/MIME Working Group J. Randall
Internet Draft RSA Security Internet Draft RSA
Document: draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-03.txt B.Kaliski Document: draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-04.txt B.Kaliski
Category: Standards EMC Corp. Category: Standards EMC Corp.
Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in CMS Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in CMS
<draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-03.txt> <draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-04.txt>
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Comments or suggestions for improvement may be made on the "ietf- Comments or suggestions for improvement may be made on the "ietf-
smime" mailing list, or directly to the author. smime" mailing list, or directly to the author.
Abstract Abstract
The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward) The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward)
mechanism for transporting keying data to a recipient using the mechanism for transporting keying data to a recipient using the
recipient's RSA public key. This document specifies the conventions recipient's RSA public key. This document specifies the conventions
for using the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm with the Cryptographic for using the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm with the Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS). This version (-03) updates the ASN.1 syntax to Message Syntax (CMS). The ASN.1 syntax is aligned with ANS X9.44 and
align with ANS X9.44 and ISO/IEC 18033-2. ISO/IEC 18033-2.
Conventions Used in This Document Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119
[STDWORDS]. [STDWORDS].
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
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the input to the underlying RSA operation is random and independent the input to the underlying RSA operation is random and independent
of the message, and the key-encrypting key KEK is derived from it in of the message, and the key-encrypting key KEK is derived from it in
a strong way. As a result, the algorithm enjoys a "tight" security a strong way. As a result, the algorithm enjoys a "tight" security
proof in the random oracle model. It is also architecturally proof in the random oracle model. It is also architecturally
convenient because the public-key operations are separate from the convenient because the public-key operations are separate from the
symmetric operations on the keying data. One benefit is that the symmetric operations on the keying data. One benefit is that the
length of the keying data is bounded only by the symmetric key- length of the keying data is bounded only by the symmetric key-
wrapping scheme, not the size of the RSA modulus. wrapping scheme, not the size of the RSA modulus.
The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in various forms is being adopted The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in various forms is being adopted
in several draft standards as well as in ANS-X9.44 and ISO/IEC 18033-2. in several draft standards as well as in ANS-X9.44 and ISO/IEC
It has also been recommended by the NESSIE project [NESSIE]. For 18033-2. It has also been recommended by the NESSIE project [NESSIE].
completeness, a specification of the algorithm is given in Appendix A For completeness, a specification of the algorithm is given in
of this document; ASN.1 syntax is given in Appendix B. Appendix A of this document; ASN.1 syntax is given in Appendix B.
NOTE: The term KEM stands for "key encapsulation mechanism" and NOTE: The term KEM stands for "key encapsulation mechanism" and
refers to the first three steps of the process above. The refers to the first three steps of the process above. The
formalization of key transport algorithms (or more generally, formalization of key transport algorithms (or more generally,
asymmetric encryption schemes) in terms of key encapsulation asymmetric encryption schemes) in terms of key encapsulation
mechanisms is described further in research by Victor Shoup leading mechanisms is described further in research by Victor Shoup leading
to the development of the ISO/IEC 18033-2 standard [SHOUP]. to the development of the ISO/IEC 18033-2 standard [SHOUP].
2. Use in CMS 2. Use in CMS
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security proof, but the disadvantage of slightly longer encrypted security proof, but the disadvantage of slightly longer encrypted
keying data. keying data.
2.1 Underlying Components 2.1 Underlying Components
A CMS implementation that supports the RSA-KEM Key Transport A CMS implementation that supports the RSA-KEM Key Transport
Algorithm MUST support at least the following underlying components: Algorithm MUST support at least the following underlying components:
* For the key derivation function, KDF2 or KDF3 (see [ANS-X9.44] * For the key derivation function, KDF2 or KDF3 (see [ANS-X9.44]
[IEEE-P1363a]) based on SHA-1 (see [FIPS-180-2]) (this function [IEEE-P1363a]) based on SHA-1 (see [FIPS-180-2]) (this function
is also specified as the key derivation function in [ANS-X9.63]) is also specified as the key derivation function in
[ANS-X9.63]).
* For the key-wrapping scheme, AES-Wrap-128, i.e., the AES Key * For the key-wrapping scheme, AES-Wrap-128, i.e., the AES Key
Wrap with a 128-bit key encrypting key (see [AES-WRAP]) Wrap with a 128-bit key encrypting key (see [AES-WRAP])
An implementation SHOULD also support KDF2 and KDF3 based on SHA-256 An implementation SHOULD also support KDF2 and KDF3 based on SHA-256
(see [FIPS-180-2]), the Triple-DES Key Wrap (see [3DES-WRAP]) and the (see [FIPS-180-2]). The Camillia key wrap algorithm (see [CAMILLIA])
Camillia key wrap algorithm (see [Camillia]). It MAY support other should be supported, and, if 3DES is supported as a content-
underlying components. When AES or Camilla are used the data block encryption cipher, then the Triple-DES Key Wrap (see [3DES-WRAP])
size is 128 bits while the key size can be 128, 192, or 256 bits SHOULD also be supported.
while Triple DES requires a data block size of 64 bits and a key size
of 112 or 168 bits. It MAY support other underlying components. When AES or Camilla are
used the data block size is 128 bits while the key size can be 128,
192, or 256 bits while Triple DES requires a data block size of 64
bits and a key size of 112 or 168 bits.
2.2 RecipientInfo Conventions 2.2 RecipientInfo Conventions
When the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is employed for a recipient, When the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is employed for a recipient,
the RecipientInfo alternative for that recipient MUST be the RecipientInfo alternative for that recipient MUST be
KeyTransRecipientInfo. The algorithm-specific fields of the KeyTransRecipientInfo. The algorithm-specific fields of the
KeyTransRecipientInfo value MUST have the following values: KeyTransRecipientInfo value MUST have the following values:
* keyEncryptionAlgorithm.algorithm MUST be id-ac-generic-hybrid * keyEncryptionAlgorithm.algorithm MUST be id-ac-generic-hybrid
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components. components.
Parties MAY formalize the assurance that one another's Parties MAY formalize the assurance that one another's
implementations are correct through implementation validation, e.g. implementations are correct through implementation validation, e.g.
NIST's Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). NIST's Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP).
4. References 4. References
4.1 Normative References 4.1 Normative References
3DES-WRAP Housley, R. Triple-DES and RC2 Key Wrapping. RFC [3DES-WRAP] Housley, R. Triple-DES and RC2 Key Wrapping. RFC
3217. December 2001. 3217. December 2001.
AES-WRAP Schaad, J. and R. Housley. Advanced Encryption [AES-WRAP] Schaad, J. and R. Housley. Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm. RFC 3394. Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm. RFC 3394.
September 2002. September 2002.
ANS-X9.63 American National Standard X9.63-2002: Public Key [ANS-X9.63] American National Standard X9.63-2002: Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry:
Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic
Curve Cryptography. Curve Cryptography.
CAMILLIA Kato, A., Moriai, S., and Kanda, M.: The Camellia [CAMILLIA] Kato, A., Moriai, S., and Kanda, M.: The Camellia
Cipher Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec. RFC 4312. Cipher Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec. RFC 4312.
December 2005 December 2005
CMS Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax. RFC [CMS] Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax. RFC
3369. August 2002. 3852. July 2004.
CMSALGS Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMSALGS] Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms. RFC 3370. August 2002. Algorithms. RFC 3370. August 2002.
FIPS-180-2 National Institute of Standards and Technology [FIPS-180-2] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). FIPS 180-2: Secure Hash Standard. August (NIST). FIPS 180-2: Secure Hash Standard. August
2002. 2002.
MSG Ramsdell, B. S/MIME Version 3 Message [MSG] Ramsdell, B. S/MIME Version 3 Message
Specification. RFC 2633. June 1999. Specification. RFC 3851. July 2004.
PROFILE Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo. [PROFILE] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo.
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile. RFC 3280. April 2002. Profile. RFC 3280. April 2002.
STDWORDS Bradner, S. Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate [STDWORDS] Bradner, S. Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels. RFC 2119. March 1997. Requirement Levels. RFC 2119. March 1997.
4.2 Informative References 4.2 Informative References
ANS-X9.44 ASC X9F1 Working Group. American National [ANS-X9.44] ASC X9F1 Working Group. American National
Standard X9.44: Public Key Cryptography for the Standard X9.44: Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry -- Key Establishment Financial Services Industry -- Key Establishment
Using Integer Factorization Cryptography. 2007 Using Integer Factorization Cryptography. 2007
CMS-OAEP Housley, R. Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport [CMS-OAEP] Housley, R. Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport
Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS). RFC 3560. July 2003. (CMS). RFC 3560. July 2003.
IEEE-P1363a IEEE Std 1363a-2004: Standard Specifications for [IEEE-P1363a] IEEE Std 1363a-2004: Standard Specifications for
Public Key Cryptography: Additional Techniques. Public Key Cryptography: Additional Techniques.
IEEE, 2004. IEEE, 2004.
ISO-IEC-18033-2 ISO/IEC 18033-2:2005 Information technology -- [ISO-IEC-18033-2] ISO/IEC 18033-2:2005 Information technology --
Security techniques -- Encryption algorithms Security techniques -- Encryption algorithms --
Part 2: Asymmetric Ciphers. ISO/IEC, 2005. Part 2: Asymmetric Ciphers. ISO/IEC, 2005.
NESSIE NESSIE Consortium. Portfolio of Recommended [NESSIE] NESSIE Consortium. Portfolio of Recommended
Cryptographic Primitives. February 27, 2003. Cryptographic Primitives. February 27, 2003.
Available via http://www.cryptonessie.org/. Available via http://www.cryptonessie.org/.
NIST-GUIDELINE National Institute of Standards and Technology. [NIST-GUIDELINE] National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
Management. Part 1: General Guideline. August 2005. Management. Part 1: General Guideline. August 2005.
Available via: Available via:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/index.html. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/index.html.
PKCS1 Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski. PKCS #1: RSA [PKCS1] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski. PKCS #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1. RFC 3447. Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1. RFC 3447.
February 2003. February 2003.
RANDOM Eastlake, D., S. Crocker, and J. Schiller. [RANDOM] Eastlake, D., S. Crocker, and J. Schiller.
Randomness Recommendations for Security. RFC 1750. Randomness Recommendations for Security. RFC 4086.
December 1994. June 2005.
SHOUP Shoup, V. A Proposal for an ISO Standard for [SHOUP] Shoup, V. A Proposal for an ISO Standard for
Public Key Encryption. Version 2.1, December 20, Public Key Encryption. Version 2.1, December 20,
2001. Available via http://www.shoup.net/papers/. 2001. Available via http://www.shoup.net/papers/.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
Within the CMS, algorithms are identified by object identifiers Within the CMS, algorithms are identified by object identifiers
(OIDs). With one exception, all of the OIDs used in this document (OIDs). With one exception, all of the OIDs used in this document
were assigned in other IETF documents, in ISO/IEC standards were assigned in other IETF documents, in ISO/IEC standards
documents, by the National Institute of Standards and Technology documents, by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), and in Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) documents. (NIST), and in Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) documents.
The one exception is that the ASN.1 module's identifier (see Appendix The one exception is that the ASN.1 module's identifier (see Appendix
B.3) is assigned in this document. No further action by the IANA is B.3) is assigned in this document. No further action by the IANA is
necessary for this document or any anticipated updates. necessary for this document or any anticipated updates.
6. Acknowledgments 6. Acknowledgments
This document is one part of a strategy to align algorithm standards This document is one part of a strategy to align algorithm standards
produced by ASC X9, ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27, NIST, and the IETF. We would produced by ASC X9, ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27, NIST, and the IETF. We would
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like to thank the members of the ASC X9F1 working group for their like to thank the members of the ASC X9F1 working group for their
contributions to drafts of ANS X9.44 which led to this specification. contributions to drafts of ANS X9.44 which led to this specification.
Our thanks to Russ Housley as well for his guidance and Our thanks to Russ Housley as well for his guidance and
encouragement. We also appreciate the helpful direction we've encouragement. We also appreciate the helpful direction we've
received from Blake Ramsdell and Jim Schaad in bringing this document received from Blake Ramsdell and Jim Schaad in bringing this document
to fruition. to fruition.
7. Authors' Addresses 7. Authors' Addresses
James Randall James Randall
RSA Laboratories RSA, The Security Division of EMC
174 Middlesex Turnpike 174 Middlesex Turnpike
Bedford, MA 01730 Bedford, MA 01730
USA USA
e-mail: jrandall@rsasecurity.com e-mail: jrandall@rsasecurity.com
Burt Kaliski Burt Kaliski
EMC EMC
176 South Street 176 South Street
Hopkinton, MA 01748 Hopkinton, MA 01748
USA USA
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There has been some confusion over whether the various SHA object There has been some confusion over whether the various SHA object
identifiers have a NULL parameter, or no associated parameters. As identifiers have a NULL parameter, or no associated parameters. As
also discussed in [PKCS1], implementations SHOULD generate algorithm also discussed in [PKCS1], implementations SHOULD generate algorithm
identifiers without parameters, and MUST accept algorithm identifiers identifiers without parameters, and MUST accept algorithm identifiers
either without parameters, or with NULL parameters. either without parameters, or with NULL parameters.
sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha1 }} -- NULLParms MUST be sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha1 }} -- NULLParms MUST be
sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha224 }} -- accepted for these sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha224 }} -- accepted for these
sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha256 }} -- OIDs sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha256 }} -- OIDs
sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha384 }} - "" sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha384 }} -- ""
sha512 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha512 }} - "" sha512 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha512 }} -- ""
The object identifier for KDF3 (see [ANS X9.44]) is: The object identifier for KDF3 (see [ANS X9.44]) is:
id-kdf-kdf3 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf3(2) } id-kdf-kdf3 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf3(2) }
The associated parameters identify the underlying hash function. For The associated parameters identify the underlying hash function. For
alignment with the draft ANS X9.44, the hash function MUST be an ASC alignment with the draft ANS X9.44, the hash function MUST be an ASC
X9-approved hash function. (See Note.) However, other hash functions X9-approved hash function. (See Note.) However, other hash functions
MAY be used with CMS. MAY be used with CMS.
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} }
This object identifier has a NULL parameter. This object identifier has a NULL parameter.
tdes-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= tdes-Wrap ALGORITHM ::=
{{ OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NullParms }} {{ OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NullParms }}
NOTE: As of this writing, the AES Key Wrap and the Triple-DES Key NOTE: As of this writing, the AES Key Wrap and the Triple-DES Key
Wrap are in the process of being approved by ASC X9. Wrap are in the process of being approved by ASC X9.
The object identifiers for the Camillia Key Wrap depends on the size of The object identifiers for the Camillia Key Wrap depends on the size
the key encrypting key. There are three object identifiers: of the key encrypting key. There are three object identifiers:
id-camellia128-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-camellia128-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3) algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
camellia128-wrap(2) } camellia128-wrap(2) }
id-camellia192-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-camellia192-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3) algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
camellia192-wrap(3) } camellia192-wrap(3) }
id-camellia256-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-camellia256-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
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X9-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= { X9-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
sha1 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512, sha1 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512,
... -- allows for future expansion ... -- allows for future expansion
} }
id-sha1 OID ::= { id-sha1 OID ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
algorithms(2) sha1(26) algorithms(2) sha1(26)
} }
id-sha224 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(4) } id-sha224 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(4) }
id-sha256 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(1) } id-sha256 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(1) }
id-sha384 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha384(2) } id-sha384 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha384(2) }
id-sha512 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha512(3) } id-sha512 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha512(3) }
sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha1 }} -- NullParms MUST be sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha1 }} -- NullParms MUST be
sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha224 }} -- accepted for these sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha224 }} -- accepted for these
sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha256 }} -- OIDs sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha256 }} -- OIDs
sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha384 }} - "" sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha384 }} -- ""
sha512 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha512 }} - "" sha512 ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-sha512 }} -- ""
-- Symmetric Key-Wrapping Schemes -- Symmetric Key-Wrapping Schemes
id-aes128-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes128-Wrap(5) } id-aes128-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes128-Wrap(5) }
id-aes192-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes192-Wrap(25) } id-aes192-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes192-Wrap(25) }
id-aes256-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes256-Wrap(45) } id-aes256-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes256-Wrap(45) }
aes128-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-aes128-wrap }} aes128-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-aes128-wrap }}
aes192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-aes192-wrap }} aes192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-aes192-wrap }}
aes256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-aes256-wrap }} aes256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-aes256-wrap }}
id-alg-CMS3DESwrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg-CMS3DESwrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) alg(3) 6 smime(16) alg(3) 6
} }
tdes-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NullParms }} tdes-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= {{ OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NullParms }}
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