draft-ietf-smime-cms-seed-01.txt   draft-ietf-smime-cms-seed-02.txt 
S/MIME Working Group Jongwook Park (KISA) S/MIME Working Group Jongwook Park (KISA)
Internet Draft Sungjae Lee (KISA) Internet Draft Sungjae Lee (KISA)
Document: draft-ietf-smime-cms-seed-01.txt Jeeyeon Kim (KISA) Document: draft-ietf-smime-cms-seed-02.txt Jeeyeon Kim (KISA)
Expires: October 2004 Jaeil Lee (KISA) Expires: Feburary 2005 Jaeil Lee (KISA)
Target category : Standard Track April 2004 Target category : Standard Track August 2004
Use of the SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS Use of the SEED Encryption Algorithm
in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
<draft-ietf-smime-cms-seed-01.txt> <draft-ietf-smime-cms-seed-02.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies the conventions for using the SEED encryption This document specifies the conventions for using the SEED encryption
algorithm for encryption with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). algorithm for encryption with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
SEED is added to the set of optional symmetric encryption algorithms
in CMS by providing two classes of unique object identifiers (OIDs).
One OID class defines the content encryption algorithms and the other
defines the key encryption algorithms.
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document specifies the conventions for using the SEED encryption This document specifies the conventions for using the SEED encryption
algorithm [SEED][TTASSEED] for encryption with the Cryptographic algorithm [SEED][TTASSEED] for encryption with the Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS)[CMS]. The relevant object identifiers (OIDs) and Message Syntax (CMS)[CMS]. The relevant object identifiers (OIDs) and
processing steps are provided so that SEED may be used in the CMS processing steps are provided so that SEED may be used in the CMS
specification (RFC 3369, RFC 3370) for content and key encryption. specification (RFC 3369, RFC 3370) for content and key encryption.
1.1 SEED 1.1 SEED
SEED is a symmetric encryption algorithm that had been developed by SEED is a symmetric encryption algorithm that had been developed by
KISA (Korea Information Security Agency) and a group of experts since KISA (Korea Information Security Agency) and a group of experts since
1998. The input/output block size of SEED is 128-bit and the key 1998. The input/output block size of SEED is 128-bit and the key
length is also 128-bit. SEED has the 16-round Feistel structure. A length is also 128-bit. SEED has the 16-round Feistel structure. A
128-bit input is divided into two 64-bit blocks and the right 64-bit 128-bit input is divided into two 64-bit blocks and the right 64-bit
block is an input to the round function with a 64-bit subkey block is an input to the round function with a 64-bit subkey
generated from the key scheduling. generated from the key scheduling.
SEED is easily implemented in various software and hardware because SEED is easily implemented in various software and hardware because
it is designed to increase the efficiency of memory storage and the it takes less memory to implement that than other algorithms and
simplicity in generating keys without degrading the security of the generates keys without degrading the security of the algorithm. In
algorithm. In particular, it can be effectively adopted to a particular, it can be effectively adopted to a computing environment
computing environment with a restricted resources such as a mobile with a restricted resources such as a mobile devices, smart cards and
devices, smart cards and so on. so on.
SEED is robust against known attacks including DC (Differential SEED is robust against known attacks including DC (Differential
cryptanalysis), LC (Linear cryptanalysis) and related key attacks, cryptanalysis), LC (Linear cryptanalysis) and related key attacks,
etc. SEED has gone through wide public scrutinizing procedures. etc. SEED has gone through wide public scrutinizing procedures.
Especially, it has been evaluated and also considered Especially, it has been evaluated and also considered
cryptographically secure by trustworhty organizations such as ISO/IEC cryptographically secure by credible organizations such as ISO/IEC
JTC 1/SC 27 and Japan CRYTEC (Cryptography Reasearch and Evaluation JTC 1/SC 27 and Japan CRYTEC (Cryptography Reasearch and Evaluation
Comittees) [ISOSEED][CRYPTEC]. Comittees) [ISOSEED][CRYPTEC].
SEED is a national industrial association standard [TTASSEED] and is SEED is a national industrial association standard [TTASSEED] and is
widely used in South Korea for electronic commerce and financial widely used in South Korea for electronic commerce and financial
services operated on wired & wireless PKI. services operated on wired & wireless communications.
1.2 Terminology 1.2 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in uppercase, "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in uppercase,
as shown) are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. as shown) are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Object Identifiers for Content and Key Encryption 2. Object Identifiers for Content and Key Encryption
This section provides the OIDs and processing information necessary This section provides the OIDs and processing information necessary
for SEED to be used for content and key encryption in CMS. SEED is for SEED to be used for content and key encryption in CMS. SEED is
added to the set of optional symmetric encryption algorithms in CMS added to the set of optional symmetric encryption algorithms in CMS
by providing two classes of unique object identifiers (OIDs). One by providing two classes of unique object identifiers (OIDs). One OID
OID class defines the content encryption algorithms and the other class defines the content encryption algorithms and the other defines
defines the key encryption algorithms. Thus a CMS agent can apply the key encryption algorithms. Thus a CMS agent can apply SEED either
SEED either for content or key encryption by selecting the for content or key encryption by selecting the corresponding object
corresponding object identifier, supplying the required parameter, identifier, supplying the required parameter, and starting the
and starting the program code. program code.
2.1 OIDs for Content Encryption 2.1 OIDs for Content Encryption
SEED is added to the set of symmetric content encryption algorithms SEED is added to the set of symmetric content encryption algorithms
defined in [CMSALG]. The SEED content-encryption algorithm in Cipher defined in [CMSALG]. The SEED content-encryption algorithm in Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC) mode has the following object identifier: Block Chaining (CBC) mode has the following object identifier:
id-seedCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-seedCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) { iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004)
algorithm(1) seedCBC(4) } algorithm(1) seedCBC(4) }
The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present, and the The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present, and the
parameters field MUST contain the value of IV: parameters field MUST contain the value of Initialization Vector
(IV):
SeedCBCParameter ::= SeedIV -- Initialization Vector SeedCBCParameter ::= SeedIV -- Initialization Vector
SeedIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) SeedIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
The plain text is padded according to Section 6.3 of [CMS]. The plain text is padded according to Section 6.3 of [CMS].
2.2 OIDs for Key Encryption 2.2 OIDs for Key Encryption
The key-wrap/unwrap procedures used to encrypt/decrypt a SEED The key-wrap/unwrap procedures used to encrypt/decrypt a SEED
content-encryption key (CEK) with a SEED key-encryption key content-encryption key (CEK) with a SEED key-encryption key (KEK) are
(KEK) are specified in Section 3. Generation and distribution of specified in Section 3. Generation and distribution of key-encryption
key-encryption keys are beyond the scope of this document. keys are beyond the scope of this document.
The SEED key-encryption algorithm has the following object The SEED key-encryption algorithm has the following object
identifier: identifier:
id-npki-app-cmsSeed-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-npki-app-cmsSeed-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) npki-app(7) { iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) npki-app(7)
smime(1) alg(1) cmsSEED-wrap(1) } smime(1) alg(1) cmsSEED-wrap(1) }
The parameter associated with this object identifier MUST be absent, The parameter associated with this object identifier MUST be absent,
because the key wrapping procedure itself defines how and when to because the key wrapping procedure itself defines how and when to use
use an IV. an IV.
3. Key Wrap Algorithm 3. Key Wrap Algorithm
SEED key wrapping and unwrapping is done in conformance with the SEED key wrapping and unwrapping is done in conformance with the AES
AES key wrap algorithm [AES-WRAP][RFC3394]. key wrap algorithm [RFC3394].
3.1 Notation and Defintions 3.1 Notation and Defintions
The following notation is used in the description of the key The following notation is used in the description of the key wrapping
wrapping algorithms: algorithms:
SEED(K, W) Encrypt W using the SEED codebook with key K SEED(K, W) Encrypt W using the SEED codebook with key K
SEED-1(K, W) Decrypt W using the SEED codebook with key K SEED-1(K, W) Decrypt W using the SEED codebook with key K
MSB(j, W) Return the most significant j bits of W MSB(j, W) Return the most significant j bits of W
LSB(j, W) Return the least significant j bits of W LSB(j, W) Return the least significant j bits of W
B1 ^ B2 The bitwise exclusive or (XOR) of B1 and B2 B1 ^ B2 The bitwise exclusive or (XOR) of B1 and B2
B1 | B2 Concatenate B1 and B2 B1 | B2 Concatenate B1 and B2
K The key-encryption key K K The key-encryption key K
n The number of 64-bit key data blocks n The number of 64-bit key data blocks
s The number of steps in the wrapping process, s The number of steps in the wrapping process,
skipping to change at page 5, line 22 skipping to change at page 5, line 28
R[t][i] = R[t-1][i+1] R[t][i] = R[t-1][i+1]
R[t][n] = LSB(64, SEED(K, A[t-1] | R[t-1][1])) R[t][n] = LSB(64, SEED(K, A[t-1] | R[t-1][1]))
3) Output the results. 3) Output the results.
Set C[0] = A[s] Set C[0] = A[s]
For i = 1 to n For i = 1 to n
C[i] = R[s][i] C[i] = R[s][i]
An alternative description of the key wrap algorithm involves An alternative description of the key wrap algorithm involves
indexing rather than shifting. This approach allows one to indexing rather than shifting. This approach allows one to calculate
calculate the wrapped key in place, avoiding the rotation in the the wrapped key in place, avoiding the rotation in the previous
previous description. This produces identical results and is more description. This produces identical results and is more easily
easily implemented in software. implemented in software.
Inputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P[1], P[2], ..., P[n]}, and Inputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P[1], P[2], ..., P[n]}, and
Key, K (the KEK). Key, K (the KEK).
Outputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]}. Outputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]}.
1) Initialize variables. 1) Initialize variables.
Set A = IV, an initial value (see Section 3.4) Set A = IV, an initial value (see Section 3.4)
For i = 1 to n For i = 1 to n
R[i] = P[i] R[i] = P[i]
skipping to change at page 6, line 7 skipping to change at page 6, line 11
R[i] = LSB(64, B) R[i] = LSB(64, B)
3) Output the results. 3) Output the results.
Set C[0] = A Set C[0] = A
For i = 1 to n For i = 1 to n
C[i] = R[i] C[i] = R[i]
3.3 SEED Key Unwrap 3.3 SEED Key Unwrap
Key unwrapping with SEED is identical to Section 2.2.2 of Key unwrapping with SEED is identical to Section 2.2.2 of [RFC3394],
[RFC3394], with "AES" replaced by "SEED". with "AES" replaced by "SEED".
The inputs to the unwrap process are the KEK and (n+1) 64-bit blocks The inputs to the unwrap process are the KEK and (n+1) 64-bit blocks
of ciphertext consisting of previously wrapped key. It returns n of ciphertext consisting of previously wrapped key. It returns n
blocks of plaintext consisting of the n 64-bit blocks of the blocks of plaintext consisting of the n 64-bit blocks of the
decrypted key data. decrypted key data.
Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]}, and Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]},
Key, K (the KEK). and Key, K (the KEK).
Outputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P[1], P[2], ..., P[n]}. Outputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P[1], P[2], ..., P[n]}.
1) Initialize variables. 1) Initialize variables.
Set A[s] = C[0] where s = 6n Set A[s] = C[0] where s = 6n
For i = 1 to n For i = 1 to n
R[s][i] = C[i] R[s][i] = C[i]
2) Calculate the intermediate values. 2) Calculate the intermediate values.
skipping to change at page 6, line 47 skipping to change at page 6, line 51
For i = 1 to n For i = 1 to n
P[i] = R[0][i] P[i] = R[0][i]
Else Else
Return an error Return an error
The unwrap algorithm can also be specified as an index based The unwrap algorithm can also be specified as an index based
operation, allowing the calculations to be carried out in place. operation, allowing the calculations to be carried out in place.
Again, this produces the same results as the register shifting Again, this produces the same results as the register shifting
approach. approach.
Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]}, and Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]},
Key, K (the KEK). and Key, K (the KEK).
Outputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P[0], P[1], ..., P[n]}. Outputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P[0], P[1], ..., P[n]}.
1) Initialize variables. 1) Initialize variables.
Set A = C[0] Set A = C[0]
For i = 1 to n For i = 1 to n
R[i] = C[i] R[i] = C[i]
2) Compute intermediate values. 2) Compute intermediate values.
skipping to change at page 7, line 30 skipping to change at page 7, line 34
Then Then
For i = 1 to n For i = 1 to n
P[i] = R[i] P[i] = R[i]
Else Else
Return an error Return an error
3.4 Key Data Integrity -- the Initial Value 3.4 Key Data Integrity -- the Initial Value
The initial value (IV) refers to the value assigned to A[0] in the The initial value (IV) refers to the value assigned to A[0] in the
first step of the wrapping process. This value is used to obtain an first step of the wrapping process. This value is used to obtain an
integrity check on the key data. In the final step of the integrity check on the key data. In the final step of the unwrapping
unwrapping process, the recovered value of A[0] is compared to the process, the recovered value of A[0] is compared to the expected
expected value of A[0]. If there is a match, the key is accepted as value of A[0]. If there is a match, the key is accepted as valid, and
valid, and the unwrapping algorithm returns it. If there is not a the unwrapping algorithm returns it. If there is not a match, then
match, then the key is rejected, and the unwrapping algorithm the key is rejected, and the unwrapping algorithm returns an error.
returns an error.
The exact properties achieved by this integrity check depend on the The exact properties achieved by this integrity check depend on the
definition of the initial value. Different applications may call definition of the initial value. Different applications may call for
for somewhat different properties; for example, whether there is somewhat different properties; for example, whether there is need to
need to determine the integrity of key data throughout its lifecycle determine the integrity of key data throughout its lifecycle or just
or just when it is unwrapped. This specification defines a default when it is unwrapped. This specification defines a default initial
initial value that supports integrity of the key data during the value that supports integrity of the key data during the period it is
period it is wrapped (in Section 3.4.1). Provision is also made to wrapped (in Section 3.4.1). Provision is also made to support
support alternative initial values (in Section 3.4.2). alternative initial values (in Section 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Default Initial Value 3.4.1 Default Initial Value
The default initial value (IV) is defined to be the hexadecimal The default initial value (IV) is defined to be the hexadecimal
constant: constant:
A[0] = IV = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6 A[0] = IV = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6
The use of a constant as the IV supports a strong integrity check on The use of a constant as the IV supports a strong integrity check on
the key data during the period that it is wrapped. If unwrapping the key data during the period that it is wrapped. If unwrapping
produces A[0] = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6, then the chance that the key data produces A[0] = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6, then the chance that the key data
is corrupt is 2^-64. If unwrapping produces A[0] any other value, is corrupt is 2^-64. If unwrapping produces A[0] any other value,
then the unwrap must return an error and not return any key data. then the unwrap must return an error and not return any key data.
3.4.2 Alternative Initial Values 3.4.2 Alternative Initial Values
When the key wrap is used as part of a larger key management When the key wrap is used as part of a larger key management protocol
protocol or system, the desired scope for data integrity may be more or system, the desired scope for data integrity may be more than just
than just the key data or the desired duration for more than just the key data or the desired duration for more than just the period
the period that it is wrapped. Also, if the key data is not just an that it is wrapped. Also, if the key data is not just an SEED key, it
SEED key, it may not always be a multiple of 64 bits. may not always be a multiple of 64 bits. Alternative definitions of
Alternative definitions of the initial value can be used to address the initial value can be used to address such problems. According to
such problems. According to [RFC3394], NIST will define alternative [RFC3394], NIST will define alternative initial values in future key
initial values in future key management publications as needed. In management publications as needed. In order to accommodate a set of
order to accommodate a set of alternatives that may evolve over alternatives that may evolve over time, key wrap implementations that
time, key wrap implementations that are not application-specific are not application-specific will require some flexibility in the way
will require some flexibility in the way that the initial value is that the initial value is set and tested.
set and tested.
4. SMIMECapabilities Attribute 4. SMIMECapabilities Attribute
An S/MIME client SHOULD announce the set of cryptographic functions An S/MIME client SHOULD announce the set of cryptographic functions
it supports by using the S/MIME capabilities attribute. This it supports by using the S/MIME capabilities attribute. This
attribute provides a partial list of OIDs of cryptographic functions attribute provides a partial list of OIDs of cryptographic functions
and MUST be signed by the client. The functions' OIDs SHOULD be and MUST be signed by the client. The functions' OIDs SHOULD be
logically separated in functional categories and MUST be ordered logically separated in functional categories and MUST be ordered with
with respect to their preference. respect to their preference.
RFC 2633 [RFC2633], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities RFC 2633 [RFC2633], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities
signed attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability signed attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs)
SEQUENCEs) to be used to specify a partial list of algorithms that to be used to specify a partial list of algorithms that the software
the software announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support. announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support.
If an S/MIME client is required to support symmetric encryption with If an S/MIME client is required to support symmetric encryption with
SEED, the capabilities attribute MUST contain the SEED OID SEED, the capabilities attribute MUST contain the SEED OID specified
specified above in the category of symmetric algorithms. The above in the category of symmetric algorithms. The parameter
parameter associated with this OID MUST be SeedSMimeCapability. associated with this OID MUST be SeedSMimeCapability.
SeedSMimeCapabilty ::= NULL SeedSMimeCapabilty ::= NULL
The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing SEED MUST be The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing SEED MUST be DER-encoded as
DER-encoded as the following hexadecimal strings: the following hexadecimal strings:
30 0C 06 08 2A 83 1A 8C 9A 44 01 04 05 00 30 0C 06 08 2A 83 1A 8C 9A 44 01 04 05 00
When a sending agent creates an encrypted message, it has to decide When a sending agent creates an encrypted message, it has to decide
which type of encryption algorithm to use. In general the decision which type of encryption algorithm to use. In general the decision
process involves information obtained from the capabilities lists process involves information obtained from the capabilities lists
included in messages received from the recipient, as well as other included in messages received from the recipient, as well as other
information such as private agreements, user preferences, legal information such as private agreements, user preferences, legal
restrictions, and so on. If users require SEED for symmetric restrictions, and so on. If local policy requires the use of SEED for
encryption, it MUST be supported by the S/MIME clients on both the symmetric encryption, then the both the sending and receiving S/MIME
sending and receiving side, and it MUST be set in the user clients must support it, and SEED must be configured as the preferred
preferences. symmetric algorithm.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This document specifies the use of SEED for encrypting the This document specifies the use of SEED for encrypting the content of
content of a CMS message and for encrypting the symmetric key used a CMS message and for encrypting the symmetric key used to encrypt
to encrypt the content of a CMS message, and the other mechanisms the content of a CMS message, and the other mechanisms are the same
are the same as the existing ones. Therefore, the security as the existing ones. Therefore, the security considerations
considerations described in the CMS specifications [CMS][CMSALG] and described in the CMS specifications [CMS][CMSALG] and the AES key
the AES key wrap algorithm [AES-WRAP][RFC3394] can be applied to wrap algorithm [RFC3394] can be applied to this document. No security
this document. No security problem has been found on SEED problem has been found on SEED [CRYPTREC].
[CRYPTREC].
6. Intellectual Property Statement
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7. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
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The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not
be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on 6. References
an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE."
8. References 6.1 Normative Reference
8.1 Normative Reference [TTASSEED] Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA),
South Korea, "128-bit Symmetric Block Cipher (SEED)",
TTAS.KO-12.0004, September, 1998 (In Korean)
http://www.tta.or.kr/English/new/main/index.htm
[CMS] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3369, [CMS] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3369,
August 2002. August 2002.
[CMSALG] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMSALG] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002. Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2633] Ramsdell, B., Editor. S/MIME Version 3 Message [RFC2633] Ramsdell, B., Editor. S/MIME Version 3 Message
Specification. RFC 2633. June 1999. Specification. RFC 2633. June 1999.
[RFC3394] J. Schaad and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard [RFC3394] J. Schaad and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002. (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
[AES-WRAP] National Institute of Standards and Technology. AES Key [RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Wrap Specification. 17 November 2001. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/kms/key-wrap.pdf
8.2 Informative Reference 6.2 Informative Reference
[SEED] Jongwook Park, Sungjae Lee, Jeeyeon Kim, Jaeil Lee, [SEED] Jongwook Park, Sungjae Lee, Jeeyeon Kim, Jaeil Lee,
"The SEED Encryption Algorithm", draft-park-seed-00.txt "The SEED Encryption Algorithm", draft-park-seed-01.txt
[SEED-WEB] KISA, "SEED Algorithm Specification",
http://www.kisa.or.kr/seed/seed_eng.html"
[TTASSEED] Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA),
South Korea, "128-bit Symmetric Block Cipher (SEED)",
TTAS.KO-12.0004, September, 1998 (In Korean)
http://www.tta.or.kr/English/new/main/index.htm
[ISOSEED] ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 27 N 256r1, "National Body [ISOSEED] ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 27 N 256r1, "National Body
contributions on NP 18033 Encryption algorithms in contributions on NP 18033 Encryption algorithms in
response to document SC 27 N 2563", October, 2000 response to document SC 27 N 2563", October, 2000
[CRYPTREC] Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan, [CRYPTREC] Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan,
CRYPTREC. "SEED Evaluation Report", February, 2002 CRYPTREC. "SEED Evaluation Report", February, 2002
http://www.kisa.or.kr http://www.kisa.or.kr
9. Authors' Address 7. Authors' Address
Jongwook Park Jongwook Park
Korea Information Security Agency Korea Information Security Agency
78, Garak-Dong, Songpa-Gu, Seoul, 138-803
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Phone: +82-2-405-5432 Phone: +82-2-405-5432
FAX : +82-2-405-5499 FAX : +82-2-405-5499
Email: khopri@kisa.or.kr Email: khopri@kisa.or.kr
Sungjae Lee Sungjae Lee
Korea Information Security Agency Korea Information Security Agency
Phone: +82-2-405-5243 Phone: +82-2-405-5243
FAX : +82-2-405-5499 FAX : +82-2-405-5499
Email: sjlee@kisa.or.kr Email: sjlee@kisa.or.kr
skipping to change at page 12, line 8 skipping to change at page 10, line 46
Phone: +82-2-405-5238 Phone: +82-2-405-5238
FAX : +82-2-405-5499 FAX : +82-2-405-5499
Email: jykim@kisa.or.kr Email: jykim@kisa.or.kr
Jaeil Lee Jaeil Lee
Korea Information Security Agency Korea Information Security Agency
Phone: +82-2-405-5300 Phone: +82-2-405-5300
FAX : +82-2-405-5499 FAX : +82-2-405-5499
Email: jilee@kisa.or.kr Email: jilee@kisa.or.kr
Appendix A ASN.1 Module 8. Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
ipr@ietf.org.
9. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Appendix. ASN.1 Module
SeedEncryptionAlgorithmInCMS SeedEncryptionAlgorithmInCMS
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-seed(25) } pkcs9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-seed(24) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
id-seedCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-seedCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) { iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004)
algorithm(1) seedCBC(4) } algorithm(1) seedCBC(4) }
-- Initialization Vector (IV)
SeedCBCParameter ::= SeedIV SeedCBCParameter ::= SeedIV
SeedIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) SeedIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
-- SEED Key Wrap Algorithm identifiers - Parameter is absent. -- SEED Key Wrap Algorithm identifiers - Parameter is absent.
id-npki-app-cmsSeed-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-npki-app-cmsSeed-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) npki-app(7) { iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) npki-app(7)
smime(1) alg(1) cmsSEED-wrap(1) } smime(1) alg(1) cmsSEED-wrap(1) }
-- SEED S/MIME Capabilty parameter -- SEED S/MIME Capabilty parameter
 End of changes. 

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