draft-ietf-smime-cms-seed-02.txt   rfc4010.txt 
S/MIME Working Group Jongwook Park (KISA) Network Working Group J. Park
Internet Draft Sungjae Lee (KISA) Request for Comments: 4010 S. Lee
Document: draft-ietf-smime-cms-seed-02.txt Jeeyeon Kim (KISA) Category: Standards Track J. Kim
Expires: Feburary 2005 Jaeil Lee (KISA) J. Lee
Target category : Standard Track August 2004 KISA
February 2005
Use of the SEED Encryption Algorithm Use of the SEED Encryption Algorithm
in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
<draft-ietf-smime-cms-seed-02.txt> Status of This Memo
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies the conventions for using the SEED encryption This document specifies the conventions for using the SEED encryption
algorithm for encryption with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). algorithm for encryption with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
SEED is added to the set of optional symmetric encryption algorithms SEED is added to the set of optional symmetric encryption algorithms
in CMS by providing two classes of unique object identifiers (OIDs). in CMS by providing two classes of unique object identifiers (OIDs).
One OID class defines the content encryption algorithms and the other One OID class defines the content encryption algorithms and the other
defines the key encryption algorithms. defines the key encryption algorithms.
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document specifies the conventions for using the SEED encryption This document specifies the conventions for using the SEED encryption
algorithm [SEED][TTASSEED] for encryption with the Cryptographic algorithm [SEED][TTASSEED] for encryption with the Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS)[CMS]. The relevant object identifiers (OIDs) and Message Syntax (CMS)[CMS]. The relevant object identifiers (OIDs)
processing steps are provided so that SEED may be used in the CMS and processing steps are provided so that SEED may be used in the CMS
specification (RFC 3369, RFC 3370) for content and key encryption. specification (RFC 3852, RFC 3370) for content and key encryption.
1.1 SEED 1.1. SEED
SEED is a symmetric encryption algorithm that had been developed by SEED is a symmetric encryption algorithm developed by KISA (Korea
KISA (Korea Information Security Agency) and a group of experts since Information Security Agency) and a group of experts since 1998. The
1998. The input/output block size of SEED is 128-bit and the key input/output block size and key length of SEED is 128-bits. SEED has
length is also 128-bit. SEED has the 16-round Feistel structure. A the 16-round Feistel structure. A 128-bit input is divided into two
128-bit input is divided into two 64-bit blocks and the right 64-bit 64-bit blocks and the right 64-bit block is an input to the round
block is an input to the round function with a 64-bit subkey function, with a 64-bit subkey generated from the key scheduling.
generated from the key scheduling.
SEED is easily implemented in various software and hardware because SEED is easily implemented in various software and hardware because
it takes less memory to implement that than other algorithms and it takes less memory to implement than other algorithms and generates
generates keys without degrading the security of the algorithm. In keys without degrading the security of the algorithm. In particular,
particular, it can be effectively adopted to a computing environment it can be effectively adopted in a computing environment with a
with a restricted resources such as a mobile devices, smart cards and restricted resources, such as mobile devices and smart cards.
so on.
SEED is robust against known attacks including DC (Differential SEED is robust against known attacks including DC (Differential
cryptanalysis), LC (Linear cryptanalysis) and related key attacks, cryptanalysis), LC (Linear cryptanalysis), and related key attacks.
etc. SEED has gone through wide public scrutinizing procedures. SEED has gone through wide public scrutinizing procedures. It has
Especially, it has been evaluated and also considered been evaluated and is considered cryptographically secure by credible
cryptographically secure by credible organizations such as ISO/IEC organizations such as ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 and Japan CRYPTREC
JTC 1/SC 27 and Japan CRYTEC (Cryptography Reasearch and Evaluation (Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees)
Comittees) [ISOSEED][CRYPTEC]. [ISOSEED][CRYPTREC].
SEED is a national industrial association standard [TTASSEED] and is SEED is a national industrial association standard [TTASSEED] and is
widely used in South Korea for electronic commerce and financial widely used in South Korea for electronic commerce and financial
services operated on wired & wireless communications. services operated on wired and wireless communications.
1.2 Terminology 1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in uppercase, "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in uppercase,
as shown) are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. as shown) are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Object Identifiers for Content and Key Encryption 2. Object Identifiers for Content and Key Encryption
This section provides the OIDs and processing information necessary This section provides the OIDs and processing information necessary
for SEED to be used for content and key encryption in CMS. SEED is for SEED to be used for content and key encryption in CMS. SEED is
added to the set of optional symmetric encryption algorithms in CMS added to the set of optional symmetric encryption algorithms in CMS
by providing two classes of unique object identifiers (OIDs). One OID by providing two classes of unique object identifiers (OIDs). One
class defines the content encryption algorithms and the other defines OID class defines the content encryption algorithms and the other
the key encryption algorithms. Thus a CMS agent can apply SEED either defines the key encryption algorithms. Thus, a CMS agent can apply
for content or key encryption by selecting the corresponding object SEED either for content or key encryption by selecting the
identifier, supplying the required parameter, and starting the corresponding object identifier, supplying the required parameter,
program code. and starting the program code.
2.1 OIDs for Content Encryption 2.1. OIDs for Content Encryption
SEED is added to the set of symmetric content encryption algorithms SEED is added to the set of symmetric content encryption algorithms
defined in [CMSALG]. The SEED content-encryption algorithm in Cipher defined in [CMSALG]. The SEED content-encryption algorithm in Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC) mode has the following object identifier: Block Chaining (CBC) mode has the following object identifier:
id-seedCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-seedCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) { iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004)
algorithm(1) seedCBC(4) } algorithm(1) seedCBC(4) }
The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present, and the The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present, and the
parameters field MUST contain the value of Initialization Vector parameters field MUST contain the value of Initialization Vector
(IV): (IV):
SeedCBCParameter ::= SeedIV -- Initialization Vector SeedCBCParameter ::= SeedIV -- Initialization Vector
SeedIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) SeedIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
The plain text is padded according to Section 6.3 of [CMS]. The plain text is padded according to Section 6.3 of [CMS].
2.2 OIDs for Key Encryption 2.2. OIDs for Key Encryption
The key-wrap/unwrap procedures used to encrypt/decrypt a SEED The key-wrap/unwrap procedures used to encrypt/decrypt a SEED
content-encryption key (CEK) with a SEED key-encryption key (KEK) are content-encryption key (CEK) with a SEED key-encryption key (KEK) are
specified in Section 3. Generation and distribution of key-encryption specified in Section 3. Generation and distribution of key-
keys are beyond the scope of this document. encryption keys are beyond the scope of this document.
The SEED key-encryption algorithm has the following object The SEED key-encryption algorithm has the following object
identifier: identifier:
id-npki-app-cmsSeed-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-npki-app-cmsSeed-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) npki-app(7) { iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) npki-app(7)
smime(1) alg(1) cmsSEED-wrap(1) } smime(1) alg(1) cmsSEED-wrap(1) }
The parameter associated with this object identifier MUST be absent, The parameter associated with this object identifier MUST be absent,
because the key wrapping procedure itself defines how and when to use because the key wrapping procedure itself defines how and when to use
an IV. an IV.
3. Key Wrap Algorithm 3. Key Wrap Algorithm
SEED key wrapping and unwrapping is done in conformance with the AES SEED key wrapping and unwrapping is done in conformance with the AES
key wrap algorithm [RFC3394]. key wrap algorithm [RFC3394].
3.1 Notation and Defintions 3.1. Notation and Definitions
The following notation is used in the description of the key wrapping The following notation is used in the description of the key wrapping
algorithms: algorithms:
SEED(K, W) Encrypt W using the SEED codebook with key K SEED(K, W) Encrypt W using the SEED codebook with key K
SEED-1(K, W) Decrypt W using the SEED codebook with key K SEED-1(K, W) Decrypt W using the SEED codebook with key K
MSB(j, W) Return the most significant j bits of W MSB(j, W) Return the most significant j bits of W
LSB(j, W) Return the least significant j bits of W LSB(j, W) Return the least significant j bits of W
B1 ^ B2 The bitwise exclusive or (XOR) of B1 and B2 B1 ^ B2 The bitwise exclusive or (XOR) of B1 and B2
B1 | B2 Concatenate B1 and B2 B1 | B2 Concatenate B1 and B2
K The key-encryption key K K The key-encryption key K
n The number of 64-bit key data blocks n The number of 64-bit key data blocks
s The number of steps in the wrapping process, s The number of steps in the wrapping process,
s = 6n s = 6n
P[i] The ith plaintext key data block P[i] The ith plaintext key data block
C[i] The ith ciphertext data block C[i] The ith ciphertext data block
A The 64-bit integrity check register A The 64-bit integrity check register
R[i] An array of 64-bit registers where R[i] An array of 64-bit registers where
i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n
A[t], R[t][i] The contents of registers A and R[i] after A[t], R[i][t] The contents of registers A and R[i] after
encryption step t. encryption step t.
IV The 64-bit initial value used during the IV The 64-bit initial value used during the
wrapping process. wrapping process.
In the key wrap algorithm, the concatenation function will be used to In the key wrap algorithm, the concatenation function will be used to
concatenate 64-bit quantities to form the 128-bit input to the SEED concatenate 64-bit quantities to form the 128-bit input to the SEED
codebook. The extraction functions will be used to split the 128-bit codebook. The extraction functions will be used to split the 128-bit
output from the SEED codebook into two 64-bit quantities. output from the SEED codebook into two 64-bit quantities.
3.2 SEED Key Wrap 3.2. SEED Key Wrap
Key wrapping with SEED is identical to Section 2.2.1 of [RFC3394] Key wrapping with SEED is identical to Section 2.2.1 of [RFC3394]
with "AES" replaced by "SEED". with "AES" replaced by "SEED".
The inputs to the key wrapping process are the KEK and the plaintext The inputs to the key wrapping process are the KEK and the plaintext
to be wrapped. The plaintext consists of n 64-bit blocks, containing to be wrapped. The plaintext consists of n 64-bit blocks containing
the key data being wrapped. The key wrapping process is described the key data being wrapped. The key wrapping process is described
below. below.
Inputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P[1], P[2], ..., P[n]}, and Inputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P[1], P[2], ..., P[n]}, and
Key, K (the KEK). Key, K (the KEK).
Outputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]}. Outputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]}.
1) Initialize variables. 1) Initialize variables.
Set A[0] to an initial value (see Section 3.4) Set A[0] to an initial value (see Section 3.4)
skipping to change at page 6, line 9 skipping to change at page 6, line 5
B = SEED(K, A | R[i]) B = SEED(K, A | R[i])
A = MSB(64, B) ^ t where t = (n*j)+i A = MSB(64, B) ^ t where t = (n*j)+i
R[i] = LSB(64, B) R[i] = LSB(64, B)
3) Output the results. 3) Output the results.
Set C[0] = A Set C[0] = A
For i = 1 to n For i = 1 to n
C[i] = R[i] C[i] = R[i]
3.3 SEED Key Unwrap 3.3. SEED Key Unwrap
Key unwrapping with SEED is identical to Section 2.2.2 of [RFC3394], Key unwrapping with SEED is identical to Section 2.2.2 of [RFC3394],
with "AES" replaced by "SEED". with "AES" replaced by "SEED".
The inputs to the unwrap process are the KEK and (n+1) 64-bit blocks The inputs to the unwrap process are the KEK and (n+1) 64-bit blocks
of ciphertext consisting of previously wrapped key. It returns n of ciphertext consisting of previously wrapped key. It returns n
blocks of plaintext consisting of the n 64-bit blocks of the blocks of plaintext consisting of the n 64-bit blocks of the
decrypted key data. decrypted key data.
Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]}, Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]},
skipping to change at page 7, line 30 skipping to change at page 7, line 28
3) Output results. 3) Output results.
If A is an appropriate initial value (see Section 3.4), If A is an appropriate initial value (see Section 3.4),
Then Then
For i = 1 to n For i = 1 to n
P[i] = R[i] P[i] = R[i]
Else Else
Return an error Return an error
3.4 Key Data Integrity -- the Initial Value 3.4. Key Data Integrity -- the Initial Value
The initial value (IV) refers to the value assigned to A[0] in the The initial value (IV) refers to the value assigned to A[0] in the
first step of the wrapping process. This value is used to obtain an first step of the wrapping process. This value is used to obtain an
integrity check on the key data. In the final step of the unwrapping integrity check on the key data. In the final step of the unwrapping
process, the recovered value of A[0] is compared to the expected process, the recovered value of A[0] is compared to the expected
value of A[0]. If there is a match, the key is accepted as valid, and value of A[0]. If there is a match, the key is accepted as valid,
the unwrapping algorithm returns it. If there is not a match, then and the unwrapping algorithm returns it. If there is not a match,
the key is rejected, and the unwrapping algorithm returns an error. then the key is rejected, and the unwrapping algorithm returns an
error.
The exact properties achieved by this integrity check depend on the The exact properties achieved by this integrity check depend on the
definition of the initial value. Different applications may call for definition of the initial value. Different applications may call for
somewhat different properties; for example, whether there is need to somewhat different properties; for example, whether there is a need
determine the integrity of key data throughout its lifecycle or just to determine the integrity of key data throughout its lifecycle or
when it is unwrapped. This specification defines a default initial just when it is unwrapped. This specification defines a default
value that supports integrity of the key data during the period it is initial value that supports the integrity of the key data during the
wrapped (in Section 3.4.1). Provision is also made to support period it is wrapped (in Section 3.4.1). Provision is also made to
alternative initial values (in Section 3.4.2). support alternative initial values (in Section 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Default Initial Value 3.4.1. Default Initial Value
The default initial value (IV) is defined to be the hexadecimal The default initial value (IV) is defined to be the hexadecimal
constant: constant:
A[0] = IV = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6 A[0] = IV = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6
The use of a constant as the IV supports a strong integrity check on The use of a constant as the IV supports a strong integrity check on
the key data during the period that it is wrapped. If unwrapping the key data during the period that it is wrapped. If unwrapping
produces A[0] = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6, then the chance that the key data produces A[0] = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6, then the chance that the key data
is corrupt is 2^-64. If unwrapping produces A[0] any other value, is corrupt is 2^-64. If unwrapping produces A[0] = any other value,
then the unwrap must return an error and not return any key data. then the unwrap must return an error and not return any key data.
3.4.2 Alternative Initial Values 3.4.2. Alternative Initial Values
When the key wrap is used as part of a larger key management protocol When the key wrap is used as part of a larger key management protocol
or system, the desired scope for data integrity may be more than just or system, the desired scope for data integrity may be more than just
the key data or the desired duration for more than just the period the key data, and the desired duration may be more than just the
that it is wrapped. Also, if the key data is not just an SEED key, it period that it is wrapped. Also, if the key data is not just a SEED
may not always be a multiple of 64 bits. Alternative definitions of key, it may not always be a multiple of 64 bits. Alternative
the initial value can be used to address such problems. According to definitions of the initial value can be used to address such
[RFC3394], NIST will define alternative initial values in future key problems. According to RFC 3394 [RFC3394], NIST will define
management publications as needed. In order to accommodate a set of alternative initial values in future key management publications as
alternatives that may evolve over time, key wrap implementations that they are needed. To accommodate a set of alternatives that may
are not application-specific will require some flexibility in the way evolve over time, non-application-specific key wrap implementations
that the initial value is set and tested. will require some flexibility in the way the initial value is set and
tested.
4. SMIMECapabilities Attribute 4. SMIMECapabilities Attribute
An S/MIME client SHOULD announce the set of cryptographic functions An S/MIME client SHOULD announce the set of cryptographic functions
it supports by using the S/MIME capabilities attribute. This it supports by using the S/MIME capabilities attribute. This
attribute provides a partial list of OIDs of cryptographic functions attribute provides a partial list of OIDs of cryptographic functions
and MUST be signed by the client. The functions' OIDs SHOULD be and MUST be signed by the client. The functions' OIDs SHOULD be
logically separated in functional categories and MUST be ordered with logically separated in functional categories and MUST be ordered with
respect to their preference. respect to their preference.
RFC 2633 [RFC2633], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities RFC 3851 [RFC3851], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities
signed attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs) signed attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs)
to be used to specify a partial list of algorithms that the software to be used to specify a partial list of algorithms that the software
announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support. announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support.
If an S/MIME client is required to support symmetric encryption with If an S/MIME client is required to support symmetric encryption with
SEED, the capabilities attribute MUST contain the SEED OID specified SEED, the capabilities attribute MUST contain the SEED OID specified
above in the category of symmetric algorithms. The parameter above in the category of symmetric algorithms. The parameter
associated with this OID MUST be SeedSMimeCapability. associated with this OID MUST be SeedSMimeCapability.
SeedSMimeCapabilty ::= NULL SeedSMimeCapabilty ::= NULL
skipping to change at page 8, line 47 skipping to change at page 9, line 4
signed attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs) signed attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs)
to be used to specify a partial list of algorithms that the software to be used to specify a partial list of algorithms that the software
announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support. announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support.
If an S/MIME client is required to support symmetric encryption with If an S/MIME client is required to support symmetric encryption with
SEED, the capabilities attribute MUST contain the SEED OID specified SEED, the capabilities attribute MUST contain the SEED OID specified
above in the category of symmetric algorithms. The parameter above in the category of symmetric algorithms. The parameter
associated with this OID MUST be SeedSMimeCapability. associated with this OID MUST be SeedSMimeCapability.
SeedSMimeCapabilty ::= NULL SeedSMimeCapabilty ::= NULL
The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing SEED MUST be DER-encoded as The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing SEED MUST be DER-encoded as
the following hexadecimal strings: the following hexadecimal strings:
30 0C 06 08 2A 83 1A 8C 9A 44 01 04 05 00 30 0C 06 08 2A 83 1A 8C 9A 44 01 04 05 00
When a sending agent creates an encrypted message, it has to decide When a sending agent creates an encrypted message, it has to decide
which type of encryption algorithm to use. In general the decision which type of encryption algorithm to use. In general, the decision
process involves information obtained from the capabilities lists process involves information obtained from the capabilities lists
included in messages received from the recipient, as well as other included in messages received from the recipient, as well as other
information such as private agreements, user preferences, legal information, such as private agreements, user preferences and legal
restrictions, and so on. If local policy requires the use of SEED for restrictions. If local policy requires the use of SEED for symmetric
symmetric encryption, then the both the sending and receiving S/MIME encryption, then both the sending and receiving S/MIME clients must
clients must support it, and SEED must be configured as the preferred support it, and SEED must be configured as the preferred symmetric
symmetric algorithm. algorithm.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This document specifies the use of SEED for encrypting the content of This document specifies the use of SEED for encrypting the content of
a CMS message and for encrypting the symmetric key used to encrypt a CMS message and for encrypting the symmetric key used to encrypt
the content of a CMS message, and the other mechanisms are the same the content of a CMS message, with the other mechanisms being the
as the existing ones. Therefore, the security considerations same as the existing ones. Therefore, the security considerations
described in the CMS specifications [CMS][CMSALG] and the AES key described in the CMS specifications [CMS][CMSALG] and the AES key
wrap algorithm [RFC3394] can be applied to this document. No security wrap algorithm [RFC3394] can be applied to this document. No
problem has been found on SEED [CRYPTREC]. security problem has been found on SEED [CRYPTREC].
6. References 6. References
6.1 Normative Reference 6.1. Normative References
[TTASSEED] Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA), [TTASSEED] Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA), South
South Korea, "128-bit Symmetric Block Cipher (SEED)", Korea, "128-bit Symmetric Block Cipher (SEED)", TTAS.KO-
TTAS.KO-12.0004, September, 1998 (In Korean) 12.0004, September, 1998 (In Korean)
http://www.tta.or.kr/English/new/main/index.htm http://www.tta.or.kr/English/new/main/index.htm
[CMS] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3369, [CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC
August 2002. 3852, July 2004.
[CMSALG] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMSALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002. Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
[RFC2633] Ramsdell, B., Editor. S/MIME Version 3 Message [RFC3851] Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
Specification. RFC 2633. June 1999. Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification",
RFC 3851, July 2004.
[RFC3394] J. Schaad and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard [RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002. (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
6.2 Informative Reference 6.2. Informative References
[SEED] Jongwook Park, Sungjae Lee, Jeeyeon Kim, Jaeil Lee, [SEED] Park, J., Lee, S., Kim, J., and J. Lee, "The SEED
"The SEED Encryption Algorithm", draft-park-seed-01.txt Encryption Algorithm", RFC 4009, February 2005.
[ISOSEED] ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 27 N 256r1, "National Body [ISOSEED] ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 27 N 256r1, "National Body
contributions on NP 18033 Encryption algorithms in contributions on NP 18033 Encryption algorithms in
response to document SC 27 N 2563", October, 2000 response to document SC 27 N 2563", October, 2000
[CRYPTREC] Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan, [CRYPTREC] Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan,
CRYPTREC. "SEED Evaluation Report", February, 2002 CRYPTREC. "SEED Evaluation Report", February, 2002
http://www.kisa.or.kr http://www.kisa.or.kr
7. Authors' Address Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
SeedEncryptionAlgorithmInCMS
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-seed(24) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
id-seedCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004)
algorithm(1) seedCBC(4) }
-- Initialization Vector (IV)
SeedCBCParameter ::= SeedIV
SeedIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
-- SEED Key Wrap Algorithm identifiers - Parameter is absent.
id-npki-app-cmsSeed-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) npki-app(7)
smime(1) alg(1) cmsSEED-wrap(1) }
-- SEED S/MIME Capability parameter
SeedSMimeCapability ::= NULL
END
Authors' Addresses
Jongwook Park Jongwook Park
Korea Information Security Agency Korea Information Security Agency
78, Garak-Dong, Songpa-Gu, Seoul, 138-803 78, Garak-Dong, Songpa-Gu, Seoul, 138-803
REPUBLIC OF KOREA REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Phone: +82-2-405-5432 Phone: +82-2-405-5432
FAX : +82-2-405-5499 FAX : +82-2-405-5499
Email: khopri@kisa.or.kr EMail: khopri@kisa.or.kr
Sungjae Lee Sungjae Lee
Korea Information Security Agency Korea Information Security Agency
Phone: +82-2-405-5243 Phone: +82-2-405-5243
FAX : +82-2-405-5499 FAX : +82-2-405-5499
Email: sjlee@kisa.or.kr EMail: sjlee@kisa.or.kr
Jeeyeon Kim Jeeyeon Kim
Korea Information Security Agency Korea Information Security Agency
Phone: +82-2-405-5238 Phone: +82-2-405-5238
FAX : +82-2-405-5499 FAX : +82-2-405-5499
Email: jykim@kisa.or.kr EMail: jykim@kisa.or.kr
Jaeil Lee Jaeil Lee
Korea Information Security Agency Korea Information Security Agency
Phone: +82-2-405-5300 Phone: +82-2-405-5300
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9. Full Copyright Statement Acknowledgement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Appendix. ASN.1 Module
SeedEncryptionAlgorithmInCMS
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-seed(24) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
id-seedCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004)
algorithm(1) seedCBC(4) }
-- Initialization Vector (IV)
SeedCBCParameter ::= SeedIV
SeedIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
-- SEED Key Wrap Algorithm identifiers - Parameter is absent.
id-npki-app-cmsSeed-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) npki-app(7)
smime(1) alg(1) cmsSEED-wrap(1) }
-- SEED S/MIME Capabilty parameter
SeedSMimeCapability ::= NULL
END Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
 End of changes. 

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