draft-ietf-smime-ecc-04.txt   draft-ietf-smime-ecc-05.txt 
INTERNET-DRAFT Simon Blake-Wilson, Certicom Corp INTERNET-DRAFT Simon Blake-Wilson, Certicom Corp
draft-ietf-smime-ecc-04.txt Daniel R. L. Brown, Certicom Corp draft-ietf-smime-ecc-05.txt Daniel R. L. Brown, Certicom Corp
Paul Lambert, Cosine Communications Paul Lambert, Cosine Communications
12 March, 2001 Expires: 12 September, 2001 7 May, 2001 Expires: 6 November, 2001
Use of ECC Algorithms in CMS Use of ECC Algorithms in CMS
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are
working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also
distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
skipping to change at page 1, line 36 skipping to change at page 1, line 36
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Abstract Abstract
This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (ECC) public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS). The ECC algorithms support the creation of digital (CMS). The ECC algorithms support the creation of digital
signatures and the exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate signatures and the exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate
content. The definition of the algorithm processing is based on content. The definition of the algorithm processing is based on
the ANSI X9.62 standard and the ANSI X9.63 draft, developed by the the ANSI X9.62 standard, developed by the ANSI X9F1 working group,
ANSI X9F1 working group. and the IEEE 1363 standard and the SEC 1 standard.
The readers attention is called to the Intellectual Property Rights
section at the end of this document.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1 Introduction ........................................ 3 1 Introduction ........................................ 3
1.1 Requirements terminology ....................... 3 1.1 Requirements terminology ....................... 3
2 SignedData using ECC ................................ 3 2 SignedData using ECC ................................ 3
2.1 SignedData using ECDSA ......................... 3 2.1 SignedData using ECDSA ......................... 3
2.1.1 Fields of the SignedData ................ 3 2.1.1 Fields of the SignedData ................ 3
2.1.2 Actions of the sending agent ............ 4 2.1.2 Actions of the sending agent ............ 4
2.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent .......... 4 2.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent .......... 4
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3 EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms 3 EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
EnvelopedData format. EnvelopedData format.
3.1 EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH 3.1 EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH
This section describes how to use ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve This section describes how to use ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData. Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData.
Ephemeral-static ECDH is specified in [X9.63]. Ephemeral-static Ephemeral-static ECDH is specified in [SEC1] and [IEEE1363].
ECDH is the elliptic curve analog of the ephemeral-static Ephemeral-static ECDH is the the elliptic curve analog of the
Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm specified jointly in the ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm specified
documents [CMS, Section 12.3.1.1] and [CMS-DH]. jointly in the documents [CMS, Section 12.3.1.1] and [CMS-DH].
In an implementation that uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData with key In an implementation that uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData with key
agreement, the following techniques and formats MUST be used. agreement, the following techniques and formats MUST be used.
3.1.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 3.1.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as in [CMS], but with the following KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as in [CMS], but with the following
restrictions: restrictions:
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symmetric encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the symmetric encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the
KEK. KEK.
3.1.2 Actions of the sending agent 3.1.2 Actions of the sending agent
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending
agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain
parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate). The sending parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate). The sending
agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the
KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string
"SharedData", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see
Section 8.2). The sending agent then performs the initiator Section 8.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment
transformation of the 1-Pass Diffie-Hellman scheme specified in and the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve
[X9.63, Section 6.2.1]. As a result the sending agent obtains: Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section 6.1]. As a
result the sending agent obtains:
- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of
the type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit the type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit
string and placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator string and placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator
field, and field, and
- a shared secret bit string "KeyData" which is used as the - a shared secret bit string "K" which is used as the pairwise
pairwise key-encryption key for that recipient. key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].
3.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent 3.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving
agent determines the bit string "SharedData", which is the DER agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER
encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2), and the integer encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2), and the integer
"keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. "keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm.
The receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the The receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the
bit string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, which an value of the bit string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, which an value of the
type ECPoint (see Section 8.2) encapsulated as a bit string. The type ECPoint (see Section 8.2) encapsulated as a bit string. The
receiving agent completes the responder transformation of the receiving agent performs the key agreement operation of the
1-Pass Diffie-Hellman scheme [X9.63, Section 6.2.2]. As a result Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section
the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string "KeyData" 6.1]. As a result the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit
which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK. string "K" which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to
unwrap the CEK.
3.2 EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV 3.2 EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData. 1-Pass ECMQV (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData. ECMQV is
is specified in [X9.63]. Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-KEA], 1-Pass specified in [SEC1] and [IEEE1363]. Like the KEA algorithm
ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a static key [CMS-KEA], 1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key
pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the receiving pair, a static key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair
agent. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it can be used of the receiving agent. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that
with both EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData. it can be used with both EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData.
In an implementation that uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData In an implementation that uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData
with key agreement, the following techniques and formats MUST be with key agreement, the following techniques and formats MUST be
used. used.
3.2.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 3.2.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData the fields of When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData the fields of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are: KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are:
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encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK
generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm. generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm.
3.2.2 Actions of the sending agent 3.2.2 Actions of the sending agent
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first
obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters, obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters,
(e.g. from the recipient's certificate) and checks that the domain (e.g. from the recipient's certificate) and checks that the domain
parameters are the same. The sending agent then determines an parameters are the same. The sending agent then determines an
integer "keydatalen", which is the KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric integer "keydatalen", which is the KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric
key-size in bits, and also a bit string "SharedData", which is the key-size in bits, and also a bit string "SharedInfo", which is the
DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2). The sending DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2). The sending
agent then performs the initiator transformation of the 1-Pass agent then performs the key deployment and key agreement operations
ECMQV scheme specified in [X9.63, Section 6.9.1]. As a result the of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section 6.2].
sending agent obtains As a result the sending agent obtains
- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of
type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit string, type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit string,
placed in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey placed in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey
publicKey field (see Section 8.2), and publicKey field (see Section 8.2), and
- a shared secret bit string "KeyData" which is used as the - a shared secret bit string "K" which is used as the pairwise
pairwise key-encryption key for that recipient. Parity bits key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].
are adjusted according to the key wrap algorithm.
The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an AuthenticatedData The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an AuthenticatedData
for greater efficiency. for greater efficiency.
3.2.3 Actions of the receiving agent 3.2.3 Actions of the receiving agent
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent
determines the bit string "SharedData", which is the DER encoding determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding
of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2), and the of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2), and the integer
integer "keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the "keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm.
KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving agent then retrieves the static The receiving agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC
and ephemeral EC public keys of the originator, from the originator public keys of the originator, from the originator and ukm fields
and ukm fields as described in Section 3.2.1, and its static EC as described in Section 3.2.1, and its static EC public key
public key identified in the rid field and checks that the domain identified in the rid field and checks that the domain parameters
parameters are the same. The receiving agent then performs the are the same. The receiving agent then performs the key agreement
responder transformation of the 1-Pass ECMQV scheme [X9.63, Section operation of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme [SEC1, Section 6.2]. As
6.9.2]. As a result the receiving agent obtains a shared secret a result the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K"
bit string "KeyData" which is used as the pairwise key-encryption which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK.
key to unwrap the CEK.
4 AuthenticatedData using ECC 4 AuthenticatedData using ECC
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation, AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation,
and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For
example, the sending agent might not want the message to be example, the sending agent might not want the message to be
authenticated when forwarded.) authenticated when forwarded.)
4.1 AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV 4.1 AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. 1-Pass (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. ECMQV is
ECMQV is specified in [X9.63]. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV specified in [SEC1]. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it
is that it can be used with both EnvelopedData and can be used with both EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData.
AuthenticatedData.
4.1.1 Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 4.1.1 Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document. KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.
4.1.2 Actions of the sending agent 4.1.2 Actions of the sending agent
The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData
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Implementations of this specification MUST implement either Implementations of this specification MUST implement either
SignedData with ECDSA or EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH. SignedData with ECDSA or EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH.
Implementations of this specification SHOULD implement both Implementations of this specification SHOULD implement both
SignedData with ECDSA and EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH. SignedData with ECDSA and EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH.
Implementations MAY implement the other techniques specified, such Implementations MAY implement the other techniques specified, such
as AuthenticatedData and 1-Pass ECMQV. as AuthenticatedData and 1-Pass ECMQV.
Furthermore, in order to encourage interoperability, Furthermore, in order to encourage interoperability,
implementations SHOULD use the elliptic curve domain parameters implementations SHOULD use the elliptic curve domain parameters
specified by ANSI [X9.62, X9.63], NIST [FIPS-186-2] and SECG specified by ANSI [X9.62], NIST [FIPS-186-2] and SECG [SEC2].
[SEC2].
6 Certificates using ECC 6 Certificates using ECC
Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with
this specification to distribute agents' public keys. The use of this specification to distribute agents' public keys. The use of
ECC algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in ECC algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in
[PKI-ALG]. More details can be found in [SEC3]. [PKI-ALG]. More details can be found in [SEC3].
7 SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC 7 SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC
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for ECMQV. for ECMQV.
8 ASN.1 Syntax 8 ASN.1 Syntax
The ASN.1 syntax that is used in this document is gathered together The ASN.1 syntax that is used in this document is gathered together
in this section for reference purposes. in this section for reference purposes.
8.1 Algorithm identifiers 8.1 Algorithm identifiers
The algorithm identifiers used in this document are taken from The algorithm identifiers used in this document are taken from
[X9.62] and [X9.63]. [X9.62], [SEC1] and [SEC2].
The following object identifier indicates the hash algorithm used The following object identifier indicates the hash algorithm used
in this document: in this document:
sha-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) sha-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 } oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 }
The following object identifier is used in this document to The following object identifier is used in this document to
indicate an elliptic curve public key: indicate an elliptic curve public key:
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entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material
supplied by the sending agent. When used with ECDH and CMS, the supplied by the sending agent. When used with ECDH and CMS, the
entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm. When used with entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm. When used with
ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string
addedukm (encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial). addedukm (encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial).
suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits, suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits,
represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH]. (E.g. for 3DES represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH]. (E.g. for 3DES
it would be 00 00 00 c0.) it would be 00 00 00 c0.)
Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to
the key derivation function, as specified in [X9.63, Section the key derivation function, as specified in [SEC1, Section 3.6.1].
5.6.3]. Note that ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo Note that ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified
specified in [CMS-DH]. Here a counter value is not included in the in [CMS-DH]. Here a counter value is not included in the keyInfo
keyInfo field because the key derivation function specified in field because the key derivation function specified in [SEC1,
[X9.63, Section 5.6.3] ensures that sufficient keying data is Section 3.6.1] ensures that sufficient keying data is provided.
provided.
9 Summary 9 Summary
This document specifies how to use ECC algorithms with the S/MIME This document specifies how to use ECC algorithms with the S/MIME
CMS. Use of ECC algorithm within CMS can result in reduced CMS. Use of ECC algorithm within CMS can result in reduced
processing requirements for S/MIME agents, and reduced bandwidth processing requirements for S/MIME agents, and reduced bandwidth
for CMS messages. for CMS messages.
References References
[X9.42] ANSI X9.42-2001, "Agreement Of Symmetric Keys Using
Diffie-Hellman and MQV Algorithms", American National
Standards Institute, 2001, Approved draft.
[X9.62] ANSI X9.62-1998, "Public Key Cryptography For The [X9.62] ANSI X9.62-1998, "Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", American Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", American
National Standards Institute, 1999. National Standards Institute, 1999.
[X9.63] ANSI X9.63-xxxx, "Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key
Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography", American
National Standards Institute, 2000, Working draft.
[PKI-ALG] L. Bassham, R. Housley and W. Polk, "Algorithms and [PKI-ALG] L. Bassham, R. Housley and W. Polk, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and CRL profile", PKIX Infrastructure Certificate and CRL profile", PKIX
Working Group Internet-Draft, November 2000. Working Group Internet-Draft, November 2000.
[BON] D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC", [BON] D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC",
Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000, Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000,
Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University
of Waterloo, 2000 of Waterloo, 2000. Paper version available from
http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps
[MUST] S. Bradner, "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate [MUST] S. Bradner, "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
[FIPS-180] FIPS 180-1, "Secure Hash Standard", National Institute [FIPS-180] FIPS 180-1, "Secure Hash Standard", National Institute
of Standards and Technology, April 17, 1995. of Standards and Technology, April 17, 1995.
[FIPS-186-2] FIPS 186-2, "Digital Signature Standard", National [FIPS-186-2] FIPS 186-2, "Digital Signature Standard", National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 15 February Institute of Standards and Technology, 15 February
2000. 2000.
skipping to change at page 14, line 17 skipping to change at page 14, line 9
Profile", PKIX Working Group Internet-Draft, January Profile", PKIX Working Group Internet-Draft, January
2001. 2001.
[CMS] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630, [CMS] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630,
June 1999. June 1999.
[IEEE1363] IEEE P1363, "Standard Specifications for Public Key [IEEE1363] IEEE P1363, "Standard Specifications for Public Key
Cryptography", Institute of Electrical and Electronics Cryptography", Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, 2000. Engineers, 2000.
[K] B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerabilty", Posting to ANSI X9F1
and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998.
[LMQSV] L. Law, A. Menezes, M. Qu, J. Solinas and S. Vanstone, [LMQSV] L. Law, A. Menezes, M. Qu, J. Solinas and S. Vanstone,
"An efficient protocol for authenticated key agreement", "An efficient protocol for authenticated key agreement",
Technical report CORR 98-05, University of Waterloo, Technical report CORR 98-05, University of Waterloo,
1998. 1998.
[CMS-KEA] J. Pawling, "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC [CMS-KEA] J. Pawling, "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC
2876, July 2000. 2876, July 2000.
[MSG] B. Ramsdell, "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification", [MSG] B. Ramsdell, "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification",
RFC 2633, June 1999. RFC 2633, June 1999.
[CMS-DH] E. Rescorla, "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", [CMS-DH] E. Rescorla, "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
RFC 2631, June 1999. RFC 2631, June 1999.
[SEC1] SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for [SEC1] SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for
Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000. Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000.
[SEC2] SECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", [SEC2] SECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters",
Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000. Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000.
[SEC3] SECG, "ECC in X.509", Standards for Efficient
Cryptography Group, Working Draft, 2000.
Security Considerations Security Considerations
This specification is based on [CMS], [X9.62] and [X9.63] and the This specification is based on [CMS], [X9.62] and [SEC1] and the
appropriate security considerations of those documents apply. appropriate security considerations of those documents apply.
In addition, implementors of AuthenticatedData should be aware of In addition, implementors of AuthenticatedData should be aware of
the concerns expressed in [BON] when using AuthenticatedData to the concerns expressed in [BON] when using AuthenticatedData to
send messages to more than one recipient. send messages to more than one recipient. Also, users of MQV
should be aware of the vulnerability in [K].
When 256, 384, and 512 bit hash functions succeed SHA-1 in future
revisions of [FIPS], [FIPS-186-2], [X9.62] and [SEC1], then they
can similarly succeed SHA-1 in a future revision of this document.
Intellectual Property Rights Intellectual Property Rights
The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed
in regard to the specification contained in this document. For in regard to the specification contained in this document. For
more information, consult the online list of claimed rights more information, consult the online list of claimed rights
(http://www.ietf.org/ipr.html). (http://www.ietf.org/ipr.html).
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
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