draft-ietf-smime-escertid-03.txt   draft-ietf-smime-escertid-04.txt 
Network Working Group J. Schaad Network Working Group J. Schaad
Internet-Draft Soaring Hawk Consulting Internet-Draft Soaring Hawk Consulting
Intended status: Informational December 21, 2006 Updates: 2634 (if approved) January 4, 2007
Expires: June 24, 2007 Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: July 8, 2007
ESS Update: Adding CertID Algorithm Agility ESS Update: Adding CertID Algorithm Agility
draft-ietf-smime-escertid-03.txt draft-ietf-smime-escertid-04.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
skipping to change at page 1, line 34 skipping to change at page 1, line 35
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 24, 2007. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 8, 2007.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2007).
Abstract Abstract
In the original Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME draft, a In the original Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME document (RFC
structure for cryptographically linking the certificate to be used in 2634), a structure for cryptographically linking the certificate to
validation with the signature was introduced, this structure was be used in validation with the signature was introduced, this
hardwired to use SHA-1. This document allows for the structure to structure was hardwired to use SHA-1. This document allows for the
have algorithm agility and defines new attributes to deal with the structure to have algorithm agility and defines a new attribute for
updating. this purpose.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Updates to RFC 2634 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Replace Section 5.4 'Signing Certificate Attribute 2. Replace Section 5.4 'Signing Certificate Attribute
Definitions' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Definitions' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Insert new section 5.4.1 'Signing Certificate Attribute 3. Insert new section 5.4.1 'Signing Certificate Attribute
Definition Version 2' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Definition Version 2' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Insert new section 5.4.1.1 'Certificate Identification 4. Insert new section 5.4.1.1 'Certificate Identification
Version 2' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Version 2' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Insert new section 5.4.2 ' Signing Certificate Attribute 5. Insert new section 5.4.2 ' Signing Certificate Attribute
Defintion Version 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Defintion Version 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Renumber Section 5.4.1 Certificate Identification Version 1 . 11 6. Renumber Section 5.4.1 Certificate Identification Version 1 . 11
7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 19 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In the original Enhanced Security Services (ESS) for S/MIME draft In the original Enhanced Security Services (ESS) for S/MIME document
[ESS], a structure for cryptographically linking the certificate to [ESS], a structure for cryptographically linking the certificate to
be used in validation with the signature was defined. This be used in validation with the signature was defined. This
structure, called ESSCertID was hardwired to use a SHA-1 hash value. structure, called ESSCertID was hardwired to use a SHA-1 hash value.
The recent attacks on SHA-1 require that we change define a new The recent attacks on SHA-1 require that we define a new attribute
attribute which allows for the use of a different algorithm. This which allows for the use of a different algorithms. This document
document performs that task. performs that task.
This document defines the structure ESSCertIDv2 along with a new This document defines the structure ESSCertIDv2 along with a new
attribute SigningCertificateV2 which uses the updated structure. attribute SigningCertificateV2 which uses the updated structure.
This document allows for the structure to have algorithm agility and This document allows for the structure to have algorithm agility and
defines new attributes to deal with the updating. defines new attributes to deal with the updating.
1.1. Notation 1.1. Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. Updates to RFC 2634
This document updates section 5.4 of RFC 2634. Once the updates are
applied, the revised section will have the following structure:
5.4 Signing Certificate Attribute Definitions
5.4.1 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 2
5.4.1.1 Certificate Identification Version 2
5.4.2 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 1
5.4.2.1 Certificate Identification Version 1
In addition, the ASN.1 module in Appendix A is replaced.
2. Replace Section 5.4 'Signing Certificate Attribute Definitions' 2. Replace Section 5.4 'Signing Certificate Attribute Definitions'
The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent simple The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent simple
substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set
of authorization certificates to be used in verifying a signature. of certificates to be used in verifying a signature.
Two different attributes exist for this due to a flaw in the original Two different attributes exist for this due to a flaw in the original
design. The only substantial difference between the two attributes design. The only substantial difference between the two attributes
is that SigningCertificateV2 allows for hash algorithm agility, while is that SigningCertificateV2 allows for hash algorithm agility, while
SigningCertificate forces the use of the SHA-1 hash algorithm. With SigningCertificate forces the use of the SHA-1 hash algorithm. With
the recent advances in the ability to create hash collisions for the recent advances in the ability to create hash collisions for
SHA-1 it is deemed wise to move forward sooner rather than later. SHA-1 it is wise to move forward sooner rather than later.
When the SHA-1 hash function is used, the SigningCertificate When the SHA-1 hash function is used, the SigningCertificate
attribute MUST be used. The SigningCertificateV2 attribute MUST be attribute MUST be used. The SigningCertificateV2 attribute MUST be
used if any algorithm other than SHA-1 is used and SHOULD NOT be used used if any algorithm other than SHA-1 is used and SHOULD NOT be used
for SHA-1. Applications SHOULD recognize both attributes as long as for SHA-1. Applications SHOULD recognize both attributes as long as
they consider SHA-1 able to distinguish between two different they consider SHA-1 able to distinguish between two different
certificates. (I.e. the possibility of a collision is sufficently certificates. (I.e. the possibility of a collision is sufficently
low.) low.)
Four cases exist which need to be taken into account when using this Four cases exist which need to be taken into account when using this
attribute for correct processing: attribute for correct processing:
1. Signature Validates and the hashes match: This is the success 1. Signature Validates and the hashes match: This is the success
case. case.
2. Signature Validates and the hashes do not match: In this case the 2. Signature Validates and the hashes do not match: In this case the
certificate contained the correct public key, the certificate certificate contained the correct public key, but the certificate
containing the public key is not the one that the signer intended containing the public key is not the one that the signer intended
to be used. In this case the application should attempt a search to be used. In this case the application should attempt a search
for a different certificate with the same public key and for for a different certificate with the same public key and for
which the hashes match. If no such certificate can be found, which the hashes match. If no such certificate can be found,
this is a failure case. this is a failure case.
3. Signature Fails Validation and the hashes match: In this case it 3. Signature Fails Validation and the hashes match: In this case it
can be assumed that the signature has been modified in some can be assumed that the signature has been modified in some
fashion. This is a failure case. fashion. This is a failure case.
skipping to change at page 5, line 12 skipping to change at page 5, line 12
hash value in the attribute and use the new certificate to retry hash value in the attribute and use the new certificate to retry
the signature validation. the signature validation.
3. Insert new section 5.4.1 'Signing Certificate Attribute Definition 3. Insert new section 5.4.1 'Signing Certificate Attribute Definition
Version 2' Version 2'
5.4.1 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 2 5.4.1 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 2
The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent the simple The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent the simple
substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set
of authorization certificates to be used in verifying a signature. of certificates to be used in verifying a signature.
SigningCertificateV2 is identified by the OID: SigningCertificateV2 is identified by the OID:
id-aa-signingCertificateV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-aa-signingCertificateV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 47 } smime(16) id-aa(2) 47 }
The attribute has the ASN.1 definition: The attribute has the ASN.1 definition:
SigningCertificateV2 ::= SEQUENCE { SigningCertificateV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
skipping to change at page 5, line 40 skipping to change at page 5, line 40
to verify the signature. The encoding of the ESSCertIDv2 for this to verify the signature. The encoding of the ESSCertIDv2 for this
certificate SHOULD include the issuerSerial field. If other certificate SHOULD include the issuerSerial field. If other
constraints ensure that issuerAndSerialNumber will be present in constraints ensure that issuerAndSerialNumber will be present in
the SignerInfo, the issuerSerial field MAY be omitted. The the SignerInfo, the issuerSerial field MAY be omitted. The
certificate identified is used during the signature verification certificate identified is used during the signature verification
process. If the hash of the certificate does not match the process. If the hash of the certificate does not match the
certificate used to verify the signature, the signature MUST be certificate used to verify the signature, the signature MUST be
considered invalid. considered invalid.
If more than one certificate is present, subsequent certificates If more than one certificate is present, subsequent certificates
limit the set of authorization certificates that are used during limit the set of certificates that are used during signature
signature validation. Authorization certificates can be either validation. Certificates can be either attribute certificates or
attribute certificates or normal certificates. The issuerSerial normal certificates. The issuerSerial field (in the ESSCertIDv2
field (in the ESSCertIDv2 structure) SHOULD be present for these structure) SHOULD be present for these certificates, unless the
certificates, unless the client who is validating the signature is client who is validating the signature is expected to have easy
expected to have easy access to all the certificates required for access to all the certificates required for validation. If only
validation. If only the signing certificate is present in the the signing certificate is present in the sequence, there are no
sequence, there are no restrictions on the set of authorization restrictions on the set of certificates used in validating the
certificates used in validating the signature. signature.
policies contains a sequence of policy information terms that policies contains a sequence of policy information terms that
identify those certificate policies that the signer asserts apply identify those certificate policies that the signer asserts apply
to the certificate, and under which the certificate should be to the certificate, and under which the certificate should be
relied upon. This value suggests a policy value to be used in the relied upon. This value suggests a policy value to be used in the
relying party's certification path validation. The definition of relying party's certification path validation. The definition of
PolicyInformation can be found in [PKIXCERT]. PolicyInformation can be found in [PKIXCERT].
If present, the SigningCertificateV2 attribute MUST be a signed If present, the SigningCertificateV2 attribute MUST be a signed
attribute; it MUST NOT be an unsigned attribute. CMS defines attribute; it MUST NOT be an unsigned attribute. CMS defines
skipping to change at page 7, line 12 skipping to change at page 7, line 12
NOT be zero or multiple instances of AttributeValue present in the NOT be zero or multiple instances of AttributeValue present in the
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue. attrValues SET OF AttributeValue.
4. Insert new section 5.4.1.1 'Certificate Identification Version 2' 4. Insert new section 5.4.1.1 'Certificate Identification Version 2'
Insert the following text as a new section Insert the following text as a new section
5.4.1.1 Certificate Identification Version 2 5.4.1.1 Certificate Identification Version 2
The best way to identify certificates is an often-discussed issue. The best way to identify certificates is an often-discussed issue.
The ESSCertIDV2 structure supplies two different fields that are used The ESSCertIDv2 structure supplies two different fields that are used
for this purpose. for this purpose.
The hash of the entire certificate allows for a verifier to check The hash of the entire certificate allows for a verifier to check
that the certificate used in the verification process was the same that the certificate used in the verification process was the same
certificate the signer intended. Hashes are convenient in that they certificate the signer intended. Hashes are convenient in that they
are frequently used by certificate stores as a method of indexing and are frequently used by certificate stores as a method of indexing and
retrieving certificates as well. The use of the hash is required by retrieving certificates as well. The use of the hash is required by
this structure since the detection of substituted certificates is this structure since the detection of substituted certificates is
based on the fact they would map to different hash values. based on the fact they would map to different hash values.
skipping to change at page 7, line 37 skipping to change at page 7, line 37
to identify the correct signing certificate. (This assumes the same to identify the correct signing certificate. (This assumes the same
issuer name is not re-used from the set of trust anchors.) The issuer name is not re-used from the set of trust anchors.) The
issuer/serial number pair can be stored in the sid field of the issuer/serial number pair can be stored in the sid field of the
SignerInfo object. However the sid field is not covered by the SignerInfo object. However the sid field is not covered by the
signature. In the cases where the issuer/serial number pair is not signature. In the cases where the issuer/serial number pair is not
used in the sid or the issuer/serial number pair needs to be signed, used in the sid or the issuer/serial number pair needs to be signed,
it SHOULD be placed in the issuerSerial field of the ESSCertIDv2 it SHOULD be placed in the issuerSerial field of the ESSCertIDv2
structure. structure.
Attribute certificates and additional public key certificates Attribute certificates and additional public key certificates
containing authorization information do not have an issuer/serial containing information do not have an issuer/serial number pair
number pair represented anywhere in a SignerInfo object. When an represented anywhere in a SignerInfo object. When an attribute
attribute certificate or an additional public key certificate is not certificate or an additional public key certificate is not included
included in the SignedData object, it becomes much more difficult to in the SignedData object, it becomes much more difficult to get the
get the correct set of certificates based only on a hash of the correct set of certificates based only on a hash of the certificate.
certificate. For this reason, these certificates SHOULD be For this reason, these certificates SHOULD be identified by the
identified by the IssuerSerial object. IssuerSerial object.
This document defines a certificate identifier as: This document defines a certificate identifier as:
ESSCertIDv2 ::= SEQUENCE { ESSCertIDv2 ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT {id-sha256} hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
DEFAULT {algorithm id-sha256 parameters NULL},
certHash Hash, certHash Hash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
} }
Hash ::= OCTET STRING Hash ::= OCTET STRING
IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE { IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer GeneralNames, issuer GeneralNames,
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber
} }
skipping to change at page 8, line 40 skipping to change at page 8, line 41
The fields of IssuerSerial are defined as follows: The fields of IssuerSerial are defined as follows:
issuer contains the issuer name of the certificate. For non- issuer contains the issuer name of the certificate. For non-
attribute certificates, the issuer MUST contain only the issuer attribute certificates, the issuer MUST contain only the issuer
name from the certificate encoded in the directoryName choice of name from the certificate encoded in the directoryName choice of
GeneralNames. For attribute certificates, the issuer MUST contain GeneralNames. For attribute certificates, the issuer MUST contain
the issuer name field from the attribute certificate. the issuer name field from the attribute certificate.
serialNumber holds the serial number that uniquely identifies the serialNumber holds the serial number that uniquely identifies the
certificate for the issuer CA. certificate for the issuer.
5. Insert new section 5.4.2 ' Signing Certificate Attribute Defintion 5. Insert new section 5.4.2 ' Signing Certificate Attribute Defintion
Version 1 Version 1
5.4.2 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 1 5.4.2 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 1
The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent the simple The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent the simple
substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set
of authorization certificates to be used in verifying a signature. of certificates to be used in verifying a signature.
The definition of SigningCertificate is The definition of SigningCertificate is
SigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { SigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
certs SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID, certs SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID,
policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
} }
id-aa-signingCertificate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-aa-signingCertificate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
skipping to change at page 9, line 37 skipping to change at page 9, line 37
The encoding of the ESSCertID for this certificate SHOULD include the The encoding of the ESSCertID for this certificate SHOULD include the
issuerSerial field. If other constraints ensure that issuerSerial field. If other constraints ensure that
issuerAndSerialNumber will be present in the SignerInfo, the issuerAndSerialNumber will be present in the SignerInfo, the
issuerSerial field MAY be omitted. The certificate identified is issuerSerial field MAY be omitted. The certificate identified is
used during the signature verification process. If the hash of the used during the signature verification process. If the hash of the
certificate does not match the certificate used to verify the certificate does not match the certificate used to verify the
signature, the signature MUST be considered invalid. signature, the signature MUST be considered invalid.
If more than one certificate is present in the sequence of If more than one certificate is present in the sequence of
ESSCertIDs, the certificates after the first one limit the set of ESSCertIDs, the certificates after the first one limit the set of
authorization certificates that are used during signature validation. certificates that are used during signature validation. Certificates
Authorization certificates can be either attribute certificates or can be either attribute certificates or public key certificates. The
normal certificates. The issuerSerial field (in the ESSCertID issuerSerial field (in the ESSCertID structure) SHOULD be present for
structure) SHOULD be present for these certificates, unless the these certificates, unless the client who is validating the signature
client who is validating the signature is expected to have easy is expected to have easy access to all the certificates required for
access to all the certificates required for validation. If only the validation. If only the signing certificate is present in the
signing certificate is present in the sequence, there are no sequence, there are no restrictions on the set of certificates used
restrictions on the set of authorization certificates used in in validating the signature.
validating the signature.
The sequence of policy information terms identifies those certificate The sequence of policy information terms identifies those certificate
policies that the signer asserts apply to the certificate, and under policies that the signer asserts apply to the certificate, and under
which the certificate should be relied upon. This value suggests a which the certificate should be relied upon. This value suggests a
policy value to be used in the relying party's certification path policy value to be used in the relying party's certification path
validation. validation.
If present, the SigningCertificate attribute MUST be a signed If present, the SigningCertificate attribute MUST be a signed
attribute; it MUST NOT be an unsigned attribute. CMS defines attribute; it MUST NOT be an unsigned attribute. CMS defines
SignedAttributes as a SET OF Attribute. A SignerInfo MUST NOT SignedAttributes as a SET OF Attribute. A SignerInfo MUST NOT
include multiple instances of the SigningCertificate attribute. CMS include multiple instances of the SigningCertificate attribute. CMS
defines the ASN.1 syntax for the signed attributes to include defines the ASN.1 syntax for the signed attributes to include
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue. A SigningCertificate attribute attrValues SET OF AttributeValue. A SigningCertificate attribute
MUST include only a single instance of AttributeValue. There MUST MUST include only a single instance of AttributeValue. There MUST
NOT be zero or multiple instances of AttributeValue present in the NOT be zero or multiple instances of AttributeValue present in the
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue. attrValues SET OF AttributeValue.
6. Renumber Section 5.4.1 Certificate Identification Version 1 6. Renumber Section 5.4.1 Certificate Identification Version 1
Change the number on this section from 5.4.1 to 5.4.2.1 Change the number on this section from 5.4.1 to 5.4.2.1.
Change the title on this section to "Certificate Identification Change the title on this section to "Certificate Identification
Version 1". Version 1".
7. Normative References 7. Normative References
[ESS] Hoffman, P., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME", [ESS] Hoffman, P., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME",
RFC 2634, June 1999. RFC 2634, June 1999.
[PKIXCERT] [PKIXCERT]
Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W., and D. Solo, "Internet Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002. April 2002.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 3852, July 2004.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
Replace the ASN.1 module with this one. Replace the ASN.1 module in RFC 2634 with this one.
ExtendedSecurityServices-2006 ExtendedSecurityServices-2006
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-ess-2006(30) } pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-ess-2006(30) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
IMPORTS IMPORTS
ContentType, IssuerAndSerialNumber, SubjectKeyIdentifier, -- Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC 3852]
AlgorithmIdentifier ContentType, IssuerAndSerialNumber, SubjectKeyIdentifier
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms(1)} rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
cms-2004(24)}
-- PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile, Section A.1 Explicity Tagged Module
-- 1988 Syntax [RFC 3280]
AlgorithmIdentifier, CertificateSerialNumber
FROM PKIX1Explicit88
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) pkix1-explicit(18) }
;
-- PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile, Sec A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module, -- PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile, Sec A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module,
PolicyInformation, CertificateSerialNumber, GeneralNames FROM -- 1988 Syntax [RFC 3280]
PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) PolicyInformation, CertificateSerialNumber, GeneralNames
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7)id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19)}; internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-implicit(19)};
-- Extended Security Services -- Extended Security Services
-- The construct "SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF" appears in several ASN.1 -- The construct "SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF" appears in several ASN.1
-- constructs in this module. A valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE can have zero or -- constructs in this module. A valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE can have zero or
-- more entries. The SIZE (1..MAX) construct constrains the SEQUENCE to -- more entries. The SIZE (1..MAX) construct constrains the SEQUENCE to
-- have at least one entry. MAX indicates the upper bound is unspecified. -- have at least one entry. MAX indicates the upper bound is unspecified.
-- Implementations are free to choose an upper bound that suits their -- Implementations are free to choose an upper bound that suits their
-- environment. -- environment.
UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING -- UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
-- The contents are formatted as described in [UTF8] -- The contents are formatted as described in [UTF8]
-- Section 2.7 -- Section 2.7
ReceiptRequest ::= SEQUENCE { ReceiptRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier, signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
receiptsFrom ReceiptsFrom, receiptsFrom ReceiptsFrom,
receiptsTo SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-receiptsTo) OF GeneralNames } receiptsTo SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-receiptsTo) OF GeneralNames }
ub-receiptsTo INTEGER ::= 16 ub-receiptsTo INTEGER ::= 16
skipping to change at page 15, line 47 skipping to change at page 16, line 7
ub-privacy-mark-length INTEGER ::= 128 ub-privacy-mark-length INTEGER ::= 128
SecurityCategories ::= SET SIZE (1..ub-security-categories) OF SecurityCategories ::= SET SIZE (1..ub-security-categories) OF
SecurityCategory SecurityCategory
ub-security-categories INTEGER ::= 64 ub-security-categories INTEGER ::= 64
SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE { SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {
type [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, type [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type -- defined by type value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type
} }
--Note: The aforementioned SecurityCategory syntax produces identical --Note: The aforementioned SecurityCategory syntax produces identical
--hex encodings as the following SecurityCategory syntax that is --hex encodings as the following SecurityCategory syntax that is
--documented in the X.411 specification: --documented in the X.411 specification:
-- --
--SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE { --SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {
-- type [0] SECURITY-CATEGORY, -- type [0] SECURITY-CATEGORY,
-- value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type } -- value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type }
-- --
--SECURITY-CATEGORY MACRO ::= --SECURITY-CATEGORY MACRO ::=
--BEGIN --BEGIN
--TYPE NOTATION ::= type | empty --TYPE NOTATION ::= type | empty
--VALUE NOTATION ::= value (VALUE OBJECT IDENTIFIER) --VALUE NOTATION ::= value (VALUE OBJECT IDENTIFIER)
skipping to change at page 17, line 26 skipping to change at page 17, line 32
id-aa-signingCertificateV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-aa-signingCertificateV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 47 } smime(16) id-aa(2) 47 }
id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 } csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }
ESSCertIDv2 ::= SEQUENCE { ESSCertIDv2 ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT {algorithm hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
id-sha256 parameters NULL} DEFAULT {algorithm id-sha256 parameters NULL},
certHash Hash, certHash Hash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
} }
ESSCertID ::= SEQUENCE { ESSCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash Hash, certHash Hash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
} }
Hash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA1 hash of entire certificate Hash ::= OCTET STRING
IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE { IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer GeneralNames, issuer GeneralNames,
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber
} }
END -- of ExtendedSecurityServices-2006 END -- of ExtendedSecurityServices-2006
Author's Address Author's Address
Jim Schaad Jim Schaad
Soaring Hawk Consulting Soaring Hawk Consulting
PO Box 675 PO Box 675
Gold Bar, WA 98251 Gold Bar, WA 98251
Phone: (425) 785-1031 Phone: (425) 785-1031
Email: jimsch@exmsft.com Email: jimsch@exmsft.com
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2007).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights. retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
 End of changes. 31 change blocks. 
65 lines changed or deleted 102 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.33. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/