IPv6 Operations Working Group (v6ops)                            F. Gont
Internet-Draft                                              SI6 Networks
Intended status: Informational                               N. Hilliard
Expires: June 8, July 6, 2021                                               INEX
                                                              G. Doering
                                                             SpaceNet AG
                                                               W. Kumari
                                                               G. Huston
                                                                  W. Liu
                                                     Huawei Technologies
                                                        December 5, 2020
                                                         January 2, 2021

    Operational Implications of IPv6 Packets with Extension Headers


   This document summarizes the operational implications of IPv6
   extension headers specified in the IPv6 protocol specification
   (RFC8200), and attempts to analyze reasons why packets with IPv6
   extension headers are often dropped in the public Internet.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Disclaimer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Background Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Previous Work on IPv6 Extension Headers . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Packet Forwarding Engine Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Recirculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Requirement to Process Layer-3/layer-4 information in
       Intermediate Systems  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  ECMP and Hash-based Load-Sharing  . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  Enforcing infrastructure ACLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.3.  DDoS Management and Customer Requests for Filtering . . .   9
     6.4.  Network Intrusion Detection and Prevention  . . . . . . .  10
     6.5.  Firewalling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Operational Implications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.1.  Inability to Find Layer-4 Information . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.2.  Route-Processor Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.3.  Inability to Perform Fine-grained Filtering . . . . . . .  12
     7.4.  Security Concerns Associated with IPv6 Extension Headers   12
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14  13
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   IPv6 Extension Headers (EHs) allow for the extension of the IPv6
   protocol, and provide support for core functionality such as IPv6
   fragmentation.  However, common implementation limitations suggest
   that EHs present a challenge for IPv6 packet routing equipment and
   middle-boxes, and evidence exists that IPv6 packets with EHs are
   intentionally dropped in the public Internet in some network

   The authors of this document have been involved in numerous
   discussions about IPv6 extension headers (both within the IETF and in
   other fora), and have noticed that the security and operational
   implications associated with IPv6 EHs were unknown to the larger
   audience participating in these discussions.

   This document has the following goals:

   o  Raise awareness about the operational and security implications of
      IPv6 Extension Headers specified in [RFC8200], and present reasons
      why some networks resort to intentionally dropping packets
      containing IPv6 Extension Headers.

   o  Highlight areas where current IPv6 support by networking devices
      maybe sub-optimal, such that the aforementioned support is

   o  Highlight operational issues associated with IPv6 extension
      headers, such that those issues are considered in IETF
      standardization efforts.

   Section 3 provides background information about the IPv6 packet
   structure and associated implications.  Section 4 of this document
   summarizes the previous work that has been carried out in the area of
   IPv6 extension headers.  Section 5 discusses packet forwarding engine
   constraints in contemporary routers.  Section 6 discusses why
   contemporary routers and middle-boxes may need to access Layer-4
   information to make a forwarding decision.  Finally, Section 7
   discusses the operational implications of IPv6 EHs.

2.  Disclaimer

   This document analyzes the operational challenges represented by
   packets that employ IPv6 Extension Headers, and documents some of the
   operational reasons why these packets are often dropped in the public
   Internet.  This document is not a recommendation to drop such
   packets, but rather an analysis of why they are dropped.

3.  Background Information

   It is useful to compare the basic structure of IPv6 packets against
   that of IPv4 packets, and analyze the implications of the two
   different packet structures.

   IPv4 packets have a variable-length header size, that allows for the
   use of IPv4 "options" -- optional information that may be of use by
   nodes processing IPv4 packets.  The IPv4 header length is specified
   in the IHL header field of the mandatory IPv4 header, and must be in
   the range from 20 octets (the minimum IPv4 header size) to 60 octets
   (accommodating at most 40 octets of options).  The upper-layer
   protocol type is specified via the "Protocol" field of the mandatory
   IPv4 header.

                  Protocol, IHL
                       |        |
                       |        v
                  |             |                        |
                  |    IPv4     |       Upper-Layer      |
                  |    Header   |       Protocol         |
                  |             |                        |

                  variable length

                      Figure 1: IPv4 Packet Structure

   IPv6 took a different approach to the IPv6 packet structure.  Rather
   than employing a variable-length header as IPv4 does, IPv6 employs a
   linked-list-like packet structure, where a mandatory fixed-length
   IPv6 header is followed by an arbitrary number of optional extension
   headers, with the upper-layer header being the last header in the
   IPv6 header chain.  Each extension header typically specifies its
   length (unless it is implicit from the extension header type), and
   the "next header" type that follows in the IPv6 IPv6 header chain.

          NH          NH, EH-length      NH, EH-length
           +-------+      +------+            +-------+
           |       |      |      |            |       |
           |       v      |      v            |       v
     |             |             |    |               |              |
     |    IPv6     |    Ext.     |    |     Ext.      |  Upper-Layer |
     |    header   |    Header   |    |     Header    |  Protocol    |
     |             |             |    |               |              |

      fixed length    variable number of EHs & length
     <------------> <-------------------------------->

                      Figure 2: IPv6 Packet Structure

   This packet structure has the following implications:

   o  [RFC8200] requires the entire IPv6 header chain to be contained in
      the first fragment of a packet, therefore limiting the IPv6
      extension header chain to the size of the Path-MTU. path MTU.

   o  Other than the Path-MTU path MTU constraints, there are no other limits to
      the number of IPv6 EHs that may be present in a packet.
      Therefore, there is no upper-limit regarding "how deep into the
      IPv6 packet" the upper-layer may be found.

   o  The only way for a node to obtain the upper-layer protocol type or
      find the upper-layer protocol header is to parse and process the
      entire IPv6 header chain, in sequence, starting from the mandatory
      IPv6 header, until the last header in the IPv6 header chain is

4.  Previous Work on IPv6 Extension Headers

   Some of the operational implications of IPv6 Extension Headers have
   been discussed in IETF circles: at the IETF:

   o  [I-D.taylor-v6ops-fragdrop] discusses a rationale for which
      operators drop IPv6 fragments.

   o  [I-D.wkumari-long-headers] discusses possible issues arising from
      "long" IPv6 header chains.

   o  [I-D.kampanakis-6man-ipv6-eh-parsing] describes how
      inconsistencies in the way IPv6 packets with extension headers are
      parsed by different implementations could result in evasion of
      security controls, and presents guidelines for parsing IPv6
      extension headers with the goal of providing a common and
      consistent parsing methodology for IPv6 implementations.

   o  [I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering] analyzes the security
      implications of IPv6 EHs, and the operational implications of
      dropping packets that employ IPv6 EHs and associated options.

   o  [RFC7113] discusses how some popular RA-Guard implementations are
      subject to evasion by means of IPv6 extension headers.

   o  [RFC8900] analyzes the fragility introduced by IP fragmentation.

   A number of recent RFCs have discussed issues related to IPv6
   extension headers, specifying updates to a previous revision of the
   IPv6 standard ([RFC2460]), many of which have now been incorporated
   into the current IPv6 core standard ([RFC8200]) or the IPv6 Node
   Requirements ([RFC8504]).  Namely,

   o  [RFC5095] discusses the security implications of Routing Header
      Type 0 (RTH0), and deprecates it.

   o  [RFC5722] analyzes the security implications of overlapping
      fragments, and provides recommendations in this area.

   o  [RFC7045] clarifies how intermediate nodes should deal with IPv6
      extension headers.

   o  [RFC7112] discusses the issues arising in a specific fragmentation
      case where the IPv6 header chain is fragmented into two or more
      fragments (and formally forbids such fragmentation case).

   o  [RFC6946] discusses a flawed (but common) processing of the so-
      called IPv6 "atomic fragments", and specified improved processing
      of such packets.

   o  [RFC8021] deprecates the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments.

   o  [RFC8504] clarifies processing rules for packets with extension
      headers, and also allows hosts to enforce limits on the number of
      options included in IPv6 EHs.

   o  [RFC7739] discusses the security implications of predictable
      fragment Identification values, and provides recommendations for
      the generation of these values.

   o  [RFC6980] analyzes the security implications of employing IPv6
      fragmentation with Neighbor Discovery for IPv6, and formally
      recommends against such usage.

   Additionally, [RFC8200] has relaxed the requirement that "all nodes
   examine and process the Hop-by-Hop Options header" from [RFC2460], by
   specifying that only nodes that have been explicitly configured to
   process the Hop-by-Hop Options header are required to do so.

   A number of studies have measured the extent to which packets
   employing IPv6 extension headers are dropped in the public Internet:

   o  [PMTUD-Blackholes] and [Linkova-Gont-IEPG90] presented some
      preliminary measurements regarding the extent to which packet
      containing IPv6 EHs are dropped in the public Internet.

   o  [RFC7872] presents more comprehensive results and documents the
      methodology for obtaining the presented used to obtain these results.

   o  [Huston-2017] and [Huston-2020] measured packet drops resulting
      from IPv6 fragmentation when communicating with DNS servers.

5.  Packet Forwarding Engine Constraints

   Most contemporary routers use dedicated hardware (e.g.  ASICs or
   NPUs) to determine how to forward packets across their internal
   fabrics (see [IEPG94-Scudder] and [APNIC-Scudder] for details).  One
   of the common methods of handling next-hop lookup is to send a small
   portion of the ingress packet to a lookup engine with specialised
   hardware (e.g. ternary CAM or RLDRAM) to determine the packet's next-
   hop.  Technical constraints mean that there is a trade-off between
   the amount of data sent to the lookup engine and the overall
   performance of the lookup engine.  If more data is sent, the lookup
   engine can inspect further into the packet, but the overall
   performance of the system will be reduced.  If less data is sent, the
   overall performance of the router will be increased but the packet
   lookup engine may not be able to inspect far enough into a packet to
   determine how it should be handled.

      For example, contemporary high-end routers can use up to 192 bytes
      of header (Cisco ASR9000 Typhoon) or 384 bytes of header (Juniper
      MX Trio).

   If a hardware forwarding engine on a contemporary router cannot make
   a forwarding decision about a packet because critical information is
   not sent to the look-up engine, then the router will normally drop
   the packet.

      Section 6 discusses some of the reasons for which a contemporary
      router might need to access layer-4 information to make a
      forwarding decision.

   Historically, some packet forwarding engines punted packets of this
   form to the control plane for more in-depth analysis, but this is
   unfeasible on most current contemporary router architectures as a result of
   the vast difference between the hardware forwarding capacity of the
   router and processing capacity of the control plane and the size of
   the management link which connects the control plane to the
   forwarding plane.

   If an IPv6 header chain is sufficiently long that it exceeds the
   packet look-up capacity of the router, the router could resort to
   dropping the packet, as a result of being unable to determine how the
   packet should be handled.

5.1.  Recirculation

   Although TLV chains are amenable to iterative processing on
   architectures that have packet look-up engines with deep inspection
   capabilities, some packet forwarding engines manage IPv6 Extension
   Header chains using recirculation.  This approach processes Extension
   Headers one at a time: when processing on one Extension Header is
   completed, the packet is looped back through the processing engine
   again.  This recirculation process continues repeatedly until there
   are no more Extension Headers left to be processed.

   Recirculation is typically used on packet forwarding engines with
   limited look-up capability, because it allows arbitrarily long header
   chains to be processed without the complexity and cost associated
   with packet forwarding engines which have deep look-up capabilities.
   However, recirculation can impact the forwarding capacity of
   hardware, as each packet will pass through the processing engine
   multiple times.  Depending on configuration, the type of packets
   being processed, and the hardware capabilities of the packet
   forwarding engine, this could impact data-plane throughput
   performance on the router.

6.  Requirement to Process Layer-3/layer-4 information in Intermediate

   The following subsections discuss some of the reasons for which
   contemporary routers and middle-boxes may need to process Layer-3/
   layer-4 information to make a forwarding decision.

6.1.  ECMP and Hash-based Load-Sharing

   In the case of ECMP (equal cost multi path) load sharing, the router
   on the sending side of the link needs to make a decision regarding
   which of the links to use for a given packet.  Since round-robin
   usage of the links is usually avoided to prevent packet reordering,
   forwarding engines need to use a mechanism that will consistently
   forward the same data streams down the same forwarding paths.  Most
   forwarding engines achieve this by calculating a simple hash using an
   n-tuple gleaned from a combination of layer-2 through to layer-4
   packet header information.  This n-tuple will typically use the src/
   dst MAC address, src/dst IP address, and if possible further layer-4
   src/dst port information.  Layer-4 port information can increase the
   entropy of the hash, and it is often thought desirable to use it if

   We note that in

   In the IPv6 world, flows are expected to be identified by means of
   the IPv6 Flow Label [RFC6437].  Thus, ECMP and Hash-based
   Load-Sharing would Load-
   Sharing should be possible without the need to process the entire
   IPv6 header chain to obtain upper-layer information to identify
   flows.  However, we note that for a long time  Historically, many IPv6 implementations failed to set the
   Flow Label, and ECMP and Hash-based
   Load-Sharing / hash-based load-sharing devices also did not
   employ the Flow Label for performing their task.  Clearly, widespread
   support of [RFC6437] would relieve middle-boxes from having to
   process the entire IPv6 header chain, making Flow Label-based ECMP
   and Hash-based Load-Sharing [RFC6438] feasible.

   While support of [RFC6437] is currently widespread for current
   versions of all popular host implementations, there is still only
   marginal usage of the IPv6 Flow Label for ECMP and load balancing
   [Cunha-2020].  A contributing factor could be the issues that have
   been found in host implementations and middle-boxes [Jaeggli-2018].

6.2.  Enforcing infrastructure ACLs

   Generally speaking, infrastructure

   Infrastructure ACLs (iACLs) drop unwanted packets destined to parts of a provider's infrastructure, because they
   network's infrastructure IP addresses.  Typically, iACLs are
   not deployed
   because external direct access to a network's infrastructure
   addresses is operationally needed unnecessary, and can be used for attacks
   of different sorts against router control planes.  Some  To this end,
   traffic usually needs to be differentiated depending on the basis of layer-3 or
   layer-4 criteria to achieve a useful balance of protection and functionality, for example:
   functionality.  For example, an infrastructure may be configured with
   the following policy:

   o  Permit some amount of ICMP echo (ping) traffic towards a router's
      addresses for troubleshooting.

   o  Permit BGP sessions on the shared network of an exchange point
      (potentially differentiating between the amount of packets/seconds
      permitted for established sessions and connection establishment),
      but do not permit other traffic from the same peer IP addresses.

6.3.  DDoS Management and Customer Requests for Filtering

   The case of customer DDoS protection and edge-to-core customer
   protection filters is similar in nature to the infrastructure ACL iACL protection.
   Similar to infrastructure ACL iACL protection, layer-4 ACLs generally need to be applied
   as close to the edge of the network as possible, even though the
   intent is usually to protect the customer edge rather than the
   provider core.  Application of layer-4 DDoS protection to a network
   edge is often automated using Flowspec [RFC5575].

   For example, a web site that normally only handled traffic on TCP
   ports 80 and 443 could be subject to a volumetric DDoS attack using
   NTP and DNS packets with randomised source IP address, thereby
   rendering traditional [RFC5635] source-based real-time black hole
   mechanisms useless.  In this situation, DDoS protection ACLs could be
   configured to block all UDP traffic at the network edge without
   impairing the web server functionality in any way.  Thus, being able
   to block arbitrary protocols at the network edge can avoid DDoS-
   related problems both in the provider network and on the customer
   edge link.

6.4.  Network Intrusion Detection and Prevention

   Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) examine network traffic
   and try to identify traffic patterns that can be correlated to
   network-based attacks.  These systems generally inspect application-
   layer traffic (if possible), but at the bare minimum inspect layer-4
   flows.  When attack activity is inferred, the operator is signaled notified of
   the potential intrusion attempt.

   Network Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) operate similarly to
   NIDS's, but they can also prevent intrusions by reacting to detected
   attack attempts by e.g., triggering packet filtering policies at
   firewalls and other devices.

   Use of extension headers can result be problematic for NIDS/IPS, since:

   o  Extension headers increase the complexity of resulting traffic,
      and the associated work and system requirements to process it.

   o  Use of unknown extension headers can prevent an NIDS/IPS to
      process from
      processing layer-4 information

   o  Use of IPv6 fragmentation requires a stateful fragment-reassembly
      operation, even for decoy traffic employing forged source
      addresses (see e.g. [nmap]).

   As a result, in order to increase the efficiency or effectiveness of
   these systems, packets employing IPv6 extension headers are often
   dropped at the network ingress point(s) of networks that deploy these

6.5.  Firewalling

   Firewalls enforce security policies by means of packet filtering.
   These systems generally usually inspect layer-3 and layer-4 traffic, and but can
   often also examine application-layer traffic flows.

   As with NIDS/IPS (Section 6.4), use of IPv6 extension headers can
   represent a challenge to network firewalls, since:

   o  Extension headers increase the complexity of resulting traffic,
      and the associated work and system requirements to process it (see
      e.g.  [Zack-FW-Benchmark]).

   o  Use of unknown extension headers can prevent firewalls to process from
      processing layer-4 information information.

   o  Use of IPv6 fragmentation requires a stateful fragment-reassembly
      operation, even for decoy traffic employing forged source
      addresses (see e.g. [nmap]).

   Additionally, a common firewall filtering policy is the so-called
   "default deny", where all traffic is blocked (by default), and only
   expected traffic is added to an "allow/accept list".

   As a result, whether because of the challenges represented by
   extension headers or because the use of IPv6 extension headers has
   not been explicitly allowed, packets employing IPv6 extension headers
   are often dropped by network firewalls.

7.  Operational Implications

7.1.  Inability to Find Layer-4 Information

   As discussed in Section 6, contemporary routers and middle-boxes that need to find
   the layer-4 header must process the entire IPv6 extension header
   chain.  When such devices are unable to obtain the required
   information, the forwarding device has the option to drop the packet
   unconditionally, forward the packet unconditionally, or process the
   packet outside the normal forwarding path.  Forwarding packets
   unconditionally will usually allow for the circumvention of security
   controls (see e.g.  Section 6.5), while processing packets outside of
   the normal forwarding path will usually open the door to DoS attacks
   (see e.g.  Section 5).  Thus, in these scenarios, devices often
   simply resort to dropping such packets unconditionally.

7.2.  Route-Processor Protection

   Most contemporary routers have a fast hardware-assisted forwarding
   plane and a loosely coupled control plane, connected together with a
   link that has much less capacity than the forwarding plane could
   handle.  Traffic differentiation cannot be done performed by the control plane
   plane, because this would overload the internal link connecting the
   forwarding plane to the control plane.

   The Hop-by-Hop Options header has been particularly challenging since
   in most circumstances, the corresponding packet is punted to the
   control plane for processing.  As a result, operators usually drop
   IPv6 packets containing this extension header.  Please see  [RFC6192]
   for provides
   advice regarding protection of the router a router's control plane.

7.3.  Inability to Perform Fine-grained Filtering

   Some router implementations do not have support for fine-grained
   filtering of IPv6 extension headers.  For example, an operator that
   wishes to drop packets containing Routing Header Type 0 (RHT0), may
   only be able to filter on the extension header type (Routing Header).
   This could result in an operator enforcing a more coarse filtering
   policy (e.g. "drop all packets containing a Routing Header" vs. "only
   drop packets that contain a Routing Header Type 0").

7.4.  Security Concerns Associated with IPv6 Extension Headers

   The security implications of IPv6 Extension Headers generally fall
   into one or more of these categories:

   o  Evasion of security controls

   o  DoS due to processing requirements

   o  DoS due to implementation errors

   o  Extension Header-specific issues

   Unlike IPv4 packets where the upper-layer protocol can be trivially
   found by means of the "IHL" ("Internet Header Length") IPv4 header
   field, the structure of IPv6 packets is more flexible and complex,
   and complex.
   This can represent a challenge for devices that need to find this
   information, since locating upper-layer protocol information requires
   that all IPv6 extension headers be examined.  This has presented  In turn, this presents
   implementation difficulties, and since some packet filtering mechanisms
   that require upper-layer information (even if just the upper layer
   protocol type) can be trivially circumvented by inserting IPv6
   Extension Headers between the main IPv6 header and the upper layer
   protocol.  [RFC7113] describes this issue for the RA-Guard case, but
   the same techniques could be employed to circumvent other IPv6
   firewall and packet filtering mechanisms.  Additionally,
   implementation inconsistencies in packet forwarding engines can
   result in evasion of security controls
   [I-D.kampanakis-6man-ipv6-eh-parsing] [Atlasis2014] [BH-EU-2014].


   Sometimes packets with attached IPv6 Extension Headers can impact throughput
   performance on routers that forward them. and middleboxes.  Unless appropriate
   mitigations are put in place (e.g., packet dropping and/or rate-limiting), rate-
   limiting), an attacker could simply send a large amount of IPv6
   traffic employing IPv6 Extension Headers with the purpose of
   performing a Denial of Service (DoS) attack (see Section 7 for
   further details).

      In the most trivial case, a packet that includes a Hop-by-Hop
      Options header might go through the slow forwarding path, and to be
      processed by the router's CPU.  Another possible case might be
      where  Alternatively, a router that has been configured
      to enforce an ACL based on upper-layer information (e.g., upper
      layer protocol or TCP Destination Port), needs Port) may need to process the
      entire IPv6 header chain
      (in in order to find the required information),
      information, thereby causing the packet to be processed in the
      slow path [Cisco-EH-Cons].  We note that, for obvious reasons, the
      aforementioned performance issues can affect other devices such as
      firewalls, Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), etc.
      [Zack-FW-Benchmark].  The extent to which performance is affected
      on these devices are affected is typically implementation-dependent.

   IPv6 implementations, like all other software, tend to mature with
   time and wide-scale deployment.  While the IPv6 protocol itself has
   existed for over 20 years, serious bugs related to IPv6 Extension
   Header processing continue to be discovered (see e.g.  [Cisco-Frag1],
   [Cisco-Frag2], and [FreeBSD-SA]).  Because there is currently little
   operational reliance on IPv6 Extension headers, the corresponding
   code paths are rarely exercised, and there is the potential for bugs
   that still remain to be discovered in some implementations.

   IPv6 Fragment Headers are employed to allow fragmentation of IPv6
   packets.  While many of the security implications of the
   fragmentation / reassembly mechanism are known from the IPv4 world,
   several related issues have crept into IPv6 implementations.  These
   range from denial of service attacks to information leakage, as
   discussed in [RFC7739], [Bonica-NANOG58] and [Atlasis2012]).

8.  IANA Considerations

   There are no IANA registries within this document.  The RFC-Editor
   can remove this section before publication of this document as an

9.  Security Considerations

   The security implications of IPv6 extension headers are discussed in
   Section 7.4.  This document does not introduce any new security

10.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Mikael
   Abrahamsson, Fred Baker, Dale W.  Carder, Brian Carpenter, Tim Chown,
   Owen DeLong, Gorry Fairhurst, Tom Herbert, Lee Howard, Tom Petch,
   Sander Steffann, Eduard Vasilenko, Eric Vyncke, Jingrong Xie, and
   Andrew Yourtchenko, for providing valuable comments on earlier
   versions of this document.

   Fernando Gont would like to thank Jan Zorz / Go6 Lab
   <https://go6lab.si/>, Jared Mauch, and Sander Steffann
   <https://steffann.nl/>, for providing access to systems and networks
   that were employed to perform experiments and measurements involving
   packets with IPv6 Extension Headers.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC5095]  Abley, J., Savola, P., and G. Neville-Neil, "Deprecation
              of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6", RFC 5095,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5095, December 2007,

   [RFC5722]  Krishnan, S., "Handling of Overlapping IPv6 Fragments",
              RFC 5722, DOI 10.17487/RFC5722, December 2009,

   [RFC6946]  Gont, F., "Processing of IPv6 "Atomic" Fragments",
              RFC 6946, DOI 10.17487/RFC6946, May 2013,

   [RFC6980]  Gont, F., "Security Implications of IPv6 Fragmentation
              with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery", RFC 6980,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6980, August 2013,

   [RFC7112]  Gont, F., Manral, V., and R. Bonica, "Implications of
              Oversized IPv6 Header Chains", RFC 7112,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7112, January 2014,

   [RFC8021]  Gont, F., Liu, W., and T. Anderson, "Generation of IPv6
              Atomic Fragments Considered Harmful", RFC 8021,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8021, January 2017,

   [RFC8200]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,

   [RFC8504]  Chown, T., Loughney, J., and T. Winters, "IPv6 Node
              Requirements", BCP 220, RFC 8504, DOI 10.17487/RFC8504,
              January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8504>.

11.2.  Informative References

              Scudder, J., "Modern router architecture and IPv6",  APNIC
              Blog, June 4, 2020, <https://blog.apnic.net/2020/06/04/

              Atlasis, A., "Attacking IPv6 Implementation Using
              Fragmentation",  BlackHat Europe 2012. Amsterdam,
              Netherlands. March 14-16, 2012,

              Atlasis, A., "A Novel Way of Abusing IPv6 Extension
              Headers to Evade IPv6 Security Devices", May 2014,

              Atlasis, A., Rey, E., and R. Schaefer, "Evasion of High-
              End IDPS Devices at the IPv6 Era",  BlackHat Europe 2014,
              2014, <https://www.ernw.de/download/eu-14-Atlasis-Rey-

              Bonica, R., "IPV6 FRAGMENTATION: The Case For
              Deprecation",  NANOG 58. New Orleans, Louisiana, USA. June
              3-5, 2013, <https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/

              Cisco, "IPv6 Extension Headers Review and Considerations",
              October 2006,

              Cisco, "Cisco IOS Software IPv6 Virtual Fragmentation
              Reassembly Denial of Service Vulnerability", September
              2013, <http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/

              Cisco, "Cisco IOS XR Software Crafted IPv6 Packet Denial
              of Service Vulnerability", June 2015,

              Cunha, I., "IPv4 vs IPv6 load balancing in Internet
              routes",  NPS/CAIDA 2020 Virtual IPv6 Workshop, 2020,

              FreeBSD, "FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-20:24.ipv6:
              IPv6 Hop-by-Hop options use-after-free bug", September
              2020, <https://www.freebsd.org/security/advisories/

              Huston, G., "Dealing with IPv6 fragmentation in the
              DNS",  APNIC Blog, 2017,

              Huston, G., "Measurement of IPv6 Extension Header
              Support",  NPS/CAIDA 2020 Virtual IPv6 Workshop, 2020,

              Gont, F. and W. LIU, "Recommendations on the Filtering of
              IPv6 Packets Containing IPv6 Extension Headers", draft-
              ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-06 (work in progress), July

              Kampanakis, P., "Implementation Guidelines for parsing
              IPv6 Extension Headers", draft-kampanakis-6man-ipv6-eh-
              parsing-01 (work in progress), August 2014.

              Jaeggli, J., Colitti, L., Kumari, W., Vyncke, E., Kaeo,
              M., and T. Taylor, "Why Operators Filter Fragments and
              What It Implies", draft-taylor-v6ops-fragdrop-02 (work in
              progress), December 2013.

              Kumari, W., Jaeggli, J., Bonica, R., and J. Linkova,
              "Operational Issues Associated With Long IPv6 Header
              Chains", draft-wkumari-long-headers-03 (work in progress),
              June 2015.

              Petersen, B. and J. Scudder, "Modern Router Architecture
              for Protocol Designers",  IEPG 94. Yokohama, Japan.
              November 1, 2015, <http://www.iepg.org/2015-11-01-ietf94/

              Jaeggli, G., "Dealing with IPv6 fragmentation in the
              DNS",  APNIC Blog, 2018,

              Linkova, J. and F. Gont, "IPv6 Extension Headers in the
              Real World v2.0",  IEPG 90. Toronto, ON, Canada. July 20,
              2014, <http://www.iepg.org/2014-07-20-ietf90/iepg-

   [nmap]     Fyodor, "Dealing with IPv6 fragmentation in the
              DNS",  Firewall/IDS Evasion and Spoofing,

              De Boer, M. and J. Bosma, "Discovering Path MTU black
              holes on the Internet using RIPE Atlas", July 2012,

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
              December 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.

   [RFC5575]  Marques, P., Sheth, N., Raszuk, R., Greene, B., Mauch, J.,
              and D. McPherson, "Dissemination of Flow Specification
              Rules", RFC 5575, DOI 10.17487/RFC5575, August 2009,

   [RFC5635]  Kumari, W. and D. McPherson, "Remote Triggered Black Hole
              Filtering with Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF)",
              RFC 5635, DOI 10.17487/RFC5635, August 2009,

   [RFC6192]  Dugal, D., Pignataro, C., and R. Dunn, "Protecting the
              Router Control Plane", RFC 6192, DOI 10.17487/RFC6192,
              March 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6192>.

   [RFC6437]  Amante, S., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and J. Rajahalme,
              "IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 6437,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6437, November 2011,

   [RFC6438]  Carpenter, B. and S. Amante, "Using the IPv6 Flow Label
              for Equal Cost Multipath Routing and Link Aggregation in
              Tunnels", RFC 6438, DOI 10.17487/RFC6438, November 2011,

   [RFC7045]  Carpenter, B. and S. Jiang, "Transmission and Processing
              of IPv6 Extension Headers", RFC 7045,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7045, December 2013,

   [RFC7113]  Gont, F., "Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router
              Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)", RFC 7113,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7113, February 2014,

   [RFC7739]  Gont, F., "Security Implications of Predictable Fragment
              Identification Values", RFC 7739, DOI 10.17487/RFC7739,
              February 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7739>.

   [RFC7872]  Gont, F., Linkova, J., Chown, T., and W. Liu,
              "Observations on the Dropping of Packets with IPv6
              Extension Headers in the Real World", RFC 7872,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7872, June 2016,

   [RFC8900]  Bonica, R., Baker, F., Huston, G., Hinden, R., Troan, O.,
              and F. Gont, "IP Fragmentation Considered Fragile",
              BCP 230, RFC 8900, DOI 10.17487/RFC8900, September 2020,

              Zack, E., "Firewall Security Assessment and Benchmarking
              IPv6 Firewall Load Tests",  IPv6 Hackers Meeting #1,
              Berlin, Germany. June 30, 2013,

Authors' Addresses

   Fernando Gont
   SI6 Networks
   Segurola y Habana 4310, 7mo Piso
   Villa Devoto, Ciudad Autonoma de Buenos Aires

   Email: fgont@si6networks.com
   URI:   https://www.si6networks.com

   Nick Hilliard
   4027 Kingswood Road
   Dublin  24

   Email: nick@inex.ie

   Gert Doering
   SpaceNet AG
   Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14
   Muenchen  D-80807

   Email: gert@space.net

   Warren Kumari
   1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
   Mountain View, CA  94043

   Email: warren@kumari.net

   Geoff Huston

   Email: gih@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net
   Will (Shucheng) Liu
   Huawei Technologies
   Bantian, Longgang District
   Shenzhen  518129
   P.R. China

   Email: liushucheng@huawei.com